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PREFACE
This thesis deals with the legal nature of government 
contracts in Australia. It deals with the law relating to 
and governing federal contracts. The scope of this body of 
law is broad and somewhat complex. It includes several aspects 
of constitutional law relating to the structure and operation 
of the government as well as a substantial amount of law that 
might normally be categorised as sales or contract law.
Contracting for supplies and services is only one of the 
several means by which the government can satisfy its needs.
The government can perform the work itself, the supplies can 
be requisitioned or the right of eminent domain can be invoked. 
These alternate techniques have all been used at one time or 
another, especially during periods of crisis or emergency.
Under normal circumstances, however, the government has chosen 
to fulfil the vast majority of its needs by contracting for 
them - the method most consistent with a private enterprise 
economy.
One means of analysing this government contracting process 
is to consider the relative position and bargaining power of 
the government and its contractors. Does the government 
represent such a large segment of the total demand for a 
product that it dominates the market by controlling the demand?
(iii)
(iv)
Conversely, are some suppliers in the position of controlling 
the entire output of a product? The Australian Government 
deals contractually with almost every part of the private 
economy, from major companies to small businesses and such 
non-profit institutions as universities and research 
organisations. Hence the parties that supply goods and 
services to the government are, in one sense, as diverse as 
the entire economy. On the other hand, there is a large group 
of contractors, e.g. in the aerospace field, which are almost 
totally devoted to government work.
The Australian Government is also as diverse as
the industries with which it deals. All Commonwealth 
Government Departments (27 in number at present) and most 
Commonwealth statutory authorities conduct significant 
procurement programmes. Generally these departments and 
authorities have been assigned the responsibility for 
fulfilling all or a major portion of the government's need in 
a given area. As a result, they have adopted procurement 
techniques, procedures and standard forms especially designed 
for their particular objectives. Some uniformity of policy 
has been effected through the designation of the Office of 
Purchasing Division in the Department of Administrative 
Services which acts as the central purchasing organisation in 
some areas of government purchasing.
(v)
Since the field of government contracts is one of growing 
importance in the relationship of governments to individuals, 
an attempt is made here to analyse the legal nature of such 
contracts. All but chapters I and VIII in this thesis have 
formed the basis of six seminars I gave in my Department 
during 1976 and 1977. Part of chapter IV formed the basis of 
a paper which I delivered at a Seminar sponsored jointly by 
Department of Law and Institute of Purchasing and Supply 
Management (IPSM). This paper has been published in the iPSM's 
official journal "Australian Purchasing and Supply" (January 1978
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Contracts have been indispensable tools for carrying on 
business amongst private parties; now they have become almost 
equally important in conducting the affairs of government. 
Construction of public works, procurement of defence materials, 
and vital research and development are performed to a 
substantial extent under the terms of contracts entered into 
between government and private persons or organisations. The 
requirements of government are extensive and wide ranging; the 
principal method by which they are met is through procurement.^ 
The government has to purchase stores right from 'brooms to 
aeroplanes'; from day to day minor office requirements such as 
pens, paper clips, paper, paper products, wood products,
The term 'procurement' has a wide connotation embracing the 
whole process of QcgtdsiriOH of goods and services from the 
development and definition of a requirement through to 
warehousing and issue for use. Often it seems to be used as 
a simple equivalent for all government contracting and that is 
the way it has been used here. For an elaborate definition of 
'procurement', see s.3, Purchasing Commission Bill 1975.
(The Bill was rejected by the Senate and thus never became an 
Act). See also, Turpin, Government Contracts (1972) 267
[hereinafter referred to as Turpin]; Government Procurement 
Policy Report by Committee of Inquiry, P„P.No.124 of 1975, xiii 
[Also known as Scott Committee Report] ; Whelan and Pasley, 
Federal Government Contracts, Cases and Materials (New York 
1975) 6; Enderby, "Purchasing as a Function of Government" 
(June 1974) Australian Purchasing and Supply 11.
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2furniture, toiletries and other materials, to great quantities 
of goods of every description ranging from battleships to motor 
vehicles, computers, aircraft, space satellites, sophisticated 
electronic equipment for communications on air, land and sea 
and weapons systems. Government also requires many types of 
services such as construction or repair of buildings, highways, 
bridges and airfields, the execution of programmes of research 
and development, the designing of equipment, the writing of 
computer programmes, and consultancy and project management 
services.
Government is huge and hugely rich and its contracts are 
enormous. The greatest consumer and most powerful customer 
in Australia is the Commonwealth itself. It buys in such volume 
that goods have to be stored and drawn upon when needed. The 
Commonwealth Government has to supply the standard specified 
needs of materials and services which are regularly issued to, 
and used by, government departments, schools, hospitals, police, 
defence forces, harbour facilities, water and sewerage, gas and 
electricity, and many other public community needs. Contract 
is not, however, the only method by which government may obtain 
its requirements. Some of the goods and services are also 
provided by the government's own factories, dockyards, workshops 
and research establishments. But most of the government's 
requirements are met by contracts whereby rights and duties 
are created not by the exercise of powers that are peculiarly
3governmental, but by voluntary act of the parties.
2. Reasons for Studying Government Contracts
Because practically all functions of government depend,
in some measure, on contracts for their continued operation,
the sheer size of the government's organisational structure
means that a tremendous power for good or ill is wielded by
the purchasing system. Whilst funds are budgeted for functions
such as defence, telecommunications, road construction, public
works, health, etc., the translation of these budgets into
specific governmental actions and accomplishments is to a
significant extent through procurement. The effectiveness of
government expenditure in meeting its objectives depends,
therefore, in no small way, on the efficiency of the procurement
function. Procurement is an integral part of the business of
government. It has a very wide impact on the Australian
government's important departments of Treasury (since
taxpayer's money is spent), Administrative Services and Defence
(for, the security of the country is largely dependent upon
2the best procurement of ammunition), Postal and 
Telecommunications (which enters contracts for the purchase
^Turpin, op. cit. at 88, 260; Campbell, "Federal Contract
Law" (1970) 44 A.L.J. 580.
^Cf. Millar, Australia's Defence (2nd ed. 1969) 145: "Some
20 percent of all defence equipment made in Australia is 
produced by the Commonwealth Department of Supply, and 80 
percent under contract to it."
4of communications materials), Construction (with responsibility 
for the planning, execution and maintenance of Commonwealth 
Government works), Transport, as well as many other government 
departments. Thus not only does the cost of purchased equipment, 
stores, etc., make a heavy impact on the budget, but many 
important government policies and objectives could not be 
carried out unless procurement did its job.
Government contracts play a catalytic and pacing role in 
bringing government-developed standards and products into 
practical commercial use. These range from automobile safety 
standards and fire-resistant materials to solid-state computer 
components. Entire segments of industry have been spawned by 
technological break-throughs and spin-offs from government pro­
curements for electronics, metallurgy, fuels, and lubricants. It 
was recently remarked that Australian manufacturing to a large 
extent depended for its existence on government contracts.^ The 
magnitude of government orders allows industry to plan for larger 
volumes, more sophisticated methods, better equipment and cost 
reduction. It provides leverage which is used as an instrument 
for achieving national, social and economic objectives that do 
not pertain directly to deliverable goods and services. For 
example, procurement is used to assure equal employment 
opportunities, improve wages and conditions of employment, and
^C.P.D. (Senate) 20 August 1975, Vol. 65 at 83.
5channel employment and business opportunities into labour 
surplus areas. Even ecological considerations add new 
dimensions to the purchasing job where the function is used as 
an instrument of corporate efforts in anti-pollution drives. It 
would not be unlikely that what a supplier does to the 
environment can be a factor of his acceptability to receive an 
order. Volume production puts industry in a better position to 
enter into the export market. It also encourages industry's 
research and development and the desire to keep up with 
overseas competitors. Government contracts can play a part in 
other ways too, as for example, by the promotion of local 
industry where necessary. Government can discriminate in 
favour of private industry as against government establishments, 
or, again, in favour of local industry as against overseas, or 
in favour of concerns which are domestically owned as against 
those owned by foreign interests.
Government purchasing can also be the source of facts to 
predict the future. Through its suppliers, government can 
collect basic information on new technologies, new methods and 
new ideas. In brief, the magnitude of the outlays involved, 
the important programme needs dependent on procurement, and the 
impact of procurement policies on the private sector underscore 
the importance of making certain that procurement operations 
are carried out as effectively and economically as possible.
It is significant that the first recommenddt noted by the 
Scott Committee recommends that "the Australian Government
6takes an early opportunity to announce its intention to 
upgrade its procurement operations to a degree commensurate 
with the importance of such policies, the total amount of money 
involved therein and the wide spread sections of the community 
thereby affected".^
3 . Economic Significance
From the standpoint of its size in terms of Australian 
government expenditures, the study of government contracts 
might be reckoned a worthwhile thing. Accurate figures on 
exact dollar amounts spent on government contracts are,
2however, hard to come by, but the total figure is vast indeed. 
The Purchasing Division in the Department of Administrative 
Services has recently estimated government expenditure on 
procurement by Commonwealth purchasing agencies during 1975- 
1976 at $3,000 million, with a total number of contracts
3arranged during that year as exceeding 35,000. Pointing to 
the importance of procurement in Australia, the Scott Committee 
said that in money terms procurement by government bodies
Scott Committee Report, op. cit. para. 9.1.
2The Scott Committee was disappointed that Australia's 
procurement statistics were either not available or, where 
available, were not in a suitable form to allow the types of 
examination which the Committee would have liked to make.
3Government Purchasing Arrangements (Draft Policy Booklet), 
Purchasing Division, Department of Administrative Services, 
Canberra, May 1977.
7played a most important part, in the expenditure of governments. 
The statistics given in Tables 1 and 2 below have been 
collected from various sources to point to the economic 
significance of the Australian government's procurement function.
^Scott Committee Report paras. 6.9 to 6-21.
2The impact of government contracts can also be seen from the 
following figures: In its report for the year 1974-1975, the
Department of Manufacturing Industry published the following 
figures as value of purchasing during 1970-1975 (this department 
took over the procurement function from the Department of Supply 
in 1974. Its Contracts Branch was later transferred to the 
Office of Purchasing Commission on 1 July 1975, which is now 
called Purchasing Division, Department of Administrative 
Services):











Sources: Report, Manufacturing Industry 1975
A.G.P.S.; Defence Report 1975 A.G.P.S.
In the pre-war period (1913-1914) the annual value of 
departmental requirements for the Commonwealth was approximately 
<£2.5 million, see for details, Report from the Joint Committee 
for Public Accounts upon stores and supplies for Commonwealth 
Requirements, P.P. No. 319 of 1914-15-16; Commonwealth's 
financial commitments for procurement of stores and materials 
during 1957-1958 was approximately £100 million, see for the 
break-up, Scott Committee Report, para. 2.24, and see, Forty- 
Eighth Report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee of Public 
Accounts, P.P. No. 58 of 1960 for 1960 estimates. For detailed 
statistics regarding defence procurement spending from 1950- 
1951 to 1968-69, see Bellany and Richardson, Australian
Defence Procurement (1970) . (This is the first study ever 
undertaken of the policies of Australian governments towards 
the acquistion of weapons for the defence forces). For 1970- 
1971 figures on defence procurement, see Snedden, "Dollar 
Purchasing Power" (March 1972) 19 (11) Australian Purchasing 14.
8TABLE 1
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON PROCUREMENT ($ million)
Gross national expenditure^3^
1972-731 1973-74 1974-75
(1) 40,194 50,400 58,618
(2) Total public sector expenditure^3^ 8,907 10,718 14,383
(3) Total public sector expenditure 
as a percentage of (1) above 22.6/. 21.37 24.5/.
(4) Australian Government (including 
statutory authorities) public 
sector expenditure out of (2) 
above(a) 3,187 3,865 4,933
(5) State and Local authorities public 
sector expenditure out of (2) 
above(a) 5, 720 6,853 9,450
(6) Australian Government public 
sector expenditure as a 
percentage of (2) above(a) 35.87 36.17 34.37
(7) Total Government (Commonwealth
and States) procurement^) 5,841 6,868 9,372
(8) Total Purchases of Materials,
goods and services by Australian 
Government Authorities (includ­
ing Budget and Non-Budget sector 
outlays)(c) 2,028 2,299 3,072
(9) Total expenditure on procurement
by States and local governments 3,813 4, 569 6,300
The figures for 1972-73 represent a revision of Scott Committee 
Report Tables and the revised estimates have been taken from 
Australian National Accounts.
Sources: (a) Compiled with the assistance of the publications of
Purchasing Division, Department of Administrative 
Services, 17 November 1975 (Minute Paper); National 
Income and Expenditure Statement and Australian 
National Accounts.
(b) Compiled with the assistance of the publications of 
Purchasing Division, Department of Administrative 
Services, 20 November 1975 and October 1976; 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and Quarterly 
Estimates of National Income and Expenditure.
(c) Australian Government Statistician, October 1976.
(d) Purchasing Division, Department of Administrative 
Services, 20 November 1975 (Minute Paper).
9TABLE 2
ESTIMATED PURCHASES BY AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES 
OF MATERIALS, GOODS AND SERVICES, 1971-72 to 1975-76
1
Category of Purchase 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76
$m $m $m $m $m
Final Consumption
Expenditure 977 1032 1087 1438 1500
Expenditure on Fixed
Assets 589 530 659 928 1000
Gross Working Expenses of
Public Trading Enterprises 471 466 553 706 500
Total Purchases of Materials, 2Goods and Services 2037 2028 2299 3072 3000
Represented by:
Purchases from Local
Sources 1879 1872 2072 2992 3544
Purchases from Imported 
Sources
Ratio of Internal to
158 158 228 128 156
External Sources of Supplvl3:1 12:1 9:1 23:1 23:1
Imports:
Imports of sophisticated 
equipment and military
stores 106 113 198 76 98
Imports of Works of Art - - 3 6 8
Imports of other Items 52 45 27 46 50
Ratio of Internal to External
Sources of 'Other Items'
Purchases 32:1 42:1 77:1 65:1 71:1
^Includes Budget and Non-Budget Sector outlays.
2Revised estimates - Purchasing Division (Canberra, May 1977)
Sophisticated equipment and military stores includes ADP, telephon 
telegraphic equipment, electrical circuit machinery, tanks, air­
craft, aircraft parts, bombs, missiles, weapons and other stores. 
Source: Compiled by Purchasing Division, Department of Adminis­
trative Services and the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
October 1976.
lü
The United States Government, which is the biggest purchaser
of goods and services in the whole world,spent during fiscal year
1972 $57.48 billions on procurement by executive agencies.^
This amount represented about one-fourth of the United States
Government budget, particularly when combined with the estimated
2$39.1 billion expended through Federal grants.
Procurement expenditures are thought to generate some three 
times their amount through the "multiplier" effect (secondary 
and related consumer spending). Thousands of government 
activities are involved in acquiring products and services or 
supporting programmes that affect a large population. The impact 
of government procurement on the nation's economic and social well­
being is more far-reaching than even these figures suggest. The
See Report of the Commission on Government Procurement (1972) 
Vol.l, 154-55 [hereinafter referred to as Report of the C.G.P.1. 
In the United Kingdom, the total expenditure of the Procurement 
Executive (Ministry of Defence), which is only one of the 
departments of the central government involved in procurement 
activity, was in excess of £1000 millions in 1971: Turpin and
Whelan (eds.), The London Transcript - A Comparative Look at 
Public Contracting in the United States and the United Kingdom 
(1973) Part I at 30. In Canada, on the other hand, contracts 
were let for a contract value of approximately Can.$1000 millions 
during 1972: Scott Committee Report para. 7.6.
2Report of the C.G.P., ibid. "Every 40 seconds of every working 
day the Department of Defense enters into a contract action 
valued at $10,000 or more" (a statement made by an Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, Installations and Logistics (U.S.)):
London Transcript, op. cit., Part II at 3.
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award of a major contract can stimulate the growth of certain 
regions and industries; and the failure of a large government 
contractor may plunge sizeable areas into economic hardship.
4. A Fourfold Classification of Government Contracts
Government contracts are affected by a wide range of public
needs having to serve some complex economic activities. As a
result government contracts reveal various specific conceptual
differences from private contracts.'*' Most areas of dissimilarity
between government contracts and private commercial contracts
involve mandatory clauses which are inserted into the government
contract and which a contractor must accept if he chooses to do
business with the government. There is therefore an absence
2of real negotiations in government contracts. However, one
obvious dissimilarity derives from the nature of one of the
contracting parties. This is the immunity of the sovereign
to suit by the contractor. The doctrine of sovereign immunity
has the effect of limiting the contractor's legal remedy for
breach of contract by the government to such situations and
3to such forums as the government chooses. The parties to a
"*"The 'private' contract itself has undergone many changes. See
Tjeff, "Contract as Thing"
(1970) 19 Amen Univ. L, Rev. 131, 137-144, and articles
cited therein.
2This aspect of government procurement is discussed in chapteis III 
and IV.
3Chapter II deals with constitutional aspects of government 
contracts.
12
private contract need not contend with such a defence. Other 
crucial examples of differences between government and private 
contracts are the government's unilateral right to terminate, to 
constrict, to alter, vary or change the quality, quantity or 
character of goods and services contracted for in the contract; 
the administrative resolution of disputes; and the existence of 
an element of public accountability in government purchasing 
since public money is spent. As already stated, 
today's government contract is more than a procurement device; 
it is also an instrument through which the government executes 
socio-economic policies such as minimum wages, fair employment 
practices and small business aid. As a result, a contractor 
who elects to deal with the government must be prepared to 
undertake larger responsibilities, turning even "square corners"."1'
Because government contracts reveal a number of conceptual
2differences (as we shall see in detail later), the following 
chapters will try to identify and develop a fourfold categorisation
In Rock Island A. & L.R. Co. v. United States (1920) 254 U.S.
141, 143, Justice Holmes warned that persons must "turn square 
corners when dealing with the Government".
2See chapters III, IV and VI. A good deal of information on the 
differences between government and private contracts can also be 
found in the following: Turpin, op. cit. at 142; Hogg, Liability
of the Crown (1971) 138-139; Mewett, "The Theory of Government 
Contracts" (1959) 5 McGill L.J. 222; Vom Baur,
"Differences Between Commercial Contracts and Government Contracts" 
(1968-1969) 2 Public Contract L.J. 12; Note, "Adaptation of 
Private Contract Principles to Government Contracts" (1952-1953)
27 Indiana L.J. 279, 281 and articles cited therein; Grossbaum, 
"Federal Support of Research Projects Through Contracts and Grants: 
A Rationale" (1970) 19 Amer. Univ. L. Rev. 423, 440-441 and Lynch 
and Reading, "Formal and Doctrinal Differences Between Government 
and Commercial Contracts" (1964) 1 San Diego L. Rev. 88.
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At one end of the spectrum we shall identify government contracts 
as in every respect similar to private commercial contracts. At 
the other end of the spectrum we shall see government contracts 
becoming increasingly unlike private contracts and increasingly 
similar to what might be called public 'arrangements' i.e. 
arrangements not so much for the procurement of supplies as for 
the fulfilment of certain national, social, economic and political 
objectives of government. Between these extremities, we shall 
find other variants of government contracts: on the one hand,
'contracts of adhesion' which still resemble some private 
contracts; on the other hand, research and development contracts 
which are far different from private contracts but which still 
have some elements to be identified as 'contracts'.
5. Scheme of the Thesis
In organising the material, an endeavour has been made to 
provide a balanced coverage of most aspects of government 
contracts. The thesis has been divided into eight chapters.
Each chapter has been further divided into sections containing 
relevant materials selected to give a rounded view of the 
present state of the legal topic covered by the chapter. It 
will be noted that chapter II of the thesis is the most extensive 
- reflecting the substantial number of legal problems that arise 
during formation of government contracts. This chapter is, 
therefore, designed to deal with the general considerations
14
involved in government contract formation with its various 
rules and procedures. The simple government contracts and 
the adhesion contracts are discussed in chapter III. In 
addition, chapter IV deals with the various standard terms 
which apply to government contracts. The 1Contrat 
Administratif' or the French administrative contract is 
discussed in a separate chapter, chapter V. The discussion 
of research and development contracts is left for chapter VI, 
while chapter VII forms the subject matter of planning 
agreements. The final chapter , chapter VIII, contains the 
conclusions emerging from the above-mentioned chapters and 
attempts to suggest possible solutions to the various problems 
that have arisen in practice. Although the main emphasis in 
the discussion is on the Australian government contract, the 
developments in the United Kingdom, United States and India 
have also been noted, wherever appropriate.
CHAPTER II
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. Historical Development of Australian
Government Contracts Process
(i) General
A few general observations may be made before tracing the 
historical development of some of the important principles and 
procedures which govern government contracts today. One, the 
Australian government contract process has developed in a 
piecemeal fashion. Two, no single department or body has been 
fully in charge of the procurement activity that involves so 
much money and so many people, and has such important economic 
implications. The result is that different departments had (and 
still have) markedly different procedures and forms, and this 
has hindered uniform development of various contracting 
principles.^" As will be seen, some principles of Australian 
Government procurement have undergone a spasmodic and haphazard 
development; as yet no complete comprehensive manual of rules 
and conditions has been issued as a guide to all departments. 
Thus departments have been guided by Treasury Regulations and
"^ "The Commonwealth at present may be said to have no recognised 
system of purchase, supply, and distribution of stores
applicable to Departments as a whole": Report from the_Joint
Committee of Public Accounts upon Stores and Supplies for 
Commonwealth Requirements P.P. No. 319, 501 (1914-1915-1916).
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Directions on the one hand and a plethora of various Government 
decisions, taken at various times, on the other.
A study of the history of Australian Government purchasing 
also reveals that, in the past, authority and responsibility, if 
not separated, have been at least confused and indistinct. 
Furthermore there have been few real systematic reviews of 
Government procurement.^ The Scott Committee strongly felt that
The following is the list of inquiries made so far in relation 
to Australian Government Contracts. With the exception of the 
Scott Committee, none of these inquiry committees was devoted 
exclusively to an in-depth review of the effectiveness of the 
whole Australian procurement function, but passed judgment on 
some isolated factors. These Committees, in chronological 
order, have been;
1. Report from the Joint Committee of Public Accounts 
upon Stores and Supplies for Commonwealth Requirements, 
P.P. No. 319 of 1914-1915-1916.
2. Report of the Royal Commission Regarding the Contract 
for Erection of Additions to the General Post Office, 
Sydney, P.P. No. 223 of 1937-1938-1939.
3. Report of the Royal Commission Regarding the Contract 
or Contracts with Abbco Bread Co. Pty Ltd. for the 
Supply of Bread to the Department of the Army, and 
other matters, P.P. No. 38 of 1940-1941.
4. Australian Inter-Departmental Committee on Preference 
to Australian-Made Goods in Relation to Tenders for 
Commonwealth Government Supplies - Purchase of General 
Supplies. Melbourne Report 1 and 2 (20 November 1953).
5. Forty-Second Report of the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee of Public Accounts, P.P. No. 60 of 1959.
6. Forty-Eighth Report of the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee of the Public Accounts, P.P. No. 58 of 1960 
(2nd Report).
7. Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on 
Government Purchasing Policy (1960/1961, unpublished).
8. Parliamentary Joint Committee of Public Accounts on 
Treasury Regulation 53, P.P. No. 251 of 1964-1965.
9. Report of the Defence Legal Services Committee of
Review. Whitmore Committee), November 1971.
10. Government Procurement Policy Report by Committee of
Inquiry (Scott Committee Report), P.P. No. 124 of 1975.
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procurement had not previous Ly had what would appear to be its 
rightful recognition within the government structure.’^
(ii) Public Tendering
A central feature of the Commonwealth purchasing procedure
since the beginning of Federation has been the tendering system
designed to give all interested suppliers an opportunity to
submit offers, and to enable the purchasing authority to weigh
the merits of various products offered, in the light of their
relative prices- It was, however, soon recognised that for
many small purchases or urgent purchases, the open tender system
was neither necessary nor appropriate. In 1902, under the first
Treasury Regulations (now called Finance Regulations) (deriving
their force from the provisions of the Audit Act 1901),
exemption from the public tender procedure was given in respect
of goods costing under £100 - which marks the beginning of the
system of various levels of 'thresholds' for calling of tenders,
2written quotations, etc. Exemptions (which later on came to be
3called 'Certificates of Inexpediency') from tender procedures 
were granted in those cases where the calling of public tenders 
was impracticable or inexpedient. The Joint Committee of Public
^Scott Committee Report para. 9.3.
2Finance Regulation 52. By 1923 the exemption from tenders was 
lifted from £100 to £200. See Scott Committee Report para. 2.12. 
3 .Finance Regulation 52AA.
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Accounts# which was the first body ever appointed to look into 
the various contracting systems prevalent at that time in the 
Commonwealth Departments, recommended in its Report'*’ in 1916 
that the tenders be invited throughout the Commonwealth for the 
procurement of supplies by the Commonwealth Central Supply Board, 
the creation of which was also recommended by the Committee. 
Again, in 1953 the Inter-Departmental Committee observed that 
the tender system had proved over many years to be the fairest 
and generally the most economical method of obtaining 
Commonwealth supplies and enjoyed the full confidence of the 
business community. The Committee recommended against any
2variation of that system of procurement in any material respect. 
The whole question of public tenders was again reviewed by the
3two Committees of Public Accounts in 1959 and 1960. The 
Committee recommended that the basic tenets upon which Govern­
ment procurement procedures should be formulated should be that, 
as a general proposition, all who wish to participate in govern­
ment business be given an opportunity to do so within reasonable 
4limits. The Committee accepted the conclusion of the Working
5Party that a trades list procedure on the lines of the system
1P.P. No. 319 of 1914-1915-1916.
2Report No. 1 of Inter-Departmental Committee paras. 8 and 9.
3Forty-Second and Forty-Eighth Reports: P.P. No. 60 of 1959 and
P.P. No. 58 of 1960, respectively.
4P.P. No. 60 of 1959 para. 24.
5The Working Party was constituted pursuant to Recommendation 
31, Chapter VII P.P. No. 60 of 1959. Its Report is to be found 
in Appendix No. 2, P.P. No. 58 of 1960.
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adopted by tlie United Kingdom government was not generally 
suitable for application in Australia but that a modified form 
of trades list procedure, combined with invitation to tender by 
advertisement above a specified monetary limit provided a suit­
able procurement system for the Commonwealth Government.^ The 
Committee also recommended that the monetary limit in Treasury
Regulation 52 be increased from £200 to £500, provided certain
2conditions were fulfilled.
Public tendering, though still remaining the predominant 
method of procurement, was gradually found not to be the most 
appropriate in all situations. It was found uneconomical to 
prepare technical specifications or print large numbers of 
invitations to tender, when only one or two of a particular item 
were required. To cater for some of the difficulties and 
different circumstances which made the tender system at times, 
if not unworkable, at least rather unsuitable, methods were 
devised under which the tender system need not be used. One 
method was to enhance the amount of the "threshold" and another, 
more frequent, to grant "certificates of inexpediency". Public 
interest was also found to be not served when departments were 
faced with the problem of price fixing and collusive tendering. 
It was found that some potential tenderers were deterred from 
making a lower offer than that offered by organisations 
tendering collusively for fear of being "disciplined" by their
^P.P. No. 58 of 1960, 15. See also The Report of the Working 
Party, paras. 19 et seq.
2 Ibid.
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rivals. To meet this situation, various methods were recommended 
and enforced from time to time.^
While subscribing to a competitive procurement system with
public tendering as a basic feature, the Australian Governments
have adhered for a long time to a general principle that the
lowest suitable tender should be accepted and that some clear
justification is needed to depart from this approach. In
accordance with this basic guideline (and in support of it) the
basis of Australian Government procurement policy has been
explicitly stated long since, as being to obtain the 'best value
for money spent', and it has generally been accepted that this
objective can be attained through the open tender system. The
other important elements which have guided government procurement
are, that, as a general proposition, all should be given the
right to participate in government contracts, that procurement
procedures should be beyond reproach and that Government should
2have a reputation for fair dealing.
Another point in the historical development of the 
Australian contracting process is the policy of the government 
to place manufacturers in all States on an equal footing by 
inviting tenders on the basis of free on board, free on rail or 
into store, capital city, State of manufacture. Procurement has
Seventy-Seventh Report of the Joint Committee of Public 
Accounts, P.P. No. 251 of 1964-1965, para. 110; Scott Committee 
Report, paras. 9.170 - 9.177. For an account of the
practice of "collusive tendering", see Turpin, op.cit. 143-49.
2Forty-Second Report, PAC, op.cit. para. 24; Scott Committee
Report para. 2.19. See also Frost, "Plant Contracts - the Case 
for Rationalisation" (Dec. 1974/Jan.1975) Australian 
Purchasing 24.
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thus been used as a means of disguised subsidy for suppliers who 
are more distant from the point of use. According to the Scott 
Committee, such a practice was followed in defence purchasing as 
far back as 1917."*" The Inter-Departmental Committee on Procure­
ment Policies and Procedures 1960-1961, considered the question 
of inclusion of freight in tenders in relation to opportunities 
for suppliers in different States to supply government require­
ments but recommended that no change needed to be made in pro­
cedures. ^
(iii) Post Award Policy
The origin of public disclosure of tenders can be traced 
back to colonial regulations. The requirement to gazette 
information concerning contracts entered into by an Australian 
Colony first occurred in New South Wales in 1823. The Regulations 
regarding the Commonwealth's contracts have been influenced mainly 
by the rules obtaining in the Colony of Victoria at Federation. 
That Colony's "General Regulations Respecting Public Moneys" 
used the expression "an abstract", in 1857, in requiring that all 
contracts entered into on behalf of the Government of Victoria 
be published in the Government "Gazette". Since its inception 
in 1902, Treasury Regulation 53 has retained this principle of 
publishing "an abstract".
~*~Scott Committee Report para. 2.10.
2Id. paras. 2.23 and 2.25. Regarding government's policy for 
'overseas purchasing' see Scott Committee Report paras. 3.53,
3.54; Notes on Australian Industry Participation in Overseas 
Defence Procurement (December 1972) ; Report of the Defence Legal 
Services Committee of Review para.186 (November 1971); Bellamy 
and Richardson, Australian Defence Procurement (1970)26.
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The prime purpose of notification of contracts arranged in
the Government Gazettes has been public disclosure of government
contracts. It has been believed to add to the general confidence
in the fair application of the rules and procedures governing
government procurement and to prevent any tendency towards, or
suggestion of, departmental favouritism to certain tenderers.
Regulation 53 has undergone various amendments since its
inception in 1902.1 In its Forty-Eighth Report to Treasury
Regulation 52, the Public Accounts Committee re-affirmed the
principle of public disclosure and recommended that all contracts
let at the value in excess of £200 should be notified in the
Commonwealth Gazette irrespective of whether an inexpediency
certificate was issued, selected quotations sought, or an Order-
2in-Council obtained or public tenders invited. In its Seventy- 
Seventh Report(1965), the Parliamentary Joint Committee of Public 
Accounts endorsed this view while dealing with Regulation 53 
threadbare. It specifically went into the question of desirability 
or otherwise of disclosing a successful tenderer's unit prices.
In that connection, the Committee took note of the following views 
of the Attorney-General's Department and expressed its agreement
^For a chronological record of these changes between 1902 and 
1961 with amendments to the relevant Treasury Directions see 
Appendices 2 and 3, Seventy-Seventh Report of the Joint Committee 
of Public Accounts, P.P. No. 251 of 1964-65.
2P.P. No. 58 of 1960, 15.
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with the legal position- The Attorney-General's Department 
had stated:^"
There is no general rule of law that tenders submitted 
to any person calling for tenders are to be treated as 
confidential. There may be particular customs applic­
able in particular trades in this regard, but I do not 
know of any specific example. A person who submits a 
tender may do so on condition that it is maintained 
confidentially by the person to whom it is submitted.
In that case I believe the sanction for failure to 
observe the confidence is a business sanction and not 
a legal sanction. If the person to whom the tender is 
given does not maintain the confidence reposed in him 
by the tenderer then that tenderer may not tender again.
The Joint Committee though agreeing that,in a competitive
market, disclosure of the unit prices of a contract considerably
assisted competitive contracting and promoted public confidence
in departmental tendering by removing any suspicion of patronage
on the part of contracting agencies, yet said that there were
substantial administrative reasons for not publishing unit prices
in the Gazette. It pointed out that a large volume of detail
would be required to gazette the unit prices. The Committee
however added that in order to maintain the principle of fullest
possible disclosure of contracts, an unsuccessful tenderer may
obtain further details of the successful tenderer and the reasons
for the non-acceptance of its tender by writing to the purchasing
authority. Thus the Committee recommended that the disclosure of
unit prices might be made to the interested parties, upon request,
2and subsequent to gazettal. The Committee also recommended
P.P. No. 251 of 1964-1965 para.108. See also Scott Committee 
Report paras. 2.35, 2.36.
P.P. No. 251 para.115- See also para.111.2
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the adoption of a uniform method of presentation of "Contracts 
Arranged" in the Gazette,^ since it found that a marked lack of 
uniformity existed among Departments and Authorities in regard 
to the amount of detail of contracts arranged published in the 
Gazette under Regulation 53. The Scott Committee in 1974 went 
a step further by recommending that, subject only to such special 
cases as the Minister responsible for purchasing might authorise, 
the results of all tenders when finally decided should be avail­
able to all tenderers together with the reasons for the awarding
2of the contract.
2. Organisational Developments and_____Present
Australian Purchasing Authorities
(i) General
While rules and regulations establish the goals and the 
framework within which government contracts are made, the most 
important factor in carrying them out is the calibre of the 
work force. The actions of the purchasing departments have a 
major impact on the effectiveness with which about one-third 
of the Commonwealth budget is spent. Every year thousands of 
separate transactions varying from a five-dollar purchase to 
actions committing millions of dollars take place in this process.
I^d. para.115. See also para.103.
2See Recommendation 32, paras.10.92 - 10.95. See for similar 
views, Recommendation 5, The Report of the Commission on Govern­
ment Procurement (1972) Vol.l (U.S.) (cited herein as Report of 
the C.G.P.).
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The importance of the organisational structure in the procure­
ment process is therefore apparent. The following discussion 
is an indication of the structure and functions of various 
Australian Government procurement authorities as they exist 
today. Emphasis has been laid on the organisational developments 
and the present set-up of five of the largest executive agencies 
and departments of the Australian Government which have been 
heavily involved in the acquisition process.
Traditionally, each Australian Government department has 
had responsibility for purchasing its own requirements. The 
exception has been the Defence Department, for which the Depart­
ment of Supply has had basic procurement responsibility. Two 
striking features in historical development of the organisational 
structure of Australian purchasing are noticeable. One, the 
increasing number of procurement agencies, independent of each 
other and with no single central purchasing body to co-ordinate 
the procurement of Government requirements. This fragmentation 
has inevitably led to unnecessary competition between departments, 
duplication of staff and effort, and a great measure of waste and 
inefficiency.^ Two, the frequent structural changes of the 
authority responsible for purchasing. To take only one example, 
until 1969 policy control of the then Commonwealth Stores, Supply 
and Tender Board (C.S.S.T.B.) was provided from within the
^Scott Committee Report paras. 8.2 - 8.6.
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Treasury, while the executive work of the Board was handled by 
staff of the Postmaster-General's Department (with salaries and 
expenses reimbursed annually by Treasury). In 1970 it was 
placed within the then newly-established Australian Government 
Publishing Service (A.G.P.S.) which brought together a number of 
common services previously provided elsewhere (printing, publish­
ing, advertising, etc.)* The A.G.P.S. was transferred in 1971 
to the Department of the Environment, Aborigines and the Arts.
In December 1972 the A.G.P.S. was moved again, this time to the 
newly-created Department of the Media.^ In January 1974 the 
Commonwealth Stores, Supply and Tender Board (C.S.S.T.B.) was
renamed 'The Australian Government Stores and Tender Board'
2(A.G.S.T.B.). The Department of the Media continued to provide
the services of the chairman and the secretary of the A.G.S.T.B.
until 1 August 1975, when the Office of the Australian Purchasing
Commission, within the Department of Services and Property, took
3over the functions of the Board. The name of the Department of 
Services and Property, which was formed in December 1972 and had 
taken over some of the functions of the Department of the Interioi 
and the Department of Works, has since been changed to the
"^Department of the Media - Report of Activities (for the period 
ended 30 June 1973) 18.
2Department of the Media - Report (for 1 July 1973 - 30 June 
1974) 36.
3Department of the Media Annual Report (1974-1975) 36.
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Department of Administrative Services. The name 'Office of 
the Australian Government Purchasing Commission1 23 has recently 
been changed to 'Purchasing Division', Department of Adminis­
trative Services.
(ii) Department of Supply
The Department of Supply has been the earliest and most
important Department of the Australian Government to be involved in
3procurement of supplies, particularly for defence purposes.
It has had a chequered history and its structure, functions
and even name have frequently been changed. It has played a
leading role in the creation of procurement work-force for
Australia since Federation. The Defence Legal Services Committee
of Review paid a rich tribute to the Department when it said:
Turning first to the question of Australian procurement 
- the situation here appears to the Committee to be 
fairly satisfactory because the Department of Supply is
Australian Government Gazette No.S200, 7 October 1975. See 
also Gazette No.S104, 6 June 1975; S128, 1 July 1975; S262,
22 December 1975 and S175, 5 October 1976.
2See generally Department of Supply Handbook (An Account of the 
Purposes, Structure and Functions of the Department) 30 Septembe 
1955; Department of Supply: Activities and Developments (Yearly 
Reports from 1959 to 1974).
3The value of purchases by the Department of Supply for 1970-1975 
(for the Department of Defence, Departmental establishments and 
other Government Departments but excluding contracts placed on 
the Government factories) has been as follows:
1970- 71 ... $180 million
1971- 72 ... $203 million
1972- 73 ... $188 million
1973- 74 ... $183 million
1974- 75 ... $182 million.
(Source: Report. Manufacturing Industry 1975: Activities and 
Developments 1974-75, Department of Manufacturing Industry, 
(A.G.P.S. Canberra 1975, 29)).
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solely responsible for procurement .... Officers of 
the Department are skilled in contract matters, and 
indeed they have acquired a djal of expertise in the 
legal aspects of procurement.
The Department of Supply and Development was established
2in June 1939, by the Supply and Development Act 1939." The 
origin of the Department goes back to the early stages of the 
1914-18 war when a contract and supply organisation was created 
within the Department of Defence to handle the unprecedented 
demand for supplies required for Australian forces being sent
3overseas. The Defence Contract and Supply Board was the main-
The Report of the Defence Legal Services Committee of Review 
(November 1971) 72 et seq.
2The Supply and Development Act, 1939-1973 gave to the Department 
of Supply responsibility for (inter alia): (1) the provision of
supply of war material (section 5(1)(a)); (2) the acquisition,
maintenance and disposal of stocks of goods in connection with 
defence (section 5(1)(d)); (3) the investigation and development
of Australian sources of supply of goods ... (section 5(1)(e) 
(ii)); (4) research, design and development in relation to war
material (section 5(1) (f) ) - The Supply and Development 
Regulations, under the Act, set out the organisational basis on 
which the Department was to operate. Regulation 29(1) stated 
that "There shall be a Contract Board...." Regulation 33(1) 
provided that "The Contract Board shall be charged with the duty 
of arranging for the performance of services and the purchase 
of supplies including food stuffs for the Naval, Military and 
Air Forces and for the Department...." See also, Enderby, 
"Purchasing as a Function of Government" (June 1974) Australian 
Purchasing 11-15. It may be noted that the Defence Force 
Re-Organisation Act 1975 (No. 96 of 1975) has repealed provisions 
of the Supply and Development Act 1939-1973 (now cited as the 
Supply and Development Act 1939-1975) relating to purchase of 
supplies and research and development in connection with defence 
(see ss. 97-102 and Schedule 4 of the Defence Force 
Re-Organisation Act 1975).
3For an account of pre-World War I procurement establishment, 
see Scott Committee Report para. 2.1 - 2.3 and Public Accounts 
Committee's Report upon Stores and Supplies for Commonwealth 
Requirements, P.P. No. 319 of 1914-1915-1916, 5-7.
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spring of the new organisation, which functioned successfully 
throughout the war years. In the years following the war, defence 
supplies were obtained on an increasing scale from Australian 
sources and the supply organisation was broadened progressively 
to meet the expanding requirements. Important production and 
supply units brought into being were the Munitions Supply 
Board, the Factory Board (including the Commonwealth Munitions 
and Clothing Factories), the Contract Board and the Principal 
Supply Officers' Committee. In 1939, these production and supply 
units, together with the petroleum supply and distribution 
activities of the Defence Committee were transferred from the 
Defence Department to form the nucleus of the newly created 
Department of Supply and Development.^ Since its establishment 
it has undergone frequent structural and functional changes.
To state the most important: In 1942 the Department's
title was altered to that of Department of Supply and Shipping. 
From 1948 to 1950 it was again the Department of Supply and 
Development. On 17 March 1950, the Department of Supply and 
Development was abolished and a new Department of Supply was 
created. More recently, on June 11, 1974, the Department of 
Supply was merged with the Department of Secondary Industry to
"^For a good historical account, see the Handbook, An account of 
the Purposes, Structure and Functions of the Department (30 
September 1955) Department of Supply, 6-8.
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form the new Department of Manufacturing Industry. But the
function of supply and procurement of goods and services,
including munitions and aircraft for defence was transferred
to the Department of Manufacturing Industry only for a short
2period (12 June 1974 - 30 June 1975). With the establishment
of the Office of the Purchasing Commission on 1 July 1975,
under the Department of Services and Property, the function of
3procurement was vested in the latter Department. By an
Administrative Arrangement Order, dated 1 July 1975, it was
declared that the Department of Services and Property (formed
in December 1972) would, inter alia, deal with these matters,
namely, Australian Government purchasing policy, procurement
and purchase of goods and services, as required for Australian
Government purposes, maintenance of stocks of any such goods,
4disposal of surplus goods, etc. The name of this Department
Australian Government Gazette No.48B, 12 June 1974. The Depart­
ment of Supply does not exist now. Section 98 of the Defence 
Force Re-Organisation Act 1975 has, by an amendment in section 4 
of the Supply and Development Act, omitted from the definition of 
"the Department" the words "Supply"and substituted the words 
"Manufacturing Industry".
2Most of the functions of the former Department of Supply were 
relocated on 1 July 1975. For the activities of the Department 
of Manufacturing Industry with regard to procurement during the 
year, see the Report, Manufacturing Industry 1975: Activities 
and Developments 1974-75, Department of Manufacturing Industry, 
(A.G.P.S. Canberra 1975) 4, 28-29.
3Australian Government Gazette No. S128, 1 July 1975.
4But see Australian Government Gazette No. S220, 30 October 1975 
when by an Administrative Arrangement Order, all these functions 
were re-vested with the Department of Manufacturing Industry. 
However, soon with the change of Government the procurement 
function came back to the Department of Administrative Services 
(see Australian Government Gazette No. S233, 14 November 1975).
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was changed to the Department of Administrative Services on
7 October 1975.’^ By an Administrative Arrangement Order of
22 December 1975 the item relating to 'Australian Government
purchasing policy' was omitted from the list of principal matters
2dealt with by the Department of Administrative Services. The
functions of the Department of Administrative Services have
recently been expanded by an Administrative Arrangement Order,
3dated 5 October 1976.
The stores and services contracted for by the Department
of Supply and its successors cover a very wide spectrum, from
food stuffs to weapons systems. The Department has been involved
in sophisticated contractual arrangements, such as sale of the
Ikara anti-submarine missile overseas, purchase of Macchi
training aircraft, contract for Mirage aircraft, F- 111 and
4Chinook helicopter purchases etc. The Department has also
^Australian Government Gazette No.S200, 7 October 1975.
2Australian Government Gazette No.S262, 22 December 1975. It 
may be noted here that matters dealt with by the Department of 
the Special Minister of State were passed on to the Department 
of Services and Property with regard to 'Australian Purchasing 
Policy', by an Administrative Arrangement Order published in 
the Australian Government Gazette S104, 6 June 1975.
3The Australian Government Gazette No.S175, 5 October 1976, 
provides that the Department of Administrative Services will deal, 
inter alia, with the following matters: Procurement and purchase 
of goods and services, as required, for Commonwealth Government 
purposes; maintenance of stocks of any such goods; disposal of 
surplus goods; acquisition, leasing and disposal of land and 
property, in Australia and overseas, and arranging for the con­
struction of buildings overseas, for Commonwealth Government 
purposes, etc.
4Report of the Defence Legal Services Committee of Review 
(November 1971)73. For a specialised study, see Bellaay and 
Richardson, Australian Defence Procurement (1970). See also, 
Millar, Australia's Defence(2nd ed.1969) 145 et seq.
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acted as the purchasing authority for a largo number of other 
Government Departments which do not have their own contracting 
units, e.g. the Department of Minerals and Energy, Health, 
Science, Department of Foreign Affairs, Customs and Excise etc.
(iii) Australian Government Stores and 
Tender Board (A.G.S.T.B.)
A second major purchasing authority is vested in the 
A.G.S.T.B."'" The historical development of the A.G.S.T.B. 
(previously the Commonwealth Stores Supply and Tender Board - 
C.S.S.T.B.) and the complexity of the administrative changes 
involved, has been stated in the previous pages. Its functions 
and responsibilities, like that of the erstwhile Department of 
Supply, are now being carried on by the Purchasing Division, 
Department of Administrative Services. The Board's main respon­
sibility is to purchase stores, including office machines, in 
general use ('common use' items) throughout Government Depart­
ments . Contracts are arranged by the Board for the requirements 
of a single department or the bulk requirements of a number of 
departments. It carries out this function in either of two ways.
‘'"The value of contracts arranged by the A.G.S.T.B. during 1972- 
1975 is as follows:
1972- 73 ... $23.5 million
1973- 74 ... $60 million
1974- 75 ... $99 million
(Sources: Australian Government Stores and Tender Board, Annual
Report, 1973/74; Department of Media Annual Report 1974-75, 36 
and Department of Media - Report of Activities for the period 
ended 30 June 1973, 18). The value of contracts placed by the
A.G.S.T.B. for the year ending June 1976 is $36.3 million - 
Table 11, Statistical Report No. 6, Office of the Purchasing 
Commission (year ending 30 June 1976)-
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First for the vast majority of items, estimates of forward 
usage are obtained from all departments; these estimates are 
collated and offers are sought for supply of the total estimated 
requirements during a specified period. The tender documents 
indicate the estimated requirements, in each major location so 
that tenderers may offer for only a portion of the reqirements, 
if they like. The A.G.S.T.B. selects the lowest suitable tender 
and arranges a contract for the supply of the requirements of 
Australian Government Departments during the specified period. 
The actual quantities ordered by the individual consignees 
(Departments) may be greater or lesser than the estimated 
quantities indicated in the tender. A contract of this type is 
called a 'period' or 'term' or 'rate' contract. The Board 
issues a circular to ordering officers in all departments, 
advising all details of the contract. Secondly, for a small 
number of 'common use' items such as stationery, office 
requisites, office machines, general house-keeping items such as 
cleaning materials, repair and services etc., the A.G.S.T.B. 
collects the estimates as above, obtains offers and places its 
order for the total quantity. Individual departments then 
obtain their requirements by feg tfisiti OILS on the A.G.S.T.B. The 
Board, in addition, examines proposals which involve the issue 
of a "Certificate of Inexpediency" which will dispense with the 
invitation of public tenders, for the supply of stores for 
government departments, which do not have authority to issue
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"Certificates of Inexpediency".
The overlapping of functions of the Department of Supply, 
charged with the purchase of defence requirements and the 
requirements of its own establishments under statutory authority, 
and of the A.G.S.T.B., with the responsibility for the purchase 
of stores in common use for all departments under the Treasury 
Regulations, no longer exists, since the activities of both are 
now being carried on by the Purchasing Division, Department of 
Administrative Services.
(i-v) Department of Construction
This Department was established by the Administrative
Arrangement Order on 22 December 1975, and the erstwhile Depart-
2ment of Housing and Construction was abolished. The new Depart­
ment of Construction has authority in relation to 'works' acti­
vities involving (1) planning, execution and maintenance of 
Commonwealth Government works and (2) design and maintenance of
furniture, furnishings and fittings for the Commonwealth 
3Government.
The Department of Construction is the largest works organ­
isation in Australia as planning, execution and maintenance
^Certificates of Inexpediency are issued by the A.G.S.T.B. under 
Finance Regulation 52AA(2) as a delegated authority of the Sec­
retary to the Department of Finance. The total value of propo­
sals for which Certificates were granted to June 1976 came to 
$8.6 million: Table 14 Statistical Report No.6 Purchasing Division 
2Australian Government Gazette No. S262, 22 December 1975.
Another department which now shares some of the functions of the 
earlier Department of Housing and Construction is the Depart­
ment of Environment, Housing and Community Development.
3Australian Government Gazette No. S175, 5 October 1976.
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authority for the Commonwealth Government. The Department
arranges construction of buildings on behalf of other Commonwealth
Departments and statutory bodies. Contracts are arranged to
provide best value for money spent, and except in special cir-
2cumstances, following the invitation of public tenders. No 
comparable organisation covers such a wide range of operations 
from small everyday maintenance tasks to the design and con­
struction of multi-million dollar projects. Important national 
works planned and executed by the Department vary in scope and 
diversity from major airports to large office blocks, roads, dams, 
telephone exchanges, laboratories, mountain cable-ways, power 
stations, hospitals and other community amenities, hydro-electric 
schemes, water supplies, satellite and deep space tracking 
stations, wharves and bridges, defence establishments, to mention 
the obvious ones. The Department of Construction conforms with 
any specific policies originating from the Office of the Purchasin' 
Commission within the Department of Administrative Services, 
wherever appropriate.^
1Works expenditure during 1970-1974 is given below:
1970- 1971 ... $308.3 million
1971- 1972 ... $326.8 million
1972- 1973 ... $333.3 million
1973- 1974 ... $376.9 million 
(Source: Scott Committee Report para. 3.40).
2C.P.D. (II. of R. ) Weekly Hansard No. 12, 2 June 1976 (Reply 




(v) The Postal and Telecommunications Department
On 30 June 1975, commitments in respect of contracts let
for the supply of materials by the Postal and Telecommunications
Department amounted to approximately $239 million ($200 million
in 1973-74). Of this amount it is estimated that $226 million
($187.6 million in 1973-74) relates to telecommunication work.1 23
The above mentioned figures provide an overall indication of the
extent of the Department's procurement activity. The Department,
earlier called the Postmaster-General's Department, has the
following functions to perform: Postal, telegraphic, telephonic,
2and other like services.
(vi) Purchasing Division (earlier known as the Office
of the Purchasing Commission) within the Department 
of Administrative Services
In the absence of an official central purchase organisation, 
the Purchasing Division of the Department of Administrative 
Services is functioning as a central procurement agency for 
almost all of the Australian Government Departments for the 
arranging of contracts for the purchase of defence supplies,
3'common use' items and a wide range of other goods and services. 
The Department is also the sole purchaser of real property for
^Annual Report for the year 1974-75. Postmaster-General's 
Department, P.P. No.13 of 1976, 50.
2Australian Government Gazette No. S175, 5 October 1976. For 
details, see Scott Committee Report paras. 3.61 - 3.69.
3C.P.D. (H. of R.) Weekly Hansard No.12, 4 June 1976 (Minister's 
reply to a question upon notice), 3112.
use by the Commonwealth Government Departments. Much has
2already been said about its establishment and functions. The 
Purchasing Division is already performing the function of 
Australia's two most important procuring agencies viz., Depart­
ment of Supply and the Australian Government Stores and Tender 
Board.
There are a number of government departments which largely 
have a policy-making role and a comparatively limited demand for 
special purchases (with the important exception of the Department 
of Science which has reasonably significant requirements of 
'special' items for its civil space research programs, meteor­
ological and Antarctic activities) and the Purchasing Division 
is largely carrying on the procurement for them. There are at 
least 28 government commiSSLOYlS, authorities and agencies such 
as Trans-Australia Airlines, Qantas Airways Ltd., the Australian 
National Line, the Overseas Telecommunications Commission, the 
Atomic Energy Commission, Australian Postal Commission,C-S.I.R.0., 
Commonwealth Bank etc. and these statutory bodies also sometimes 
use the expert services of the Purchasing Division. However, it 
should be stated that most of these instrumentalities have 
established their own Tender Boards under the parent Acts and 





3. Australian Government Contract Law
(i) Liability of the Commonwealth 
in Contract
2The Constitution of Australia contains no specific
provisions for contracting, but it is trite law that the
implied power of the executive to enter into contracts is
3inherent in the concept of sovereignty- The Constitution, 
however, does empower the Parliament of the Commonwealth 
under section 78 to make laws conferring rights to proceed 
against the Commonwealth or a State in respect of matters 
within the limits of the judicial power- So by enacting a 
law, the Parliament may remove any immunity from suit, say 
in contract, which the Commonwealth might, otherwise enjoy.
In fact, the Commonwealth Parliament did exercise this power
For valuable assistance to the study and exposition of the 
Commonwealth capacity to contract and liability in contract, 
the author desires to express his acknowledgments and oblig­
ations to the following: Campbell, "Australian Government
Contracts" Research Paper No.47, Royal Commission on Australian 
Government Administration 1974-1976 (Microfiche Ref. R47X); 
"Commonwealth Contracts" (1970) 44 A.L.J.14; "Federal Contract 
Law" (1970) 44 A.L.J. 580; "Agreements about the Exercise of 
Statutory Powers" (1971) 45 A.L.J. 338; Hogg, "The
Doctrine of Executive Necessity in the Law of Contract" (1970) 
44 A.L.J. 154; "Suits against the Commonwealth and the States 
in the Federal Jurisdiction" (1970) 44 A.L.J. 425; Liability 
of the Crown in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom 
Ch. 9,
2The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900.
3In the United States also, the Constitution contains no 
provisions for contracting but the power has never been denied, 
see e.g. United States v. Tingey (1831) 39 U.S. 114.
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soon after the passing of the Constitution, by enacting, first a 
temporary Act in 1902 called the Claims Against the Commonwealth 
Act 1902, and then replacing it by the Judiciary Act in 1903. 
That Judiciary Act (now entitled the Judiciary Act 1903-1973) is 
still in force and it determines, inter alia, the liability of 
the Commonwealth or a State in contract; section 56 of the Act, 
for instance, expressly recognises the liability of the Common­
wealth as a juristic person to actions in contract or tort and
thus removes the Commonwealth's immunity from suits by private 
1persons.
It is sometimes argued, however, that the Commonwealth's
liability in contract (as well as in tort) is derived from s.75
of the Constitution and not from the provisions of the Judiciary 
2Act. Section 75 of the Constitution provides, "In all matters
. . . (iii) In which the Commonwealth, or a person suing or being
sued on behalf of the Commonwealth, is a party: ... the High
Court shall have original jurisdiction". In The Commonwealth
3v. New South Wales Isaacs, Rich and Starke, JJ. thought that 
s.75 of the Constitution was the source of substantive liability
Howard, Australian Federal Constitutional Law (2nd ed. 
1972) 111; Maguire v. Simpson (High Court decision handed down 
on 5 December 1977, unreported) p.2 (per Barwick CJ)
[hereinafter Maguire v. Simpson] .
2For example, Commonwealth v. New South Wales (1923) 32 C.L.R. 
200, 212 ; New South Wales v. Commonwealth (No.l) (1932) 46 C.L.R. 
155, 210, 211, 215; New South Wales v. Bardolph (1934) 52 C.L.R. 
455, 458-59; Heimann v. Commonwealth (1935) 54 C.L.R.126, 129; 
Musgrave v. Commonwea1th (1937) 57 C.L.R. 514, 550.
3 (1923) 32 C.L.R.200.
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of the Commonwealth; if, they argued, liability depended wholly 
on federal legislation under s.78 of the Constitution, the 
Commonwealth Parliament could enact a statute making the States 
liable to the Commonwealth, but refusing "a reciprocal liability". 
Another view which has been advanced is that the liability must 
rest upon statute and the provisions of Part IX of the Judiciary 
Act amount to statutory imposition of liability for contract 
(and tort too) upon the Crown in right of the Commonwealth and, 
within the limits of subject matter to which Federal jurisdict­
ion is conferred, in right of the States also. Dixon J in two
2later cases viz. Musgrave v. The Commonwealth and Werrin v. The 
3Commonwealth expressed disagreement with the views of Isaacs,
Rich and Starke, JJ. In the first case, his Honour feared that
If it be true that the Constitution imposes the 
liability, possibly the consequence may follow 
that the law governing the responsibility of 
the Commonwealth for civil wrong as indeed for 
liability ex contractu also became fixgd as at 
the establishment of the Commonwealth.
In the second case, Dixon J observed:
It is, of course, true that the words "matters"
[in s.75 of the Constitution] includes actions of 
contract as well as actions of tort, and 
logically it should follow that sec. 75 has the 
same operation in relation to liability ex 
contractu. If sec. 75, a constitutional provision, 
operates as a source of liability, it is not easy
Id. 214. Higgins J., however, expressed himself against 
such an opinion, see jLd. 217.
2 (1937) 57 C.L.R. 514.
3 (1938) 59 C.L.R. 150.
4Musgrave v. The Commonwealth (1937) 57 C.L.R. 514, 547.
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to see how parliamentary legislation could extinguish, 
qualify, or limit the liability thence arising ....
It is, therefore, possible to argue that the reason­
ing on which their Honours' judgment.proceeds involves 
the consequence that the delictual and contractual 
liability of the Commonwealth as well as, within 
Federal jurisdiction, of the States is imposed by sec.
75 of the Constitution and cannot be discharged, 
barred or otherwise affected by any law of the Parlia-^ 
ment, as for example by an Act indemnifying the Crown.
He concluded that s.75 could not be the source of substantive
liability, but it simply made the Commonwealth subject to the
2jurisdiction of the High Court. This line of thinking was 
favoured in Asiatic Steam Navigation Co. Ltd, v. The Commonwealth, 
though the Court did not find it necessary to determine the point.
It may therefore be submitted that s.75 confers only a juris­
diction, and not a right of action where no right of action 
existed before; that it does not extend the category of cases in 
which the Commonwealth, or a State may be sued, but merely enables 
certain suits, which might otherwise have been brought in some 
other court, to be brought in the High Court; and that the provis­
ions of the Judiciary Act operate to impose substantive liability
4upon the Commonwealth. Actually, s.78 of the Constitution which
^Werrin v. The Commonwealth (1938) 59 C.L.R. 150, 166.
2Id. 167. Rich J said "I do not think that anything which was 
said in The Commonwealth v. New South Wales was intended to mean 
that sec. 75 of the Constitution produced the effect of establish­
ing as constitutional rights incapable of legislative control 
causes of action to which subjects might become entitled under 
the general law against either Commonwealth or State." _Id. 161.
3 (1957) 96 C.L.R. 397, 423.
4The same view is held by two authors in their
articles: see Campbell, "Federal Contract Law" (1970)
44 A.L.J. 580, 587-88 and Hogg, "Suits against the Common­
wealth and the States in the Federal Jurisdiction" (1970) 44 
A.L.J. 425, 426, 435.
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gives the Federal Parliament power to make laws conferring 
rights of proceeding against the Commonwealth or a State, further 
goes on to show that the founders did not intend to lay down 
substantive liability of the Crown in any of the provisions of 
the Constitution.
The next question that arises then is which provision/s of
the Judiciary Act 1903 impose substantive liability. Part
IX of the Act is headed: "Suits by and against the Commonwealth
1and the States". Section 56 states (as far as relevant) that
a person making a claim against the Commonwealth, whether in
contract or in tort, may in respect of the claim bring a suit
against the Commonwealth (a) in the High Court; (b) in the
Supreme Court of the State or Territory in which the claim arose;
or (c) in any other court of competent jurisdiction of
the State or Territory in which the claim arose. The next section is
s.64 which reads (as material for our purpose here):
In any suit to which the Commonwealth or a State is
a party, the rights of parties shall as nearly as 
possible be the same, and judgment may be given and 
costs awarded on either side, as in a suit between 
subject and subject.
Further ss.79 and 80 of the Act which fall under Part XI
2"Supplementary Provisions" deal with "Application of Laws".
^Sections 56-67.
2On the interpretation of s.79 of the Judiciary Act, see Pedersen 
v * Young (1964) 110 C.L.R. 162, 165; Commissioner of Stamp Duties 
(N.S,W.) v. Owensf No.21 (1953) 88 C.L.R. 168, 170; John Robertson
& Co Ltd v. Ferguson Transformers Pty Ltd (1973) 129 C.L.R. 65, 
80-81, 83, 88, 94-95.
43
Section 79 enunciates:
The laws of each State, including the laws relating 
to procedure, evidence, and the competency of witnesses, 
shall, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution 
or the laws of the Commonwealth, be binding on all 
courts exercising federal jurisdiction in that State in 
all cases to which they are applicable.
Section 80 states:
So far as the laws of the Commonwealth are not applicable 
or so far as their provisions are insufficient to carry 
them into effect, or to provide adequate remedies or 
punishment, the common law of England as modified by the 
Constitution and by the statute law in force in the State 
in which the court in which the jurisdiction is exercised 
is held, shall, so far as it is applicable and not incon­
sistent with the Constitution and the laws of the Common­
wealth, govern all Courts exercising federal jurisdiction 
in the exercise of their jurisdiction in civil and 
criminal liability.
To appreciate the applicability of the above-mentioned 
sections of the Judiciary Act in the context of a dispute 
relating to a Commonwealth contract, let us take an illustration. 
Suppose A, a resident of New South Wales, has a dispute with the 
Commonwealth in contract. The first question is where and in 
what court A may file a suit. As stated earlier, under s.75 
of the Constitution, the High Court would have original juris­
diction since it is a matter in which the Commonwealth is a 
party. ^ A may, however, instfdcl file a suit against the Common­
wealth, under s.56 of the Judiciary Act, in the Supreme Court
of New South Wales, because that is the State in which the claim 
2has arisen or in any other court of competent jurisdiction in
Section 75 (iii) of the Constitution
Section 56 (1)(b) of the Judiciary Act.2
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New South Wales. Let us suppose that A chooses to file the 
suit in the High Court and the High Court is at that particular 
time, sitting at Melbourne, Victoria. The question then is, what 
law should apply to this dispute on a government contract - 
whether Federal government contract law (if any) or Federal 
contract law generally (if any) or the State government contract 
law (if any), or State contract law generally (if any), or if 
there is no Federal or State contract law, the common law of 
England as modified by the Constitution and by the State statute 
law. The next question is: in case the State law is applicable, 
then which State's law should apply - the State law of New South 
Wales, where the claim has arisen or the State law of Victoria, 
where the High Court is sitting.
The answer to the first question, i.e. what law should 
apply, is to be found in ss.79 and 80 of the Judiciary Act 1903 - 
1973. A court trying an action by or against the Commonwealth 
is exercising Federal jurisdiction. Any court exercising federal 
jurisdiction in a State is directed by ss.79 and 80 to apply the 
law of that State unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution 
or the matter in hand is regulated by Commonwealth law. Hence, 
in the absence of a contrary Constitutional provision or Common­
wealth legislation, an action against the Commonwealth in contract
2may be decided by reference to rules of State law. An objection
^Section 56 (1) (c) of the Judiciary Act.
2 Howard, Australian Federal Constitutional Law (2nd ed.
1972) 111. The author, it is surprising to note, does not 
consider the effect of s.64 of the Judiciary Act.
may, however, be raised here that as a matter of constitutional 
law, States have no power to bind the Crown in right of the 
Commonwealth."^ To that, the answer in the words of Professor 
Campbell is:
State laws which do not, under the rules of the State 
legal system, apply to the Commonwealth, may be made to 
apply to the Commonwealth by federal legislation.
Section 64 of the Judiciary Act is such a provision .... 
When read in conjunction with ss.79 and 80, what this 
means is that for the purpose of determining the applic­
ability of State law to Commonwealth contracts, the fact 
that one party is the Commonwealth is usually to be 
ignored.2
Regarding the second question (i.e. which State's law is
to apply, as in our example, the State law of New South Wales
or of Victoria), the answer is that the State law of New South
Wales should apply, and not of Victoria because (as implicit
in s.56 of the Judiciary Act) the law of that State will apply
where the claim arises, and it is immaterial for the purposes of
determining the jurisdiction of the High Court where it
3held its sitting at a particular time.
^Commonwea1th v. Cigamatic Pty Ltd. (1962) 108 C.L.R. 372.
Campbell "Federal Contract Law" (1970) 44 A.L.J. 580, 
581—82.
3 Howard, op.cit. at 108 et seq.; Musgrave v. The Common- 
wea1th (1937) 57 C.L.R. 514, 550-51; Suehle v. The Commonwealth
(1967) 116 C.L.R. 353, 355-56. See also Hogg, "Suits
against the Commonwealth and the States in the Federal Juris­
diction" (1970) 44 A.L.J. 425, 427-31 for a full analysis of 
the case law on the point. But see Campbell "Federal'
Contract Law" (1970) 44 A.L.J. 580, 582, for the difficulty 
such an interpretation of s.56 raises. For more discussion 
see Phillips, "Choice of Law in Federal Jurisdiction"
(1961) 3 M.U.L.R. 170 (Part I), 348 (Part II) Lane,
Note (1967) 41 A.L.J. 210,
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(ii) The scope of s.64 of the Judiciary Act
The general rule at common law is that the Crown is not
bound by a statute unless expressly named or bound by necessary 
2implication. Section 64 of the Judiciary Act, it is submitted, 
does not dispel that rule for the construction of statutes. What 
it states is simply that in case the Crown is expressly made 
bound by a statute, or by necessary implication, it could be con­
sidered to be bound, then rights of the parties in a dispute 
(between Crown in right of the Commonwealth or in right of State 
and a subject) will be the same as in a suit between subject and 
subject. The plain meaning of the words used in s.64 is, that in 
a suit, say in contract, between Government and a private party, 
the law applicable will be the same as governing contractual 
relations between private parties. Differing views, however, 
have been expressed on the question whether s.64 is directed to
procedural matters or operates so as to confer substantive rights 
3on the parties. According to Hogg, the application of a State
statute to Commonwealth-subject disputes might not be constitut-
4ionally valid, but for s.64 of the Judiciary Act. He further 
states that "the rights of parties" to which s.64 refers include
^For the historical background of s.64, see Maguire v. Simpson 
op.cit. at 2-6(per Barwick CJ).
2See Howard, op.cit. 113 and the references cited therein.
For differences of judicial opinion, see Madras Electric Supply 
Corporation Ltd, v. Boarland [1955] A.C. 667.
3The cases in which it has been held that the rights referred to 
by s.64 are rights of a purely procedural kind are: The Common­
wealth v. Baume (1905) 2 C.L.R.405, 418 (per O'Connor J); Griffin 
v. South Australia (1924) 35 C.L.R. 200, 204 (per Isaacs J).
4Hogg, op.cit. at 432-34. See also Maguire v. Simpson at 2 
(per Barwick CJ)
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substantive as well as procedural rights, and cites with approval
the following controversial dictum, of Kitto J (though obiter) in
the case of Asiatic Steam Navigation Co Ltd v. The Commonwealth:
[T]he rights referred to in s.64 include the substantive 
rights to be given effect to in the suit . ,..[I]t follows 
that s.64 must be interpreted as taking up and enacting/ 
as the law to be applied in every suit to which the 
Commonwealth or a State is a party, the whole body of 
the law, statutory or not, by which the rights of the 
parties would be governed if the Commonwealth or State 
were a subject instead of being the Crown.
Hogg places reliance on the Privy Council judgment in 
2Farnell v. Bowman, stating that in several cases the State
statutes have been held applicable to the Commonwealth (by the
operation of s.64) which would not have applied to the
3Commonwealth of their own force. He also considers that
^Id. at 433 citing (1957) 96 C.L.R. 397, 427.
2 (1887) 12 A.C. 643, 650. In Farnell v. Bowman, the main question
was whether, under the provisions of the New South Wales Act 39 
Viet.No.38 (the provisions of which were similar to ss.56 and 64 
of the Judiciary Act), the Government Colony was liable to be sued 
in an action of tort. The claim of the plaintiff, respondent in 
appeal, was that the Government by their servant broke and entered 
the lands of the plaintiff situated in the colony, and lit fires 
thereon, and thereby burned down and destroyed the grass, trees and 
fences of the plaintiff on the said lands. The Judicial Committee 
held in favour of the plaintiff and dismissed the appeal. Sir 
Barnes Peacock, who spoke for the Council, observed* "Justice 
requires that the subject should have relief against the Colonial 
Governments for torts as well as in cases of breach of contract 
or the detention of property wrongfully seized in the hands of the 
Crown. And when it is found that the Act uses words sufficient 
to embrace new remedies, it is hard to see why full effect should 
be denied to them" (at 649). The case has been cited in support 
of the argument that s.64 includes substantive rights: see e.g., 
Asiatic Steam Navigation case at 427 (Kitto J); Downs v. Williams 




the judgment in the Asiatic Steam Navigation case holds "that
even a statute which is expressed as not to apply to the Common-
2wealth is made applicable by s.64". Hogg thus seems to reach 
two conclusions: first, that the effect of s.64 of the Judiciary 
Act is to make applicable to the Commonwealth the State statutes, 
which would not of their own force apply to the Commonwealth, 
because they are incapable to doing so as a matter of constitut­
ional law; and secondly, that the effect of s.64 is to apply to 
the Commonwealth a statute, notwithstanding the express or implied 
exclusion of the Commonwealth from the binding operation of a 
particular enactment. Regarding the first, it is submitted that, 
that is the correct interpretation of s.64 read with ss.79 and 
80 of the Judiciary Act. Regarding the second, it is submitted 
that the judgment in the Asiatic Steam Navigation case does not 
hold that s.64 enacts that the law to be applied in every suit
to which the Commonwealth (or a State) is a party will be the
as that
same^by which the rights of the private parties are governed, 
notwithstanding an express or implied exclusion of the Common­
wealth (or a State) from the binding operation of a particular 
enactment. That is actually the obiter dictum of Kitto J in 
that case, which was not supported by the other members of the 
Court. It is further submitted that for the purposes of the 
Asiatic Steam Navigation case s.64 was not relevant and whatever
1(1957) 96 C.L.R. 397.
2Hogg, op.cit. at 433.
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interpretation of the section is held, the decision will be the
same. In that case the Commonwealth sought to limit its liability
for damages under s.503 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 but the
appellants sought to exclude the Commonwealth from the application
of s.503 because of s.741 of the same Act. The appellants had
suffered loss because of the collision of their ship with the
ship of the Commonwealth, caused by the negligence of the latter.
Section 503, so far as material, provided in general terms that
the owners of a ship, British or foreign, shall (if certain
conditions were fulfilled) not be liable for damage caused by
that ship to another ship or her cargo beyond an amount exceeding
£8 per ton of the ship's tonnage. Section 741 of the Act provided
Lhat, "This Act shall not, except where specially provided,
apply to ships belonging to Her Majesty". The Commonwealth
argued that s.503 would apply because of s.80 of a later Act,
viz, the Merchant Shipping Act 1906 which provided:
Her Majesty may by Order in Council make regulations 
with respect to the manner in which Government ships 
may be registered as British ships for the purpose of 
the Merchant Shipping Acts, and those Acts, subject 
to any exceptions and modifications which may be made 
by Order in Council, either generally or as respects 
any special class of Government ships, shall apply 
to Government ships registered in accordance with 
those regulations as if they were registered in manner 
provided by those Acts.
An Order in Council was later made in 1924 relating to Govern­
ment ships of the Commonwealth. The High Court unanimously held 
that the effect of s.80 of the 1906 Act was, in certain circum­
stances, to render the earlier Act applicable in the case of
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Government ships and, to the extent therein provided, that
1section over-rode the provisions of s.741 of the 1894 Act.
itself of
Thus the Commonwealth was allowed to avail/^the limitation of 
liability provisions given in s.503.
The High Court, however, did refer to s.64 of the Judiciary 
Act, The joint judgment of Dixon CJ, McTiernan
and Williams JJ, pointed out that there has been a difference of 
opinion as to the scope of s.64 of the Judiciary Act which some­
times has been treated as limited to questions of procedure and 
at other times as extending in itself to the substantive law
governing the liability put in suit, but these differences of
2opinions were found of no relevance to the case. Fullagar J 
said that
[T]he effect of s.64 is not to mate applicable either 
in favour of the Commonwealth or against it, a statute 
the express terms of which exclude the Crown. For the 
purposes of suits to which the Commonwealth is a party 
the general law as between subject and subject is to 
apply. But this general enactment cannot be regarded 
as derogating from any special enactment which by its 
own terms is made either applicable or inapplicable to 
the Commonwea1th.3
1 (1957) 96 C.L.R. 397, 407, 420.
2See at 417. For a detailed discussion on this question, see 
B a Lime v. The Commonwealth (1906) 4 C.L.R. 97, 123-24; The Common­
wealth v. Miller (1910) 10 C.L.R. 742, 753-54; The Commonwealth
v. New South Wales (1923) 32 C.L.R. 200; New South Wales v. 
Bardolph (1934) 52 C.L.R. 459, 460, 497, 506, 507; Musgrave v.
The Commonwealth (1937) 57 C.L.R. 514,543,546-48,550,551; Werrin 
v. The Commonwealth (1938) 59 C.L.R.150, 161,165-68; Washington 
v. The Commonwealth (1939) 39 S.R.(N.S.W.)133; Naismith v.McGovern 
(1953) 90 C.L.R.336,342,343; Asiatic Steam Navigation Co.Ltd, v. 
The Commonwealth (1955-56) 96C.L.R.397,417,424,427,428; The Common­
wea 1th v. Anderson (1960)105 C .L.R.303,309; South Australia v. The 
Commonwea1th (1962)108 C .L.R.130,140; Downs v. Williams (1971) 45 
A.L.J.R.576,577,578-79, 591.
% e e  at4Z4.
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Although the statement by Fullagar J was made in the context
of the case, it may be submitted that it can have general
application. His Honour's views are, however, diametrically
opposed to the dictum of Kitto J.^ Menzies J in The Commonwealth 
2v. Anderson also expressed his doubts about the correctness of
views held by Kitto J in the Asiatic Steam Navigation case.
It is submitted that s.64 of the Judiciary Act extends
in itself to the substantive law governing the liability put 
3in suit. In addition, it deprives the Commonwealth, when it
is a litigant, of the privileges that by the common law the
4Crown had in proceedings between it and a subject. However,
Fullagar J's example at 424 makes the position very clear.
To quote: "The position may perhaps be tested by supposing that 
the Commonwealth sues in ejectment the tenant of land owned by 
it, and the defendant relies on State legislation which restricts 
the rights of landlords to eject tenants. That legislation does 
not, and in my opinion as a matter of constitutional law could 
not, bind the Commonwealth. Could it possibly be said that the 
effect of s.64 was to place the Commonwealth in its ejectment 
action in the position of a subject in respect of the legislat­
ion". See also Downs v.Williams (1971) 45 A.L.J.R. 576, 579, 
where Menzies J cited with approval the above example.
2 (1960) 105 C.L.R. 303, 317-18. In Anderson case it was held 
that the provisions of Part III of the Landlord and Tenant 
(Amendment) Act 1948-58 (N.S.W.), which are expressed not to 
bind the Commonwealth, are not called into operation by s.64 
of the Judiciary Act so as to prevent the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales from entertaining an action in ejectment brought 
by the Commonwealth against an overholding tenant.
3Contra, Lumb and Ryan, The Constitution of the Commonwealth 
of Australia Annotated (2nd ed. 1977) 285.
4See Windeyer J at 318 in Anderson case.
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if a Commonwealth (or a State ) law tends to exclude it from 
the binding operation of a particular enactment, it may further 
be submitted that, s.64 cannot have the effect of making it appli­
cable to the Commonwealth (or the State). This is so, because if 
it is a later Federal statute which excludes the Commonwealth 
from the binding operation of an earlier enactment, then accord­
ing to a settled canon of construction of statutes, the later 
statute would prevail notwithstanding s.64 of the Judiciary Act.* 234 
And if it is a State statute which excludes the State from the 
applicability of a State Act, s.64 of the Judiciary Act cannot 
make that law applicable to the State because the Commonwealth
2has no power to legislate on the domestic matters of the State.
In the Anderson case Dixon CJ observed:
It is perhaps not unimportant to bear in mind that 
it is the rights of parties as in a suit between 
subject and subject,^not the law, that are to apply 
as nearly as may be.
4In Downs v. Williams, McTiernan J cited with approval the
above stated observation of Dixon CJ and added:
In such a case as this therefore it is only after it 
has been ascertained that a statutory duty is imposed 
on the Crown that the rights between the parties are 
determined by the general law applicable as between 
subject and subject.
It may be noted that the High Court decision in Maguire v.
Simpson (discussed below) did not involve a situation in which the
Court had to decide whether s.64 would, in federal jurisdiction, 
override as against a State the operation of later State laws 
expressly excluding the State from particular obligations or 
liabilities. But see, Mason J's remarks at p.30 of the judgment.
2 Howard, op.cit. at 27. See generally, Sawer, "State 
Statutes and the Commonwealth" (1961) 1 Univ. of Tas. L. Rev.580.
3At 310.
4 (1971) 45 A.L.J.R. 576, 577.
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In Downs v. Williams, the plaintiff-respondent, who sustained 
personal injuries at a place occupied by the Crown, sued the 
Government of New South Wales (whom the defendant-appellant 
represented) in damages for conduct contrary to certain provisions 
of the Factories, Shops and Industry Act 1962 (N.S.W.) which 
dealt with fencing of dangerous machinery. The Government's 
contention was that the impugned Act did not in express terms 
bind the Crown and that there were no words in the Act which 
clearly implied the intention that the Crown should be bound 
by it. But the plaintiff relied upon ss. 3 and 4 of the Claims 
Against the Government and Crown Suits Act 1912 (N.S.W.)
(sections similar to s.64 of the Judiciary Act) as imposing 
liability on the Government. The question that came before the 
High Court was: whether the plaintiff should succeed notwithstand­
ing that the Industry Act, by which the statutory duty was 
imposed, did not reveal an intention to bind the Crown, if it 
was found that he would have been entitled to maintain an action 
for damages caused by a breach of statutory duty if the premises 
had been occupied by a private individual. The Court held by 
a majority (Windeyer and Gibbs JJ dissenting) that the Govern­
ment was not liable to pay damages because the Industry Act 
did not bind the Crown. Menzies J cited with approval the views 
of Fullagar J expressed in Asiatic Steam Navigation case^ and
J‘Fullaga.r J at 424.
54
said:1
I do not accept the view, for instance, that sections 
such as those under consideration, and s.64 itself, 
take up and enact, as the law to be applied in every 
case where a government is a party, provisions of 
statutory law which do not, upon their own terms, 
apply to a government.
McTiernan J lent support to Dixon CJ's observations in
2Anderson case cited above and added:
In such a case as this therefore it is only after it 
has been ascertained that a statutory duty is imposed 
on the Crown that the rights between the parties are 
determined by the general law applicable as between 
subject and subject.
In the recent decision in Maguire and Ors. v. Simpson 
and Qrs. (unreported) handed down on 5 December 1977, the High 
Court held that the rights of
the parties to which s.64 of the Judiciary Act referred were
4substantive and not merely procedural rights. The High Court 
has further held that s.64 had an ambulatory operation and that 
the section was capable of including legislative changes made in
^At 578-79 (Downs v. Williams).
2See supra.
3Downs v. Williams, op.cit. at 577. Gibbs J said: "If a statute
which governs the rights of the parties in an action between 
subject and subject has been enacted subsequent to the Claims 
Against the Government and Crown Suits Act 1912, and expressly 
provides that it shall not apply to the Crown, this provision in 
the later statute must prevail over the general provisions of the 
earlier statute with which it is inconsistent", (at 592).
4Maguire v. Simpson, op.cit. at 5-6 (per Barwick CJ), at 9 (per 
Gibbs J), at 28 (per Mason J), at 33 (per Jacobs J), at 35 (per 
Murphy J). Stephen J, however, did not find it necessary to 
decide whether s.64 applied only to matters of procedure or 
extended also to substantive law, see at 21-22, 25.
55
the law after that section was enacted. The facts in the Maguire 
case were: The Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia was owed
certain money ($5,325.17) on current account by a partnership 
firm. The last dealing in the partnership bank account was enter­
ed on 15 February 1966. Shortly thereafter the main assets of 
the partnership were sold and the net proceeds of sale ($9,832) 
were deposited into court, pending determination of claims to the 
fund by interested parties. In proceedings in the Supreme Court 
of New South Wales, the Bank claimed to participate as an 
unsecured creditor notwithstanding that more than six years had 
passed since its debt became due. In reply to the plaintiff's 
argument that the Bank's claim was time-barred under s s .14(1) and 
63(1) of the Limitation Act 1969 (N.S.W.), the Bank asserted, 
inter alia, that the Limitation Act did not validly apply to the 
Bank since the legislature of New South Wales had no power to 
render the Act binding on the Commonwealth. The matter having 
been removed into the High Court, the Court observed that the 
basic question to be decided in the case was whether the provi­
sions of the Limitation Act 1969 (N.S.W.) were rendered applicable
2by virtue of s.64 of the Judiciary Act.
The High Court, as stated already, held that s.64 was the
"''Id. at 18 (per Gibbs J) , at 2 4 (per Stephen J) , at 2 5 (per Mason 
J) and at 35 (per Murphy J).
2It may be noted that the High Court held that the Bank, for the 
purposes of the suit, stood in the position of the Crown, see 
id. at 27-28. It may further be noted that the provisions of the 
Limitation Act did reveal an intention that the Act shall bind the 
Crown in right of the Commonwealth and the State (ss.lO(l), 11(1)). 
See id. at 7 and 30.
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source of authority of a State court to apply the provisions of
the Limitation Act (N.S.W.) to a suit by the Bank to recover a
debt due to it. Gibbs J said:
The effect of s.64 ... is that the Limitation Act, which 
is to be applied in the proceedings by virtue of s.79 [of 
the Judiciary Act], is rendered applicable to the 
Commonwealth as though it were a subject, and therefore 
binds the Bank. The Limitation Act is so applied by 
force of Commonwealth law, and not by its own force as 
a State law ...[s.]64 is not in terms limited to rights 
of a procedural kind and no reason exists to imply a 
limitation of that kind in a remedial provision expressed 
in the broad terms of s.64.^
Accordingly, the High Court held that the Bank's claim was 
time-barred under the provisions of the Limitation Act 1969 
(N.S.W.) and hence it could not recover the balance of the 
current account.
(iii) Commonwealth's Legislative Power 
Regarding Government Contracts
Not only does the Constitution of Australia contain no
section for government contracts, but there is no single entry
in s.5l (enumerating the legislative powers of the Parliament)
on which the power to legislate with respect of Commonwealth
contracts may clearly be founded. Several possible constitutional
2bases for legislation have been suggested. At best the power
Id. at 9. It is, however, pertinent to note that Stephen J. 
suggested that s.64 required "careful scrutiny by those concerned 
with law reform into potentialities of the section with a view 
to its amendment, so that the already existing doubts as to its 
operation may be resolved and difficulties as yet to be 
encountered may be avoided". (id. at 25)
2 Campbell, "Federal Contract Law", op.cit. at 585-86.
Campbell, however, concludes that the Commonwealth's 
contracting power "is not inhibited by the restraints which the 
Constitution imposes on federal law-making". (at 580). See also 
by the same author, "Commonwealth Contracts" (1970) 44 A.L.J.
14, 23.
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to legislate with regard to contracts may be derived from
cl. (xxxix) of s.51 which empowers the Commonwealth Parliament
to make laws with respect to -
Matters incidental to the execution of any power 
vested by this Constitution in the Parliament or 
in either House thereof, or in the Government of 
the Commonwealth, or in the Federal Judicature, 
or in any department or officer of the Commonwealth.
Section 61 of the Constitution"^ deals with the executive power
of the Commonwealth and since the power to enter into contracts
is inherent in the concept of sovereignty, that power can be
said to be an executive power with respect to which the Parliament
of the Commonwealth may legislate under cl. (xxxix) of s. 51 of
2the Constitution. Similarly, power to legislate with respect
Section 61 reads: "The executive power of the Commonwealth is 
vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General 
as the Queen's representative, and extends to the execution and 
maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Common- 
wea1th".
2For a treatment of the case law on the question of
Commonwealth's contracting power and the limitations on that 
power, see Campbell, "Commonwealth Contracts" 44 A.L.J.14.
Campbell's summary of the position is worthy of citation: 
"The judicial opinions ... generally point to the conclusion that 
to be valid, a contract by the Crown in right of the Commonwealth 
must be one that parliament could, if it has not done so already, 
validly authorise. For an Act of the federal parliament to be 
valid, it must be a law with respect to one or other of the 
enumerated subjects of federal legislative power. Among the 
legislative powers of the Commonwealth is the power to make laws 
with respect to any matter incidental to powers vested by the 
Constitution in the Government of the Commonwealth (s. 51 (XXXIX)), 
meaning in this context the executive government. Thus if the 
executive power of the Commonwealth referred to in s.61 includes 
power to contract, without restriction on the nature or terms of 
the contract, a federal Act authorising a Commonwealth contract 
must always be a valid law, and a Commonwealth agreement can 
never be impugned on the ground of unconstitutionality."
(Id. at 22-23).
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to contracts may be said to arise from matters incidental to 
the execution of the power vested by s.78 of the Constitution 
in the Parliament to make laws with respect to causes of actions 
and remedies against the Commonwealth.’1" The constitutional 
basis for law-making with respect to contracts may also be 
found as incidental to the subject-matter of various clauses 
of s.51 itself. For example, since the power of the Parliament 
with respect to cl.(V) viz., "Postal, telegraphic, telephonic, 
and other like services" may be said to include the power with 
respect to matters incidental to the execution of that power, 
the Parliament may enact laws dealing with contracts for the 
procurement of supplies and services for telegraphic, telephonic, 
etc. purposes. In a like manner, the power under cl.(VI) 
regarding the naval and military and defence of the Commonwealth 
etc. may be said to include the power of the Parliament to 
legislate with respect to supplies for defence. The existence 
of the Audit Act 1901-1975 and the Supply and Development Act 
1939-1975 on the statute book of Government, which have 
provisions dealing with government contracts are examples of 
exercise of such a power by the Parliament of the Commonwealth.
^Werrin v. The Commonwealth (1938) 59 C.L.R. 150, 165, 167.
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(iv) Limitations upon Executive ^
Government's Contracting Power
At one time it was considered that the executive power of
the Commonwealth in s.61 of the Constitution was confined to the
execution and maintenance of the Constitution and laws of the 
2Commonwealth. But now it is established beyond doubt that the
executive power of the Commonwealth under s.61 is not to be
construed as being so restricted in content, and that it extends
beyond the execution and maintenance of the Constitution and
laws of the Commonwealth, and includes, for example, prerogative 
3powers. It has also been established in a recent pronouncement
4of the High Court in the Seas and Submerged Lands case that 
the exercise of prerogative power is not dependent upon the 
authority of statute. Declarations of war, and the making of 
treaties, for example, are executive acts which the Governor-
5General may perform quite independently of any legislation.
For an instructive contribution, see Richardson, "The
Executive Power of the Commonwealth" in Commentaries on the 
Australian Constitution: A Tribute to Geoffrey Sawer (1977) ed. 
Zines, ch. 2, 50-87 [hereinafter cited as Richardson].
2This view was taken in The Commonwealth v. Colonial Combing, 
Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd (the Wooltops case) (1922)31 C.L.R.
421,at 453-54 (per Higgins J), at 431-32(per Knox CJ and G. Duffy J)
3Barton v. The Commonwealth (1974) 3 A.L.R. 70, at 75-77 (per 
Barwick CJ), at 79 (per McTiernan and Menzies JJ), at 86-87 (per 
Mason J) and at 92-93 (_ger Jacobs J) . See also Richardson, 
op.cit. at 55, 57.
4New South Wales v. The Commonwealth (1975) 8 A.L.R. 1
5Victoria v. The Commonwealth (A.A.P. case) (1975) 7 A.L.R.
211, 333 (per Jacobs J)
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The power of the executive government of the Commonwealth
to enter into a contract is, however, not a prerogative power,
but is an exercise of the executive power of the Commonwealth.
2In LeMesurier v. Connor, Isaacs J observed that the content of
the executive power is not exhaustively defined by s.61 and its
3specific limits have to be determined aliunde. It is now well-
established that the executive power of the Commonwealth also
extends to the Crown's capacity as a person to enter into
4contractual relations with subjects. In New South Wales v.
Bardolph, Evatt J observed:
[T]he general capacity of the Crown to enter into a 
contract should be regarded from the same point of 
view as the capacity of the King would be by the 
Courts of common law. No doubt the King had special 
powers, privileges, immunities and prerogatives.
But he never seems to have been regarded as being 
less powerful to enter into contracts than one of his 
subj ects.
Richardson, op.cit.76. The author points out that the power 
of the Crown to enter into a contract is not a prerogative 
power because the latter (as defined in Halsbury's Laws of 
England (4th ed.1974) Vol.8,583) refers only to those things 
in respect of which the Sovereign enjoys pre-eminence over 
and above all other persons by virtue of the common law, but 
out of its ordinary course, in right of her regal dignity, 
and comprehends all the special dignities, liberties, privileges, 
powers and royalties allowed by the common law to the Crown in 
England (See J_d. 57 n.19, and 76). See also Lumb and Ryan, 
op.cit. at 228.
2 (192 9) 42 C.L.R. 481.
3Id. at 514.
4 .Richardson, op.cit. at 55.
5(1934) 52 C.L.R.455 at 474-75.
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The High Court in the A.A.P. cose has extended the scope of
executive power by stating that there is an implied executive
power of the Commonwealth to engage in activities appropriate to
a national government. Mason J thus observed:
[Tjhere is to be deduced from the existence and 
character of the Commonwealth as a national govern­
ment and from the presence of ss.51 (xxxix) and 61 
a capacity to engage in enterprises and activities 
peculiarly adapted to the government of a nation
and which cannot otherwise be carried on for the• • ? benefit of the nation.
(a) Restrictive view of the scope 
of s.61 of the Constitution
Opinions have, however, been divided on the effect of s.61
of the Constitution on the scope of the power of the Commonwealth
to enter into contracts. At common law there is no general
principle denying the Crown capacity or competence to contract
3in the absence of a statutory authority. But it has been argued 
that the effect of s.61 is to supersede the Crown's common law
Victoria v. The Commonwealth (1975) 7 A.L.R. 277. The case 
concerned appropriation of moneys (amounting to several millions 
of dollars) for a community-based social service programme called 
The Australian Assistance Plan, under which moneys could be 
expended on various types of social services or social welfare 
benefits which were not within the four corners of the Common­
wealth Social Services powers (e.g., s.51(xxiii) and s.51(xxiiiA). 
The High Court by a majority of 4-3 upheld the validity of the 
appropriation. For a discussion of the case, see
Sawer, Federation Under Strain, Australia 1972-1975 (1977) 17, 68; 
Lumb and Ryan, op.cit.193-94 and 290-91; Richardson, op.cit.
66, 67 and 76.
2 (1975) 7 A.L.R. 277, 327. See also Richardson, op.cit. at 76.
3 Campbell, "Commonwealth Contracts" (1970) 44 A.L.J. 14; 
Turpin, Government Contracts 19.
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authority to contract and thereby make it necessary for authority
to be supplied by an Act of Parliament.^' This limited view of
the Crown's power to enter into contracts seems to stem mainly
2from the following cases. In the Wooltops case, the facts were 
that under the War Precautions (Wool) Regulations 1916 and the 
War Precaution (Sheepskins) Regulations 1916, the Executive had 
purported to enter into an agreement with a company under which 
consent was given to the company to sell wooltops in return for 
a share in the profits of the transaction or on the basis that 
the business of manufacturing wooltops would be carried on by the 
company as agent for the Commonwealth in consideration of the
(1927) Royal Commission on the Constitution of the Commonwealth. 
Report of Proceedings and RLinutes of Evidence, 781. Commonwea 1th
v . Colonial Combing, Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd (Wooltops 
case) (1922) 31 C.L.R. 421, 431, 432, 441; Commonwea1th v.
Colonial Ammunition Co Ltd (1924) 34 C.L.R. 198, 224; The 
Commonwealth v. The Australian Commonwealth Shipping Board (1926) 
39 C.L.R. 1, 9, 10. In New South Wales v. Bardolph (1934) 52
C.L.R. 455, the High Court held that statutory authority was not 
necessary to enable the Crown to enter into a contract "in the 
ordinary course of administering a recognised part of the 
government of the State". (at 508 per Dixon J. , see also at 
474 (Evatt J), 496 (Rich J)). The result of this holding that 
a contract not of that description would not be binding unless 
Parliament had authorised it to be made, has been criticised by 
Campbell in "Commonwealth Contracts" (1970) 44 A.L.J. 
14, 15- See also Attorney General (Vic) v. The Commonwealth
(1934) 52 C.L.R. 533, 562; Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v.
The Commonwealth (1954) 92 C.L.R. 424, 461. The better view 
seems to be that s.61 of the Constitution does not exclude the 
operation of the common law as far as it relates to the capacity 
of the Crown to enter into contracts. For a contrary view, see 
Lumb and Ryan, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia 
Annotated (2nd ed. 1977) 299.
2 (1922) 31 C.L.R. 421.
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company receiving an annual sum from the Commonwealth. It was 
accepted that the regulation in question did not confer power 
on the Commonwealth to enter into such an arrangement. It there­
fore had to be determined whether the contract was in execution 
of or in maintenance of any provision in the Constitution. The 
Court gave a negative answer: no power was to be found in the
Constitution to authorise such an arrangement, nor did the 
subject matter of the contract fall within the area of 
responsibility of a Commonwealth department under s.64.'1 23'
2In Commonwealth v . Australian Commonwealth Shipping Board
it was held that a contract to sell to a municipal council
steam turbo-alternators was not authorised by the executive
power. Such a subject matter did not fall within the
3Commonwealth defence power. It was held by the High Court in 
this case that the Australian Commonwealth Shipping Board, 
established under the Commonwealth Shipping Act 1923, had 
no power to enter into an agreement either because the
Act did not confer power on the Board to enter into the agreement 
or/ if it did, the Act was beyond the power conferred upon
the Commonwealth Parliament by the Constitution.
^See also Commonwealth v. Colonial Ammunition Co Ltd (1924)
34 C.L.R. 198, 224.
2 (1926) 39 C.L.R. 1.
3_Id. at 9, 10.
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In Australian Alliance Assurance Co Ltd v . Goodwyn,
The Insurance Commissioner,^  Shand J stated that
purely trading or business enterprises can only be 
undertaken by the State with legislative sanction, 
and that onerous contracts undertaken by the Executive 
Government, or their accredited agents (especially 
those undertake [sic] not for exigencies of State, 
but solely for purposes of commercial enterprise), 
are incompetent to bind the State unless and until 
they are validated by Act of Parliament.
2Again in New South Wales v. Bardolph the High Court seems to
have suggested that excepting contracts entered into "in the
ordinary or necessary course of Government administration",
3statutory authority must exist for every contract.
The last two decisions referred to above related to
contracting by the Crown in right of States. At Commonwealth
level, in Attorney-General (Victoria) v. The Commonwealth
(Clothing Factory case), Rich J said he was
not prepared to accede to the argument that, without 
legislative power, the Commonwealth Executive can 
enter into business operations simply because it is 
a juristic entity, and in conducting business is not 
exercising governmental power over the subject.^
1 [1916] Q.S.R. 225 at 272-3.
2(1934) 52 C.L.R. 455.
3Id. at 474 (per Evatt J) . See also at 496 (per Rich J) , and 
502-3 (per Starke J) and 508 (per Dixon J).
4 (1934) 52 C.L.R. 533 at 562.
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Further in Australia Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v. The Commonweeilth 
the High Court seems to have expressed a similar view. In that 
case the Court unanimously dismissed an action brought by the 
Australian Woollen Mills against the Commonwealth for recovery 
of money due under a contract to pay a subsidy. The Court held 
that no binding contract was constituted because there was no 
intention to create contractual relations. The Court therefore 
"excluded from consideration" questions of general constitutional 
law, but still went on to remind that "if there was an intention 
on the part of the Government to assume a legal obligation, one
2would certainly have expected statutory authority to be sought".
3Again in Re K.L. Tractors Ltd. a creditor of K.L. Tractors 
Ltd., which was being wound up on the petition of the Common­
wealth, applied for an order that the proof of debt lodged by 
the Commonwealth should be expunged on the ground that it was 
not within the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth for it 
to make or perform the contracts, upon which its debt was based. 
It was argued that the contracts for the sale and delivery by 
the Commonwealth to the company of tractor parts were outside the 
legal competence of the Executive Government of the Commonwealth 
in that neither the defence nor any other power authorised at the 
material times the production of machinery parts for civilian 
use under commercial contracts.
1(1954) 92 C.L.R. 424 
2Id. at 461 (the Court consisted of Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb, 
Fullagar and Kitto JJ). For an analysis of the case
see, Lücke, "The Intention to Create Legal Relations" (1970)
3 Adelaide L. Rev. 419-420, 425.
3(1961) 106 C.L.R. 118.
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In a joint judgment Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Kitto JJ
observed that since the claim of the Commonwealth was for goods
sold and delivered and the company having accepted and taken
benefit of them, the question whether the Commonwealth in
supplying those goods exceeded the limits of its constitutional
powers, was unnecessary to decide.'*’ Windeyer J in a separate,
though concurring, judgment said:
It is not, in my view, necessary to decide here 
whether ... the Commonwealth might have been 
restrained or prohibited from engaging in or 
appropriating moneys for the activities that it 
was contended were beyond its constitutional 
powers because foreign, so it was said, to any 
function that it could properly undertake.2
The Court in dismissing the summons of the creditor, held that
the whole of the debt submitted for proof by the Commonwealth
be paid in priority to all other debts.
(b) Other view
On the other hand, Professor Campbell holds an opposite 
3view. The two High Court opinions (viz♦ the Clothrng 
Factory case and the Australian Woollen Mills 
case), according to the author, "echo views" of the Royal 
Commission on the Constitution of 1928-29, views which seem
~*~Id. at 3 34.
2Id. at 338. The High Court also made observations upon the 
application of the doctrine of ultra vires in constitutional 
and company law. See at id. 335 and 337-38. See also Lumb, 
"Contractual Relations between Government and Citizen" (1962)
35 A.L.J. 45.
3See Campbell, "Australian Government Contracts" Research
Paper No.47, Royal Commission on Australian Government Adminis­
tration 1974-6 (Microfiche Ref.R47X). See also by the same 
author "Commonwealth Contracts" (1970) 44 A.L.J.14.
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to have been "based on the Wooltops ease" - a ease which (the
author points out) neither reveals, nor on its facts required
any concluded "decision on the broader question of whether all
or some Commonwealth contracts require statutory backing".^"
The dictUTh (in New South Wales v. Bardolph) that the capacity
of the Crown to enter into contracts without statutory authority
is limited to contracts "in the ordinary course of administering
2a recognised part of the government", is criticised by the 
author on the basis that"such a view is bound to create 
difficulties for the courts in the absence of clear legal 
distinctions", to adjudge whether or not a contract was made
3in the ordinary or necessary course of government administration. 
Furthermore, it would cause hardship for the contractors for they 
would have to know for sure in advance about the constitution-
4ality of each and every contract they enter into with government. 
But if, on the other hand (the author points out), the Common­
wealth's contracting capacity is considered to be existing inde­
pendently of a statute, the Parliament may still, if it so desires, 
enact laws regulating or restricting the Commonwealth's power to
JEd. 4 and 5-6. For a discussion of Wooltops case, see also 
Campbell op.cit. (1970) 44 A.L.J. at 17.
2 (1934) 52 C.L.R. 455 at 508 (Dixon J).
3Id. at 7 (citing South Australia v. The Commonwealth (1942)
65 C.L.R. 373, 423)
4 Campbell, "Commonwealth Contracts" (1970) 44 A.L.J.
14 at 15.
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contract or may lay down mandatory requirements regarding
the manner in which that authority is to be exercised.^ A
contract made contrary to legislation limiting executive
2authority to contract would, of course, be invalid. In an
extreme case, Parliament may even refuse to appropriate money
if the Commonwealth ventures to enter contracts which, though
legal, may not be proper, for the contractual obligation to
pay Crown moneys cannot constitutionally be fulfilled until
3the Parliament appropriates the requisite funds.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is submitted 
that the capacity of the Commonwealth to enter into contracts 
is not subject to specific prior parliamentary approval or 
prior appropriation of funds. The better opinion appears 
to be that held by Professor Campbell that s.6l of the 
Constitution does not exclude the operation of the common 
law as far as it relates to the capacity of the Crown to 
enter into contracts. The author rightly doubts "whether 
in practice the executive does in fact restrict its
^Ibid. Richardson, op.cit. at 73 observes that
the view, that the Crown has no power to enter into contracts 
except under statutory authority, is now obsolete.
2Campbell, JCd. at 15-16 (citing The Commonwea 1 th v. Colonial
Ammunition Co. Ltd. (1924) 34 C.L.R. 198; Commercial Cable Co.
v. Government of Newfoundland [1916] 2 A.C. 610; McKay v.
Attorney-General for British Columbia [1922] 1 A.C. 457).
3 .Sections 81 and 83 of the Constitution. See also the
Australian Assistance Plan case (1975) 7 A.L.R. 277; Auckland
Harbour Board v. R^ [1924] A.C. 318 (money paid without
appropriation is recoverable by the Commonwealth).
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contracting to contracts authorised by statute and contracts in
the course of performing well recognised functions of government".
Reference must here be made to Professor Sawer1 234s
2penetrating observation in his recent work, where he points out
that because the general question of the scope of the
Commonwealth executive powers has usually arisen in the context
of relations with the States, the courts have taken a common
approach regarding the Commonwealth's executive powers vis-a-vis
3State powers and federal executive powers generally.
"Similarly", the author further states, "in the few earlier cases
concerning Commonwealth activities of a business or at least ♦
economic character, some doubts expressed concerning the power
of the Crown in right of the Commonwealth to carry on such
activities have been expressed in contexts where the business
was located in a State or States, and the decisions do not
clearly differentiate between the federal constitutional
difficulty and the broader difficulty arising from possible
restrictions on the capacity of the Crown, i.e. the government,
4to make business contracts."
"^Campbell, "Australian Government Contracts" op. cit. at 7.




Commenting upon the Connor loan affair, Professor Sawcr
states that it did not, however, raise any "federal constitut-
2ional problem". But could an objection be raised against the
raising of government loans, on the ground, as suggested in 
3 4Wooltops and Colonial Ammunition cases, that "the executive
may not make contracts involving the provisions of public funds
5save with the authority of parliament"? The authority to raise 
the said loan, the author points out, had been given under the 
executive power of the Commonwealth and it did not have any par­
liamentary authorisation.^ Dismissing that objection, the author 
states; "[T]he better view is that there is no constit­
utional doctrine requiring either specific prior parliamentary
approval or prior appropriation for the validity of a loan raised
7by the authority of the supreme executive power". Regarding 
Crown contracts involving expenditure of public moneys, the 
author observes that after the High Court's judgment in New South
O
Wales v. Bardolph, the position is that "the Crown has a general
^Mr R.F.X. Connor, the Minister for Minerals and Energy (as he 
then was) under the Whitlam Government was appointed by the 
Federal Executive Council in December 1974 as an agent of the 
Commonwealth to borrow from overseas a sum in the currency of 
the U.S.A. 'not exceeding the equivalent of four thousand million 
dollars'. For a detailed analysis, see Sawer, op.cit. ch.5- 
2Op. cit. at 68.
3(1922) 31 C.L.R. 198.
4(1924) 34 C.L.R. 198.
5Sawer, op.cit. at 69.
^Ibid.
7Id. at 70 [italics author's].
Q
(1934) 52 C.L.R. 455.
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capacity to contract, proportioned in a federal setting to the 
subject-competence of the governmental unit in question, and 
this includes capacity to promise that public funds will become 
available for making payments; if such an agreement is made, and 
there is default in payment by the government, the creditor can 
obtain judgment from a court, ordering payment under the various 
modern statutes which make the Crown liable to judicial 
proceedings-"
The executive power of the Crown to enter into a contract is, 
however, not an unlimited power. In a number of cases, the courts 
have stated that executive power is subordinate to legislative
power and that Parliament can control the exercise of the power.
2Thus in the A.A.P- case, Jacobs J stated:
The Parliament is sovereign over the Executive 
and whatever is within the competence of the 
Executive under section 61, including or as well 
as the exercise of the prerogative within the 
area of the prerogative attached to the Government 
of Australia, may be the subject of legislation 
of the Australian Parliament.3
Again, a contract by the executive government, to be valid, 
must be one that the Commonwealth Parliament could, if it has 
not already done so, validly authorise. For an Act of the 
Parliament to be valid, it must be a law with respect to one or
Sawer, op.cit. at 71 [emphasis author's].
2Victoria v. The Commonwealth (1975) 7 A.L.R. 277.
3Id. at 334. See also New South Wales v. The Commonwealth 
(the Seas and Submerged Lands case) (1975) 8 A.L.R. 1, 9; 
Richardson, op.cit. at 66-67.
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other of the enumerated subjects stated in thirty-nine (39) 
clauses of the Constitution. It will be recalled that in 
their joint judgment, Knox CJ., Gavan Duffy, Rich and Starke 
JJ in The Commonwealth v . Australian Commonwealth Shipping 
Board stated:
The Parliament has only such power as is expressly 
or by necessary implication vested in it by the 
Constitution. There is no power which enables the 
Parliament or the Executive Government to set up 
manufacturing or engineering businesses for general 
commercial purposes.
According to Professor Richardson, the capacity of the
executive government (or a statutory authority, as in the
Shipping Board case) "is restricted by the limited purposes
2for which the Commonwealth was established". The author
then goes on to conclude that
[i]f such legislative powers as defence, section 51(vi), 
and trade and commerce, section 51(i), referred to in 
the Shipping Board case as possible sources of authority, 
were insufficient to support the making of a contract, 
there was no other source of constitutional power on 
which the Commonwealth could place reliance. Just as 
an agreement entered into by the directors of a company, 
formed under the Companies Act of a State, may be ultra 
vires the memorandum and articles of association, so an 
agreement entered into by the executive government may 
be ultra vires the powers conferred upon it under 
section 61 of the Constitution.^
In Australian Assistance Plan case, Mason J (who was in 
the minority on the decision in the case) saidf
1 (1926) 39 C.L.R. 1, 9.
2Op.cit. at 74.
3Richardson, op.cit. at 74-75. Contra Campbell, "Commonwealth 
Contracts" (1970) 44 A.L.J. 14, 22-23.
4Victoria v. The Commonwealth (1975) 7 A.L.R. 277.
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Although the ambit of the power [in s.6l] is not 
otherwise defined by Ch.II it is evident that in 
scope it is not unlimited and that its content 
does not reach beyond the area of responsibilities 
allocated to the Commonwealth by the Constitution, 
responsibilities which are ascertainable from the 
distribution of legislative powers, effected by 
the Constitution itself and the character and 
status of the Commonwealth as a national government.
The provisions of s.6l taken in conjunction with 
the federal character of the Constitution and the 
distribution of powers between the Commonwealth 
and the States make any other conclusion unacceptable.
There are two other limitations, viz. the power of the
Executive Government to fetter the exercise of administrative
discretion; and legislation appropriation, which we now
discuss in turn.
(c) The doctrine of executive necessity^
According to a well-known doctrine, the doctrine
of executive necessity, the Crown is incapable of so contracting
as to fetter its future executive discretion. In aid of this
2proposition the Amphitrite case is usually invoked. Here the 
facts were that during the first world war the British 
Government had assured the owners of a Swedish ship that if
Hogg, "The Doctrine
of Executive Necessity in the Law of Contract" (1970) 44 A.L.J. 
154. See also Turpin, Government Contracts (1972) 21;
Campbell, "Agreements about the exercise of Statutory Powers" 
(1971) 45 A.L.J. 338; Richardson, op.cit. 76-80.
2Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite v. The King [1921] 3 K.B. 500.
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the ship carried sixty per cent "approved goods" to a
British port, she would be given a clearance (required
by all foreign ships) to enable her to leave the country.
In reliance on this assurance the ship sailed to Britain
and was duly given a clearance. The assurance was renewed
with respect to a second voyage, and the ship again sailed
to Britain. On this occasion however, the British Government
denied the ship a clearance. The owners petitioned the Crown
for damages for breach of contract. Rowlatt J dismissed the
petition on the ground that there was no enforceable contract
between the Crown and the shipowners, stating:
All I have got to say is whether there was an 
enforceable contract, and I am of opinion that there 
was not. No doubt the Government can bind itself 
through its officers by a commercial contract and 
if it does so it must perform it like anybody else 
or pay damages for the breach. But this was not a 
commercial contract; it was an arrangement whereby 
the Government purported to give an assurance as 
to what its executive action would be in the future 
in relation to a particular ship .... And that is 
to my mind, not a contract for the breach of which 
damage can be sued for in a Court of law.^
Two conclusions can be derived from this statement; first, that
The Amphitrite was not a case dealing with a commercial contract;
The Amphitrite, id. at 503 .
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but hod it been so on the facts, the Government would have 
been bound to pay damages for its breach; and second, that 
The Amphitrite was not a case of a contract at all: it was 
merely "an assurance" given by the Crown which amounted to 
no more than "an expression of intention to act in a partic­
ular way in a certain event".^ Viewed in this way, it is 
clear that the case is an authority only for the proposition 
that the Crown cannot be prevented from an appropriate
exercise of the defence power in time of war by an undertaking
2previously given by the Crown.
The Amphitrite has, however, been interpreted to establish
that the Crown may not enter into a contract which would "fetter
its future executive action". What this doctrine implies is
that the Crown may breach its contracts with impunity if at
a future moment it finds such contracts inconvenient or their
performance undesirable. The Amphitrite, believed to be estab-
3lishing such a law, has been severely criticised. Turpin, 
for example, has observed:
A principle that struck down every contract by which 
the future executive action of the Crown was impeded 
would be a serious hindrance to the government in its 
contracting activities. Especially likely to offend
^Denning J in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions [1949] 1 K.B.
227, 231.
2See per Bright J in Director of Posts and Telegraphs v. Abbott 
(1974)2 2F. L.R. S.A. Sup. Ct. 157, 168, where his Honour also 
observes that The Amphitrite did not deal with a contractual 
situation.
3See Hogg, op.cit. at 155, and the authorities cited there.
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against the principle would be contracts for the 
disposal of government property, e.g. an unwanted 
factory or aircraft carrier, for by such contracts 
the Crown limits or destroys its future freedom of 
action with regard to the property to be disposed 
of .... [T]his view does not take account of those 
major procurement contracts that involve a commit­
ment of capital resources, facilities and skilled 
effort on the part of the government in the course 
of performance; such a contract, if binding, clearly 
places limits upon the government's freedom of action 
- in particular, to apply these resources to other 
purposes.1
At the present time, when contracts worth thousands of 
dollars are entered into every day and many or most of the 
governmental functions are performed by private contractors, 
any principle which gives the Government the protection of 
the doctrine of executive necessity, obviously destroys the 
credit of Government. It is not denied that situations can 
arise when the Government exercising its undoubted national 
responsibilities, may find it necessary to rescind certain 
contracts; what cannot be admitted is that a contractor should 
be made to bear the brunt of such administrative exigencies.
As Hogg has put it:
[T]he Crown occasionally has to break a contract in 
the public interest. When it does break a contract, 
however, it should pay damages to the injured party, 
assessed in the ordinary way .... In order to preserve 
its freedom of action only one immunity is needed by 
the Crown, and that is immunity from the remedies of 
specific performance and injunction, which really 
would fetter its future executive action.2
^Turpin, Government Contracts (1972) 20-21.
2Op. cit.155. The author adds that if payment of damages is not con­
sidered feasible by Government, "then a deliberate decision to 
expropriate private rights should be made and implemented by 
parliament, if necessary by retrospective legislation, and the 
government should take the political consequences."
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In a recent case in Director of Posts and Telegraphs
v. Abbott,1 one of the arguments made before the Court was that
the Government was not bound because of an implied term in the
contract that it was not to fetter the future exercise of
executive discretion. In other words, the suggestion was that
even if there was a binding contract between the Government
and the respondent, the Government could avoid performance in
the public interest. Though this question was here academic
(as the Court found on the facts that there was no contract
for the installation of a telephone connection between the
respondent and the Postmaster General's Office, the sales clerk
who dealt with the respondent having no actual or ostensible
authority to contract on behalf of the Postmaster General),
Bright J nevertheless observed:
I take it that when the Crown is entrusted in any 
capacity with a discretion it can exercise it no 
matter what ministry or ministers may be involved.
So if the Postmaster-General has granted a lease 
of a telephone service clearly the Crown can termin­
ate the service either by acquisition of the build­
ing or, at least in time of war, under the defence 
power to prevent breaches of security, or pursuant 
to any one or more of a number of prerogative or 
statutory powers. But that is not to say that the 
Crown has in all cases an unlimited and unlimitable 
discretion, when it has entered into a contract, to 
refuse performance.2
1(1974) 22 F.L.R. S.A. Sup. Ct. 157.
2Director of Posts and Telegraphs v. Abbott, op.cit. at 167.
(My italics).
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This approach is similar to that advocated by Professor 
Richardson1 23and is indicated in the following lines written 
by the author:
If the subject matter of the Crown's commitment 
involves a restraint on the.exercise of discretionary 
powers which are purely governmental in character, 
a court may readily hold that there is no intention 
to create legal rights and obligations. If such an 
agreement should specifically state that it is 
intended to give rise to contractual rights and 
obligations, in the present state of authorities, 
it would be open to the Court to hold that the 
arrangement is so far removed from the ordinary 
subject matters of contract that the Crown cannot 
legally bind itself. Otherwise, however, at least 
where the Crown is by contract binding itself to 
do or not to do only things which any ordinary 
person might bind himself to do or not to do, as, 
for example, entering into a contract to purchase 
goods over a period of time, there is no reason why 
the Crown should not be capable of affecting the 
substance of its discretion to deal freely with 
such matters during the term of the contract.^
The Crown's right to terminate a contract in the public
interest is not denied, but the crucial question is whether
the Crown should not be made liable to pay damages for a breach,
or at least pay some 'compensation' like a private party, in
3every case it refuses to perform its promise. Of course to spea 
of the Government's liability in damages is. to ignore the 
realities of current Government practice whereby the standard
^Richardson, "The Executive Power of the Commonwealth" in 
Commentaries on the Australian Constitution: A Tribute to 
Geoffrey Sawer, (ed. Zines, 1977) Chapter 2, 50,76-80.
2Id. at 80.
3 Hogg, op. cit. at 155; see also Mitchell, The Contracts 
of Public Authorities (1954) 288.
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conditions empower the Government to determine the contract at 
any time by giving to the contractor written notice and then 
indemnifying the contractor only to the extent of expenditure 
reasonably incurred."*' But perhaps these conditions represent 
a sort of tacit admission that the Government would otherwise 
be liable for unjustified breach.
(d) Legislative appropriations 
Another suggested limitation on the Commonwealth's contrac­
tual capacity relates to the parliamentary appropriation of 
funds. At one time it was thought that provisions of funds by
Parliament was a condition precedent to the validity of govern- 
2ment contracts. This view was rejected in New South Wales v.
3Bardolph and since that judgment, the law has been, as 
Professor Campbell puts it:
[W]hen the Crown enters into a contract under which it 
agrees to pay money, the validity of the contract is in 
no way affected by the fact that when the agreement was 
made, Parliament had not voted moneys to enable the 
commitment to be met. In other words, the absence of 
appropriation does not affect the Crown's contractual 
obligation, but only the enforceability of a judgment 
debt.* 234
These conditions are sometimes called as "Break" or "Termination 
for Convenience" clauses. For a detailed discussion of the 
working of these conditions, see infra, ch. IV.
2Churchward v. The Queen (1865) L.R. I Q.B. 173, 209, 210;
The Commonwealth v . Colonial Combing, Spinning and Weaving 
Co. Ltd. (Wooltops case) (1922) 31 C.L.R. 421; Australian 
Railways Union v. Victorian Railways Commissioners (1930)
44 C.L.R. 319. See also Commercial Cable Co v. Government 
of Newfoundland [1916] 2 A.C. 610, 617.
3(1934) 52 C.L.R. 455.
4 Campbell, "Private claims on Public Funds" (1969) 3 
Univ. of Tas. L. Rev. 138, 139 (citing New South Wales v.
Bardolph).
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In that case an action was brought in the High Court by Bardolph
against the State of New South Wales in which he claimed a certain
sum due to him as payment for advertisements in the plaintiff's
newspaper circulating in New South Wales. The Government pleaded,
inter alia, that it incurred no liability since no money for this
purpose had been appropriated by Parliament, nor sanctioned by
any legislative enactment. The High Court held that the Crown in
right of the Government of New South Wales was bound to pay.^
Dixon J, who discussed the case-law in great detail, remarked:
[T]he prior provision of funds by Parliament is not a 
condition preliminary to the obligation of the contract.
If it were so, performance on the part of the subject 
could not be exacted nor could he, if he did perform, 
establish a disputed claim to an amount of money under 
his contract until actual disbursement of the money in 
dispute was authorised by Parliament .... It would 
defeat the very object of such provisions as those 
contained in the Judiciary Act, if, before the Courts 
could pass upon the validity in other respects of the 
subject's claim against the Crown, it were necessary 
that Parliament should vote the moneys to satisfy it.
The view that provision of funds by Parliament is a
condition precedent to the validity of government contracts,
3according to Turpin, has been the result of placing a wrong
4construction upon the decision in Churchward v. The Queen.
"There is no doubt that this decision applies to contracts 
involving public money made by the Crown in right of the Common­
wealth, i.e. by the authority of the Governor-General in Council." 
Sawer, Federalism Under Strain, Australia 1972-1975 (1977) 71.
2 (1934) 52 C.L.R. 455, 510. In the United States, it may be 
noted, a different rule obtains. There the executive departments 
and agencies of the Federal Government are not permitted, unless 
specially authorised by law, to make contracts in advance of 
appropriations.
3Government Contracts (1972) 26.
4 (1865) L.R. 1 Q.B. 173.
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The author holds that the appropriation of funds is not relevant
to the validity of contracts and adds:
Clearly, to hold approval of estimates and appropriation 
to be necessary for the making of a valid contract, as 
opposed to payment under a contract, would be to distort 
the purpose of Estimates and, worse, to impose a serious 
limitation upon the contractual powers of the government.
It is submitted that a rule that requires that no commit­
ment to expenditure should be undertaken, and in particular no 
contract made which imposes liability upon the government for 
the payment of money, until funds have been appropriated by 
Parliament, would hardly be workable.
(v) Government's Contracting Authority 
under the Audit Act
Though in Australia, government contracting is not
subject to intrinsic limitations, it must nevertheless conform
to the procedures and requirements under the Audit Act 1901- 
21975- Section 71(1) of the Act is the most important section
3relating to government purchasing. This empowers the Governor-
General to make regulations for and in relation to -
... (d) the execution of works and the supply of
services for or by the Commonwealth, (e) the purchase 
of chattels and other property for or by the Common­
wealth, and (f) the custody, issue, sale or other
Turpin, op.cit. at 25; contra Street, Government Liability:
A Comparative Study (1953) 84-85, 92.
2The citation of the Audit Act 1901-1973 was amended by Postal 
and Telecommunications Commissions (Transitional Provisions) Act 
1975 (section 38 and Schedule 3).
3Other sections of the Act relevant to government purchasing are 
sections 53 and 63A.
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disposal and writing off of stores and other property 
of the Commonwealth, and the proper accounting for, 
and stocktaking of, those stores and that property.
In pursuance of the power given to him under s.71(l) of
the Act, the Governor-General has made Regulations earlier
known as "Treasury Regulations" but now called the "Finance
Regulations"^ which lay down the principles and procedures to
be followed by all Departments entering into government contracts
2within Australia or overseas. While most of the provisions of
the Finance Regulations are in the nature of general financial
rules of the Government, regs. 4, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52A,
52AA, 52B and 53 prescribe procedures to be followed in relation
to all government contracts - whether for works, stores or
services. These contracts are treated in the Regulations as
contracts for supplies and sub-reg. 4(1) states:
'Supplies' means supplies that are to be executed, 
furnished or performed for or by the Commonwealth, 
and includes works, stores and services that are to 
be so executed, furnished or performed.
The citation was changed from the "Treasury Regulations" to 
the "Finance Regulations" by Statutory Rules 1976, No.260 
(7 December 1976) and thus hereinafter the "Treasury Regulations" 
are cited as "Finance Regulations" in the discussion. The 
Finance Regulations, in force under the Audit Act, 1901-1975, 
comprise Statutory Rules 1942, No. 523, as amended by Statutory 
Rules 1943, No.32; 1953, No.3; 1959, No.9; 1961, Nos.77 and 122; 
1964, No.21; 1965, Nos.32 and 169; 1966, No.176; 1968, No.87; 
1972, No.31; 1974, No.129; 1975, No.156; and 1976, Nos.91 and 260 
2See reg.5A. It may be noted here that the Audit Act and Finance 
Regulations are not applicable to some statutory bodies like 
Australian National Resources, Australian National Line, Qantas, 
T.A.A., Australian Postal Commission, C.S.I.R.O., Australian 
Telecom. Commission, etc. They may, however, procure goods and 
services through the Purchasing Division, Department of Adminis­
trative Services and A.G.S.T.B.
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The provisions of the Finance Regulations dealing with 
obtaining of supplies, may be divided for convenience into three 
groups as under: (a) Preparation of a requisition for supplies;
(b) Mode of obtaining supplies; and (c) Publication of provisions 
of certain contracts.
(a) Preparation of a requisition for supplies
Every officer requiring supplies has to prepare a
2requisition for supplies. It should relate only to supplies
3that are necessary for the proper conduct of the public service.
The supplies required should be clearly described and, where
appropriate and practicable, the quantity of the supplies and
4the estimated rate should also be specified. A requisition
5has to be prepared in accordance with the prescribed form in 
all cases except where supplies are to be obtained from or through 
the Department of Construction. In the latter case it has to be
6in the form determined by the Minister of State for Construction.
Before a requisition is approved by one of the authorities pre-
7scribed under reg.49, the appropriate Authorising Officer issues
1 2See regs. 46-50. Sub-regulation 46(1).
3 4Id. para, (a) . _Id. para, (c) .
5Form 11, The Schedule to the Finance Regulations.
6Sub-paras. (i) and (ii) of reg.46(1)(b).
7Regulation 49 states the names of authorities empowered to 
approve a requisition as follows: (a) for those supplies for
which the appropriation of funds is "under the control of a 
Department of the Parliament", - the President of the Senate or 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives or both or an officer 
appointed by either or both, as the case may be; (b) for those 
supplies for which the appropriation of funds is under the con­
trol of Department of Construction - the Minister of State for 
Construction and (c) in any other case - the Minister of State 
of the Department in which the requistion originated.
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a certificate that funds are available for the purpose
of the requisition.^" Regulation 50 prescribes the procedure
under which expenditure may be incurred for small-value 
2purchases in cases of emergency, without first complying 
with the procedure stated above provided the amount of 
expenditure incurred does not exceed the maximum fixed by 
the Treasurer or $50, as the case may be. Only after the 
approval of a requisition is the Department concerned ready 
for procuring the supplies and entering into a contract.
3(b) Mode of obtaining supplies 
The general principle governing government procurement 
is stated under reg. 52 which prescribes that for all 
government contracts for supplies, beyond the monetary limit
See sub-reg.47(1). It may be noted that a different procedure 
is prescribed for requisitions of the Department of Construction 
(see reg.48). The certificate of the Authorising Officer regard­
ing the availability of funds is also not necessary if the case 
falls under sub-reg.47(2).
2For the procedure relating to small purchases, see a recent 
publication, Small Purchases Handbook (13 April 1977) Purchasing 
Division, Department of Administrative Services. See generally, 
McGlynn (PMG, Supply Branch) "Small Value Orders"
(October 1972) Australian Purchasing.
3See regs. 51, 52, 52A, 52AA and 52B.
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of $5,000 and subject to reg.5*2AKshall be entered into by- 
public invitation of tenders. Besides enumerating five special 
situations under which public invitation of tenders may be
The threshold for invitation of public tenders was raised from 
$1,000 to $5,000 by an amendment made by Statutory Rules 1975, 
No. 156. The amount was probably raised following the recommend­
ation made by the Scott Committee, see Recommendation 10, paras. 
9.92 - 9.100. Regulation 51 as amended by Statutory Rules 1975, 
No. 156 in its present form reads:
51.
(1) Subject to any Act making provisions with respect 
to contracts for supplies and to regulation 52AA 
of these Regulations, where -
(a) any supplies the estimated cost of which 
exceeds one hundred dollars;
(b) there is no existing contract between 
the Commonwealth and the supplier under 
which the supplies so required can be 
obtained; and
(c) the supplies are not obtained under a 
contract between a State and a supplier, 
representative quotations for the supplies 
shall, whenever possible, be obtained unless 
tenders are publicly invited.
(2) [Repealed]
(3) Where the estimated cost of any supplies exceeds 
one hundred dollars but does not exceed two hundred 
and fifty dollars, a quotation obtained under this 
regulation in respect of the supplies may be oral
or in writing, but, in the case of an oral quotation, 
the details of the quotation shall be recorded in 
the appropriate Departmental file.
(4) Where the estimated cost of any supplies exceeds 
two hundred and fifty dollars, each quotation 
obtained under this regulation in respect of those 
supplies shall be in writing.
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dispensed with, sub-reg. 52AA(2) makes provision for the 
issuance of 'Certificates of Inexpediency' in the following 
manner:
Where the Secretary certifies that compliance with 
regulation 51 ... is, having regard to the nature of 
the supplies and to the established practices in a 
profession, business, trade or industry connected 
with the supply of supplies of that kind, impracticable 
or inexpedient, regulation 51 of these Regulations or 
the last preceding regulation, as the case may be, 
does not apply to the supplies of that kind.
Sub-regulation 52AA(4) further empowers the Secretary, or an
officer authorised by him, to exempt the prescribed kinds of 
2supplies from the operation of regs. 51 and 52 by reason of 
the urgency with which those particular supplies are required 
and because the procurement of those supplies by public tender, 
is impracticable or inexpedient.
—-------  and 52
The five cases to which regs. 51' is made inapplicable are enum­
erated in 52AA(1). They are: (a) supplies the expenditure on 
which is authorised by the Governor-General; (b) supplies to 
be obtained under an existing contract between a supplier and 
the Commonwealth or a State; (c) supplies to be obtained from 
the Australian Government Publishing Service, the Commonwealth 
Printing Office, a State Government Printing Office, Commonwealth 
factories, Commonwealth workshops, Commonwealth stores or Common­
wealth dockyards; (d) supplies that by their nature can be 
obtained only from a State Government Department, an authority 
of a State or Territory or a municipal or other local governing 
body; (e) supplies of radioactive isotopes for medical purposes 
to be obtained by the Commonwealth X-ray and Radium Laboratory 
of the Department of Health from the Australian Atomic Energy 
Commission.
2Sub-regulation 52AA(4) applies to supplies enumerated in sub- 
reg.52AA(3). They are: (a) metals for use in the manufacture,
by or on behalf of the Commonwealth, of coins, medals, medallions, 
plaques, and other like objects at a mint; (b) supplies relating 
to the defence of the Commonwealth; (c) supplies for the Depart­
ment of Construction; (d) supplies obtained by or on behalf of 
the Administrator of the Territory of Christmas Island in connect­
ion with the administration of the Territory; and (e) supplies 
approved, or to be obtained, by the A.G.S.T.B. or by a Tender 
Board of a Department.
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By whatever manner a contractor is selected - whether by 
competitive tender under reg.52 or by inviting quotations under 
reg.51 or by negotiations under 52AA, the Chief Officer^ or an
officer authorised by him, issues a Purchase Order in accordance
2 2 with Form 13 in respect of supplies specified in the requisition.”
(c) Publication of provisions of certain 
contracts
Sub-regulation 53(1) requires publication in the
Australian Government Gazette of 'a summary of the provisions of
the contract' for contracts for supplies not less than one
4thousand dollars. Certain exceptions are set out in sub-reg.
53(2). Sub-regulation 53(3) enables information relating to
contracts, in addition to that published in the Gazette, to be 
5disclosed. The present practice of Government is to publish 
each week in the Australian Government Gazette in its General 
issues the following information^: (1) "Tenders Invited" which
contains notices regarding invitation of tenders under the name 
of the Department purchasing the goods or services along with a
^For the definition of "Chief Officer" see sub-reg.4(1), as 
amended by Statutory Rules 1974, No.129.
2See the Schedule to the Finance Regulations.
3Regulation 52A. Regulation 52B states the duties of Certifying 
Officers in relation to requisitions.
4The amount of Four hundred dollars was raised to One thousand 
dollars by an amendment by Statutory Rules 1975, No.156.
5For the history of reg.53 and specifically on the desirability 
or otherwise of disclosing a successful tenderer's unit price, see 
Seventy-Seventh Report, Joint Committee of Public Accounts, P.P. 
No.251 of 1964-65. See also the discussion regarding Post-Award 
Policy, supra; Scott Committee Report paras. 2.35, 2.36; 4.67 - 
4.71 and 10.92 - 10.95.
^Finance Instructions 31/33 - 34.
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brief description, closing date of Tenders and the addresses of 
places where the interested tenderers might obtain the forms, 
specifications, etc. for the purpose of quoting their prices;
(2) "Contracts Arranged" which contains the list of all Purchase 
Orders issued by each Department of the Commonwealth Government 
along with the tender reference number, description of supplies, 
the total value of the contract, the name of the contractor, 
the place where the contract is entered into and the duration 
of the contract, where appropriate.
(vi) Directions issued under the Finance 
Regulations
Section 71(2) of the Audit Act 1901-1975, provides that
the regulations may authorise the Secretary to the Department
of the Treasury'*' to give directions to persons subject to the
provisions of the Act "for or in relation to any of the matters
referred to in paragraphs (a) to (f) inclusive of the last pre-
2ceding sub-section". The regulations may also authorise a 
prescribed officer of a Department to give directions to officers
3of, or persons employed in, that Department. The directions 
should, of course, be not inconsistent with the Audit Act or any 
other Act or with any regulations issued under the Audit Act or 
any other Act. The regulations may also provide that a contra-
"*"Now the Secretary to the Department of Finance: Statutory Rules 
1976 No.260.
2The matters which relate to government contracts have been 
stated, supra.
3Section 71(2)(b) of the Audit Act.
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vcntion of a direction so given may be deemed to be a breach 
of the regulations."*"
Such authorisation to give directions is provided by the
Finance Regulation 12 7A, which in substance repeats the terms
of s.71(2) of the Audit Act. After the amendment of the Treasury
Regulations by Statutory Rules 1976, No.260, the Secretary to
the Department of Finance is authorised to give directions under
reg.l27A, but any directions that were in force before tha t date
and given by the Secretary to the Department of the Treasury,
2continue to be in force. The Directions given by the Secretary 
to the Treasury are contained in a Manual issued pursuant to 
s.16 of the Audit Act and Treasury Regulation 127A. Treasury 
Directions ss.31 and 32 contain directions (relating to govern­
ment contracts) which explain, inter alia, the objectives of the
3relevant regulations. Treasury (Overseas Accounts) Directions 
Nos. 11, 12 and 13 prescribe the standard procedures for the 
obtaining of supplies overseas.
(vii) Are the Regulations and Directions legally 
enforceable?
It is interesting to find out whether the regulations and 
directions, so far as they are material to government contracts,
1Section 71(2)(c).
2Regulation 10, Statutory Rules 1976, No.260.
3A copy of the up-to-date relevant sections of the Audit Act 
and a copy of the major Finance Regulations and Directions 
mentioned above are included as Appendix.
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can be enforced at the instance of a contractor in the court
of law, if a breach is established?^ Or are they merely for
internal consumption of the Government Departments? If an
2accounting officer or a person subject to the provisions of 
the Audit Act commits any breach of the Regulations (or Direct­
ions, since a contravention of a Direction is deemed to be a
3breach of a Regulation ), reg.133 authorises the Treasurer to 
impose a penalty not exceeding Ten dollars upon that accounting
4officer or person. Regulations 131, 131A and 132 also deal 
with the duties of officers to acquaint themselves with the 
regulations and directions, to make them accessible to certain 
officers and to ensure their compliance. None of these 
provisions make any mention of the rights of contractors.
But if, for example, a Purchase Order is issued under reg.
52A in contravention of say, reg.52, without an invitation 
of tenders (although the cost of the contract exceeds $5,000, 
'certificate of inexpediency' has not been issued, and the 
case does not fall within sub-reg.52AA(1)), what avenues are 
open for other contractor/s to challenge the ultra vires 
contract? A similar question arises regarding the legality
^The question has not arisen so far, but its possibility cannot 
be ruled out.
2For the definition of "accounting officer", see the Audit Act 
1901-1975, section 2.
3Sub-regulation 127A(3) of the Finance Regulations and s.71(2)(c) 
of the Audit Act 1901-1975.
4Such an authority to impose penalty is conferred by s.71(4) 
of the Audit Act.
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of the various standard conditions, to be found in the 
General Conditions of Government Contracts; we shall 
consider them further in a later chapter.^
4. Government Contracts - Are they enforceable if not 
in writing?
Although Finance Regulations and Directions deal extensively
with the formation of government contracts, the creation of a
contractual relationship is still largely determined by common
law principles. In the past these principles have been derived
primarily from case law. Although in some areas like the sale
of goods, legislation has emerged as a source of legal principles
for application to government contract, yet the rules and
decisions governing contract formation and contract performance
2are to be found in the common law of contracts.
Specific contract formation procedures followed by the 
Government may vary depending upon the procurement technique 
being utilised and the individual circumstances of each
3procurement action. However, the common law rules of offer 
and acceptance form the foundation of the government contract 
formation process.
See infra chapter IV.
2For a detailed analysis of U.S. case-law, see Note, "The 
Application of Common-Law Contract Principles in the Court 
of Claims: 1950 to Present" (1963) 49 Va. L. Rev. 773.
3"Procurement of Supplies is effected through some 150 
purchasing agencies of the Commonwealth": see Gilmour,
"Government Purchasing Arrangements" (May 1977) (unpublished 
manuscript) Purchasing Division, Department of Administrative 
Services, Canberra.
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When procurement is conducted by formal advertising, 
the Government's Invitation for Bids (IFB) is a request for 
offers, the prospective contractor's bid constitutes the 
offer, and the Government's Purchase Order (issued in accord­
ance with Form 13, Finance Regulations)^ is the acceptance.
The IFB, the bid and the Purchase Order are always written 
documents. In negotiated procurement, offers are solicited 
by Requests for Proposals (RFP) or Requests for Quotations 
(RFQ) and when negotiations conclude with an agreement, the 
Government reduces the agreement to writing in an integratedit
document and sends^to the contractor for execution. Upon his 
signature and return it becomes the offer. Finance Regulation 
52A requires that after obtaining approval from the Approving 
Authority (the Minister or one of his delegates or the relevant
Finance Regulation 52A reads as follows:
(1) When -
(a) an Authorising Officer has -
(i) certified that funds are available for the 
purpose of a Requisition; or 
(ii) given a certificate of a kind referred to in 
paragraph (a) of sub-regulation (2) of regul­
ation 47 of these Regulations by virtue of 
which a certificate whether funds are available 
for the purpose of a Requisition is not 
required; and
(b) the Requisition has been approved after submission 
for approval under regulation 49 of these Regulations.
the appropriate Chief Officer, or an officer authorised for 
the purpose by the appropriate Chief Officer, shall issue 
a Purchase Order in accordance with Form 13 in respect of 
the supplies specified in the Requisition.
(2) Unless the Treasurer otherwise approves, Purchase Orders 
shall be prepared in triplicate and shall be numbered 
consecutively.
(3) A Purchase Order shall not be issued except in accordance 
with the Requisition as approved.
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tender board) for the acceptance of a tender/quotation, the 
next step to be taken to complete the legal requirement is to 
furnish a form of acceptance to the successful tenderer. This 
Purchase Order, which inescapably has to be in writing, is 
sometimes called a Contract Acceptance and Purchase Order 
(commonly referred to by its acronymic, "CAPO ") . "*" CAPO is the 
basic contractual document which contains all the terms and 
conditions of a Commonwealth contract for supplies.
Normally, therefore, government contracts are entered into 
in writing. But the question is: will a government contract
be enforceable if it is not reduced into writing in the manner 
prescribed by the Finance Regulations? But first, what is the 
law governing private contracts? Are they required to be put 
in writing?
Very briefly, the common law did not require a contract
to be in any particular form as a condition of its validity
or enforceability. By statute, however, certain contracts
had to be evidenced in writing, as by the Statute of Frauds,
2ss.4 and 17. The Statute was received in Australia as part 
of the common law of England. Section 4 under one guise or
This is the present practice in the Purchasing Division of 
the Department of Administrative Services, which is the 
Commonwealth's biggest procurement agency.
2For an analysis of cases, see Roebuck, Law of
Contract: Text and Materials (Law Book Co. 1974) 112-32-
For a detailed account of the history and policy of the Statute 
of Frauds, see Cheshire and Fifoot, The Law of Contract (2nd 
Australian ed. by Starke and Higgins, 1969) 261-300; McGarvie, 
Pannam and Hocker, Cases and Materials on Contract (3rd ed. 
1975) 292-342.
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another is still the law in the Australian Capital Territory 
and in all the States with the exception of Western Australia.^ 
By its Law Reform (Statute of Frauds) Act 1962, Western 
Australia has partly followed in the footsteps of the U.K. 
and has repealed the provisions of s.4 with regard to special 
promises of executors and administrators, agreements in 
consideration of marriage and agreements not to be performed 
within one year of the making thereof.
The law governing the sale of goods in Australia is based
on the English Sale of Goods Act of 1893, the various States
having enacted legislation identical with the parent Act. In
all the Australian States, s.17 has been repealed but re-enacted
2in the Sale of Goods Acts. Section 9 of the Sale of Goods Act 
1923-1953 (N.S.W.) (in other States the provision is identical),
for example, imposes a requirement of form in the case of a 
contract for the sale of goods of the value of $20 or upwards.
E.g. for contracts for sales of lands, etc. see: Statute of
Frauds 1677, s.4 (A.C.T. and W.A.); Conveyancing Act 1919 s.54A 
(N.S.W.); Statute of Frauds 1972 s.5 (Q.); Law of Property Act 
1936, s.26(l) (S.A.); Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884
s.36 (Tas.); and Instruments Act 1958, s.126 (Vic.). For 
liability of executors and administrators, see: Statute of
Frauds 1677, s.4 (A.C.T., N.S.W. and S.A.); Statute of Frauds
and Limitations Act 1867, s.5 (Q. ); Mercantile Law Act 1935, 
s.6 (Tas.) and instruments Act 1958, s.126 (Vic.). See generally, 
Roebuck, op.cit. 112-32.
2Sale of Goods Ordinance 1954 (A.C.T.) s.9; Sale of Goods Act 
1923-1953 (N.S.W.) s.9; Sale of Goods Ordinance 1972 (N.T.) 
s.8; Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Q.) s.7; Sale of Goods Act 1895- 
1952 (S.A .) s.4; Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Tas.) s.9; Goods
Act 1958 (Vic.) s.9 and Sale of Goods Act 1895 (W.A.) s.4.
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Such a contract is unenforceable unless the buyer accepts
part of the goods so sold and actually receives the same or
gives something in earnest to bind the contract or in part
payment, or unless a note or memorandum in writing of the
contract is made and signed by the party to be charged.^ In
the U.K. however, s.4 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, which
re-enacted s.17 of the Statute of Frauds was repealed by the
Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1954 (U.K.) s.2.
So far the only Australian State to follow the lead thus given 
2is Queensland.
No statute makes the Statute of Frauds (or its re-enacted
provision) applicable to government contracts. But since, in
the absence of a contrary statutory rule or regulation, the
rules governing formation of government contracts are frequently
based on the legal principles of the common law of contracts,
it may be assumed that government contracts are also required
to be put in writing in such cases where private contracts are.
As far back as 1924, the Victorian Court (Mann J) held in
3The King v. Hay that Crown contracts for sale of goods must 
be in writing to be enforceable. In a suit by the Crown for
^As to how far can a contract caught by s.9 be altered verbally 
and what legal effect would such an alteration have, see Sutton, 
The Law of Sale of Goods in Australia and New Zealand (2nd ed. 
1974) 74-77.
2Statute of Frauds 1972 (Q.) s.3. Western Australia's Law 
Reform (Statute of Frauds) Act 1962 has, however, left s.4 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1895 intact.
3 [1924] V.L.R. 97.
96
recovery of £90, the price of certain stacks of hay sold 
to the defendant under an oral agreement, the defendant, 
inter alia, argued that since the contract sued on was a 
contract for the sale of goods of the value of £10 or upwards, 
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds were not complied 
with, and the said contract was therefore not enforceable by 
action. The Court holding that "the Crown was bound by the 
provisions of sec.9 of the Goods Act11/  gave judgment for the 
de fendant.
In a recent case in Coogee Esplanade Surf Motel Pty. Ltd.
2v. Commonwealth of Australia, (a case, unfortunately, unreported) 
one of the questions involved was whether a government contract 
made orally could be enforced? The facts were: the appellant
sought against the Commonwealth an order for specific performance 
of an alleged oral contract to buy the Coogee Bay Motel and 
certain furniture and furnishings therein for $700,000. The 
oral contract was alleged to have been made on the telephone 
on 4 June 1975 by the Under-Secretary of the Department of 
Services and Property (the present Department of Administrative 
Services) on behalf of the Commonwealth and the appellant.
This telephone conversation was alleged to be the subject 
of a written memorandum provided by a letter
~^ Id. at 101.
2Unreported, see [1976] A.C.L.D. 233 [Court of Appeal, Supreme 
Court of New South Wales, C.A. No.368 of 1975, 16 March 1976] .
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dated 6 June 1975, signed by the Chief Property Officer for New 
South Wales of the above Department. The Commonwealth contended, 
inter alia, that any such contract to come into existence must be 
wholly in writing, signed by the party to be charged, and contain 
a recognition or admission of the existence of a contract.
The trial court (Needham J) found that although an oral 
agreement for the sale and purchase of the motel was made on 
4 June 1975 between the Under Secretary of the relevant Depart­
ment and the appellant, "[w]ithout writing it would, of
course, be unenforceable".^ It was found, however, that the 
letter of 6 June 1975 constituted a sufficient memorandum of the 
contract. But on another ground, namely, that the Under Secretary 
had no authority to make a contract for the purchase of the motel 
building for the Commonwealth, the court dismissed the summons.
The Court of Appeal, however, did not think that an oral 
contract was, per se, unenforceable. MoffittJ found that the 
facts showed there was no intention to enter into an oral contract 
and that
... the fact that the exercise of the power to contract 
was administered by set procedures carried out by other 
departmental officers and was being so administered on 
4th June, was a very powerful circumstance, making most 
difficult an inferred verbal contract.
1No. 1821 of 1975 (3 December 1975) at 12, The Supreme Court of 
New South Wales, Equity Division.
2Court of Appeal, op,cit. 10. See also at 12-13. (per Moffitt 
and Glass JJ, Hutley J dissenting).
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He added
One would expect the most positive indications, if not 
direct words, to conclude there was a sudden change of 
procedure to a verbal contract to buy for $700,000.^
He also held that the letter of 6 June did not purport to be a
2memorandum of any oral agreement.
Ilutley J, who delivered a dissenting opinion, however, went
a step further and expressly stated that there was nothing
irregular in an informal contract between the Commonwealth and 
3the appellant. He said:
No evidence was given as to what were the regular methods 
of contracts adopted by the Commonwealth and without 
express evidence that the powers of the Commonwealth 
officers were limited to contracting in a particular 
manner, I would not assume that any such limitation 
existed. In the case of a permanent head, unless limited 
by statute or regulation, he can make his own rules as 
to how he runs his department and how it will operate.^
His Honour, however, also found that the letter dated 6 June 1975 
satisfied s.54A of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (N.S.W.), which 
required that contracts for sale etc. of land must be in writing.
It appears from the foregoing that there is no general 
principle of law which requires that Commonwealth contracts must 
be made in writing. But if a statute or a regulation expressly 
prescribes that certain contracts should be put in writing, then 
of course, they must be made in that manner to be enforceable.
In private contracts as noted above, the statutory laws of each 
State do prescribe writing for contracts
1Ibid.
2 Id. at 17-19.
3Hutley J, op. cit. at 7.
4Id . at 6.
of sale of goods, sale
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of land etc., and certain other contracts. The same principle
seems to apply to government contracts in such cases/
Suggestions have however been made that the requirement of
writing in private contracts, particularly sale of goods, is not
very desirable. Professor Roebuck, for example, has strongly
suggested that the requirement of written evidence is unnecessary
2in the present times and should be abolished by legislation.
In the author's own words:
The Australian States should ... repeal the section of 
the Sale of Goods Acts which requires contracts for the 
sale of goods of the value of twenty dollars and upwards 
to be evidenced in writing. This has been done with 
entirely beneficent consequences in England and New 
Zealand.3
The view that the requirement of writing in contracts is
. . 4superfluous, has been held by other authorities too.
While in private contracts, the requirement of writing 
rightly seems unnecessary in the present state of affairs, in 
government contracts, it is submitted,the requirement of a written 
contract protects both government and a private contractor from 
the possibility of fraud or misinterpretation by the other. More
This does raise a constitutional issue as to whether the State 
laws can on their own force apply to the Commonwealth. This 
matter has been discussed in the previous section.
2Op.cit. at 113.
3Id. 127. At 131, the author observes that "the legislation 
requiring written evidence has little to support it, and causes 
more harm than good".
4 .See Cheshire and Fifoot, op.cit. 263-64 (citing (1885)
1 L.Q.R.l); Sutton, The Law of Sale of Goods in Australia and 
New Zealand (2nd ed. 1974) 39-40. See generally, Barnett v.
Ira L. and A.C. Berk Pty Ltd. (1952) 52 S.R.(N.S.W.) 268, 275; 
Wiskin v. Terdick Bros Pty Ltd. [1928] Arg.L.R. 242 (Vic.F.C.);
U.K. Law Revision Committee (1937) Cmnd.5449.
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importantly, a writing requirement in government contracts may 
help to protect the taxpayer's dollar from being pillaged by the 
presentment of claims of the most extraordinary character if 
allowed to be sustained by parol evidence, which can always be 
produced to any required extent. It may also avoid favouritism 
in awards and thus prevent fraud. Thus, written contracts safe­
guard the government from being saddled with liability for perhaps 
secretive contracts. It may also be mentioned in passing that the 
rule that government contracts must be in writing has a similar 
aim to that of the rule that public contracts in sums exceeding 
some specified minimum, must be generally awarded by competitive 
tender.
A number of other reasons justify a policy favouring written 
agreements in government contracts, as against private contracts, 
such as the public accountability and public audit of government 
contracts, existence of numerous terms and conditions, involvement 
of a body of officials which might not consist of the same indi­
viduals all the time, avoidance of frivolous and vexatious 
litigation against an already busy administration. Needless to 
add that the requirement of writing makes things easier for both parties.
It may however be argued that since hundreds of goverment 
officials daily enter into a variety of contracts, often of a 
petty nature, the requirement of writing would make its compliance 
in practical terms extremely inconvenient from the administrative 
point of view. It may further be argued, citing in support the 
recent Coogee Surf Motel case’*' that a strict compliance with such
^Unreported. Court of Appeal, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 
C.A. No. 368 of 1975, 16 March 1976.
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a rule would jeopardise the interests of unsuspecting and unwary-
parties entering into contracts with government officials.
tkat
Aside from the factAthe preceding arguments seem to consti­
tute a conclusion that oral contracts will not lead to 
inconvenience and hardships, the absence of case-law (except for 
the two cases discussed above) in the last 50 years in Australia, 
belies those arguments. Even in these two cases, the rule 
requiring writing, it is submitted, seems to have done no mischief 
to the private parties. In the first case, viz. The King v. Hay, 
it may be recalled, the Court gave judgment against the Crown and 
in the second, Coogee Surf Motel case, the Court of Appeal's
ultimate decision was based upon its conclusion that there was no
2intention to enter into legal relationship between the parties.
It may further be mentioned that both in India and (after the
3judgment in The United States v. American Renaissance Lines, Inc.)
in the United States, government contracts are not enforceable if
not in writing. In India, government contracts are required to be
4made in accordance with art.299 of the Constitution. That article
1 [1924] V.L.R.97.
2Op.cit. at 17-19 (per MoffittJ). It may, however, be submitted 
that the decision of the Court of Appeal is wrong. The facts of 
the case clearly show that there was an intention to enter into 
a contractual relationship and that intention culminated in the 
writing of the memorandum dated 6 June 1975.
3 (1974) 494 F. 2d 1059 (Circuit Court of Appeals), cert.denied, 
(1974) 43 U.S.L.W.3295
^Ponnuswami and Puri, Cases and Materials on Contracts fIncluding 
Government Contracts] (1974) 325-29.
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so far as relevant for our purpose, reads as follows:
Contracts - (1) All contracts made in the exercise
of the executive power of the Union or of a State 
shall be expressed to be made by the President, or 
by the Governor of the State, as the case may be, 
and all such contracts and all assurances of property 
made in the exercise of that power shall be executed 
on behalf of the President or the Governor by such 
persons and in such manner as he may direct or 
authorise.^
In a number of cases, the Supreme Court of India has held that
a government contract to be valid under art.299(1) has to be 
2in writing. Thus in State of Bihar v. Karam Chand Thapar 
3Brothers Ltd, the Supreme Court held that three conditions had 
to be satisfied before a binding contract against the 
Government could arise, namely, (i) the contract must be
expressed to be made by the President or the Governor, (ii) 
it must be executed in writing, and (iii) the execution should 
be by such persons and in such manner as the President or the 
Governor might direct or authorise.
The requirement of writing does not, however, mean that 
there should always be a formal legal document between the govern­
ment and the other contracting parties for the purpose. In
4Union of India v. A.L. Rallia Ram, for example, the Court held
^The Constitution of India, 1950.
2"Some of the cases on this question arose under s .175(3) of the 
Government of India Act 1935, which was succeeded by art.299(1) 
of the Constitution- What was said in these cases with respect 
to s .175(3), applies with equal force to art.299(1) because of 
the parallel phraseology. Any reference to s .175(3) in the text 
has therefore been omitted for convenience sake.
3[1962] 1 S.C.R.827.
4[1964] 3 S.C.R. 164.
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that so long as all the requirements of art.299(1) of the 
Constitution were fulfilled and were clear from the correspond­
ence, the article did not necessarily require the execution of 
any formal document. A tender for purchase of goods in pursuance 
of an invitation issued by, and acceptance in writing which is 
expressed to be made in the name of, the President or the
Governor and executed on his behalf by a person authorised for
1the purpose would conform to the requirements.
In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, government
contracts are not generally required to be made in writing.
No special formalities are required for their formation or
enforceability, but general legal provisions imposing formal
requirements do have application to government contracts. Thus
the formality of writing prescribed by s.40 of the Law of
Property Act 1925 in respect of contracts for the sale or other
disposition of land or any interest in land applies to govern-
2ment contracts. Contracts for the sale of goods (apart from 
certain transactions of hire-purchase) are not subject to formal 
requirements.
For another judicial pronouncement, where all the earlier 
authorities are discussed, see K.P. Chowdhary v. State of Madhya 
Pradesh [1966] 3 S.C.R.919. See generally, Ponnuswami and Puri, 
op.cit. where reference is made to the case-law on the subject. 
See also, Jain and Jain, Principles of Administrative
Law (1971) 458-64.
2Section 208(3) of the Law of Property Act 1925 provides, with 
qualifications, that the Act shall bind the Crown.
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In the United States, until the case in American Renaiss­
ance Lines,  ^ it is interesting to note, there was little ques­
tion but that if all of the elements of a contract were present, 
both the government and private contractors could enforce oral
agreements made between them, even though those agreements were
2not later reduced to writing. However, in the above-stated
case, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
3Circuit held that a portion of the Appropriations Act of 1955 
which required written evidence of contractual agreements before 
the funds to pay that agreement could be recorded as an obligat­
ion of the United States constituted a statute of frauds, and 
any government contract not in writing was thus void and un­
enforceable. The facts in American Renaissance Lines case were: 
in response to a general invitation for bids, the Commodity 
Credit Corporation (a government corporation) and American 
Renaissance Lines, Inc. [hereinafter "ARL"] entered into an oral 
agreement regarding the carriage of large amounts of foodstuffs 
from the United States to South Vietnam. Before any written
The United States v. American Renaissance Lines, Inc. (1974)
494 F. 2d 1059.
2In Penn-Ohio Steel Corp. v. United States (1965) 354 F. 2d 254, 
the court indicated that a state's "statute of frauds" would not 
be applied to a federal government contract since federal law was 
applicable. See also Escote Mfg.Co. v. United States (1959)169 F. 
Supp.483; United States v. Swift & Co.(1926) 270 U.S. 124; America 
Smelting & Refining Co. v. United States (1922) 259 U.S. 75;
United States v. Purcell Envelope Co.(1919) 249 U.S. 313 (a con­
tract not formally executed and signed is binding).
331 U.S.C. § 200(a) (1) (1970).
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contract- liad been signed, ARb repudiated the oral agreement 
and refused performance. The failure of the agreement caused 
the government additional storage, handling and shipping costs 
of approximately $40,000, for the recovery of which sum a suit 
was filed by the United States. The court stated that government 
contracts wore reguired to be .in writing before they could be 
enforced and therefore denied enforcement to the United States 
of the oral agreement.1
In the light of the foregoing discussion and the wording
of the Australian Finance Regulation 52A, it does' not appear
unlikely that Australian courts would also not enforce
2contracts which were not reduced to writing.
5. Apparent Authority and Estoppel
In the United States, since the case in Whiteside v.
2United States, the accepted view has been that there is no 
doctrine of apparent authority in government contracts; the 
principle is that in order to bind the government, the govern­
ment agent upon whose acts suit is brought must have had actual
The court cited with approval the. decision of the Supreme 
Court in Clark v. United States (1877) 95 U.S. 539. The 
decision in American Renaissance Lines has, however, been 
severely criticised: see Patten, "Government Contracts -
Are They Enforceable If Not in Writing" (1975) 7 Public Contract ^  
It is submitted that reg. 52A is concerned with the following 
two matters: (i) procedural, viz. the certification of avail­
ability of funds; the approval of requisitions; and preparation 
of purchase orders in triplicate and (ii) mandatory, viz. the 
issuance of purchase orders in writing (in accordance with Form 
13). While the contractors cannot possibly have any control or 
information about the compliance with the (i) above; they can 
always be sure of compliance with the writing requirement stated 
in (ii) above. It therefore seems that a court would consider the 
cumulative effect of reg.52A and the requirement of writing in private 
contracts to be that that the Statute of Frauds applied to government 
contracts, just as it did to private contracts. See also infra 256et seq 
3(1876) 93 U.S. 247.
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authority. ' What follows from this is of course the concomitant
principle that the government may not be estopped by the action
or representation of an agent not within the scope of his
2actual authority. The law is stated thus:
If ... any such person acts outside the scope of 
the authority actually held by him the United 
States is not estopped to deny his unauthorised 
or misleading representations, commitments, or 
acts, because those who deal with a Government 
agent, officer, or employee are deemed to have 
notice of the limitations on his authority, and 
also because even though a private individual 
might be estopped, the public should not suffer 
for the act or representations of a single
In Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill (1947) 68 S.Ct. 1, 
Mr Justice Frankfurter observed (what has become an oft-quoted 
statement): "It is too late in the day to urge that the
Government is just another private litigant, for purposes of 
charging it with liability .... Whatever the form in which 
the Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement 
with the Government takes the risk of having accurately 
ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government 
stays within the bounds of his authority." (JEd. at 3.)
2See, e.g. United States v. Zenith-Godley Co. (1960) 180 F. 
Supp. 611. But see Emeco Industries, Inc, v. United States 
(1973) 485 F. 2d 652, 657 (where "estoppel" against the 
Government was applied). See generally, Whelan and Pasley, 
Cases and Materials on Federal Government Contracts (1975) 
15-35; Whelan and Dunigan, "Government Contracts: Apparent
Authority and Estoppel" (1967) 55 Geo.L.J. 830; Mclntire, 
"Authority of Government Contracting Officers: Estoppel
and Apparent Authority" (1957) 25 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 162.
Turpin has criticised the rule regarding inapplicability 
of the doctrine of estoppel against the United States 
Government: see Government Contracts (1972) 33. For more
criticism, see Stelzenmuller, "Formation of Government
Contracts - Application of Common Law Principles" (1955) 40 
Cornell L.Q. 238, 248-57.
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Government agent, especially when the representation 
in question would encourage an act proscribed by law.
In India too, the burden of ascertaining authority limit­
ations is on the person or firm contracting with the government. 
It is equally well established there that the Government may not 
be estopped by the unauthorised acts of its agents. These 
principles of estoppel and apparent authority are the direct
2outcome of the wording in art.299(1) of the Indian Constitution.
Article 299(1) prescribes, inter alia, that government contracts
shall be executed only by such persons who are authorised for
the purpose. The object of this requirement is to prevent
depletion of public funds by clandestine contracts made by any
and every public servant. The Supreme Court in State of Bihar 
3v. K.C. Thapar held that the authority to execute a contract
on behalf of the government need not always be granted by rules
expressly formulated in that behalf, or by formal notifications,
or by special orders; authority may validly be given in respect
of a particular contract or contracts by the President or the
Governor to an officer other than the one notified under the
^California Pacific Utilities Co. v. United States (1971) 194 
Ct. Cl. 703, 720 (citing Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States
(1917) 243 U.S. 389; Bianco v. United States (1965) 171 Ct. Cl. 
719; Bornstein v. United States (1965) 345 F. 2d 558; Potter 
v. United States(1964)167 Ct. Cl.28; Vogt Bros. Mfg. Co. v. 
United States (1963) 160 Ct. Cl. 687; Byrne Organization, Inc. 
v. United States (1961) 287 F. 2d 582; and National Electronics 
Laboratory, Inc, v. United States (1960) 180 F. Supp. 337).
2See generally on government contracts, Ponnuswami and Puri, 
Cases and Materials on Contracts (1974) part VII ch.5.
3A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 110. See also Bhikraj Jaipuria v. Union of 
India [1962] 2 S.C.R. 880.
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rules. Article 299(1) of the Constitution does not prescribe
any particular mode in which authority must be conferred:
authorisation may, for example, be conferred ad hoc on any
person. In another case, Mulamchand v. State of Madhya
Pradesh,^  the Supreme Court took the view that a contract not
conforming with art.299(1) could not be ratified and an
"estoppel" could not be raised against the government. The
Court stated that art.299(1) had not been enacted for the sake
of mere form and the formalities of the article could not be
dispensed with. The article is aimed at preventing the state
from being saddled with liability for unauthorised contracts and
preventing the waste of taxpayer's money being drained into
improper channels by virtue of such unauthorised contracts,
and therefore is in the public interest.
It should, however, be pointed out that the rigours of this
rule regarding the limited authority of government agents, have
2been mitigated to some extent by the application of ss.65 
3and 70 of the Indian Contract Act 1872. But still in some
1A .I.R. 1968 S.C. 1218.
2Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act 1872 reads:
"When an agreement is discovered to be void or when 
a contract becomes void, any person who has received 
any advantage under such agreement or contract is 
bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it, 
to the person from whom he received."
See Ponnuswami & Puri, op.cit. 568.
3Section 70:
"When a person lawfully does anything for another 
person, or delivers anything to him, not intending 
to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys 
the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make 
compensation to the former in respect of, ‘or to 
restore, the thing so done or delivered."
(carried on to p. 109)
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cases an unwary party contracting with the government finds 
that this limitation of estoppel and apparent authority works 
inj ustice.^
In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the consensus of
opinion amongst legal writers and judicial authorities seems to
be that the government can be bound by estoppel and a contractor
can rely upon estoppel in seeking to establish a contract with
2the government- Another principle follows from this: that a
contractor may rely upon the apparent authority of an agent of 
the government. It is submitted that this extension from the 
rule (that government can be estopped by the unauthorised acts 
of its agents) is necessary and logical. It would be meaning­
less to hold on the one hand that an agent can bind the govern­
ment by his own representation of his authority, thus raising an 
"estoppel" against the government, and then hold on the other 
hand that he may not bind the government directly unless he has
(footnote 3 contd. from p. 108)
For an authoritative exposition of the Supreme Court, see State 
of West Bengal v. B.K. Mondal & Sons A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 779; 
Ponnuswami and Puri, op.cit. 581-89. See also Pannalal v.
Dy. Commissioner, Bhandara A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1174.
"^ See e.g. Hansraj Gupta & Co v. Union of India A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 
2724.
2Turpin, op. cit. 30-36; Street, Governmental Liability: A 
Comparative Study (1953) 156-158; Orient Steam Navigation Co v.
The Crown (1925) 21 LI. List Rep. 301; Pi immer v. Mayor of 
Wellington (1884) 9 A.C. 699; Canadian Pacific Railways v.
The King [19311 A.C. 414, 428-430; Attorney General v. Co Horn 
[1916] 2 K.B. 193, 194. See generally, Campbell, "Australian
Government Contracts" Research Paper No. 47, Royal Commission 
on Australian Government Administration 1974-1976 (Microfiche 
Ref. R47X) 8-12.
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actual authority. As Turpin has stated:
This principle [of apparent authority] which ... is 
closely related to estoppel, holds a principal liable 
to a third party to whom he has by words or conduct 
represented that the agent has authority to contract 
on his behalf. On principle, and since the Crown can 
be bound by estoppel, it should be possible to rely 
upon the doctrine of apparent authority against the 
Crown.^
An estoppel may be relied upon both in establishing that
a contract was in fact made and in overcoming the defence of
an absence of authority on the part of the government's agent
to make a binding contract. But, it is submitted, in
the latter case (where a contractor seeks to repel a defence
of want of authority), he might find it easier to rely on the
twin doctrine of apparent authority, which, as one author has
stated "in the sphere of contract coincides to a large extent
with estoppel, but is not trammelled by certain technical
2limitations of the latter principle". The doctrine of apparent 
authority is easier to invoke because of a key difference which 
exists between apparent authority and estoppel as a ground for 
binding a party to a contract. The former binds the principal 
to the contract whether or not there has been detrimental reliance 
by the other party, for if an agent is found to have apparent 
authority, that ,is sufficient to raise a true contract. In the
^Government Contracts (1972) at 34. 
2Turpin, op. cit. 32.
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case of estoppel, however, the factor of detrimental reliance 
is ordinarily required to be shown.
Reference may here be made to a recent judgment of the 
Canadian Supreme Court where the Court has held that the 
principles of agency relating to apparent or ostensible authority 
apply to an agent of the Crown. In Vcrreault (J.E.) & Fils Ltcc. 
v. A.-G. for Quebec'*', the plaintiff-builder filed a suit for 
damages for a breach of a construction contract against the 
defendant-Crown (the Province of Quebec). The Crown contended 
that no enforceable contract existed between the parties since 
the Minister entering into it had not been authorised by an 
Order-in-Council or by express legislation. It was further 
contended that the doctrine of apparent authority was not applic­
able against the Crown. The impugned contract had been entered 
into on 7 June 1960 for the construction of a nursing home for 
senior citizens by a Minister of the Crown. Buc due to a change 
in government as a result of the 1970 elections, the new govern­
ment instructed the plaintiff to stop work. The trial court 
held for the plaintiff but the Quebec Court of Appeal reversed 
that decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held 
that the Crown was in breach of contract and the plaintiff was 
awarded $40,000 damages for loss of profits. The Supreme Court 
found that the contract was valid notwithstanding that it was
^(1975) 5 National Reporter 271.
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not authorised by an order-in-council or by express legislation. 
The Court stated that a contract made by an agent of the Crown 
acting within the scope of his apparent or ostensible authority 
is valid and binds the Crown.
It is submitted that in Australia the law regarding the 
applicability of the doctrines of apparent authority and estoppel 
against the government is the same as in the United Kingdom and 
Canada. A contract made by a purchasing official acting within 
the scope of his apparent authority is a valid contract by the 
government. The common law principles of agency, therefore, 
apply in respect of government contracts.
Where, however, the authority of contracting officials is 
regulated by an Act of Parliament, a contract will not bind the 
government unless made by an authorised agent. The legislation 
may, for example, nominate and thereby delimit the class of 
persons who are authorised to enter into contracts on government's 
behalf or lay down a certain procedure according to which 
contracts must be made by the agents of government in order to 
bind the government. In such cases, a strict compliance with 
statutory provisions is mandatory and an agent not complying with 
them cannot bind the principal i.e. the government.
In practice, however, authority to contract on the govern­
ment's behalf is not conferred by legislation but by, what are 
often called, General Financial Rules of the Government and by 
appropriate departmental regulations, rules, notifications or 
delegations. It is common for internal delegations to set out,
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for example, monetary powers of purchase officers to make 
purchases of supplies, execute and sign contracts, the procedure 
to be adopted by the agents in the placing of contracts, the 
types of contracts to be employed, the terms on which contracts 
are to be concluded and the situations in which the approval of 
a higher official is to be obtained.
There is no Commonwealth legislation as to who may approve
contracts/ It is generally accepted that the Minister of each
2Department has an implied power to approve contracts. Where a 
department places a request on one of the Commonwealth's 
purchasing authorities, the relevant Minister for contract 
approval is that Minister having responsibility to Parliament for 
that agency. In the case of Purchasing Division, for example, it 
is the Minister for Administrative Services. It is adminis­
tratively sound therefore to seek appropriate measures of dele­
gation to approve contracts from the relevant Minister. Again, in 
the case of Purchasing Division, the Permanent Head of the 
Department has an unlimited delegation from the Minister to 
approve contracts. The Minister, by instrument in writing, has 
also delegated his authority to arrange contracts down the
It may, however, be noted that an approval by a Minister or his 
delegate to incur expenditure on supplies is required under 
Finance Regulation 49. See also Finance Regulations 46-53 and 
Finance Directions Section 31/1-55 and Section 32/24-51. The 
question whether Finance Regulations and Directions have the 
force and effect of law is discussed in chapter IV.
2 Campbell, "Australian Government Contracts" op.cit. at 9; 
Verreault (J.E.) & Fils Ltee. v. A.-G. for Quebec (1975) 5 
National Reporter 271 (Canada).
1.L4
administrative line, with the threshold level varied in relation 
to the status of an officer in each area of contracting.
Purchases of goods or services within the limit of funds approved 
for the purpose are arranged by delegates with authorities ranging 
from $250,000 right down to $5,000 and below.^
It is submitted that a contractor dealing with the govern­
ment is not deemed to have notice of the limitations (imposed 
by the internal delegations) upon the agent's authority. If, 
therefore, the government has by words or conduct represented 
that the agent has authority to contract on its behalf, a binding 
contract will be formed between the contractor and the government 
on the principle of apparent authority, notwithstanding that the 
agent exceeded the limits of actual authority. As Professor 
Campbell has stated:
If that authority has been defined, the definition may 
be by internal rules, delegations and understandings 
which are not published to the world at large, and 
about which contractors may not even bother to enquire.
Besides, as Turpin points out, for the contractor it is very difficult
and sometimes even impossible to find out whether the agent or
officer in question has in fact the authority he appears to have
"except by direct and possibly embarrassing inquiry of the
3officer's superiors".
Gilmour, "Government Purchasing Arrangements"( Unpublished 
Manuscript) Purchasing Division, Department of Administrative 
Services (Canberra, May 1977).
2 Campbell, "Australian Government Contracts" Research 
Paper No. 47, Royal Commission on Australian Government Adminis­
tration 1974-1975 (Microfiche Ref. R47X) 9.
Turpin, Government Contracts (1972) 34.3
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6. Methods and Types of Government Contracting
There is a very definite interrelationship between the 
forces operating during the course of contract formation and the 
difficulties met during contract performance. In some cases, 
the factors considered in the contract process become the decisive 
factors in the settlement of disputes that arise during perform­
ance of the contract- Conversely, much of the work of the 
parties during contract making is aimed at avoiding difficulties 
from arising during contract performance. This section is 
devoted to the discussion of the specific techniques used in 
government procurement to form a binding contract.
(i) Methods of Procurement
The procedure by which the government solicits offers, 
establishes terms and conditions, and selects a contractor is 
the heart of the procurement process. The basic methods of 
government procurement include: (a) formal advertising;
(b) competitive negotiations, and (c) negotiations with a 
sole-source.^ One of these three forms must be decided prior 
to contractor solicitation and selection.
(a) Formal advertising
It denotes a sealed-bid technique of obtaining offers from
See generally Dent, "Purchasing of Goods and Services in
Australian Government Departments and Agencies" Research Paper 
No. 46, Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration. 
For an excellent collection of cases and materials on methods 
of procurement in the United States, see Whelan and Pasley,
Cases and Materials on Federal Government Contracts (New York, 
1975) 175-391 [hereinafter cited as Whelan and Pasley].
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several competitors. The public invitation of tenders (also
2known as open tender system) ensures open competition among 
all suppliers who believe they can comply with the government 
specifications. The principle, that anyone who can perform the 
supply or service is entitled to participate in government 
business, reduces opportunities for graft, corruption and the 
dispensing of favours. The rules of this open tender system are 
designed to forbid "private" bargaining and to encourage open 
disclosure upon award. The government derives the advantage of 
being able to obtain the best value for money by placing orders 
on a supplier who quotes the lowest rates.* 23
The basic prerequisites of formal advertising are: (1) a
complete, adequate, and realistic specification that dictates a 
common baseline of technical features and contract terms: (2) two
or more suppliers eager to obtain government business; (3) the 
selection of the successful tenderer mainly on the basis of price 
and (4) availability of sufficient time with the government to 
prepare the requisite specifications and drawings and to carry 
out the administrative work resulting from the invitation of 
tenders. Formal advertising is an excellent method of government
^Report of the C.G.P. (U.S. 1972) op. cit. Vol. 1, 18.
2An invitation for bid (IFB) is used to solicit competitive 
sealed bids.
3 . . .The objectivity and openness of formal advertising commends its 
use whenever market conditions are appropriate. For a detailed 
description of advantages of public tendering as a method of 
procurement, see Scott Committee Report paras. 4.17 - 4.18. In 
Australia, the Department of Construction is adopting a new 
method of contracting called "integrated contracts" in its 
construction contracts, see id. 4.55 - 4.57.
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purchasing when these criteria are met. When any of these
essentials cannot be satisfied, it is a completely ineffective
2method of procurement.
(a a) The mechanics of formal advertising
Once the contracting officer has determined that the procure­
ment is susceptible to formal advertising,the next step is to issue 
a tender notice in the prescribed form, stating in sufficient 
detail the description of supplies to enable the tenderers to 
quote their lowest rates. Complete invitations are circulated as 
widely as possible, in order to obtain maximum competition. There 
are various ways of soliciting offers, the principal method being 
the mailing of tender notices to the registered tenderers on the 
lists of the purchasing authorities. The tender forms can be 
obtained by other suppliers too on request. Other methods of 
soliciting offers include the displaying of copies of the invitat­
ion at the 'Notice-Boards' of the purchasing office; publishing 
brief announcements of proposed purchases in the Government
3Gazette and in trade journals; and by advertising in newspapers. 
The invitation to tender sets forth the terms and conditions and
In the United States, there is almost a Congressional folklore 
that the cure to procurement ills lies in the award of contracts 
on a formal advertising basis. It may be noted the U.S. Report 
of the Commission on Government Procurement endorsed a preference 
for formal advertising wherever practical, see Report of the 
C.G.P. Vol. I, 20 (Recommendation 3).
2These criteria have been likened to a four-legged stool. Remove 
one leg and the stool is ineffective: see Whelan and Pasley, 
op. cit. 178.
3 Snedden, "Dollar Purchasing Power" (March 1972) 19 (11)
Australian Purchasing 14, 15; Garland "The Department of Supply
as a Purchasing Authority" (September 1972) 20 (5) Australian 
Purchasing 21, 22.
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the laws, regulations and directions, to which the intending 
tenderer must agree to abide and be bound by them- Sometimes, 
reference is also made to the "General Conditions" or 
"Standard Conditions of Government Contracts" which are 
available separately on application.
Each invitation to tender contains a specific place, 
date and hour for the closing of tenders. Sufficient 
time is given between the notice of invitation and the 
closing date so that the interested suppliers get enough 
time to calculate their rates and submit their quotations 
even from distant places. Late tenders are not accepted. 
Tenders are not publicly opened but enough safeguards (in the 
words of purchasing personnel in the Purchasing Division, 
Department of Administrative Services, Canberra) are 
laid down in the procedure to avoid any mischief.^
The tenderers are required to state the duration for which 
their quotations are valid for acceptance and the government 
may either accept the offer before that date or ask for an 
extension. Except in the case of a
In the United States and India (unlike Australia and the U.K.), 
all tenders are publicly opened. The tenders are opened in 
the presence of representatives of firms, which have actually 
submitted the quotations. The Officer opening the sealed bids 
reads out the following particulars from each tender for the 
information of the representatives attending the opening: 
the name of the firm; article/nomenclature of the store; 
quantity offered; price including the unit of price and point 
of delivery and conditions stipulated by the firm. Each tender 
is numbered serially, initialled, dated on the front page and 
the price, delivery terms, etc. are circled and initialled in 
the presence of firms' representatives. The author has himself 
attended to tender openings several times in the office of the 
central purchasing organisation (DGS&D), Government of India, 
and strongly recommends the adoption of this system in Australia.
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mistake in quotation alleged and conclusively proved - in 
accordance with a most detailed procedure - no tenderer is 
permitted to alter his rates. Since the notice inviting 
offers is only an invitation to treat and not an offer, the 
government is not legally bound to accept any offer, even 
the lowest. Similarly, the tenderers who make quotations 
in response to government's invitation, are not bound by any 
legal contract unless and until the government accepts their 
offer. It follows that they may withdraw their offer 
before the acceptance by government and any condition in the 
contract forbidding them to withdraw the offers, is not 
valid in law for lack of consideration.^
After the opening of tenders, the contracting officer 
evaluates the valid offers (unsigned and incomplete offers are 
automatically rejected) by determining whether the offers are
In the United States, bids are irrevocable. For a criticism, 
see Stelzenmuller, "Formation of Government Contracts - 
Application of Common Law Principles" (1955) 40 Cornell L.Q.
238, 239-47. But see Pasley, "Formation of Government Contracts
.... A Reply" (1955) 40 Cornell L.Q. 518-31. See also Turpin, 
op. cit. 135- It may be noted here that in the United Kingdom 
(see e.g., HC Deb. v. 756 c.528) and India, a person who 
makes an offer to government is entitled to withdraw his offer 
or tender before its acceptance is intimated to him. In India, 
see e.g., Rajendra Kumar Verma v. State of M.P. A.I.R. 1972 M.P. 
131, Ponnuswami and Puri, Cases and Materials on Contracts 
fIncluding Government Contracts] (1974) 63-64.
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in accordance with the specifications and whether the offeror 
has expressed his willingness to abide by the general conditions 
of contract. As a general rule, the lowest offer is accepted 
provided it is found to have been made by a 'responsible' 
tenderer."1' This means that the prospective contractor is a 
manufacturer or regular dealer in the supplies sought; that he 
has adequate financial resources, that he can comply with 
delivery schedule; that he has a satisfactory record of prior 
performance and integrity and is otherwise qualified and eligible 
to receive an award under applicable laws and regulations. In 
determining the lowest quotation, account is taken of factors 
such as offered discounts, price escalation provisions, terms 
of delivery (F.O.B., F.O.R., ex-works or any other), and the 
like. Award of a contract is thus finally made to the lowest 
responsible bidder who survives all of the above evaluation, 
whose bid conforms to the essential provisions of the invitation 
to tender, and whose price is found to be fair and reasonable.
These and other rules discourage a buyer's inclination to
<m 2unfairly favour^award to one contractor over another.
The Government is not legally bound to accept the lowest or 
any tender, see Frost, "Plant Contracts - the Case for
Rationalisation" (Aug/Sept 1974) Australian Purchasing 24.
2This is necessarily a quite general description of formal 
advertising procedures. It is in fact a substantial and complex 
process involving considerable administrative expense. Each step 
of the process breaks down into a myriad of further consideration: 
and problems. See generally, Gilmour, "Government Purchasing
Arrangements" (May 1977)(Unpublished Manuscript) Purchasing 
Division, Department of Administrative Services, Canberra.
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Private business also often practises invitation of 
tenders for greatest efficiency but it is not referred to as 
"formal advertising". The private industrial organisations 
use a sealed-bid technique in which they "advertise" a procure­
ment to potential suppliers and sometimes the offers are invited 
through newspaper advertisements. However, the private organis­
ations do not broadcast their solicitation of offers as widely 
as does the government, nor do they foreclose the possibility 
of having discussions with an offerer before awarding him a 
contract (as the government generally does when it applies 
"formal advertising" method of procurement). The main difference 
between government and private business practice is that govern­
ment must always procure under "open tender" policy subject to 
public audit and scrutiny in accordance with proper legislative 
Acts and Regulations, whereas private organisations are not 
subject to these controls.^
(b) Competitive negotiations
The open tender system is most suitable for markets 
which are highly competitive consisting mainly of small-scale 
suppliers producing fairly simple standard commodities and where 
price is an all-important factor in awarding contracts. But in 
market situations with fewer and larger firms, complex commodities 
sophisticated specifications, where price is no longer the sole
^See Pole, "Standards in Purchasing by Government" (1972)
19 (10) Australian Purchasing 32.
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criterion for selection, the open public tender procedure is 
less appropriate- When the government buys supplies or items 
where there are specifications, the selection of contractors is 
made on the basis of price. But when there are no specifications 
and there are several technical approaches to the problem (as in 
research and development procurement or the development of a new 
weapon system), it is not easy to make a selection through formal 
advertising. Formal advertising is rarely, if ever, appropriate 
for research and development contracting and is almost never used. 
The common baseline specifications essential for formal advertis­
ing not only are lacking in research and development procurement, 
they generally are not desirable. Innovation and creativity, 
which are the key features of research and development, would be 
dissipated if specifications for uniform products were prescribed. 
In such situations, where technical superiority is the most 
important determining factor, the competitive negotiations method 
of procurement is adopted which permits contracting agencies 
greater latitude in the selection of contractors than is allowed 
for by formal advertising procedures.1 It also gives a great 
deal more flexibility since different types of contracts can be 
used in negotiated procurement, whereas the formally advertised 
procurement necessarily results in some form of fixed-price
^Very frequently this is misunderstood, and it is often suggested 
that negotiation means the lack of competition. This is not 
correct, because many times competitive negotiation is far more 
intense than the competition in formal advertising.
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contract. The requirements of the government are widely pub­
licised for competition and all potential contenders are invited 
to participate.1 2 The government usually does not rely on the 
prices initially submitted by tenderers because the comparability 
between initial offers is generally insufficient to judge the 
relative merits of the quotations. The contracting authorities 
ordinarily conduct discussions or bargaining with the tenderers 
in the course of entering into a fixed-price contract with the 
one with the best terms. In awarding cost-type contracts, the
government's emphasis is on technical competence, not price 
„ 2"guess-timates .
The technique of negotiation thus affords the best oppor­
tunities to obtain the most effective competition available by 
discussions with competitors for the purpose of more precisely 
defining achievable requirements, or otherwise obtaining 
sufficient comparability between offers, in order to reach a 
common understanding of the specifications. But it is not as 
safe a method as formal advertising because, the easy access to 
the contracting officers by the tenderers and the subjective 
judgment of the contracting cfficer which weighs quality and 
other factors against price, may sometimes, lead to semblance of
1A request for proposal (RFP) is used, which describes the agency' 
needs and invites contractors to submit proposals stating how they 
would fulfil the needs if awarded a contract.
2Report of the C.G.P. op. cit. Vol. 1, 19.
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favouritism, patronage or personal preference in the selection 
of suppliers.1 23
Sometimes, government procures supplies by a combination of
the methods of public tendering and negotiation. This is called
2"two-stage tendering". In this process, which is often used
for large or complex engineering works, where the cost of
preparing the bids is staggering, a public invitation is issued
but initially only the tender prices and a limited amount of
technical data are called for, the tendering period being quite
short. Such questions as what experience a company had had in
similar lines, what organisation will perform the work, to whom
will it report, the key people who will do the work, facilities
and plant capacity available, and so forth, are asked. These
initial bids are quickly evaluated and a short list of two or
three selected, who are then given appropriate briefing to
complete the detailed information required. Since the number of
competing tenderers is small, the discussions are less cumbersome
and more fruitful. The order is placed then on the tenderer found 
3most suitable. The "two-stage tendering" system usually takes
It is not suggested that public tendering has all the merits and 
no shortcomings. For the disadvantages of formal advertising, 
see Scott Committee Report para. 4.22.
2In the United States, this method is called a "two-phase 
proposal".
3For a discussion of "two-stage tendering" and other
methods, see Frost, "Plant Contracts - the Case for
Rationalisation Part II" (Oct/Nov 1974) Australian Purchasing 25. 
See also Garland, "The Department of Supply as a Purchasing
Authority" (Sept. 1972) 20(5) Australian Purchasing 21.
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a little longer but saves companies work and expense as 
well as saves government effort in evaluation. This system is 
also followed where considerable time is involved in preparing 
and evaluating tenders, or where projects are not sufficiently 
well defined to prepare an adequate specification for public 
tender purposes. Again, where extensive testing of samples is 
essential, the resultant delays make open tendering impracticable. 
In these cases, a public invitation is issued to potential supp­
liers to submit samples for testing. As requirements subsequently 
arise, those firms whose samples have been approved are then 
invited to tender.
Still another approach is to ask for a design study com­
petition (usually in development contracts) . The two or three 
winners of the design competition are paid for the designs, with 
a ceiling placed on what the government will pay towards the 
design. The company which submits the best design is then chosen 
as the contractor for the hardware development. Since the 
government has paid for the designs, any ideas presented are 
considered the property of the government and may be used in 
the final contract work specification.
The use of formal advertising has, however,rapidly declined 
in government procurement in the recent years and more and more 
contracts are entered into by using competitive negotiation or 
sole-source method instead. The main reasons have been the 
urgency and demands of modern war preparedness, national domestic 
priorities, compelling government to meet its needs by advancing
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the state of technology rather than by purchasing items "off 
the shelf", and the difficulties (apart from expenses) involved 
in producing specifications to procure items beyond the existing 
state of technology.
(c) Sole-source procurement
Sole-source or non-competitive method of procurement 
of supplies is used by government in cases of emergency, lack of 
reasonable competitive source, standardisation, etc- The Scott 
Committee on Government Procurement Policy received submissions 
from several defence systems contractors which lent support to 
sole-source procurement. They argued that because of the limited 
size of the Australian market for specialised defence equipment, 
sole-sources should be established with reasonable assurance of 
continuity of work in the field concerned, and furthermore, the 
procurement of such equipment through tendering resulted in frag­
mentation of capacity with the result that no firm could secure 
a viable level of workload.^
Although sole-source procurement is supposed to be the 
exception of an exception (since competitive negotiation is it­
self an exception of formal advertising, rather than the rule), 
it actually accounts for a substantial dollar volume of govern­
ment contracting, going as high as 60 percent of total government
^Scott Committee Report, paras. 9.73, 4.46.
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authorities purchases. The reason for this apparent anomaly is
of course that the big, complex, expensive contracts for the design,
development, and construction of defence materials and other
rapidly advancing technological inventions, do not often lend them-
2selves to the sealed bid procedure of competitive negotiations.
3(li) Typos of Government Contracts
Selection of the type of contract best designed to fulfil a 
procurement goal varies according to the type of procurement 
involved (for example, research and development, major systems, 
commercial products, and construction) and according to the degree
It is learnt from reliable government sources that in 1975-1976 
about 40 percent (in value) and 16 percent (in number) of 
contracts were awarded to one source. These estimates exclude 
Defence and Transport purchases overseas which could bring the 
value of sole source to 60 percent.
2But see Schairer, "The Role of Competition in Aeronautics"
(March 1969) The Aeronautical Journal 195, 207 (Fifty-Seventh 
Wilbur and Orville Wright Memorial Lecture of the Royal Aero­
nautical Society, London, England), where the author states in 
conclusion: "There seems to be a feeling that competition is
expensive and cannot be afforded .... This desire to restrict 
competition is not limited to Western Europe» This disease can 
also be found thriving in Washington, D.C. Many economists and 
politicians will stand up and make strong speeches about how 
America is great because of its freedom of enterprise and 
competition. Many of these same economists, bureaucrats and 
politicians will return to their daily work and engage in actions 
which are highly in restraint of competition, and usually on the 
assumption that a competition costs money - and lots of money - 
and that we can no longer afford competition. It seems to me 
that in most circumstances they could not be further from the 
real truth".
3"Type" is here a term used to cover contracts classified by the 
method of contractor reimbursement. This is also said to be a 
classification of government contracts by "kind". There is 
another classification, viz. by the objects for which they are 
made e.g., contracts for supplies, contracts for construction, 
contracts for services, research and development contracts, 
contracts for disposal, contracts relating to real property etc.
Such contracts, classified by the objects for which they are made, 
are discussed in later chapters.
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of risk involved and the amount of profit incentive offered 
for achieving the government's objectives. The most acceptable 
framework for contract pricing seems to be one based on the con­
tractor's costs in producing whatever is called for by the contract 
and, in most cases, on some allowance for profit. To provide 
for costs and profits in contract terms, various ways are used.
At one end of the spectrum is the fixed-price contract in which 
the contractor agrees to deliver the supplies or services for a 
pre-determined price which includes profit. At the other end is 
the cost-plus fixed fee contract (CPFF), in which the contractor 
is reimbursed for his allowable costs and the profit is fixed in 
the form of a specified fee at the time when the contract is made. 
In between the spectrum there are several variants of the CPFF 
including the incentive contracts."'- Selection of contract type 
is also influenced by factors such as the financial liability 
of government, the adequacy of cost information furnished by 
the contractor, the nature of the work, associated risks, and 
current market conditions. There is a relation between the 
amount of cost uncertainty present in a given situation and the 
type of contract. By using a right type of contract, government 
can apply the proper degree of incentive for a contractor to
2control costs and still avoid excessive or contingency pricing.
"'"A detailed discussion of the various types of contracts, part­
icularly the cost-type contract, is to be found in chapter VI 
infra.




A fixed-price contract is a contract for a specific 
output at a price which is fixed before contract is placed.
The price may be fixed in terms of units of output, or as a total 
(lump sum) which will cover the whole output. The point is that 
the contractor unddrtaXes to perform for that price
(subject to certain built-in provisions for price modification, 
such as "alterations" or "variations" clauses, which we will see 
later). If he reduces his costs, he makes more profit, if he 
increases his costs his profit is reduced and perhaps eliminated. 
The risk is his. Fixed-price contracts are always used in formal 
advertising, but this feature is not peculiar to that method of 
procurement; they are used as well in many negotiated procure­
ments. The fixed-price contract offers many advantages "and 
some hazards" for the parties to the contract. From the supplier' 
point of view, it provides maximum incentive to perform effect­
ively. The government in turn gets two main advantages; ease of 
contract administration and certainty on price. But a supplier's 
search for extra profit might lead him to cut quality. As an 
alternative, the government by agreeing to the insertion of 
"variation", "escalation" or "redetermination" clauses in the 
contract and thus assuming liability for inflationary increases, 




Cost-type contracts often involve markets quite 
dissimilar to those in which fixed-price contracts take place.
The end items may be of such magnitude and exhibit so many 
unknowns that initially no one can draw specifications that 
realistically dictate a common technical baseline for all 
offerors; nor can the parties agree to fixed-price contracts 
which provide for reliable price comparisons of common base­
line products. The acquisition of major systems usually is 
characterised by these features. Another example is the 
research and development contract where again the offers are 
not expected to exhibit a broad baseline of comparable features 
because the government deliberately asks rival R & D sellers to 
focus on innovative and individualistic approaches. Moreover 
the performance of these contracts usually involves such risks 
that use of a fixed-price contract is not feasible. Cost-type 
or cost-plus contracts are, therefore, arranged where the tasks 
cannot be specified precisely enough for fixed-price contracting.
In most of such cases, the government is now seeking to make
2increasing use of incentive fee systems. The government some­
times contracts for a product or for management skills (usually 
from industry) while owning the facilities used to produce the
^A detailed discussion of such contracts follows in chapter VI, 
infra.
2For the Australian Government Department of Supply practices, 
see Garland, "The Department of Supply as a Purchasing
Authority" (Sept. 1972) 20(5) Australian Purchasing 21.
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product or service. Such facilities are known as Government- 
owned, Contractor-operated (COCO) facilities and arc neither 
pure in-house nor pure private sector activities.^
7. Buy-Australian Policy
It is basic government procurement policy to obtain "best 
value for money". Normally, best value for money means accept­
ing the lowest suitable tender, that is, the lowest tender which 
meets the requirement specified and other criteria such as known 
performance and capacity of the contractor, the adequacy of 
after-sales service and support, etc. This policy, therefore, 
lays emphasis on the public policy of minimising expenditure of 
tax revenues. The pursuit of social and economic objectives 
(such as to provide preference for domestic materials over 
foreign materials, to prohibit members of Parliament to have 
any direct or indirect pecuniary interest in any government 
contract, to prescribe minimum wages, hours, age, and working 
conditions, to place fair portion of government purchases with 
small business concerns or with depressed industry or region, 
to provide preference to concerns performing in areas of con­
centrated unemployment or underemployment etc.) through the 
procurement process often contradicts this basic policy to 
attain the "best value for money spent". Below we discuss only 
one such important policy viz., the Buy-Australian policy and
GOCO is still not very common in Australia. They are, however, 
used in the U.S., see Report of the C.G.P. Vol. 1, 66.
132
related measures which give procurement preference to domestic 
producers in many cases and exclude lower prices from foreign 
producers or those possible Australian-based producers with 
overseas ownership.^
A study of the procurement procedures of Commonwealth
purchasing authorities over many years reveals little uniformity
or continuity of policy in the matter of preference to goods of
Australian manufacture. But there is one policy to which all
government purchasing authorities have adhered to date, namely,
that in comparing tenders for imported goods with those for
Australian-made goods, there is added in the tender price for
imported goods the amount of 'any duty and primage which would
apply if the goods were being imported commercially and not by
the Commonwealth, as well as the cost of freight and insurance
2for the imported goods. No duty is actually paid on such 
imports since goods imported by the Commonwealth and not intended 
for sale by the Commonwealth or imported in the national interest
The discussion regarding the use of government purchasing power 
as an instrument to achieve various other economic, social and 
national objectives, is to be found in chapter IV, infra.
2For the history of preference policy in relation to contracts 
arranged by Commonwealth and State government purchasing auth­
orities, see, Report No. 1 of Inter-Departmental Committee on 
Preference to Australian-made goods in relation to tenders for 
Commonwealth Government Supplies (Melbourne, 20 November 1953) 
[hereinafter referred to as "Inter-Department Committee Report 
1953"]. See also the Scott Committee Report paras. 2.22, 2.23, 
2.26 to 2.30 and 2.43. See generally, Weekes, "Australian 
Government Policy on Tariffs" (December/January 1972-1973) 20 
(8/9) Australian Purchasing 16, 20.
enter duty-free under Item J of the Second Schedule of the
Customs Toriff. This procedure ensures that Australian manu­
facturers receive the protection which the Customs Tariff is 
intended to give them viz., the protection in regard to govern­
ment purchases which is available to them from the Customs Tariff 
in regard to purchases by the private sector.'1' This policy of 
applying a national tariff to all tenders involving imported
goods has been re-affirmed by a recent announcement of govern-
2ment purchasing policy.
See Inter-Departmental Committee Report 1953, op. cit. para.35. 
See also Snedden, "Dollar Purchasing Power" (March 1972) 19(11) 
Australian Purchasing 14, 16.
2Press Statement, Government Purchasing Policy 1 October 1976. 
Reference should, however, be made here to what Lloyd
in his pioneering study, Non-Tariff Distortions of Australian 
Trade (Canberra, 1973) [hereinafter cited 'Lloyd'] has stated 
about the rule of notional duty in government purchasing :
"The plausible argument that actual or potential sales of goods 
to the government should receive the same levels of protection 
as sales of the same goods to the private sector, which gives 
rise to the notional duty pricing rule, is not in fact a sound 
argument when there are widely varying levels of protection 
throughout the economy which distort the patterns of resource 
allocation and consumption. Essentially what happens if the 
notional pricing rule is followed is that the rule removes any 
possibility of divergence between rates of protection for a 
commodity when sold to the public sector or private sector but 
it extends the wide variation among effective rates of protection 
through the Tariff and the distortions this causes into the area 
of the government purchases", (at 184). Lloyd thus recommends
that for government imports, the best policy from a long-term 
point of view in which the economy converges to a situation with 
few distortions is that the present system of notional duty be 
ended and no actual or notional duties be applied to government 
imports, (at 209) . See also jjd. 77-78. But see, Millar,
Australia's Defence (2nd ed. 1969) 146. The latest trend is 
visible from Prime Minister's comment made in an interview on 
television on 15 November 1977: "... we are going to buy Aust­
ralian unless there are overriding reasons to the contrary and 
any Department or authority would have to argue very hard to get 
an authority to buy overseas at the present time ...".
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The government has, however, often gone further than merely-
providing tariff protection to the Australian industry.1 Such
measures, other than tariffs, imposed by the government, which
restrain or distort free international trade by discriminating
between locally-produced and imported goods, have been called
2'non-tariff distortions'. The case for preference to Australian-
made goods in the procurement of government supplies over and 
above that provided by tariff has been rested partly on the 
government's settled policy of protection to indigenous industry, 
and partly on the need to build up and maintain manufacturing 
capacity essential in time of emergency. In 1953, the Government 
appointed an inter-departmental Committee to examine the question 
of preference as between tenders involving Australian-made goods 
and tenders involving imported goods for supply to the Common­
wealth and to report as to policy and procedures for adoption 
by Government Departments. The recommendations of the Committee 
were accepted by the Government in toto and in 1954 guidelines 
were developed to provide adequate preference to goods which 
were officially determined to be of direct defence significance
All developed countries practice some form of discrimination 
against foreign suppliers in the purchase of goods by the govern­
ment sector. For surveys of policies in some other countries, 
see Government Purchasing Regulations and Procedures of OECD 
Member Countries (Paris 1976, Organisation for Economic Co- 
Operation and Development); Scott Committee Report paras. 7.18 
- 7.20 (Canada), paras. 7.32 - 7.34 (U.S.) and para. 7.45 (U.K.).
2Lloyd, op. cit. at 3 and chapter 5 "Purchasing Policies of 
the Commonwealth Government".
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or where there was a need to ensure continuity of certain
supplies in the event of emergency. Furthermore, discretion
was given to departments to purchase Australian goods where
the price was only slightly higher than the overseas tender,
to cope with special circumstances.^
Another inter-departmental examination of procurement
policies and procedures took place in 1960-1961 and the question
of preferences (apart from tariff protection) was again thrashed 
2out. This Committee recommended against any 'non-tariff 
distortions' and stated that the basic aim of government purchas­
ing policy should be to obtain the best value for money spent.
In implementing its findings, however, the government made an 
important proviso that a tender from an Australian manufacturer 
which was not the lowest suitable could be accepted, if the 
production of the goods in Australia was considered by the 
appropriate authority to be essential for national security; or 
where the requirements were for a particular government depart­
ment or instrumentality and the responsible Minister considered
-hat there would be long-term savings or assurance of continuity
3of supply by placing the order on a local supplier. Elaborate
"^ Inter-Departmental Committee Report 1953, op. cit. para. 57.
See also Scott Committee Report para. 2.22.
2The Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee 1960-1961 which 
covered various aspects of procurement, besides preferences, has 
not been published by Government.
^Scott Committee Report para- 2.27.
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procedures were also laid do//n by the government to be followed
by departments to discriminate among tenders, inter alia, on the
basis of goods with low or high percentage of Australian content.
This procedure operated in the following manner until December
1972: all cases where the price tendered for the local product
was more than an overseas tender price (after the inclusion of
the notional duty), and the adjusted value of imports was $15,000
or more, an additional inquiry was required. The basic details
of the local and overseas tenders were circulated among the
"Advising Departments" which comprised the Departments of Trade
and Industry, Treasury, Labour and National Service and, in case
of dumping, the Department of Customs and Excise. If one of
these departments raised an objection to the letting of the
contract overseas on the grounds of unemployment in the area of
the local tenderer, or the desired development of Australian
production of some goods, or dumping, the matter was referred to
the Cabinet Committee on Government Purchasing Policy for a
2final decision.
J'_Id. paras. 2.29 and 2.30.
“Scott Committee Report paras. 4.36 - 4.39. See also C.P.D. 
(Senate) 1969, 520 (Minister of Supply explaining the procedure).
It is pertinent to note here that about 50 cases were considered 
each year by the "Advising Departments" and that very few were 
decided in favour of the Australian supplier (Submission of the 
Department of Supply to the Scott Committee, see para. 4.40).
One common complaint against the working of this procedure has 
been that it has operated in a secretive fashion, see The Austral­
ian Financial Review (4 October 1976) 2; Lloyd, op. cit. at 214- 
215; Bellany and Richardson, Australian Defence Procurement (1970) 
2. See generally, Spir/e.Lttld.U, Secrecy, Political Censorship 
in Australia (1972).
13 7
A movement towards a restrictive 'Buy-Australian' policy
in government contracts was heralded when in December 1972, the
incoming Labor Government directed "that Australian Government
contracts should be awarded to an Australian-owned company in
cases where Australian and overseas-owned firms submit tenders
which meet specifications and are equal in respect of price and
availability".^ The purchasing authorities were directed to
prefer firms with Australian ownership and control if their
tenders met specifications and were equal in price and continuity
of supply even though such firms had no satisfactory past
performance vis-a-vis subsidiaries of foreign companies producing
2in Australia or foreign suppliers.
In a recent statement on Commonwealth Government purchasing, 
the present government has reaffirmed the general policy of 
obtaining "best value for money" subject to tariff protection
3(notional duty) and the discretionary preference outlined below. 
The government has indicated that all Commonwealth departments 
and non-departmental authorities are to ensure that Australian 
firms are given reasonable opportunity to bid for all require­
ments which are within local capabilities. In order to do this,
^Press Statement No. 23, Preference to Australian Suppliers 
17 December 1972. See also Scott Committee Report paras. 10.30 
- 10.41.
2It is learnt from reliable government sources that under this 
policy only in one case was a contract awarded to an Australian 
supplier in preference to a foreign supplier. For a criticism 
of this policy, see Lloyd, op. cit. 219; Scott Committee Report 
para. 4.45.
3Press Statement "Government Purchasing Policy" 1 October 1976; 
Press Release "Australian-Made Goods"26 October 1977 (Issued by 
the Minister for Industry and Commerce with a theme 'Put 
Australia First').
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it has been stated that care should be taken to avoid the 
unnecessary use of specifications, tender conditions and proced­
ures, etc., which could have the practical effect of precluding 
local participation. Decisions as to whether or not "discretion­
ary preference" over and above tariff duty should be accorded 
to Australian-made goods in particular cases, are now taken by 
a Sub-Committee of Ministers chaired by the Minister of Adminis­
trative Services. The Sub-Committee is assisted and serviced 
by "Advising Department" machinery made up of the Department of 
Administrative Services, Industry and Commerce, Business and 
Consumer Affairs, Employment and Industrial Relations, Treasury, 
Defence (in so far as questions of strategic significance and/or 
national security or independence arise), and the Department 
responsible for the purchasing proposed. The Sub-Committee is 
responsible for deciding cases of "discretionary preference" 
involving purchases of $15,000 or more. The factors which the 
Ministerial Committee supposedly takes into account in deciding 
whether government orders should be placed locally or overseas 
are whether purchases from Australian sources wcu Id assist a 
depressed industry or area within Australia, or enable the 
establishment, development or retention of industrial or tech­
nological capabilities required for national security or 
independence.
These new arrangements have in principle revived the 
"Advising Department" system of granting preference to local
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goods which operated from 1961 to 1972. ~ As a consequence 
of government1s declaration of new policy, the following 
procedure is being followed in all government purchases: 
tender schedules require tenderers to state the country of 
origin of the goods offered and, where applicable, levels of 
Australian content. For this purpose the Australian content, 
expressed as a percentage, is the difference between the 
Australian supplier's ex-works nett cost and into works cost 
(excluding duty) of any imported element. Where the prices 
(after inclusion of notional duty) of a suitable offer of 
imported goods (including goods of differing Australian content) 
is $15,000 or more (current threshold level for consideration), 
and acceptable higher-priced Australian-made goods are also on 
offer, details of the competing tenders are forwarded for local- 
preference consideration by the group of Advising Departments. 
Where the adjusted price of the acceptable imported product is 
below $15,000, the basic principle of "best value for money" 
is observed; however, proposed contracts below $15,000 are 
required to be referred if particular circumstances (e.g. 
repetitive or cumulative purchases of the same or similar 
products) warrant that action. Upon receipt of the necessary
~*~Under the present system, however, Ministers responsible for 
purchasing do not have independent discretion, unlike during 
1961-1972. It may also be noted that now the Minister of 
Administrative Services, as Chairman of the Sub-Committee, 
is empowered to decide those "discretionary preference" cases 
which he may not consider fit for reference to the Sub-Committee.
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details from purchasing authorities the Deportment of Adminis­
trative Services arranges for the Advising Departments to considci 
whether there is a case for the purchase of the higher-priced 
Australian-made goods on either of the grounds stated above.
Apart from the argument that procurement is an inappropriate 
and expensive avenue for the pursuit of social and economic 
policy objectives of the government, the existing procedure of 
according preference to domestic products has been stated to be 
unsatisfactory. The Scott Committee on Government Procurement 
Policy which reviewed the then existing system of preference 
viz., the Advising Department system, recommended for its 
abolition. It observed (the same criticism would apply to the 
present system because of its close resemblance): "The system
is clearly cumbersome and time-consuming and, from this view­
point alone, it seems desirable to examine alternative methods 
for considering cases in regard to local preference .... It is 
an 'honour' system in that there is no check on whether or not 
all appropriate cases are referred to Advising Departments".^
^Scott Committee Report para. 10.47. See also paras. 10.48 - 
10.51. In Lloyd, Non-Tariff Distortions of Australian Trade 
(1973) it is observed: "Of all the non-tariff measures examined 
in this study the area of the purchasing policies of the Common­
wealth is perhaps the area about which the least is known. The 
government is generally secretive about its purchases and pur­
chasing policies and reveals as little as possible", (at 68).
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No mention has been made as to what extent of pricing preference 
would be granted to local tenderers.^ Furthermore, no definitions 
of "depressed industry", "national security" or "independence" 
have been offered. Since there is no public opening of tenders 
and all bids cannot be inspected by the public after the contract 
is awarded, the public and potential suppliers have no way of 
knowing the extent of preference to the local contractor.
8. Australian Defence Procurement and 'Offsets'
Programme
The main concern in Australia over government procurement
policies has been the defence procurement, particularly overseas
2defence procurement. The underlying policy of the Australian
It has often been suggested that the Government should adopt 
a fixed margin of preference (over and above any tariff duties 
and primage) for all goods of Australian manufacture. Even 
before the introduction of the present system, there was a 
proposal by the Minister of Industry and Commerce, Senator 
Cotton, for an automatic 10 percent pricing preference to be 
given to Australian tenderers facing overseas competition for 
government contracts. The proposal was, however, not accepted. 
See, The Australian Financial Review (4 October 1976) 2. See 
also, the Scott Committee Report paras. 10.57 - 10.63; The Age 
(2 October 1976) 3, 27. Note, however, that the Industries
Assistance Commission has strongly recommended certain short 
and long-term levels of preference to the local industry in the 
defence procurement. See Industries Assistance Commission Report 
on Aerospace Industry, P.P. No. 34 of 1976, 40-43.
2See generally Millar, Australia's Defence (2nd ed. 1969).
At 156, the author states: "With defence the main single item in 
the federal budget .... someone needs to look more closely than 
is now done at whether the country is getting, value for money in 
defence procurement both overseas and at home; whether defence 
expenditure is suitably related to national development and to 
social benefit; whether Australian defence industries are feather 
bedded, or hostages to alien national interests - and so on", 
(emphasis in the original omitted here).
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Government in regard to the procurement of defence material
is to obtain the greatest possible proportion of services
requirements from within Australia, whenever economically
or technically feasible and when it sustains or increases
the country's total defence capability. The statistics in
the following Table give some indication of the main features
of Australian defence procurement in relation to procurement 
2overseas.
For example, of the 1,300 odd aircraft acquired by the RAAF 
since 1946, over 900 have been produced by Australian industry.
See the Paper by Eltringham (of the Department of Defence)
on"Basic Issues of Defence Procurement" at the Symposium on 
Defence Policy and Procurement (held under the joint auspices 
of the Australian National University and the University of 
Sydney on 23 April 1971) [hereinafter cited as Defence Policy 
and Procurement].
2The data is incomplete and have had to be pieced together from 
a number of different sources, viz. C.P.D. (H. of R.)(1968) 3285; 
C.P.D. (H. of R.) (1971) 200; Value of Contracts placed for Defence
Purchases 1969/70 to 1974/75, Purchasing Division, Department of 
Administrative Services (13 October 1975); Defence Reports 1972, 
1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976 (A.G.P.S.); Bellany and
Richardson, Australian Defence Procurement (Canberra 1970) 3-5.
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The principal government efforts to encourage the indigen­
ous defence industry in recent years have been the attempts to 
increase the manufacture of equipment under "offsets", "sub­
contracts" and "co-production" orders accompanying overseas 
contracts. The practice of seeking "offsets"^ to government 
contracts with foreign suppliers is quite common in transactions 
involving defence equipment and large civil aircraft between 
industrialised countries. Before the introduction of "offsets" 
programme in the late sixties, the Australian defence and other 
industrial capacity was maintained through licensed production 
of overseas-designed equipment. But soon the increasing 
sophistication and cost of defence equipment, the inability of 
Australia's industry to keep pace with all advances in technology 
on a world front, the high cost of development and manufacture of 
systems and the relatively smaller quantities required, which
often precluded local participation on economic grounds, made
2 . . .that approach unrealistic. To meet that situation, in 1968-69
Offsets involve sub-contract work on a product that is normally 
purchased by the Government. In a broad sense the term "offsets" 
denotes seeking trade, technological or industry work-load ben­
efits through the negotiation of reciprocal sales by the equij>- 
ment purchaser to the seller. At the simplest level, it is 
difficult to distinguish the "offsets" programme from the barter 
trade. See Scott Committee Report para.4.73.
2For example, the aircraft industry in Australia, which relies 
almost solely on defence work for its existence and its stability 
experienced a rapid rundown in its defence workload in the early 
seventies. This decline arose because of the completion of the 
Mirage programme, the tailing off of the Macchi and the lack of 
an immediate service requirement for aircraft suitable for 
Australian production: Eltringham, "Basic Issues of Defence
Procurement" 2, Defence Policy and Procurement, op. cit.
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the Government spelled out a new approach aimed at encouraging 
greater local procurement and Australian participation through 
sub-contracting in overseas weapons projects (this was called 
the "Fairhall doctrine"/ after the name of the then Defence 
Minister/ Sir Allen Fairhall, who initiated it). The new 
approach, especially with regard to the use of defence contracts 
as an incentive to raise the technological and managerial level 
of Australian industry, was designed to boost the local industrial 
capacity by greater liaison with industry in the formulation of 
equipment plans and to seek "offsets" arrangements for major 
overseas procurement purchases.^ It was envisaged that Australian 
companies might secure, by negotiation with overseas companies 
and governments on a sub-contract basis, selected research and 
development and production work on equipment being purchased 
for use in Australia, or on other equipment of similar technol­
ogical character. Thus Australian Government purchasing power
was to be used to negotiate reciprocal benefits for Australian 
2industry. In 1970 the government announced the establishment
Sir Allen Fairhall called industry "the fourth arm of defence". 
He"was probably the first politician in Australia to recognise 
publicly that there should be a creative, rather than a conflictin 
relationship between the needs of Australia's defence and its 
industrial capabilities": see Robinson, "Defence and
Australian Industry", Defence Policy and Procurement, op. cit.
For details of the "Fairhall doctrine", see Bellany and
Richardson, Australian Defence Procurement (1970) 27 et seq.
2Drake-Brockman, "How the R.A.A.F. Aids Industry" (Feb. 1972) 
19(10) Australian Purchasing 22, 24; Snedden "Dollar
Purchasing Power" (March 1972) 19(11) Australian Purchasing 14;
Garland, "The Department of Supply as a Purchasing Authority" 
(September 1972) 20(5) Australian Purchasing 21, 22.
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of a "Standing Interdepartmental Committee" to co-ordinate the 
implementation of the Australian Industry Participation (AIP) or 
"offsets" programme. The Standing Committee remains in operation 
and comprises senior officers of the Department of Administrative 
Services, Department of Defence, Department of Industry and 
Commerce and the Department of Productivity. It also co-opts 
the services of the Department of Transport, where appropriate.
An advisory committee called "Industry Committee for the Develop­
ment of Offsets to Overseas Procurement", operating under the 
Department of Productivity and comprising up to twelve leading 
Australian businessmen renders advice to the government on the 
operation of the "offsets" programme.
By inserting offset clauses into its contracts with overseas 
contractors, the Australian Government has been, since 1970, 
trying to encourage local industrial participation. The rough 
order of offset sought is 30 percent of the purchase value of 
defence purchases. Offset policy has great advantages. Besides 
providing a substantial workload during a period of low capacity 
utilisation, offset work exposes the local industry to overseas 
management and production techniques and can lead to improvement 
in the productivity and general cost-consciousness of the local 
industry.
Recently, in February 1977, the government has introduced 
a new document titled "Notes on Australian Industry Participation
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in Overseas Procurement" in which it has stated its aims and
objectives with regard to "offsets" for the guidance of
prospective overseas suppliers. The Australian Industry-
Participation (AIP) programme is designed to secure workload,
within the constraint of practicability for long-term support of
the equipment being purchased, broaden the capabilities of
industries of strategic significance to Australia in order to
provide in-depth defence supply capability and stimulate
2technological advancement in key Australian industries. The 
government has pointed out that factors such as the willingness 
of the overseas supplier to involve Australian industry in the 
contract, the technical worth and the financial value of the 
proposal, will be significant in deciding the award of the 
contract. In pursuance of this policy, overseas tenderers are 
now required to provide separately priced proposals for Australian 
Industry Participation in every project for which they are 
invited to tender their prices. The government generally seeks 
an AIP commitment of at least 30 percent of the value of any 
contract placed with the overseas contractor. This commitment is 
achieved by either direct involvement in the manufacture of the
3equipment being bought or by some other acceptable arrangement.
"Commonwealth of Australia, Notes on Australian Industry 
Participation in Overseas Procurement" (February 1977), Australian 
Unclassified. This document supersedes "Notes on Australian 
Industry Participation in Overseas Defence Procurement" December 
1972 .
^Ibid.
3For the various types of arrangements, see below.
148
In any case, the successful tenderer is held responsible for 
ensuring that the AIP target is achieved within a timescale not 
exceeding beyond 5.years from the final equipment delivery date 
stated in the contract.
Various forms by which Australian Industry Participation 
could take place, are suggested to the overseas contractors in 
this document, e.g. a part-production arrangement (manufacturing 
in Australia of some of the spares or assemblies or parts of the 
equipment being procured) ; collaborative arrangement (particip­
ation of Australian industry in the project through the conceptual 
design, development and production stages);"*' a co-production 
arrangement (manufacture in Australia of additional quantities
of these parts, spares etc. for sale to other customers of the
2overseas contractor); or an arrangement under which the overseas 
contractor undertakes to purchase Australian products of defence 
or technological significance to Australia, in return for the 
Australian contract. The process of obtaining worthwhile"offsets" 
proposals from overseas contractors, is a matter of purchasing
A collaborative arrangement involves the formation of a multi­
national consortium to design, develop and manufacture a complex 
product. Work is allocated between the partners on the basis of 
particular skills possessed by certain industries and the size 
of each country's order for the final product. See generally, 
Industries Assistance Commission Report on Aerospace Industry, 
P.P. No. 34 of 1976 at 36.
2Co-production differs from collaborative arrangement in that 
design and development work has already been done by the overseas 
prime contractor. Unlike a collaborative project, co-production 
normally involves the local industry becoming a sub-contractor 
to the overseas manufacturer, without any risk-bearing or profit- 
sharing.
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strategy; and the evaluation of such proposals, in common with 
other factors as the performance, maintenance support, benefits 
to Australian defence industry etc., is a matter of judgment 
based on the particular circumstances of each case."1’
In announcing its purchasing policy, the present Australian 
Government has not only reaffirmed but expressed an intention to 
further develop its "offsets" policy under which Australian 
industry would be enabled to obtain work as "offsets" against 
the government's major overseas contracts. The total value of 
orders placed in Australian industry as a result of the govern­
ment's offsets programme and other reciprocal purchasing arrange-
2ments was approximately $115 million at 30 June 1976. This 
obviously is a very significant achievement in the procurement 
policy of the Australian government. The programme has'made a
The Scott Committee suggested that the threshold for examination 
of equipment purchasing proposals from the "offset"view-point 
should be about $A2 million mark with provision for examination 
of smaller projects in specified fields where appropriate, see 
Scott Committee Report paras. 10.74 - 10.81.
2Defence Report 1976 (A.G.P.S., Canberra, 1976).
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valuable contribution to improved productivity and management 
practices and to the upgrading of technology, particularly in 
Australian defence industry.^"
Press Statement, Government Purchasing Policy 1 October 1976.
On the other hand, the offsets programme is criticised because: 
"Defence offsets provide great scope for an inefficient local 
firm to get a contract for the sole reason that the overseas 
supplier has Canberra's gun at his head", The Age (2 October 
1976) 27. To an economist it appears that "the idea of offset 
and co-production agreements ... is a misguided mercantilist 
notion. It is the pattern and level of aggregate imports 
which is important. Any attempt to use substantial import 
purchases as a bargaining method to extract offsetting bilateral 
orders for Australian goods is likely to encourage the production 
of high-cost goods that are protected from the normal competition 
with imported goods by the nature of these agreements. If some 
local production of defence equipment is desirable on defence 
grounds it is unlikely that the pattern of production that may 
be negotiated with other countries as offset or co-production 
orders is that best suited to the defence needs and production 
capabilities of the country". Lloyd, op. cit.74. However, it 
needs to be stated that it is vital to the security of the 
country that all high usage rate spares and stores be manufacturec 
in Australia - even if economics are not particularly good. The 
country is only then independent of the political whims of 
overseas nations, long supply lines etc.
CHAPTER T U
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS AS CONTRACTS OF ADHESION
1. Introduction
It is familiar doctrine that government has a dual capacity -
as a government taking action binding on all citizens and as a
party to a private contract - as a superior and as an equal.^ The
traditional view, as expressed in cases and commentaries, has
been that, when the government steps down from its position of
sovereignty and enters the domain of commerce, it subjects itself
2to the same laws that govern the contracts between individuals.
Traditionally the cases also state that the rights of the parties under
a government contract are to be determined by the application of
would 3pply
the same principles as/if the contract were, between private 
3parties. The courts occasionally state that the contractor must
Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society (2nd ed. 1972) 130, 405 
[hereinafter cited as Friedmann].
2Pasley, "The Nondiscrimination Clause in Government Contracts" 
(1957) 43 Va. L.Rev. 837, 846 citing Cooke v. United States (1875) 
91 U.S. 389, 398. See also Refining Associates v. United States 
(1953) 109 F. Supp. 259, 261; Turpin and Whelan (eds.) The London 
Transcript - A Comparative Look at Public Contracting in the 
United States and the United Kingdom (1973) Part I at 30 
[hereinafter cited as The London Transcript] .
3 "When the United States enters into contract relations, its 
rights and duties therein are governed generally by the law 
applicable to contracts between private individuals". Lynch v. 
United States (1934) 292 U.S. 571, 579. This is the general rule
followed by the Anglo-American courts. For some of the leading 
American cases on this point see United States v. Standard Rice 
Co. (1944) 323 U.S. 106, 111; United States v. Edwards (1960)
285 F. 2d 109, 112; Reading Steel Casting Co. v. United States 
(1924) 268 U.S. 186, 188; Smoot's case (1872) 82 U.S. 36, 45.
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turn the same square corners as required of the government.
Indeed the view that private contract law also applies to
2government-supplier relations has enjoyed wide acceptance.
This is, however, much too undiscriminating a view, and more 
government
recently/contract law has come to be treated as a special field
of its own and it is now generally appreciated that private
contract law is not an adequate instrument to regulate the
relationship between government and its suppliers, particularly
when government procurement contracts are also utilised as
instruments to attain national goals generally considered as
3socially desirable.
^E.g. The Austin Co. v. United States (1963) 314 F. 2d 518,520-21.
2“Turpin, Government Contracts (1972) 98 [herernafter cited as 
Turpin] .
3See The London Transcript, op. cit. Part I at 1, where it is 
pointed out "Government may be said (particularly by courts) to 
contract on the same footing as anyone else but the Governments 
themselves seem to have developed so many special rules and 
detailed clauses to ensure and safeguard Government rights that 
even a first time reader is aware that he is not looking 
at an agreement reached by bargaining at the sacramental arms 
length". (emphasis in original). See also Whelan, "A Government 
Contractor's Remedies: Claims and Counter Claims" (1956) 42 Va.
L. Rev. 301; Note, "Developments in the Law - Remedies against 
the United States and its Officials" (1957) 70 Harv. L. Rev. 827, 
884, 885; Speck, "Enforcement of Non Discrimination Requirements 
for Government Contract Work" (1963) 63 Colum. L. Rev. 243; Van 
Cleve, "The Use of Federal Procurement to Achieve National Goals" 
[1961] Wis. L. Rev. 566; Pasley, op.cit. at 846; Symposium, 
"Compulsory Contracts" (1943) 43 Colum. L. Rev. 565-752. See 
for a good account of this aspect of government contracts, Turpin, 
op.cit. chapter 9, 'Procurement as an Instrument of Policy'.
In the White Paper of 1967, "Public Purchasing and Industrial 
Efficiency", the British Government firmly declared an intention 
to harness the power of the public purse to the pursuit of 
national objectives.
Thus the myth of government descending to the merket piece 
end negotiating like any other private concern is being slowly 
exploded. The businessman doing business with the government, 
or the lawyer who advises him, soon discovers that a government 
contract is quite distinct from its private counterpart.^ In 
some respects the concept of 'freedom of contract', a concept 
which pervades the law of contract/ seems unrealistic when 
applied to a government contract. The businessman confronted 
with a host of lengthy documents containing innumerable general 
conditions and standard clauses, which, he soon discovers, are 
not subject to bargaining and which, therefore, he often neither 
reads nor understands, might doubt that any "meeting of minds" 
has taken place. Furthermore, the government contractor finds 
that, in addition to the standard clauses, he is bound by a host 
of statutes and, to an undetermined extent, and regardless of 
the desires of the contracting parties, by the provisions of 
official regulations and directives. Therefore, the areas of 
negotiation are becoming more and more restricted. Conditions
See generally Baur, "Differences between
Commercial Contracts and Government Contracts" (1968-69) 2 
Public Contract L. J. 5; Doke, "Contract Formation,
Remedies, and Special Problems" _id. at 12.
^Turpin, Op. cit. states at 103: "The government standard form 
has often an additional authority in that its use is enjoined 
by established government contracting principles".
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and clauses in a government contract arc on a Lake-it-or-leavc- 
it basis; there is no freedom of choice.^
Government contracts therefore seem to reflect a power
2relationship, and not a consensual agreement between equals.
A frank recognition of this power relationship leads to the
conclusion that government contracts, just as insurance contracts,
3are contracts of adhesion.
The fact that many of the standard clauses are drafted in 
consultation with the business community does not inject any 
real consent into the contract. But see Turpin, op. cit. 
stating at 90-91: "Consultation with representatives or organ­
isations of contractors on forms and conditions of contract 
can be seen as a characteristic feature of modern procurement 
practice in this country".
2Miller, "Government Contracts and Social Control: A Preliminary 
Inquiry" (1955) 41 Va. L. Rev. 27, 57.
3Patterson, "The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy" (1919) 33 
Harv. L. Rev. 198, 222 and "The Interpretation and Construction 
of Contracts" (1954) 64 Colum. L. Rev. 833. Patterson remarks: 
"Government contracts are frequently contracts of adhesion. The 
general terms of the contract are drafted by officials and staff 
employees and the same form-contract is offered to all persons" 
(at 863). See also Pasley, "The Nondiscrimination Clause in 
Government Contracts" (1957) 43 Va. L. Rev. 837, 847 where the
author remarks: "To begin with, a government contract is a 
contract of adhesion, that is to say, a contract with standard 
terms and conditions, prepared by one party and offered to the 
other on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The consensual element 
is reduced to a minimum .... Obviously, principles of general 
contract law, based on theories of freedom of contract, can 
have little application to such a clause". (Quoted also by 
Friedmann in Law in a Changing Society op. cit. at 404; see 
Pasley again "The Interpretation of Government Contracts: A 
Plea for Better Understanding" (1956) 25 Fordham L. Rev. 211,
213 where he comments: "There is no question that the Government 
contract, with rare exceptions, is a "contract of adhesion", 
that is, a standard form, prepared by one party and required 
of the other, designed to fit a wide variety of situations by 
the filling in of appropriate blanks or the annexing of detailed 
technical specifications, and with very little opportunity for 
variation. Such contracts of adhesion have become common in 
private dealings. The insurance contract is a long-standing 
illustration". The same conclusion has been reached by some
(carried on to p.155)
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If a government contract is frequently a contract of
adhesion, so are many ordinary commercial transactions.
Today, an active consumer enters scores of contracts without in
any real sense agreeing to the terms that are imposed upon him.
As one author has put it, standard form contracts probably
account for more than ninety-nine percent of all the contracts
now made.^ The traditional bargain model no longer describes
the greatest bulk of transactions presently treated as "contracts'
2by the legislature and judiciary. The contract has ceased to 
be a matter of dicker, bargain by bargain, and item by item, and 
has become a matter of mass production of bargains, with the 
background (apart from price, quantity and the like) filled in
(footnote 3 continued from p. 154)
other authors, see e.g. Miller, "Administration by Contract:
A New Concern for the Administrative Lawyer" (1961) 36 N.Y.
Univ. L. Rev. 957, 966 where the author remarks: "The government
contract, a type of 'consensual' agreement in which predominant 
power rests with the government, differs markedly from the 
classical conception of contract. It is a product of adherence 
to prescribed terms rather than of arm's length bargaining";
Cuneo & Crowell, "Impossibility of Performance; Assumption of 
Risk or Act of Submission?" (1964) 29 Law and Contemp. Prob.
531, 549; Baur, "Differences between Commercial
Contracts and Government Contracts"(1968-69)2 Public ContractL.J. 
5, 8; Dygcrt, "Implied Warranties in Government Contracts" (1971)
53 Military L. Rev. 39. But see Frenzen, "The Administrative 
Contract in the United States "(1968-69) 37 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
270, 279 for a contrary view: "It would be wrong, however, to 
extend indiscriminately the concept of adhesion contract, with 
all its connotations of improper use of superior economic power, 
to the government contracts area" [hereinafter cited as Frenzen].
^Slawson, "Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of 
Lawmaking Power" (1971) 84 Harv. L. Rev. 529 [hereinafter cited 
as Slawson].
2Dauer, "Contracts of Adhesion in Light of the Bargain Hypothesis 
An Introduction" (1972) 5 Akron L. Rev. 1.
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not by the general law but by the standard clauses and terms,
prepared often by one of the parties only.^ " In the advanced
industrial society of modern times, the economic apparatus is
no longer focused on the particular tastes and the particular
desires of individuals, but is based on mass production and
mass distribution. This kind of production and distribution
has by necessity become more and more standardised; and this
standardisation has its counterpart in standardised forms for
dealing with the customers. Thus, still using the word contract,
2the word has become hyphenated.
Thus far, there are no dissimilarities between government 
and ordinary commercial contracts. However, in the sphere of 
government contracts there have been other developments also.
Not only are government contracts, more often than not, contracts 
of adhesion but they are gradually transforming into
^Llewellyn, Book Review of Prausnitz, The Standardization of 
Commercial Contracts in English and Continental Law (1939) 52 
Harv. L.Rev. 700 [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn, Book Review].
2Lenhoff, "Contracts of Adhesion and the Freedom of Contract:
A Comparative Study in the Light of American and Foreign Law" 
(1961-62)36 Tulane L. Rev. 481 [hereinafter cited as Lenhoff],
See generally, Lücke's Review of Loeber's book on
Government Contracts published in (1970) 3 Modern Law and 
Society (Section II) pp. 157-159.At p. 158, the reviewer
observes: "...Loeber's perhaps most important finding is that the 
contract is no longer a phenomenon based on party autonomy and 
productive of a kind of private law between the parties, but has 
become an instrument in the hands of the State for the imposition 
of private rights and duties and also for the promotion of social 
welfare and economic co-operation: ... . This new understanding 
of contract is implicit in Soviet legal literature and legislative 
practice and is also gaining ground in Western countries".
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administrative contracts and furthermore into planning agreements. 
These aspects will be studied in later chapters; for the moment 
an examination will be made of the various aspects of 
standardised adhesion contracts, which, for better or for worse, 
are here to stay in the field of government contracts /
2. Adhesion Contracts
(i) De finition
Raymond Saleilles, a French jurist, who at the turn of 
the century prepared a study of a part of the new German Civil 
Code, invented the term "contrat d 1 adhesion11. The study, 
published in 1901, stated:
Doubtless, there are contracts and contracts, and we 
are in reality far from that unity of contractual 
type assumed by the law. Eventually the law must, 
indeed, yield to the shading and differences that have 
emerged from social relations. There are pretended 
contracts that have only the name, the juridical 
construction of which remains yet to be made. For 
these, in any event, the rules of individual inter­
pretation should undergo important modifications,
'Dygert in his article "Implied Warranties in GoverrftY\6llt 
Contracts" (1971) 53 Military L. Rev. 39, states that there is 
an atmosphere of adhesion contracts in government contracting: 
"Because of the very volume of its procurement, it is not 
subject to the normal controls exercised by a system of 
competition. Contract provisions are not subject to negotiation 
in any real sense. The government dictates the terms of its 
contracts largely free from influence by the contractors who are 
dependent upon it for large portions of their business and who, 
in many cases, are dependent on such business for their very 
existence."
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if only that one might call them, for lack of a bettor 
term, contracts of adhesion, those in which a single 
will is exclusively predominant, acting as a 
unilateral will which dictates its law, no longer to 
an individual, but to an indeterminate collectivity, 
and which in advance undertakes unilaterally, 
subject to the adhesion of those who would wish to 
accept the law of the contract and to take advantage 
of the engagements imposed on themselves.
Saleilles refers to the collective labour contracts of big
industries, transportation contracts of big railroad companies
and "all those contracts which, as the Romans said, resemble a
2law much more than a meeting of minds", as examples of contracts
Saleilles, De La Declaration de Volonte (1901) §89 at 229-30 
(translation by Patterson, "The Interpretation and
Construction of Contracts" (1964) 64 Colum. L.Rev. 833 at 856). 
This term was apparently introduced into the Anglo-American 
law for the first time by Patterson, "The Delivery of a Life 
Insurance Policy" (1919) 33 Harv. L.Rev. 198, 222: vide
Kessler, "Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts about 
Freedom of Contract" (1943) 43 Colum. L.Rev. 629, 633 f.n.ll.
See also Patterson "Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Ball" 
(1943) 43 Colum. L.Rev. 731. For a similar usage of the term 
in international law, see Oppenheim, International Law Vol. I 
§§532, 533. On the origin of the term, see Steven v. Fidelity & 
Casualty Co. (1962) 58 Cal. 2d 862, 882 (Tobriner J.). See 
also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. (1960) 161 A. 2d 69, 
86; Siegelman v. Cunard White Star (1955) 221 F. 2d 189, 206; 
Ehrenzweig, "Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws" (1953) 
53 Colum. L.Rev. 1072, 1075.
2Id. at 230 (English translation from Siegelman v. Cunard White 
Star (1955) 221 F. 2d 189, 206). In France, the need for the 
distinct treatment of such contracts was recognised by the 
legislature as early as 1757, when marine insurance contracts 
deviating from the general law were required to be handwritten 
rather than printed.
of adhesion. These contracts, he points out, have the
characteristics of a legislative enactment and hence should be
interpreted "in the interests of the collectivity to which they
are addressed ... in the sense called for by both good faith
and the economic relations involved".^ According to Amos and
Walton, the term contrat d 1 2adhesion is employed "to denote
contracts in which the conditions are fixed by one of the
parties in advance. The contract, which frequently will contain
many conditions, may either be accepted or rejected but its
2conditions are not open to discussion." The boundaries of an 
appropriate definition of the term are thus marked by two 
factors: (1) imposition on, and unalterability by, the signing
party submitting to terms, fixed in advance by the other party, 
either in ignorance or out of necessity, and (2) the inequality
1Ibid.
2Introduction to French Law (2nd ed.) 152 (cited also in 
Silberberg, "The Meaning of Standard Form Contracts" (1967) 
7-8 Rhodesian L. J. 158, 160).
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of the parties' bargaining position. The terms may be fair or
For other definitions of "adhesion contracts" see, Lenhoff, 
op.cit. at 481 where the author states that the name contract of 
adhesion indicates that the legal transaction is not formulated 
as a result of the give-and-take of bargaining where the desires 
of one party are balanced by those of the other. The customer 
by entering in the transaction, has to "adhere" to the terms 
prescribed by the enterprise - for only a very few items may be 
open to his determination; Ehrenzweig defines contracts of 
adhesion as agreements in which one party's participation consists 
in his 'adherence', unwilling and often unknowing, to a document 
drafted unilaterally and insisted upon by what is usually a 
powerful enterprise: "Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws"
(1953) 53 Colum. L.Rev. 1072, 1075. Kessler in his 
article "Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts about Freedom of 
Contract" (1943) 43 Colum. L.Rev. 629 states at 632: "Standard
contracts are typically used by enterprises with strong bargaining
Sc-tviceS, is fv«UA.er\tiy rvofc it\  <*- 'posT H O  vv fce ih c p  torCuY tcipower. The weaker party, m  need of the goods orkbetter terms, 
either because the author of the standard contract has a monopoly 
(natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the same 
clauses. His contractual intention is but a subjection more or 
less voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger party, terms 
whose consequences are often understood only in a vague way, if 
at all. Thus standardized contracts are frequently contracts of 
adhesion; they are a prendre ou a laisser". Another author 
explains "The 'adhesion' contract is a standardized or form 
agreement that is drafted unilaterally by a dominant party and 
then presented to a weaker party as the only acceptable instrument. 
The latter's participation in the resultant bargain consists in 
his mere adherence": Shuchman, "Consumer Credit by Adhesion
Contract" (1962) 35 Temple L. Q. 125 at 128-9. See also Wilson, 
"Freedom of Contract and Adhesion Contracts" (1965) 14 Int'1 & 
Comp. L. Q. 172, 175-76, 181; Slawson, op.cit. at 549, 554; 
Silberberg, "The Meaning of Standard Form Contracts" (1967) 7-8
Rhodesian L. J. 158, 160 [hereinafter cited as Silberberg].
"The term 'adhesion contract' expresses an implicit hostility 
toward the more powerful of two contracting parties in a 
situation where that party has 'imposed' its will through the use 
of standard form contracts": Frenzen, op,cit. at 279;
Hippel, "The Control of Exemption Clauses - A Comparative Study" 
(1967) 16 Int'1 & Comp. L. Q. 591. According to Kahn-Freund, the 
"standard contracts" are contracts "the terms of which do not 
result from a 'give and take', a bargaining between parties, but 
are fixed in advance, and brought into operation by an act of 
formal assent." Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage by Inland
Transport (4th ed. 1965) 215 [hereinafter cited as Kahn-Freund].
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unfair. They may be all the conditions of the contract or some of 
them, for it would not affect the mischief if the supplier will 
negotiate on some conditions whilst leaving others in the category 
of "non-negotiable".^ To these the following factors may be 
added for the sake of completeness: (1) the monopolistic position
or at least the great economic power of the offeror, (2) the 
continuing and general nature of the offer, (3) a wide-spread 
demand for the goods or services offered, and (4) the use of 
standard forms, the stipulations of which serve
mostly the interests of the offeror and the reading, let alone
2the understanding of which, presents difficulties to the offeree.
Bright, "Contracts of Adhesion and Exemption Clauses"
(1967) 41 A.L.J. 261, 262 [hereinafter cited as Bright].
2In the author's possession is a Pan American clipper cargo way­
bill, dated 23 July 1975, in which the terms and limitations 
refer to the governing rules of the Warsaw Convention of 1929 and 
its amending Hague Protocol - certainly not informative for the 
ordinary layman or lawyer. See also Derby Cables, Ltd v.Frederick 
Oldridge, Ltd [1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 140, where in a lighterage 
contract entered into between the shippers and lighter-owners for 
carriage of coils of copper wire from wharf at Hull to a steam­
ship, a claim by the shippers was made alleging short delivery at 
the steamship of 20 coils out of a consignment of 1744 coils sent 
by lorry to wharf. The lighter-owners contended, inter alia, that 
they were exempted from liability by the terms of the contract.
Winn J said of the contractual conditions which were printed on 
the back of the contract that the text was "legible only by eyes 
with an acuity unlikely to be enjoyed by an individual possessing 
sufficient maturity of mind to understand it" and that it was 
"verbose, tautologous and obscure" (at 149). An excellent 
illustration of the difficulties in reading such conditions appears 
in the facsimile reproduction of a Cunard Line steamship ticket 
that cannot be deciphered unless using a microscope: see Siegelman 
v. Cunard White Star (1955) 221 F. 2d 189. This was the first 
case in which an American court used the term "adhesion contract". 
Another interesting case is New Prague Flouring Mill Co v. Spears 
(1922) 189 N.W. 815, in which the court found that the terms 
containing 4,000 words were squeezed on a single sheet of paper.
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The concept of adhesion contract has been described by use. of a 
wide variety of expressions, all of which have the same meaning.
It has been referred to simply as a
1 2 "standard contract", or a "standardized contract", or a "form
3 4 5contract", or "contract by imposition", or "imposed" or
6 7"imposed standard contract", or a "block contract", or "general
Q
conditions".
(ii) Distinctions between Adhesion Contracts 
and Standard Form Contracts
At this juncture, it will be pertinent to state the
differences (if there are any) between adhesion contracts and
standard form contracts or standardised mass contracts. Most
Friedmann, op. cit. chapter 4.
2Kessler, "Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts about Freedom of 
Contract" (1943) 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 632 [hereinafter cited 
as Kessler] .
3Kessler and Gilmore, Contracts, Cases and Materials (2nd ed. 
1970) 11 [hereinafter cited as Kessler and Gilmore] .
4Slawson, op. cit. at 529, 556.
5Grunfeld, "Passenger Charges Schemes 1952-3 and the Voice of 
the Consumer" (1954) 17 Modern L. Rev. 119.
^Grunfeld, "Reform in the Law of Contract" (1961) 24 Modern L.
Rev. 62 .
7Shuchman, "Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts" (1962) 35 
Temple L. Q. 125, 129 [hereinafter cited as Shuchman].
8 Lando, "Standard Contracts - A Proposal and a Perspective" 
(1966) 10 Scandinavian Studies in Law 129 [hereinafter cited as 
Lando] .
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scholars have used these terms interchangeably, but there are
2some who have endeavoured to draw a distinction between them.
In commercial practice the term "standard form contract" is used 
in two different meanings. It denotes model contract forms and 
contracts of adhesion. These two meanings are by no means 
identical. A model contract form is a specimen form to which 
the lawyer or businessman will turn when charged with the duty 
of drafting a contract and which will be altered and adapted to 
meet the situation in hand. A contract of adhesion is a form 
proposed (rather imposed) by one of the contracting parties to 
the other as the definitive form of the contract which is intended 
to be unalterable except in trifling and unimportant detail;
See, e.g. Bright, op. cit. at 262; Bolgar, "The Contract of 
Adhesion - A Comparison of Theory and Practice" (1972) 20 Am.
J. of Comp. L. 53, 54; Sales, "Standard Form Contracts" (1953)
16 Modern L. Rev. 318; Kessler & Gilmore, op. cit. at 11;
Friedmann, op. cit. at 129; Prausnitz, The Standardization 
of Commercial Contracts in English and Continental Law (1937), 
reviewed by Llewellyn (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700; Llewellyn,
"What Price Contract - An Essay in Perspective" (1931) 40 Yale L.
J. 704; Isaacs, "The Standardizing of Contracts" (1917) 27 Yale 
L. J. 34; Kessler, op. cit. 629; Lenhoff, op. cit. at 481; 
Kahn-Freund, op. cit. at 75,.
2See e.g. Schmitthoff, "The Unification or Harmonisation of Law 
by Means of Standard Contracts and General Conditions" (1968) 17 
Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 551; Silberberg, op. cit. 171; Slawson, op. cit. 
at 549-50; Duncan, "Adhesion Contracts: A Twentieth Century Probiert 
for a Nineteenth Century Code" (1974) 34 Louisiana L. Rev. 1081. 
[hereinafter cited as Duncan].
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the party to whom this type of contract is offered may "takc-it- 
or-leave-it" but cannot negotiate its terms and conditions.
Model contracts sometimes expressly provide that the parties 
shall insert and complete supplementary clauses or an appendix 
and hardly make sense without such exercise of the parties 1 
discretion, but contracts of adhesion are imposed by one of the 
parties upon the other. Model contracts are economically 
innocuous; they are used between parties of equal bargaining 
power and, in the course of the negotiations, are frequently 
amended in order to achieve a balance of economic interest 
between the negotiating parties. Contracts of-adhesion raise 
in some instances the suspicion that the imposing party, command­
ing a position of monopoly or superior bargaining power, might 
misuse its economic strength (which it often does) at the expense 
of the other, economically weaker party.
Since the average standard form contract tends to develop 
into an adhesion contract,
the difference does not seem to 
be of importance in the present terms of reference. Another 
point may also be noted here. There is a feeling among some 
scholars that since a contract is composed of standard terms 
and therefore not "dickered", it is adhesive. Legitimacy is 
thought to derive from the act of bargaining. A contract that 
contains both standard terms and terms that were "dickered" is 
therefore thought to be fully enforceable only with respect to
the latter. It is submitted that this is an erroneous conclusion.
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Slawson's following comments expose the fallacy:
One reads these accounts of the legitimacy which only 
"dickering" can provide with a sense of unreality.
Where do the authors suppose that this "dickering" 
occurs? Have they ever heard customers in a department 
store "dicker" terms of sale with the clerks? Or anyone 
"dickering" with an insurance agent over the terms in a 
policy? .... Nor in the past has the validity of contracts 
ever been thought to depend upon their having been 
"dickered" .... It is not an absence of an opportunity to 
dicker, but a narrowing of choice which coerces, and a 
sufficient range of choice to make a contract non adhesive 
is present if an individual has the ability to choose 
among a variety of materially different standard forms, 
although he may be powerless to change any of them by 
"dickering".^
Nowadays there are fewer and fewer contracts in the private
business world, and in the sphere of government contracting,
where both parties have discretion or opportunity to talk to
each other on an equal footing, where one party may say "Well,
I won't agree to that position", and the other one says "Well,
what about such and such instead?" That is why neither the
scholars of law nor the judges draw a distinction between
2contracts of adhesion and standard form model contracts. It is
1
Slawson, "Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of 
Lawmaking Power" (1971) 84 Harv. L. Rev. 529 at 553.
2But see Suisse Atlantique Societd d'Armdment Maritime S.A. v. 
N.V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1966] 2 All E.R. 61. Lord 
Reid in the course of the judgment implicitly recognises the 
distinction between contracts of adhesion and model contracts 
when he says (at 76):
Exemption clauses differ greatly in many respects. 
Probably the most objectionable are found in complex 
standard conditions which are now so common. In the 
ordinary way the customer has no time to read them, he 
would probably not understand them. And if he did 
understand and object to any of them, he would generally 
be told he could take it or leave it-... At the other 
extreme is the case where parties are beginning on terms 
of equality and a stringent exemption clause is accepted 
for a quid pro quo or other good reason.
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submitted that the standardised mass contract is a genus and an
one of
adhesion contract^its species. But with the passage of time and 
due to the revolutionary changes in the economic sphere, the 
species has eaten up the genus and almost all contracts now tend 
to be in the adhesion form. Contracts which once used to be a 
matter of dicker, bargain by bargain, and item by item, gave 
place to the standard model contracts because of an increase in 
the demand and supply of goods and services. But even they could 
not withstand the pressures of mass production and distribution 
and soon made an exit giving place to adhesion contracts. In 
other words the movement has been from a simple bargain type of 
contract to adhesion form via standard contract.
Bargaining is now a thing of the past. Almost invariably, the 
parties are not economically equal. There is mass production 
of goods. The contracts often involve huge quantities, partic­
ularly the government ones. And it is easier to find a counsello] 
or a small group who can draft a technically skilful form for a 
million contracts than to find a million men each of whom can 
draft one satisfactory contract.
To sum up, a contract of adhesion includes every contract, 
whether simple or under seal and whether contained in one or 
more documents, one of the parties to which (generally called 
the adhering party^) habitually makes contracts of the same type 
in a particular form and is allowed little, if any, variation
^Or the "servient" party, the expression used by Wright, 
"Opposition of Law to Business Usages" (1926) 26 Colum. L. Rev. 
917, 930; Cohen, "Property and Sovereignty" (1927) 13
Cornell L.Q. 8; and Frenzen, "The Administrative Contract in 
the United States" (1968-69) 37 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 270, 274.
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from that form. In such transactions the bargaining power 
of the parties is unequal: on the one side there is the
ordinary individual and on the other, a monopoly or powerful 
organisation with desirable goods or services to supply and 
if it is a government body wishing to procure goods or services, 
it (i.e. the government) luring the contractor with good 
regular business. The choice between not making a contract or 
making it on the only terms available is no choice at all and 
docile adherence to the pre-determined terms, a meek signature 
"on the dotted line", is the general rule. The potential 
customer/supplier/contractor has the choice either of the 
'freedom to adhere' to the set form or not. The printed 
document which sets out the standard conditions never sees the 
red, green and purple ink beloved of the conveyancer when 
negotiating his terms.^
''"See generally Eörsi, "The Validity of Clauses Excluding or 
Limiting Liability" (1975) 23 Am.j, of Comp. L. 215; Bolgar, 
op. cit. at 57; Isaacs, "The Standardizing of Contracts" 
(1917-18) 27 Yale L.J. 34, 39; see also dictum of Lord 
Mansfield in Robinson v. Bland (1760) 97 E.R. 717, 718,
2 Burr. 1077, 1078. For materials on the nature of adhesion 
contracts, see Ehrenzweig, "Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict 
of Laws" (1953) 53 Colum. L. Rev. 1072, 1088; Friedmann, 
op. cit. at 131; Lenhoff, op. cit. at 482; Langrod, "Administ­
rative Contracts" (1955) 4 Am. J. of Comp. L. 325, 327; Kessler, 
op. cit.at 640-41; Slawson, op. cit. at 544; Miller, "Government 
Contracts and Social Control: A Preliminary Study" (1955) 41 
Va. L. Rev. 27, 31; Ripert, Le Regime Democratique et le
Droit Civil Moderne (2nd ed. 1948), ch.V and II Josserand, 
L 'essor Moderne du Concept Contractuel, Recueil d'Etudes en 
1'Honneur de Geny (1934) 333.
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(iii) Advantages and Disadvantages
Preoccupation with the evils of adhesion contracts from
the point of view of the offeree must not allow their admitted
virtues to be overlooked.^ By saving time and trouble in
bargaining, simplifying internal administration and facilitating
planning they reduce administrative costs to an extent which
must benefit both parties. They have, it is said, a lulling
effect induced by the knowledge that one is signing "what everyone
2else has signed". They allow for automation in the processing
of transactions resulting in greater savings of time, effort 
3and cost. They also reduce risk to a calculable quantity and 
have the potential, if drawn up in an enlightened manner, of
For the advantages of adhesion contracts see Kessler, op. cit. 
at 631. Attention may be drawn to the following by Kessler: 
"Standardized contracts have thus become an important means of 
excluding or controlling the 'irrational factor' in litigation.
In this respect they are a true reflection of the spirit of our 
time with its hostility to irrational factors in the judicial 
process, and they belong in the same category as codifications 
and restatements" (at 632); Llewellyn, Book Review, op. cit.at 
701; Friedmann, op. cit. at 131; Slawson, op. cit. at 552;
Jorgensen, "Contract as Form" (1966) 10 Scandinavian Studies 
in Law 99, 106-108; Lando, op. cit. at 129-130; Egan,
"Standard Contracts" [1968] J. of Bus. L. 204, 206-7; Wright, 
"Opposition of Law to Business Usages" (1926) 26 Colum. L.
Rev. 917, 930 n.17; Shepherd, "Contracts in a Prosperity Year"
(1954)6 Stanford L. Rev. 208, 212; Macaulay, "Non-Contractua1 
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study" (1963) 28 Am. Soc.
Rev. 55, 58.
2Shuchman, op. cit. at 131.
3Id. at 128 quoting Demogue, Analysis of Fundamental Notions, 
(Modern Legal Philosophy Series 1916) VII, §262 at 471. Demogue 
suggests that the more general basis for form or block contracts 
is the application of the "law of least effort", that an economy 
of time makes it easier for individuals to act and thereby to 
create wealth.
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becoming "a wise code governing intra- or extra-trade relations
of a business group". ^  "Standardized relationships favour security,
simplify inter-group relationships, and may well offer machinery
for producing more to distribute and for its more effective
distribution. They may be needed as an adjustment to the technical
2phases of mass production and mass marketing". The skill and
experience of specialised legal draftsmen is made available to
the entire personnel of a large business. Judicial interpretation,
if reasonably consistent, supplements the work of standardising
contracts and accelerates the trend towards conformity. One
authoritative decision on a doubtful point may shed just the
3light needed for thousands of future such transactions.
Llewellyn, "The Effect of Legal Institutions upon Economics" 
(1925) 15 Am. Econ. Rev. 665, 673. See also Silberberg, "The 
Economics of Standard Contracts" (1968) 8 Rhodesian L. J. 89,
90-91.
2Llewellyn, "What Price Contract? - An Essay in Perspective" 
(1931) 40 Yale L. J. 704 at 717. See further at 731 where the 
author remarks: "Standardized contracts in and of themselves 
partake of the general nature of machine-production. They 
materially ease and cheapen selling and distribution. They 
are easy to make, file, check and fill".
3Cf. Llewellyn, "What Price Contract? - An Essay in Perspective" 
(1931) 40 Yale L. J. 704, 731: "Finally, from the angle of the 
individual enterprise, they make the experience and planning 
power of the high executive available to cheaper help; and 
available forthwith, without waiting through a painful training 
period".
170
"Economy, certainty and adaptability are the three outstanding
virtues of the standard contract".'1 2345' It has also been suggested
that "[b]y standardizing contracts, a law increases that real
security which is a necessary basis of initiatives and tolerable 
2risks". Stressing the economic function of adhesion contracts,
Kessler and Gilmore have observed:
Uniformity of terms is a cost reduction factor. Form 
contracts reflecting past experience, the skill and 
foresight of executives and counsel with regard to 
future contingencies, are of assistance to less exper­
ienced personnel in the making of contracts, the 
handling of performance, and the adjustment of claims.
Notwithstanding the various forms of economy resulting from
such practice, in fact, all the legal advantages of adhesion
contracts accrue to the dominant party only. Always coiled in
4power is its abuse; and contractual power is no exception.
Natural self-interest soon leads to the inclusion in such
contracts of protection extending beyond the realm of legitimate
interests. Hence the emergence and proliferation of the
5"exclusion of liability" clauses which have now occupied so
^Grunfeld, op. cit. 24 Modern L. Rev. at 64.
2Cohen, Law and the Social Order (1933) 106.
3Kessler and Gilmore, Contracts, Cases & Materials(2nd ed. 1970) 1]
4See e.g. Turpin, op. cit. at 103 "The abuses that are associated 
with standard contracts [are] - unintelligibility, concealment 
of crucial provisions in dense thickets of verbiage, unfair and 
oppressive conditions and so on...."
5Synonymous phrases are, "exception clause", "exemption clause", 
"exemptive clause", "exculpatory clause", "exempting clause", 
"exclusion clause", "non-warranty clause".
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rauch of the courts' time for over a century. Obviously, 
adhesion contracts affect both freedom and equality of bargain­
ing, except where the members of a trade consciously pursue the 
policy of considering the interests of both the potential 
parties to the contract or where groups of approximately equal 
strength confront each other. But this is seldom the case 
in government contracts. Not infrequently the weaker party to 
a prospective government contract even agrees in advance not to
retract his offer while the offeree reserves for himself the
2power to accept or refuse; or he submits to terms or change of
For a detailed treatment of such cases in the context of 
adhesion concept see, Meyer, "Contracts of Adhesion and the 
Doctrine of Fundamental Breach" (1964) 50 Va. L. Rev. 1178 
[hereinafter cited as Meyer].
2This is a controversial point. In the United States, it 
was held in Refining Associates v. United States (1953) 109 
F. Supp. 259 that when bids are invited pursuant to the formal 
advertising procedure, a bidder is said to be unable to 
withdraw his bid (unless for mistake) after the time set for 
the opening of bids. See also Turpin and Whelan (eds.), The 
London Transcript, A Comparative Look at Public Contracting 
in the United States and the United Kingdom (1973) Part I, 9.
But in Australia, a tender may be withdrawn by a contractor 
before its acceptance by the government. One wonders, however, 
if the bidder has the right of withdrawal in all cases, after 
the bids have been opened and known, would it not lead to great 
inconvenience to government and innumerable frauds by the 
withdrawing party. See also ch. II at 119, supra.
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terms which will be communicated to him later. Adhesion terms
thus invariably detract from common-law rights: by inserting
purely economic clauses, operational clauses, or by limiting
or excluding liability, by making a government agency the
sole judge of whether it is justified in terminating a contract
because of altered circumstances,^ for example. According
to Lord Denning they are "nothing less than a legislative code
imposed by the one party on the other - and sanctioned under
2the guise of freedom of contract". It is a form of contract 
"which, in the measure of the importance of the particular 
deal in the other party's life, amounts to the exercise of
3unofficial government of some by others, via private law".
^See chapter IV, infra.
2Lord Denning, "The Way of an iconoclast [ 1959-60] The Journal 
of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 77, 84. For a 
similar view, see Langrod, "Administrative Contracts" (1955)
4 Am. J. of Comp. L. 325. At 332 the author has stated:
"Thus, the 'civil' contract itself is far from having kept 
its original doctrinal 'purity' and evolves steadily toward 
a 'quasi-statutory form'"; Lloyd, The Idea of Law 219.
See also the following authorities: Llewellyn, Book Review
op. cit. at 702; Kessler, op, cit. at 632; Jorgensen,
"Contract as Form" (1966) 10 Scandinavian Studies in Law 99, 108.
3Llewellyn, "What Price Contract ..." op.cit. at 731.
(iv) Treatment of Adhesion Contracts
(a) Legislation
The law of many countries as to the validity of adhesion 
contracts seems to be in a state of confusion and uncertainty.
There is as yet (with the exception of the Israeli Standard
and the West Germany's Regulation of Standard Terms Act, 1976) ;
Contracts Law, 1964A no statute dealing exclusively with the
adhesion contracts in the common-law or civil-law jurisdictions.
In the absence of specific statutory regulation on adhesion 
contracts, England follows the general tendency of protecting 
the economically weaker party through legislation to control 
some particular kind of abuse. Examples of such "spasmodic"
In the United States, there is §2-302 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code dealing with unconscionable contracts or terms. See for 
discussion Bolgar, op. cit. at 70, 73-76 and Kessler and Gilmore,
op.cit. at 465-66 where further references can also be found on 
the subject of unconscionability. The Italian Civil Code of 
1942 has specific code articles (Articles 1341 and 1342) relating 
to standard conditions and one-sided clauses. For the text, 
English translation and discussion, see Duncan, "Adhesion 
Contracts: A Twentieth Century Problem for a Nineteenth Century
Code" (1974) 34 Louisiana L. Rev. 1081, 1088-91. For the French, 
German, Austrian, Belgium and Italian law on adhesion contracts 
see Wilson, "Freedom of Contract and Adhesion Contracts" (1965)
14 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 172. For the law in Israel, see Lando,
op. cit. See further for an interesting consideration of the 
Italian provisions: Gorla, "Standard Conditions and Form
Contracts in Italian Law" (1962) 11 Am. J. of Comp. L. 1; see 
also Bachrach, "The 'Contract of Adhesion' Doctrine in Franco- 
Belgian Law" [1956] ABA Sect. Int'l & Comp. L. Proc. 119;
Lenhoff, "Contrats d'Adhesion in German and Austrian Law" [1956] 
ABA Sect. Int'l & Comp. L. Proc. 121.
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legislative intervention, affecting in particular the validity
Cheshire and Fifoot, Law of Contract (7th ed. 1969) 111-112. 
There is a lot of piecemeal legislation: employment and
transport, in particular, have attracted statutory regulation of 
contract: in the former, for example, the Truck Acts, 1831-96,
the Solicitors Act, 1932, s.60(2); in the latter, the Carriers 
Act, 1840, s.4; Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, s.7;
Railways Act, 1921, ss.42-45; Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924; 
Carriage by Air Act, 1932; British Road Traffic Act, 1960;
British Transport Act, 1962; British Transport Commission 
(Passenger Charges) Scheme, 1954, paras. 32-33. Again in 
financing, there are the Moneylenders Act, 1927, s.6; and the 
Building Societies Act, 1939, s.14; in property holding, the 
Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948; and Agriculture Act, 1958; and 
the Rent Acts; in hire-purchase, the English Hire Purchase Acts, 
1965 and the Hire-Purchase (Advertisements) Act, 1967; in 
business organisation, the Partnership Act, 1890; and current 
Companies Act. The above list is by no means exhaustive. It 
is impossible to set out within a reasonable compass every Act 
of Parliament which restricts the freedom of the economically 
superior party designing a form of contract. Such legislation 
take?many patterns: some of them make the insertion of certain
clauses illegal or ineffective or both; some make compulsory 
the insertion of certain clauses; some make compulsory the 
adoption of a certain form of contract; some provide that certain 
clauses shall be deemed to have been incorporated or adopted 
unless they have been expressly or impliedly negatived; some 
provide that certain clauses shall not be incorporated in a 
contract unless special steps are taken to bring them to the 
attention of the other party; and some others simply require 
that certain steps shall be taken to bring to the notice of the 
other party certain clauses of the contract or provisions of 
statutes relating to it. For legislative implementation of the 
same way of thinking in the United States see e.g. Truth in 
Lending Act of 1968 [82 Stat. 146 (1968)]. For a most 
comprehensive work dealing with legislation relating to 
transport by railway, inland waterway, road vehicle and aircraft 
in the United Kingdom, see Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage
by Inland Transport (4th ed. 1965). For the relevant case-law 
and legislation restricting the carrier's power to limit its 
liability, see a good account given by the author 218 et seq.
For examples of statutory regulation of adhesion contracts in 
India, see Ramaseshan, "Adhesion Contracts and the Indian Law 
of Contract" (1975) 17 Journal of Indian Law Institute 237, 
244-246.
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of restrictive terms, are the Consumer Credit Act 1974, Road 
Traffic Act 1960, the Transport Acts 1962-1968 and the Hire 
Purchase Act 1965, all of which include provisions avoiding 
clauses which restrict or negative the drafting party's 
liability.^
If we compare these rules with those of the English Sale of 
Goods Act 1893, we find an almost complete turn-about in
2legislative policy. Whereas the Sale of Goods Act provides
that any right, duty, or liability, which would arise under a
contract of sale by implication of law may be negatived or varied
by express agreement, the new rules either prohibit the validity
of such agreements, or severely restrict the power of the parties
3to contract-out.
4(b) Judicial response
In the absence of separate statutory rules dealing with 
government contracts, the courts have so far applied the general 
principles of the ordinary contract law to government contracts. 
Since, however, government-contractor disputes are more frequently 
settled without recourse to courts (as they go to arbitration or
^In Australia, see Trade Practices Act 1974 (C'th). Further 
references to legislation in Australia can be found in Cheshire 
and Fifoot, The Law of Contract (2nd Australian ed. by Starke 
and Higgins, 1969) 107-108.
^Section 55.
3Cf. Hire-Purchase Act, 1965, s .18(3).
4See generally, Roebuck, Law of Contract, Text and Materials
(1974) chapter 7 [hereinafter cited as Roebuck]. For a survey of 
the case law in India, see Ponnuswami and Puri, Cases and 
Materials on Contracts [including Government Contracts] (1974) 
104-109. See also Ramaseshan, "Adhesion Contracts and the
Indian Law of Contract" (1975) 17 Journal of Indian Law Institute 
237.
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to some other administrative body), the courts have had very
few opportunities to apply the rules of contract law to government
contracts. In the area of private contract, on the other hand,
courts have gradually created a series of independent rules which
now do exert extensive but still imperfect control^ over
2standardised contracts or contracts of adhesion. In the exercise
of their chief function to dispense justice, the courts have
always been anxious to protect the weaker party in situations that
manifestly point to the stronger party's "covetous passion for 
3undue lucre", and have drawn in this endeavour on the principles
Most of the authors in their writings on "Adhesion Contracts" 
have criticised the judicial response to this vital matter: see
e.g. Llewellyn, Book Review op. cit. See also Kessler, op. cit. 
at 637. "[T]he majority of judges have striven, in however
haphazard a way, to mitigate at least some particularly blatant 
consequences of the early theory. If they have not achieved very 
much, this is to some extent due to judicial conservatism, but 
to a far greater extent, to the organic weakness of judicial-law 
reform": Friedmann, op. cit. at 125. Lenhoff, op. cit. at 486 
remarks: "But the trouble is that American courts shy away from
statutory analogy so that, in the absence of a specific statute, 
no remedy is available". Kahn-Freund dealing with the 
law of carriage, states: "In this respect the common law as
developed by the courts in this country failed to respond to the 
reality of the situation, and, in the name of "freedom of contract' 
helped to establish what was in fact (though not in law) a 
private legislative power to which the carrier's customers had 
to submit". (op. cit. at 214).
2Cf. Shuchman, op. cit. at 137; see also Dauer, "Contracts of 
Adhesion in light of the Bargain Hypothesis: An Introduction"
(1972) 5 Akron L. Rev. 1, 32; Llewellyn, "What Price Contract?
- An Essay in Perspective" (1931) 40 Yale L. J. 704, 751.
^Earl of Chesterfield v. Jansseen(1750) 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 128;
28 E.R. 82, 84.
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of contract law. Since under the contract law the validity 
of contracts depends on freedom of consent, the courts have 
invalidated contracts, or contractual clauses, which manifestly 
reveal defects of consent. They have invoked absence of know­
ledge, absence of choice, bargaining inadequacy, gross imposition, 
undue influence, duress, equitable "surprise", unfair advantage, 
the non est factum rule etc.'*" to deny validity to these 
unequal contracts. By a process of strict construction against 
the dominant party, the courts have been excluding such onerous
clauses where the document did not appear to be contractual 
2in nature, where the offeree's attention was not adequately
3drawn to the conditions, or where notice of them was given after
"''For a treatment of the leading Australian and English
cases, see Roebuck, op. cit. 162-219. See also, Evans v.
Llewellyn (1787) 29 E.R. 1191 (surprise and undue advantage);
Wood v. Abrey (1818) 56 E.R. 558 (want of advice); Fry v. Lane 
(1888) 40 Ch.D. 312 (unconscionable bargain); 0 1Rorke v. 
Bollinqbroke (1877) 26 W.R. 239 (H.L.) (knowledge and consent); 
Lowe v. Lombank [1960] 1 All E.R. 611 (hire-purchase). For early
American cases see New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants 
Bank (1848) 6 Howard 344; Dorr v. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. 
(1850) 4 Sandford 136; Bissell v. New York Central R.R. (1869)
25 N.Y. 442; Railroad Co. v. Lockwood (1874) 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 
357. See further Patterson, "The Interpretation and Construction 
of Contracts" (1964) 64 Colum. L. Rev. 833, 858 and the cases 
cited therein.
^Chapelton v. Barry U,D,C. [1940] 1 K.B. 532 (C.A.) (hiring of
a deck chair on a beach).
3Richardson, Spence & Co v. Rowntree [1894] A.C. 217 (folded 
ticket); Parker v. South Eastern Ry. (1877) 25 W.R. 564 (C.A.) 
(Railway cloak-room ticket). See also Roebuck, op. cit. 162 
et seg. for ticket cases. For a survey of the case law in India, 
see Ramaseshan, "Adhesion Contracts and the Indian Law of Contract 
(1975) 17 Journal of Indian Law Institute 237, 247-256.
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the contract was concluded. More recently the doctrine of
fundamental breach has been evolved in an attempt to deal with
2the problem at a more basic level.
In the early stages of the development of the law on this 
point, traditional concepts of the law concerning freely 
bargained individual contracts were applied to adhesion contracts. 
"Consent" was construed by using the device of "objective 
expectations" which the acceptance of such a form was regarded 
as carrying with it. Thus, the approach was the idea of an 
implied consent; later, however, the courts adopted the approach 
of 'construction'. Handicapped by the axiom that courts can 
only interpret but cannot make contracts for the parties, they 
have used the old roundabout method of construing ambiguity
Olley v. Marlborough Court Ltd [1949] 1 K.B. 532 (C.A.) (notice 
displayed in the bedroom of the hotel). In a Note, "Exemption 
Clauses - Contractual and Tortious Liability" (1954) 17 Modern
L. Rev. 155, Gower collects a number of devices used by
the courts to enable a finding of liability. Also see 
generally Coote, Exception Clauses (1964); Eorsi, "The Validity 
of Clauses Excluding or Limiting Liability" (1975) 23 Am. J. of 
Comp. L. 215, 221 et seq.
2Treitel, Law of Contract (1975) 144, 159; see also Reynolds,
"Warranty, Condition and Fundamental Term" (1963) 79 L.Q. Rev. 
534, 546; Kahn-Freund, op. cit. at 217, 234 et seq. See
generally on the doctrine, Cheshire and Fifoot, Law of Contract 
(2nd Aust. ed. 1969 by Starke and Higgins) 213 et seq. ; Coote, 
"The Rise and Fall of Fundamental Breach" (1966-67) 40 A.L.J. 
336; Ramaseshan, "Fundamental Obligation and the Indian Law of 
Contract" (1968) 10 Journal of Indian Law Institute 331; Allan,
"The Scope of Contract" (1967-68) 41 A.L.J. 274, 283. See also 
Suisse Atlantique Societe d'Armement Maritime S.A. v. N.V. 
Rotterdamsche, Kolen Centrale [1966] 2 All E.R. 61 (H.L.).
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where there is none, construing language into patently not 
meaning what the language is patently trying to say, and 
interpreting onerous terms into a well-meaning meaninglessness. 
But these techniques, "since they purport to construe, and do 
not really construe, ... seriously embarrass later efforts at 
true construction".^ If at any time an adhesion contract imposed 
by a big organisation is construed adversely to it by the
2courts, it is an easy matter for the contract to be redesigned.
Llewellyn, Book Review, op. cit. at 702, 703. It is interest­
ing to note what Llewellyn wrote in 1931 in his article, "What 
Price Contract? - An Essay in Perspective" 40 Yale L.J. 704: 
"Such 'construction' kills security in transactions, if 
'security' means predictability of actions at law. No man is 
safe when language is to be read in the teeth of its intent.
Nor is even the party who is being protected safe, this side of 
final judgement, in having got what he thinks he has bought 
(the 'life insurance as a commodity' suggestion). For such 
'construction' often enough defeats itself- It begins by 
admitting power in the parties (in the dominant party) to make 
their dicker as they wish. Sooner or later that admission will 
be taken seriously; sooner or later men will be held to the 
very type of thing which prior courts have conceived as too 
outrageous to be admitted as intent. Meantime the greater 
bargainer, defeated once and again, recurs to the attack.
After each case he can redraft and fight again. A single 
victory, if achieved, has good chance of being permanent".
(id. at 732-734).
2Roebuck, op. cit. at 209. See also Smith J's remarks in
Woodgate v. Great Western Ry._Co (1884) 51 L.T. 826, 832;
Huddleston B. in McCartan v. Noth-Eastern Ry. Co (1885) 54 L.J.
Q.B. 441, 443. Agger in his . article,
"Unconscionable Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code" 
(1966) 4 Am. Business L. Rev. 127, 147, has said: "By
distorting the construction of contract language, the courts 
have merely encouraged the draftsmen to become more skilled 
in phrasing a substitute. If one adaptation fails when subse­
quently tested by litigation, an infinite number of revisions 
still remain untried".
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The exact position on this point is portrayed with great
clarity by Professor Roebuck:
Much confusion has been imported into this part of 
the law by unnecessarily categorizing terms in an 
attempt to escape the efforts of the draftsmen of 
exclusion clauses. If a clause excludes all liability 
for breach of implied terms, a court may evade it 
by finding that an express term has been broken.
If the clause excludes liability for breach of all 
conditions and warranties, express or implied, then 
why not invent a "fundamental term" which is something- 
bigger than and different from conditions and 
warranties? Such are the clumsy stratagems made 
necessary when judges try to do justice with a 
set of legal principles which is cruder than 
contemporary morality. ^
3. Government Contracts
(i) Government as a Superior Party
One of the major causes which is responsible for a
transformation in the function and substance of contract in
this century is the tremendous expansion of the welfare and
social-service functions of the State in all common-law
jurisdictions which has led to a vast increase of contracts
where government departments are on one side, and a private
business on the other. The government is usually superior -
intellectually, psychologically and economically - in terms of
2bargaining power when it contracts. Thus it may draft the
^Op. cit. at 209.
2Over the years a serious imbalance has developed between the 
government and its contractors and one of the factors contribut­
ing to that imbalance is that "[t]he government, by and large, 
dictates the terms and conditions in contracts", see "Symposium 
on Government Procurement: Comments on the Procurement
Commission's Dispute Remedies and Award Protest Recommendations" 
(1974) 42 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 222, 229.
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contract to its best advantage, giving the adhering or the 
servient party no chance to bargain. The government,offering 
contracts, is the biggest, strongest and richest contracting 
side because of its sovereign powers, privileges and immunities 
and there is no comparison to its contractual authority in the 
private sector,^ more so since it has no competition in certain 
fields like weapons, ammunition, space requirements, etc. As is 
often the case in a commercial contract that the terms are 
dictated by the dominant party and are one-sided and unreasonable, 
so is it true of a government contract with regard to the imposition 
and unreasonableness of the contractua1 terms. In any government 
contract, the weaker party is the contractor and since it is a 
contract of adhesion, there is little or no negotiation or give- 
and-take regarding the type of contract. There is no assumption 
of risk but a submission to terms dictated. Government contract 
is thus something more than the traditional consensual 
transaction between private individuals. As already noted, the 
traditional idea of contract is fast becoming extinct in 
commercial transactions, and it is submitted that with the 
phenomenal increase of government business, the extinction of 
those much respected doctrines like freedom of contract and
^Bethlehem Steel Corporation was the largest ship-building company 
in the world, but still the U.S. Supreme Court in United States 
v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation (1942) 315 U.S. 289, (per 
Frankfurter J dissenting) considered (though tacitly) the United 
States Government to be a stronger contracting party. See also 
Miller, "Government Contracts and Social Control: A Preliminary
Inquiry" (1955) 41 Va. L. Rev. 27, 49- stating: "The attempt to
equate the Federal Government as a purchaser with any private 
individual or firm will not hold water".
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equality of bargaining- iß being accelerated. In government
contracts we find that the conditions which are imposed
are on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and give only
an illusory freedom of choice to business concerns. So far as
the conditions imposing social and economic policies are
concerned, no bargaining takes place; the contract clauses
embodying those policies are prescribed and printed in advance,
becoming standard "boiler-plate" in the contractual document.
To a large extent, therefore, the government contract is an
instrument of power relationship, and only vaguely resembles the
consensual agreement extolled by Maine and relied upon by Adam
Smith. This distinctive character of government contract law
stems primarily from the peculiar forms of contract which are
decreed by the government in olympian style. The final word is
that of the government. Little, if anything, is left to the quid
pro quo of bargaining. The decision of the contractor is that
of accepting the conditions imposed, or of not accepting them
and giving up the contract entirely. Change them, bargain over
1them, he cannot.
Only once has the government argued before a court that it
was the weaker, helpless party to a contract and that, therefore,
economic duress was imposed on it. This was in United States v.
2Bethlehem Steel Corporation, which although not involving an
^As stated in the earlier pages, bargaining over the terms of 
adhesion contracts between private individuals is also not 
possible, generally speaking. Examples are legion, including 
conditions on transportation tickets and agreements by public 
utilities, insurance, and agreements by public utilities to 
furnish services.
** (1942 ) 315 U.S.289.
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adhesion contract, is nevertheless relevant because it illustrates
the rationale of the doctrine so forcefully. The Court remarked:
Although there are many cases in which an individual 
has claimed to be a victim of duress in dealings with 
government ... this, so far as we know, is the first 
instance in which government has claimed to be a victim 
of duress in dealings with an individual.^
The dispute in this case was between Bethlehem Shipbuilding 
Corporation Ltd., and the United States Government about the 
amount of profits claimed by Bethlehem under thirteen war-time 
contracts for building ships. The contracts were negotiated and 
executed in 1917 and 1918, when the warfare made it necessary for 
the United States to build the greatest possible number of ships 
in the shortest possible time. Efforts on the part of the 
government to obtain a lump sum contract from Bethlehem were un­
successful. Bethlehem insisted on cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts 
which also included bonus-for-saving clauses amounting to 50 per­
cent of the difference between actual and estimated costs. To 
accelerate production and to avoid the responsibility for 
commandeering the plant, the negotiators for the government 
acquiesced and placed upon them the contract. The government 
paid Bethlehem in addition to the actual cost of building 
the ships which came to $109,000,000, a fixed fee of $11 million 
and bonuses to the tune of about $8 million, but refused 
to pay the balance amounting to $5 million. It brought
10p. cit. at 300.
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a suit in equity for an accounting and for a refund of amounts
paid in excess of a just and reasonable compensation, claiming
fraud and economic duress. The court by a majority refused to
espouse the doctrine on the ground that the government had had
other bargaining weapons including compulsion and requisitioning,
but Justice Frankfurter in his powerful dissent wrote:
But is there any principle which is more familiar 
or more firmly embedded in the history of Anglo- 
American law than the basic doctrine that the 
courts will not permit themselves to be used as 
instruments of inequality and injustice? Does 
any principle in our law have more universal 
application than the doctrine that courts will 
not enforce transactions in which the relative 
positions of the parties are such that one has 
unconscionably taken advantage of the necessities 
of the other?1
He further emphasised that the law was not so primitive that 
it sanctioned every injustice except brute force and downright
2fraud. He quoted Lord Chancellor Northington's classic remark,
And there is great reason and justice in this rule, 
for necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free 
men, but, to answer a present exigency, will submit 
to any terms that the crafty may impose upon them,
implying that that observation was applicable to government too.
The absence of real negotiations in undertaking a govern­
ment contract has an important corollary, and this is that the 
contractor is handed a sizeable wad of fine small print or "boiler 
plate" as it is often called. Much of this is written up in
~^ Id. at 3 26.
2Vernon v. Bethell (1761) 2 Eden 110, 113; 28 E.R. 838.
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something called "General Provisions" and, this is put "together
in a very small print. The result is that the contractor tends to
look at it and say "Well, this looks like an awful lot of fine
print and I don't think I would ever get round to reading it".
But it is not so simple and innocuous. There are some hidden
meanings lurking in them; as has been put by one of the leading
American authorities on government contracts:
[W]hen we come to Government contracts, the man 
entering into a Government contract literally lands, 
like a man coming down in a parachute, in a foreign 
country of new and exotic remedies that require a 
high degree of specialized knowledge. ^
And, if a dispute should arise between the contractor and the
government, he will discover that he has already bound himself
to let representatives of the government decide the dispute
and so has entrusted his rights to the fairness and impartiality
2of the adverse party. This unfettered authority of one party 
to a contract is certainly a departure from practice in the 
traditional contract setting.
Baur, "Differences between Commercial 
Contracts and Government Contracts" (1968-69) 2 Public Contract 
L.J. 5, 9. See also by the same author "Fifty Years of 
Government Contract Law" (1969) 29 Fed. B.J. 305.
2See the remarks made by Zelling (President of the Law
Council of Australia) in Bright, "Contracts of Adhesion and 
Exemption Clauses" (1967) 41 A.L.J. 261, 272: "Any of us who
are familiar with building contracts with the Crown, in 
particular, know that not only do they have exemption clauses 
in them, but they have clauses which make the Crown very largely 
judge in its own cause".
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The businessman seeking government contracts has thus only 
an illusory freedom of choice. To the extent that his economic 
health, and in some cases even existence, depends on receiving 
either government contracts or sub-contracts from other 
government contractors, he has no feasible alternative but to 
submit to the attachment of conditions having no relation to the 
buying and selling process. For him it is a matter of survival 
in the business. If he refuses to sign a contract containing 
the clauses written by the government, the remedy is of course 
a prophylactic one: denial of a contract. There is a natural
reluctance to offend powerful public officials who are in a 
position to exercise important discretionary functions in the 
future. And government does take advantage of its superior 
position by imposing its will on all who contract with it. 
Obviously, therefore, principles of general contract law, based 
on theories of freedom of contract, can have little application 
to government's standard forms.
(ii) Relevance of Private Contract Case-Law 
to Government's Adhesion Contracts
Bethlehem was an exceptional case where the government 
claimed to be an inferior party. In more than ninety-nine per­
cent of all contracts, government is a dominant party and imposes
"^There is a growing number of industries and firms which have 
become almost totally dependent on government for the sale of 
their products e.g. defence and space-related enterprises.
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its terms on the other party. The question then is: are the
courts to invalidate such contracts, where the government 
dictates the contractual terms and the other party has no 
alternative but to submit, on the grounds of coercion, or 
duress, or lack of freedom, or inequality of bargaining or on 
any other ground? In the private contracts, as we have seen 
above, the courts have, though hesitatingly, covertly and 
inconsistently, tried to protect the weaker party through 
various means viz., by invoking 'construction'; by finding 
ambiguities and then adopting the meaning more favourable to the 
adherer; by interpreting the contract to mean what a reasonable 
buyer would expect it to mean, and thus protecting the weaker 
party's expectations at the expense of the stronger's; by 
invoking the concept of "disguised contract" to protect the 
unwary adherer; by denying enforcement on the grounds that they 
were "inequitable" or "unconscionable" or by interpreting 
contracts to help 'what seemed to them the more deserving side', 
and by various other ways and means discussed in the earlier 
part of this chapter. Should the same approach be followed 
vis-a-vis government contracts?^" This may be done if government 
contracts are similar to commercial contracts. Whether and to 
what extent is the similarity present, has been debated for a 
long time and the consensus seems to be that government contracts 
are definitely different from contracts between private parties.
"^This question will be dealt with elaborately in the next chapter 
(ch. IV, infra), but here an attempt is being made to present the 
private contract case-law developments in comparable situations.
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No doubt, government contracts, like their commercial 
counterparts, are adhesion contracts, but as it would have 
already appeared, they are adhesion contracts to a far greater 
degree than commercial contracts. In commercial contracts, 
we are generally concerned with the "boilerplate" clauses of 
the seller who is often more resourceful and economically 
superior. But, in most government contracts, we have the 
government as the purchaser of stores and services and the seller 
as the 'adhering party'. The "exemption clauses" in question 
are thus not those of the seller, which are and have been the 
bone of contention in commercial contracts. Here the small print 
is designed to protect the purchaser. Government contracts are 
different from ordinary contracts of adhesion in still another 
way. In ticket cases, for example, the small print is handed 
over to the other party simultaneously when the contract is made, 
but in government contracts the standard terms are made known to 
the contractor much in advance, e.g. when quotation is invited.
It follows that some of the devices which the courts usually 
employ in ticket and other cases, (e.g. attention insufficiently 
drawn, meaning not explained, nature of the document not clear, 
etc.) to protect the 'adhering party' to the adhesion contract 
might not be justifiably applied to government contracts.
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Again, in making its contracts the government has, 
very broadly speaking, not a single goal but a hierarchy of 
goals. It will be unrealistic to equate it with an ordinary 
buyer or seller. The agreements often seek to do much more 
than simply procure supplies and services. Thus a government 
contract is not just a "business" contract, it is a pursuit of 
social or economic objectives too. As stated by Turpin, it would 
be remarkable if any government were to carry out its 
procurement wholly without regard to the incidental effects of 
its purchasing activity upon the structure and health of 
industry, upon employment, and upon the economy as a whole.
In this as in other fields the decisions of government can 
be expected to be political decisions, which take account of 
the ulterior social and economic consequences of alternative 
courses of action.^” Government contracts thus often include . 
other objectives of the government than getting stores and 
services with the object of getting 'value for money'. They, 
for instance, often provide that the prevailing rate of wages 
shall be paid by the contractors; that fair labour practices 
be adhered to strictly; and that in hiring and firing, the 
contractors must not discriminate on the basis of race,
"^Turpin, Government Contracts (1972) chapter 9 .
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religion or national origin. In this respect, therefore, 
government contracts appear as quasi-administrative or 
regulatory instruments which can be used, within the restricted 
field of procurement, in support of legislation or as an 
alternative means of implementing policy.^
These are only a few of the differences between
government contracts and private contracts; others are stated
in chapters II, IV and VI. Nevertheless, there seems to be
no reason why the government authority should not meet the
necessary test of fairness and that the authority be
properly exercised. Considerations, of course, will differ
here. The courts would understandably be aware of a
legitimate public interest in the superiority of the 
2government. The courts, hopefully, would give due weight 
to the government's social, economic and other policies 
while adjudicating upon the adhesion contracts. Although 
the government, as all powerful organisations, employs 
individuals who may abuse their authority, courts may
^Turpin, op. cit. at 254.
2Strikingly, there is no Australian statute which declares 
public policies applicable to government contracts. But in 
the United States, it is not so. _Cf. Whelan, "Public Contracts 
of the United Kingdom Government: A Comparative Survey and
Introduction" (1964) 32 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 82, 86-87.
191
legitimately examine such situations and give appropriate
relief. Some authorities have suggested that the legislature
should step in and regulate all adhesion contracts.^ But
it is submitted that that may not solve the problem fully
2either in private or government contracts. As suggested 
in the next chapter, the courts, by adopting the unconscion- 
ability concept would have sufficient capability to handle 
government adhesion contracts. In this manner their long 
experience with adhesion contracts in the private commercial 
world will be best utilised.
Even in private contracts the courts have, by and large, 
not permitted themselves to be used as instruments of inequity 
and injustice. They have not enforced transactions in which 
the relative positions of the parties have been such that 
one has unconscionably taken advantage of the necessities
See e.g., Bright, op. cit. at 264, 266, 267; McCutcheon v.
David Macbrayne [1964] 1 W.L.R. 125 at 137 (H.L.) (per Lord
Devlin). It may also be noted that in Israel, the Standard 
Contracts Law 1964, contains a provision dealing with govern­
ment contracts too. For an account of Israeli Standard 
Contract Law, see Lando, "Standard Contracts - A Proposal 
and a Perspective" (1966) 10 Scandinavian Studies in Law 127; 
Diamond, "The Israel Standard Contracts Law" (1965) 14 Int'l & 
Comp. L.Q. 1410; Jacobson, "The Standard Contracts Law of 
Israel" [1968] Journal of Business Law 325; Note, "Administrative 
Regulation of Adhesion Contracts in Israel" (1966) 66 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1340 and Egan, "Standard Contracts" [1968] Journal
of Business Law 204, wherein the author has recommended the 
adoption of Israeli Standard Contracts Law in England.
2See ch. IV infra. See also Dauer, "Contracts of Adhesion in 
the light of Bargain Hypothesis: An Introduction" (1972) 5
Akron L. Rev. 1, 36-41. Will "administrative supervision" be 
Sill Tl^ lot, See Llewellyn's Book Review, op. cit. at 705. See 
generally, Grunfeld, "Reform in the law of Contract" (1961)
24 Modern L. Rev. 62, 80; Slawson, op. cit. at 565-66.
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of the other. They have attempted to deal with lop-sided
See, e.g. Pinnock Bros, v. Lewis & Peat, Ltd. [1923] 1 K.B. 690;
Smeaton Hanscomb & Co. Ltd, v. Sassoon 1 Setty, Son & Co. (No.l) 
[1953] 2 All E.R. 1471; Karsales (Harrow), Ltd, v. Wallis [1956]
2 All E.R. 866; Yeoman Credit, Ltd, v. Apps [1961] 2 All E.R.
281; Astley Industrial Trust, Ltd, v. Grimley [1963] 2 All E.R.
33; Charterhouse Credit Co. Ltd, v. Tolly [1963] 2 All E.R. 432 
are some of the English cases. For the leading cases in the 
United States see, e.g. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc.
(1960) 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69. The facts were: H purchased 
a new Plymouth sedan from Bloomfield Motors and gave it to his 
wife, the co-plaintiff, as a present. The automobile was 
manufactured by the defendant, Chrysler Corporation, and sold by 
it to the other defendant, Bloomfield Motors, a retail dealer.
When he purchased the car, H signed a purchase order without 
reading two paragraphs in fine print (six-point script). Included 
in this fine print was a clause which provided that the 
manufacturer and the dealer gave no warranties, express or 
implied, except that they would make good at the factory any parts 
which became defective within 90 days of delivery, or before the 
car had been driven 4,000 miles, whichever event should occur 
first.
Mrs H was badly injured and the car demolished when driving the 
car 10 days after it had been delivered. The steering mechanism 
failed and the car turned into a wall.
An action for personal injuries based on negligence and breach 
of the implied warranty of merchantability was brought against 
the seller and the manufacturer. The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
held that the defence, based on the standard disclaimer clause 
in the standardised contract did not lie. This Court openly 
declared that a disclaimer of warranties included in a 
standardised mass form is void on public policy grounds. See 
also Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc, v. Johnson (1967) 236 A. 2d 843;
Unico v. Owen (1967) 232 A.2d 405; Willard Van Dyke Productions 
v. Eastman Kodak Co. (1963) 189 N.E. 2d 693; Gray v. Zurich 
Insurance Co. (1966) 419 P. 2d 168; Gerhardt v. Continental 
Insurance Co. (1966) 225 A.2d 328; Klar v. H. Parcel Room, Inc. 
(1947) 73 N.E. 2d 912; Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. 
(1965) 350 F. 2d 445 ("add-on" provision clause) and a number of 
more cases cited in Dewey, "Freedom of Contract: Is it Still 
Relevant?" (1970) 31 Ohio State L.J. 724. While the Henningsen 
case has commanded much judicial attention, it was not followed 
in Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co. (1967) 207 Va. 972, 154 S.E. 
2d 140. It is submitted that this case can easily be 
distinguished from Henningsen (surprisingly, the Supreme Court 
in Virginia has not done so) on various points: (1) No personal
injuries were received in this case as opposed to Henningsen 
wherein Mrs H was badly injured; (2) the vehicle developed 
minor defects which were repaired by the sellers free of charge
(carried on to p.193)
193
contracts mainly in two ways. First, by evolving the contra
proferentem rule: in case of doubt the clause must be construed
against the party which drafted the contract. Its most familiar
application has been in insurance contracts. Secondly, there has
been a much more far reaching approach in recent years involving
the concept of fundamental breach.^" Still there are cases which,
2as Llewellyn has said, make "justice shiver and shake".
3L 1 Estrange v. Graucob is perhaps the best example. In that case,
(footnote 1 continued from p. 192)
under the terms of the "New Car Warranty" and even when finally 
(thrice the car broke down and was repaired) the vehicle was 
returned to the sellers and the contract was rescinded by the 
purchaser, the sellers found only a minor defect which was 
repaired at a cost of $12.00; (3) when the vehicle was returned,
it had been driven 8,331 miles by the purchaser; (4) the "New 
Car Warranty" protected the car for 12 months or 12,000 miles 
as against 90 days or 4,000 miles in Henningsen; (5) the 
exclusionary provisions in the warranty were not in fine print 
and were not stated separately from the express warranty whereas 
in Henningsen they were printed in six-point script and were 
referred to the back of the purchase order.
^For discussions of the doctrine cf. Meyer, op. cit.;
Wedderburn, "Contract-Exception Clause-Fundamental Breach- 
Agents" [1960] Camb. L.J. 11; id. [1962] 17.
2Llewellyn, Book Review op. cit. at 702. For a glaring example, 
where a court in India held an exemption clause good and valid, 
which excluded all liability, even for negligence, of the 
government-run airline, see Indian Airlines v. Madhuri Chowdhuri 
A.I.R. 1965 Calcutta 252, discussed in Ponnuswami and Puri, Cases 
and Materials on Contracts [Including Government Contracts]
(1974) 104-109.
^[1934] 2 K.B. 294, Roebuck, op. cit. at 163-166.
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a company was engaged in selling automatic cigarette machines 
to small shopkeepers by instalment payments. Miss L'Estrange 
bought such a machine and was asked to sign a long form which 
included a large number of clauses in small print, one of which 
said that "any express or implied condition, statement or 
warranty, statutory or otherwise, is hereby excluded." The 
machine having become unworkable a few days after delivery, the 
buyer sued for return of the instalments paid on the theory that 
the machine was unfit for the purpose for which it was bought.
The company claimed that the agreement in writing excluded all 
implied warranties of reasonable fitness. The Divisional Court 
(Scrutton and Maugham, L.JJ.) reversing a judgment of the County 
Court, gave judgment for the company. In disposing of the 
buyer's contention that she was not bound by the terms of the 
agreement since she had not read the document and, therefore, 
knew nothing of its contents, the Court held that the buyer, 
having signed the agreement and havingT\ot- been induced to do so by 
fraud and misrepresentation, was bound by its terms, and
cannot be heard to say that she is not bound by the document 
because she did not read it.^
^See also Hollis Bros, v. White Sea Tinder Trust Ltd. (1936)
3 All E.R. 895; Galbraith v. Mitchenall Estate [1964] 2 Q.B. 473, 
479 and South Australian Railways Commissioner v. Egan (1973) 47
A.L.J.R. 140.
CHAPTER IV
STANDARD TERMS OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS IN AUSTRALIA, 
UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM AND INDIA
1. Genera 1
Contracts have been compared to private statutes as
between contracting parties- Perhaps in no case is this
analogy more true than in the case of government contracts.
Invariably government contracts are executed on standard forms
which are subject to "standard terms'1^  prescribed by government.
If anyone wishes to contract with the government, he can do so
on these fixed pre-written standard terms only; no alterations
are generally made. From these standard terms, the individual
contractor is no more able to depart in his bid for governmentapplicant for insurance
contracts than an individual / can modify the standard
terms of insurance contracts, or the passenger of an ocean liner 
or an aeroplane or for that matter the passenger of a Canberra 
ACTION bus can modify the conditions of transportation. These 
standard terms, in effect, acknowledge the overriding rights of 
government as a buyer and bring into the limelight what we may 
call the adhesion nature of government contracts.
The standard terms comprise complicated and voluminous 
contract clauses purporting to protect the government's interest
"Standard terms" is only one of the various descriptive terms 
used to indicate the same thing. The other terms used are 
"general conditions", "standard conditions", "boiler plate 
clauses", " clauseology" or just "conditions of contract".
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in virtually every conceivable situation. According to Whelan 
and Pasley in their recent work, "A consequence of this 
clauseology (as these clauses in bulk are often called) is 
that contractors are ill-advised, indeed, if they do not rely 
on an attorney familiar with such complex and sometimes
2imprecise semantics". As long ago as 1953, Street remarked:
Indeed, may one not say that if the government only 
contracts on these terms, then, even though the 
terms have not the form of delegated legislation, 
nevertheless it is, indirectly, a recognition of 
a separate body of governmental contract law? The 
English lawyer today cannot advise his client 
solely by reference to the statutes, statutory 
instruments and law reports .... There has sprung 
up what one writer has called administrative quasi­
legislation .
This phenomenon of administrative rules having the force
3of law has been noted by other authorities too. A contemporary
authority on government contracts in the United Kingdom, Colin
4Turpin, drawing attention to their quasi-regulatory effect, 
writes: "The terms of standard contract forms, transcending
as they do the limits of individual contracts and constituting 
in effect a set of detailed model regulations for government's
Federal Government Contracts, Cases & Materials (The Foundation 
Press, Inc. 1975) 392.
2Street, Governmental Liability: A Comparative Study (1953) 100
[citing Note, (1944) 60 L.Q.R. 127] .
3See Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society (2nd ed. 1972) 129.
Friedmann has called it an exercise of quasi-judicial power in 
the context of private contracts. The position is not different 
in government contracts.
4Turpin, Government Contracts (1972) 72-73 (citing Lloyd).
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relation with industry in the field of procurement, are
accordingly of great importance". ^  Lord Denning in one of
his judgments remarked that the standard terms have "come to
2resemble a legislative code". The underlying theme of this 
chapter is that, in government contracts, the standard terms 
are of paramount importance in determining the rights and 
duties of the parties.
Standard terms are inserted in government contracts as 
a matter of course or by compulsion of statute or regulation. 
Their main purpose is that the taxpayer's dollar is spent 
effectively and economically in meeting the civil and defence 
procurement needs without unnecessary duplication or over­
lapping of functions, that the best possible terms on purchases 
are obtained, that there is some degree of uniformity in the 
treatment of contractors, that whenever necessary the government' s 
property entrusted to a contractor is safeguarded, that 
government is not put to uncertain or indefinite liability in 
its contracts and that, whenever necessary, government may have 
the power to terminate the contract at any time. The contract 
clauses used by government are variously drafted. Most of 
them are the products of long years of development. The 
complexity and length of many clauses represent the cumulative 
result of responses to decisions of courts and administrative
^Id. at 264.
2Amalgamated Building Contractors Ltd.v. Waltham Holycross 
Urban District Council [1952] 2 All E.R. 452, 453. See also 
Mitchell, The Contracts of Public Authorities (1954) 216 et seg.
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bodies. Sometimes, the government consults the representatives 
of industry also in drafting or modifying the clauses/
The magnitude of the government's outlays for procurement 
creates opportunities for implementing selected national policies. 
The opportunities lie in the disciplining effect which the govern­
ment can exert on its contractors. Thus, a distinct and growing 
set of terms is to be found in government contracts which is 
designed to achieve certain national, social and economic object­
ives of government and which tvaS no direct commercial relevance 
to the procurement activity of the government. The government
requires, for example, that suppliers maintain fair employment
2 3practices, provide safe and healthy working conditions,
4 5pay fair wages, refrain from polluting the air and water,
6give preference to national products in their purchases,
place fair portion of sub-contracts to small business 
7 8concerns, labor surplus area concerns, and minority business
^It may be noted that in the United States, s.4 of the Administ­
rative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §553) [1970] as amended [Supp. IV, 
1974] which establishes procedures designed to achieve public 
participation in government rulemaking, exempts from public
notice and comment, inter alia, rules that involve a matter 
relating to public contracts [see jid. §553 (a) (1), (2)] .
2E.g. Australia: Conditions 23-26,Form 1 23*567A 1 and cl.42,Form W70;
U.S.A. Articles 16, 17, 18, Standard Form 32 (Supply Contract)
and Article 25, Standard Form 23A (Construction Contract);
U.K.: SCs 16, 17 and 36, GC/Stores/1, SC 17, GC/Works/l;
India: Clause 19, P.W.D. Form No. 7 (Works Contract). For an
explanation of the various forms, see section 2 of this chapter.
3 4Ibid. Ibid.
5E.g. U . K . SC 18, GC/Works/I; U.S.A.: FPR §1-1.2302-2.
6E.g. U.S.A. : Articles 14 and 24, Standard Forms 32& 23A respectivly.
7E.g. U.S.A. :Articles 21 and 29, Standard Forms 3 2 & 23A respectively.
Q
E.g. U.S.A. :Article 22, Standard Form 32.
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1 2 concerns, and promote the rehabilitation of prisoners and
3the severely handicapped. The 1 arge dollar figure
4involved ($A3713 mrllion for total purchases of materials, 
goods and services in 1975-76), makes the procurement process 
appear to be an attractive vehicle for achieving social and 
economic goals. The procurement process also draws attention 
because its flexible regulatory system makes it readily adaptable 
to the implementation of diverse policies.
The government contract is thus not only a formal 
document calling for the furnishing of supplies and services, 
but also a vehicle for the implementation of public or admin­
istrative policies. It is increasingly becoming clear from 
the insertion of a large number of such standard terms that
the procurement power has become a powerful mechanism for
5the enforcement of many public policies.
^E.g. U.S.A.: Article 23, Standard Form 32 and Article 30, 
Standard Form 23A.
2E.g. U.S.A.: FPR §50-250; ASPR §12-1102.
3E.g. U.S.A.: 41 U.S.C. §§46-48 (Blind-made products);
FPR §1-12.1304-1 (Employment of the Handicapped Clause).
^Purchasing Division, Department of Administrative Services, 
October 1976.
5See Miller, "Administration by Contract: A New Concern for 
the Administrative Lawyer" (1961) 36 N.Y. Univ. L. Rev. 957.
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Most oi' the standard -terms found in government contracts 
are unknown in private business. The closest parallel among 
private contracts seem to be insurance and financing contracts, 
which also are now generally regulated by statutes. Perhaps
it is not too much to say that some of the standard terms in
government contracts may not be legally valid, if private 
contract law standards are applied to them. However, before 
dealing with this question and with the content of the standard 
terms and their legal validity, we may first describe the 
framework of the standard terms of government contracts in 
Australia, United States, United Kingdom and India.
2. Framework of Standard Terms
A. AUSTRALIA
The standard terms generally applicable to Australian
government contracts are the "General Conditions of Contracts
arranged by the Commonwealth for supply of goods and services"
(Contract Form "A")^ and "General Conditions of Contract" for
2construction (’works') contracts (Form W70). In addition to 
those two sets of standard terms, the Australian Government 
Stores and Tender Board (A.G.S.T.B) prescribes its own standard 
terms which are contained in "General Conditions of Tender and
"^July 1975 edition. There are 41 standard terms, divided into 
two parts. While Conditions 1 to 34 (excepting 29 and 30, which 
do not apply to period contracts) apply to all contracts, 
Conditions 35 to 41 apply only to period contracts.
2December 1972 edition with 46 Conditions in it.
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1Contract" (C.T.B. No.l). Very often the government also
includes certain other terms in its contracts in the form of
'Special Conditions' to suit specific cases. The 'Special
Conditions', apart from stating the administrative arrangements
regarding a particular contract, specifications and drawings,
quality assurance, production plan, delivery terms etc., also
sometimes include very important clauses such as "Termination
by the Commonwealth", "Variation of Contract" etc. Numerous
public authorities in the Commonwealth and all the State
Governments have their own printed forms containing the standard
terms of contracts. In New South Wales, for example, the State
Government uses the following two forms: "General Conditions
of Contract, Public Works Department, New South Wales" and
"General Conditions of Contracts for Stores and Services",
State Contracts Control Board.
In Australia, the authority to prescribe the standard
terms for government contracts is presently not to be found
in a statute or regulation. Before the amendment of the
Supply and Development Act 1939-1973 (now Supply and Development
2Act 1939-1975) by the Defence Force Re-Organisations Act 1975 
(No. 96 of 1975), it could be said that the source of authority 
to, inter alia, prescribe standard terms for defence contracts, 
was derived from s.5(l)(d) of the Act which gave the Department
^September 1968 edition with 29 Conditions in it.
2Section 97(2), Defence Force Re-Organisation Act 1975.
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of Supply responsibility for "the acquisition, maintenance and 
disposal of stocks of goods in connection with defence."
But now since para.(d) of sub.s.(l) of s.5 has been repealed1 
by the Defence Force Re-Organisation Act 1975, the legal 
authority seems to be derived from the prerogative powers of 
the Crown, exercised by the Governor-General in Council. The 
Executive Branch of the Australian Government is thus an 
hierarchical organisation of delegated powers vested 1A 
Ministers of each Department of Government from time to time 
by the Administrative Arrangement Orders, issued by the 
Governor-General, acting with the advice of the Executive 
Council. The Ministers, in turn, delegate powers to the various 
heads in their departments for good and efficient administration. 
The standard terms for government contracts are drafted by 
senior government officials concerned with purchasing, with the 
help of the legal officers of the Deputy Crown Solicitor's 
office within the Attorney-General's Department. Some of the 
standard terms owe their existence to the drafting by the 
Central Contracts Board, which has now become
^Section 99(1), id.
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defunct. The present delegation of powers is enumerated
2under an Administrative Arrangement Order of 5 October 1976, 
according to which the two major procurement agencies in 
Australia,viz. the Department of Administrative Services and 
the Department of Construction, are assigned the matters 
relating to procurement of goods and services and execution of 
construction contracts, for Commonwealth Government purposes, 
respectively.
The contract activities of the Australian Government 
departments which enter into procurement contracts are, on the 
one hand, subject to extensive Finance Regulations and Finance 
Directions (formerly called Treasury Regulations and Treasury 
Directions), and on the other, governed by standard terms. 
Whereas the larger part of Finance regulations and directions 
are intended to apply only to the officers and employees who 
conduct affairs of the government, the same cannot be said 
about the corpus of the standard terms, which appear to be 
intended to apply directly to contractors. With every
'Section 27 of the Supply and Development Act gives power to the 
Governor-General to make regulations. In pursuance of that 
section, Supply and Development Regulations were made which, 
inter alia, led to the establishment of a Contract Board with 
necessary powers to make defence contracts. On 1 July 1975, the 
Governor-General, acting under sub.s. (2) of s.5 of the Supply 
and Development Act 1939-73, varied the matters to be administered 
by the Department by omitting the matter specified in para.5(1)
(d) (Australian Government Gazette No. S128, 1 July 1975) . Later 
on, the Defence Force Re-Organisation Act 1975, repealed para.
(d) of sub.s. (1) of s.5 (by s.99). But the government seems to 
have forgotten to repeal the Division 3 (Regulations 29-37) of 
the Supply and Development Regulations which were prescribed for 
carrying out the Department of Supply's function relating to 
procurement (specified under erstwhile para. 5(1)(d)).
2Australian Government Gazette No. S175.
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invitation of tender, for example, for the supply of goods or 
services in Australia - whether by formal advertising, com­
petitive negotiations or sole-source - there is appended a 
condition, namely, "This tender shall be deemed to have been 
submitted subject to the General Conditions of Contracts arranged 
by the Commonwealth for supply of goods and services (Contract 
Form "A"), and any tenderer whose tender is accepted, shall, if 
required, sign a formal agreement in a form required by the 
Commonwealth and lodge a deposit as security for the proper 
performance of the contract in accordance with the provisions of 
such General Conditions". The standard terms contained in 
"Form A" are not set out in the tender invitation but these may 
be obtained from the procuring authority on request. It is, 
however, understood that the tenderers are generally made aware 
of the standard terms (general and special) sufficiently in 
advance so that they are not faced with surprise later on. 
Generally speaking, the standard terms contained in the General 
Conditions or Special Conditions are not up for negotiation at 
all and the contracts are virtually on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis.^ However, it may be added that the contents of the
One reliably learns from government authorities that in the last 
25 years, only in about half a dozen cases was the contractor's 
objection to the inclusion of some of the standard clauses 
(mainly with regard to "termination by Commonwealth" or "break 
clause", "price variation clause" and delivery terms) in the 
contract acceded to by the government. A standard term is 
excluded or varied upon the request of the contractor only if the 
contractor gives convincing reasons to support the exclusion, the 
rates quoted by him are the lowest and the government considers 
it impracticable to invite fresh quotations. But an exclusion 
or variation, which may put the government to risk of loss of
money or property, is not accepted as a matter of policy.
205
standard terms contained 
authorities in Australia 
the standard terms to be
in the various forms of procurement 
are not significantly different from 
found in other countries under survey.
B. U.S.A.
The various standard terms of government contracts in the
United States are contained in the procurement regulations which
implement the two basic statutes governing procurement by federal
agencies - the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947^" and the
2Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949.
The Armed Services Procurement Act represents a comprehensive 
revision and restatement of the earlier laws governing military 
procurement and is designed to provide a uniform purchasing
authority for the entire military establishment under a single
3 . 4statute. The underlying policy is contained in §2304(a),
which reiterates the long-standing requirement that formal
advertising shall be the preferred method for placing contract#
except in certain enumerated cases where "such method
5is not feasible and practicable". One significant
^Title 10, United States Code §§2301-14 (1970), as amended,
(Supp. IV, 1974).
2Title 41, United States Code §§251-60 (1970), as amended,
(Supp. Ill, 1973). Some provisions of the Act are also contained 
in Title 40, United States Code, Chapters 10 and 16, and in Title 
44, United States Code, Chapters 21, 25, 27, 29 and 31.
3H.R. Rep. No. 109, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947).
410 U.S.C. §2304(a), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
5 Ibid.
amendment which should be noted is the increase from $2,500
to $10,000 in the limit on exemptions from using advertised
procurement procedures for small purchases, following the
recommendation of the Commission on Government Procurement 
1(1972). Other salient sections of the Act declare a policy 
of placing a fair proportion of contracts with small business 
concerns, prescribe procedures for formal advertising, 
prohibit or restrict certain types of contracts, and establish 
requirements concerning advance payments, delegation of
2procurement functions, and examination of contractor records.
In addition to purchase of personal property and nonpersonal
services by military agencies, the Act applies to procurement
by the Coast Guard and the National Aeronautics and Space
3Administration.
The underlying purpose of Title III of the Federal Property 
4Act was to apply the principles of the Armed Services Procure­
ment Act to all civilian agency procurement. The procurement 
sections of the Federal Property Act are fashioned after, and 
are substantially identical with, thfr provisions of the 
Armed Services Procurement Act, deviating only in the
5elimination of provisions applicable primarily to the military.
In particular similar treatment is given to the requirement for 
formal advertising, subject to enumerated exceptions; contracting
^10 U.S.C. §2304(1) (3) (1970), as amended (Supp. IV, 1974).
210 U.S.C. §§2301, 2305-08, 2313 (1970), as amended (Supp. IV,1974
3Id. §2303(a) (1970).
4Title 41, U.S.C. §§251-60 (1970), as amended (Supp.III, 1973).
5H.R. Rep. No. 670, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
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with small business concerns- procedures for formal advertising; 
restrictions on certain types of contracts.; advance payments; 
and examination of contractor records/ The Act governs the 
procurement of the General Services Administration (the central 
supply agency) and most other civilian agencies.
Although there are a number of ancillary statutes that
affect procurement, imposing requirements in such areas as
2 3contractor employees and foreign purchases, the two statutes 
stated above represent the fundamental statutory guidelines 
governing federal procurement. These two basic government 
statutes, however, state only the broad policies governing the 
manner in which federal agencies will contract, and establishing 
procedures for their effectuation is the function of the procure­
ment regulations. The standard terms of government contracts 
are contained in the two major procurement regulations of the 
U.S. Government viz., the Armed Services Procurement Regulations 
(commonly referred by its acronymic "ASPR") and the Federal 
Procurement Regulations (commonly referred to as "FPR").
Title 41, United States Code §§252(b)-(c), 253, 254(b)-(c),
255 (1970), as amended (Supp. Ill, 1973).
2See, e.g. Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. §276a (1970), as amended 
(Supp. Ill, 1973); Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act, 
40 U.S.C. §§327-33 (1970), as amended (Supp. Ill, 1973); Walsh 
Healey Government Contracts Act, 41 U.S.C. §§35-45 (1970).
3See Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. §§10a-d (1970). A detailed 
listing of the ancillary statutes affecting procurement appears 
in S.Rep. No. 91-427, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 10-15 (1969) and 
the Report of the Commission on Government Procurement (1972)
Vol. 1, 114-15. The Commission observed that since World War II,
there has been no session of Congress which has not enacted at 
least one piece of legislation with reference to Government 
Contracts. It stated "Today, about 4,000 procurement-related 
statutory provisions have been identified". See gxI.Vol. 4,215.
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ASPR is designed to provide uniform policies and procedures 
relating to the procurement of supplies and services for the 
Department of Navy, Army, Air Force and the Defence Supply Agency. 
In addition to ASPR, there are other publications within the 
Department of Defense which have a bearing on contracting; many 
important provisions are found in Department of Defense Direct­
ives ("DoD Dir."), Department of Defense Instructions (DoD Inst.") 
and Defense Procurement Circulars ("DPC"). The other major 
procurement regulation is the Federal Procurement Regulation 
System. The purpose of the system is to codify and publish 
uniform policies and procedures applicable to federal agencies
All references to ASPR are here made from Title 32 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.)(Revised as of November 1, 1975). 
ASPR has been issued under the authority of ch. 137, Title 10 of 
the United States Code (10 U.S.C. §2202 (1970), as amended (Supp. 
IV, 1974) which provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, an officer or agency of the Department of Defense may 
obligate funds for procuring, producing, warehousing, or distri­
buting supplies, or for related functions of supply management, 
only under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.
The purpose of this section is to achieve the efficient, economi­
cal, and practical operation of an integrated supply system to 
meet the needs of the military departments without duplicate or 
overlapping operations or functions". The ASPR are to be found 
in Subchapter A of Chapter I (Office of the Secretary of Defense) 
of Subtitle A (Department of Defense) of Title 32 (National 
Defense) of the C.F.R. and they run into Volumes I, II and III, 
divided into sections [XXVI (26) in all], each section divided 
into parts and paragraphs. Each section of the ASPR deals with 
a separate aspect of procurement, covering a very wide field of 
subjects like the various methods of procurement, contract clause^, 
termination of contracts, patents, data, and copyrights, contract 
cost principles and procedures, procurement forms, contractor's 
industrial labor relations, contract modification, to mention 
only a few of them.
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in the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services 
(including construction) and to a limited extent procurement of 
real property by lease. The system includes regulations prescri­
bed by the Administrator of General Services, called the Federal
Procurement Regulation (FPR),’^ as well as individual agency
2procurement regulations.
"All references to FPR are here made from Title 41 of the C.F.R. 
(Revised as of July 1, 1976) . The authority to issue the regu­
lations is vested in the Administrator of General Services by 
the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act 1949 [Title 
40, U.S.C. §486(c) (1970), as amended (Supp.Ill,1973)] which states
The Administrator shall prescribe such regulations as 
he deems necessary to effectuate his functions under 
this Act, and the head of each executive agency shall 
cause to be issued such orders and directives as such 
head deems necessary to carry out such regulations.
The FPR are to be found in Chapter I of Title 41 (Public Contracts 
and Property Management) of the Code of Federal Regulations. 
Chapter I is divided into 30 parts, and each part is further 
divided into subparts, sections and subsections.
2Regulations issued by individual government agencies, supple­
menting the FPR are given the names of the departments or 
agencies issuing them. For example, there are the Energy 
Research and Development Administration Procurement Regulations 
(ERDA-PR) (previously known as Atomic Energy Commission PR 
(AECPR)), the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare PR 
(HEWPR), National Aeronautics and Space Administration PR 
(NASAPR), and others. These regulations are to be found in 
Chapter 2 through 49 of Subtitle A (Federal Procurement 
Regulations System)of Title 41 of the C.F.R.
210
The ÄSPR and the FPR are structurally comparable, although 
the former is by far more comprehensive.^ Both regulations 
implement in detail the policies expressed in the basic procure­
ment statutes and in many of the ancillary laws affecting 
procurement. For example, procedures designed to effectuate laws
concerning labor and foreign purchases are prescribed in both 
2regulations as are rules regarding contracting with, small business 
3concerns. Many other detailed procedures affecting government
contracts are dealt with in both the ASPR and the FPR. Among
4the more important are formal advertising, negotiated procure-
5 6 7ment, termination of contracts, patent, data and copyrights,
ASPR runs into over 2,500 pages. The magnitude of these regula­
tions may be illustrated by the following quotation from 
Doke, "Contract Formation, Remedies and Special Problems" 
(1968-69) 2 Public Contract L.J. 12, 13:
I had a student who made a study of the regulations 
and specifications involved in a typical supply 
contract, and he took the Government Printing 
Office edition of the regulations, beginning with 
ASPR, down through the implementing Army Procure­
ment Procedures, down through the command, down 
through the procurement office, and he stacked them 
up. As I recall, it was about 2^ feet high.
2ASPR §§12-000 to 12-1006 (the procurement regulations cited can 
be converted to the C.F.R. by pre-fixing "3 2 C.F.R." for the 
"ASPR"); FPR §§1-12.000 to 1-12.1003 (the procurement regulations 
cited can be converted to the C.F.R. by pre-fixing "41 C.F.R." 
for the"FPR"); and ASPR §§6-000 to 6-1110; FPR §§1-6.100 to 
1-6.1004.
3ASPR §§1-700 to 1-708; FPR §§1-1.700 to 1-1.712.
4ASPR §§2-100 to 2-503.2; FPR §§1-2.000 to 1-2.503-2.
JASPR §§3-100 to 3-1100.2; FPR §§1-3.000 to 1-3.903-2.
3ASPR §§8-000 to 8-811; FPR §§1-8.000 to 1-8.806-7.
7ASPR §§9-000 to 9-606; FPR §§1-9.100 to 1-9.106-6.
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contract cost principles, retention requirements for contractor
2 3and sub-contractor records, and contract financing. The
treatment of each of these matters is most exhaustive and
principles are stated to cover all conceivable situations.
Interspersed throughout various parts of the regulations are the
many standard terms required to be included in government
contracts. Of particular significance are those portions of the
4ÄSPR and FPR reserved exclusively for contract clauses, which 
are incorporated by way of "General Provisions" in the United 
States Standard Forms. Structurally, the standard terms contain­
ed in these forms are the essence of the government contract.
Two of the United States Standard Forms viz. Standard Form 23A 
(prescribing "General Provisions" for fixed-price construction
5contracts) and Standard Form 32 (prescribing "General 
Provisions" for procuring supplies by formal advertising as
LASPR §§15-000 to 15-809.5; FPR §§1-15.000 to 1-15.502-5.
For the specific terms, see Articles 24 and 20 of Standard 
Forms 32 and 23A for Supply and Construction contracts 
respectively.
2ASPR Appendix M; FPR §§1-20.000 to 1-20.301-3.
3ASPR Appendix E; FPR §§1-30.000 to 1-30.710.
4ASPR §§7-000 to 7-2003.70; FPR §§1-7.000 to 1-7.703-24.
5April 1975 edition, prescribed by the General Services 
Administration, FPR §1-16.401 (41 C.F.R., revised as of July 1, 
1976). FPR §1-16.401 also prescribes that pending the publicat­
ion of a new edition of the Form, the Payment to Contractor 
Clause (FPR §1-7.602-18) shall be substituted for the Payment 
to Contractor Clause in Article 7, and the Listing of Employment 
Openings Clause (FPR §1-12.1102-2), the Employment of 
Handicapped Clause (FPR §1-12.1304-1), and the Clean Air and 
Water Clause (FPR §1-1.2302-2) shall be added as additional 
articles of the General Provisions.
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well as by negotiation)" contain much (but by no means all) of
the standard terms which seem to earn comment in connection
2with government contracts.
While many sections of the ASPR and FPR are for the
guidance of government officials involved in procurement
activity so as to provide for the government an economical and
efficient system for the procurement of goods and services, the
3standard terms contained in the "Contract Clauses", "Standard 
4 5Forms" and elsewhere have a demonstrable effect on the 
community which does, or is seeking to do, business with the 
government either as contractors or indirectly as subcontractors.
' April 1975 edition, prescribed by General Services Administrat­
ion, FPR §1-16.101 (41 C.F.R., revised as of July 1, 1976). FPR 
§1-16.101 also prescribes that pending the publication of a new 
edition of the form, the Listing of Employment Openings clause 
(FPR§1-12.1102-2), the Employment of the Handicapped clause 
(FPR §1-12.1304-1), and the Clean Air and Water clause (FPR § 
§1-1.2302-2) shall be added as additional articles of the 
General Provisions.
2Standard Form 23A, General Provisions (Construction Contract)
(41 C.F.R. §1-16.901-23A, revised as of July 1, 1976) contains 
31 articles. Standard Form 32, General Provisions (Supply 
Contract) (41 C.F.R. §1-16.901-32, revised as of July 1, 1976) 
contains 25 articles. Both forms were revised in April 1975.
It may also be noted that the forms prescribed under ASPR 
contain for the most part identical standard terms to those 
prescribed under Forms 23A and 32. In addition, however, in 
order to meet special circumstances of defense contracts, ASPR 
§7-000 et sea, prescribe terms which may be inserted in 
appropriate cases. See, generally, ASPR §§16-000 to §§16-828 
and Appendix F (32 C.F.R., revised as of November 1, 1975).
3ASPR §§7-000 to 7-2003.70; FPR §§1-7.000 to 1-7.703-24.
4See, in particular, Standard Forms 23A and 32, supra. See 
generally, ASPR §§16-000 to 16-828 and Appendix F; FPR §§1-16.000 
to 1-16.903.
5See, for example, 'Termination clauses' ASPR §§8-000 to 8-811 
and ASPR §7-602.29(a); FPR §§1-8.000 to 1-8.806-7.
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It is the impact of the contract rules upon this large, 
heterogeneous community toward which our further attention will 
be directed. The standard terms consist mainly of clauses 
required by statute or regulation to be included in public 
contracts and have a great effect on the rights and obligations 
of the contractor. Thus the bulk of the provisions of a 
government contract tend to be prescribed by law and regulation. 
Because deviations from the requirements of the regulations 
involve a tedious procedure, generally undertaken only on a case- 
by-case basis, such deviations are the exception rather than the 
rule."1' This situation lends credence to the view that, for the 
most part, government of the United States contracts by 
regulation.^
C. U.K.
The real 'living law' of government contracts in the United
3Kingdom is hidden in standard terms of government contracts.
The standard terms are contained in the two principal forms viz., 
"Standard Conditions of Government Contracts for Stores
See for example, FPR §§1-1.009 to 1-1.009-2 which lay down the 
procedure regarding deviations from the Federal Procurement 
Regulations.
2See Hannah, "Government by Procurement" (1963) 18 Bus. Law. 997; 
Stone, "Contract by Regulation" (1964) 29 Law & Contemp. Prob. 32. 
3Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society (2nd ed. 1972) 403; Turpin, 
"Government Contracts: a study of methods of contracting"
(1968) 31 Modern L. Rev. 241. A remark by Whelan and Pasley, 
Federal Government Contracts, Cases & Materials (1975) 392, is 
pertinent: "We might note that rich gardens of prose are not
characteristic only of contracts of the United States. The 
public contracts of the United Kingdom display closely similar 
growth " .
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Purchases" (Form GC/Stores/1) and "General Conditions of
Government Contracts for Building and Civil Engineering Works"
2(Form GC/Works/1) . The standard terms contained in these forms
were composed by an inter-departmental group known as the
"Contract Coordinating Committee" (whence the "CCC" in the title
of the earlier forms) consisting of highly experienced contract
administrators of the various government agencies. Legal advice
with respect to the drafting of contract clauses is rendered by
the Office of Treasury Solicitor. The standard terms are kept
under review respectively by the Purchasing and Sale of Goods
Sub-Committee and the Building and Civil Engineering Sub-
3Committee of the Procurement Policy Committee. The standard 
terms embodied in these forms are in part identical with those 
of the principles of ordinary law of contract, but although the 
ordinary law provides the framework in which government contracts 
are made, yet "the relations of the parties are determined less 
by the formal rules of contract law than by the standard contract
forms in use, specially agreed terms, and the settled practices
4of the contracting departments".
Thus the ordinary law of contract has only a subsidiary 
relevance to government contracts because in practice they are
^"October 1970 Edition, as amended, September 1975.
2Edition 1 - November 1973.
3Turpin, Government Contracts (1972) 103 et seq. ; see also 
Whelan, "Public Contracts of the United Kingdom: A Comparative
Survey and Introduction" (1964) 32 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 82.
4'Turpin, op. cit. at 72-73 (emphasis supplied).
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1 2governed by the standard terms for "stores" and "works" 
contracts. Unlike the United States, it is a characteristic 
and striking feature of the British system of procurement that 
it is almost entirely unaffected by statutory regulation. The 
rules and procedures that govern the placing, conditions and 
management of government contracts have their origin not in 
legislation but in administrative agencies of the executive.
D. INDIA
The standard terms of government contracts in India, like 
in Australia and the U.K., do not have any statutory basis.
These are drafted by expert and experienced contract 
administrators with the help of legal officers from the Ministry 
of Lav;. As elsewhere, these complicated and voluminous standard 
terms purport to protect the government's interests in virtually 
every conceivable situation. In India, procurement of supplies 
or stores and construction is conducted in a most centralised 
manner, which has led to the development of uniform and efficient 
procurement policies. Stores or supplies of various kinds are 
procured for defence and other administrative agencies of the 
Central Government and most of the state governments' offices, 
by a highly skilled Central Purchase Organisation known as the 
Directorate-General of Supplies & Disposals (DGSSD). The standard 
terms governing contracts of DGS&D (which are mostly entered 
through formal invitation of tenders followed by public opening
^"Stores" contracts are equivalent to the American "Supply" 
contracts.
2"Works" contracts are equivalent to the American "Construction" 
contracts.
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of quotations, as in the U.S.) are contained in Form No.
DGS&D-68 (Revised). Special Conditions which may be incorporated 
to supplement the general conditions in (i) contracts for plant 
and machinery and manufactured equipment, (ii) contracts for sea 
and river craft, (iii) supply and erection of structures, are 
provided in forms Nos. DGS&D-71, DGS&D-72 and DGS&D-73 respectively 
Again for 'works' or 'construction' contracts, the Central 
Public Works Department (C.P.W.D.) is the agency of the Central 
Government operating throughout the country for construction, 
maintenance and repairs of all works and buildings financed from 
Civil Works Budget. The standard terms on which contracts are 
awarded to contractors are contained in various forms, namely, 
P.W.D. (Public Works Department), Form No. 6 (Notice Inviting 
Tenders), P.W.D. Form No. 7 (Percentage Rate Tender), P.W.D.
Form No. 8 (Item Rate Tender), P.W.D. Form No. 9 (Supply of 
Materials), P.W.D. Form No. 10 (Piecework), P.W.D. Form No. 11 
and 11A (Work Order), P.W.D. Form No. 12 (Lump Sum Contract) and 
P.W.D. Form No. 47 (Tender for demolition of buildings).
3. Corpus of Standard Terms
Like an insurance policy, the government contract is a 
contract of adhesion, only more so.^  The magnitude of government 
procurement undoubtedly dictates a certain erosion of the bargain 
element in government contracts. Achieving measurable 
standardisation and uniformity in transactions entered into by its 
agents is clearly in the government's interest. For this reason
Grossbaum, "Procedural Fairness in Public Contracts: The
Procurement Regulations" (1971) 57 Va. L. Rev. 171, 182.
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alone, some depreciation of the bargain element, as it pertains 
to individual transactions, must be countenanced as a fact of 
life in contracting with the government. Notwithstanding this 
erosion in the bargain element, a corresponding benefit enures 
to the public - the expectation that the standard terms of 
government contracts will be uniformly applied in a 
nondiscriminatory manner.
The standard terms of government contracts are of particular 
significance to the contractor, since they expose him to many 
of the peculiarities of government contracting uncommon to 
commercial dealings. Among those features having little or no 
counterpart in private commerce are conditions relating to 
termination of contract, alteration or changes, dispute 
settlement, inspection and rejection, patent rights, examination 
of records, default, delays, penalties, close supervision and 
stringent controls regarding manner and method of contract 
performance, recovery of sums due, use of plant and machinery of 
of the contractor without compensation, conditions of labour, 
wages etc. Some of these standard terms subordinate and 
supersede the common law of contract* For example, under the 
common law, one party is not entitled to cancel a contract 
without compensating the other for his loss of anticipated 
profits. Nevertheless, under the standard terms, as pointed out 
in detail below, government can terminate contracts without 
liability for anticipated profits. Again, under the common law, 
one party is not entitled to recover any profit earned by the
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other, but under the U.S. stamdard terms (authorised under 
Renegotiation Acts) government can recapture excess profits. 
Similarly, in the U.K., standard conditions provide for the 
recovery of excess profits.’*’ These standard terms drafted by 
procurement officials in collusion with lawyers obviously reek 
of the superior bargaining position of the government.
(i) Unilateral Termination of Contract
The standard term of government contracts by which the 
government reserves the unilateral power to determine the contract 
at any time and for any reason or for no reason and absent
default by the contractor, is called "termination" or "break"
2clause. Under this clause, the government may terminate the 
whole contract or part of it because of increasing costs, the 
non-attainment of set goals, a change in government policy 
rendering procurement unnecessary, a new economy drive by the
^SCs 48 and 50, Form GC/Stores/1.
2In Australia, a standard break clause (quoted in full in the 
next section of this chapter) is included in all contracts in 
any of the following categories: (i) developmental contracts
and cost-plus contracts generally; (ii) contracts, other than 
period contracts, involving expenditure exceeding $100,000;
(iii) contracts, other than period contracts, expected to run for 
a period exceeding 12 months; and (iv) any contract about which 
there is doubt concerning the continuation of the related project.
In the U.S. this clause is titled "Termination for 
Convenience of the Government". Termination clause for fixed 
price contracts for 'supplies' is contained in FPR §1-8.701 and 
for 'construction' in FPR §1-8.703. The cognate clause for 
defence construction contracts is to be found in ASPR §7-602.29 
(a). In the U.K. see SC 56, Form GC/Stores/1 and SC 44, Form 
■GC/Works/1. In India the standard break clause is contained in 
the "Conditions of Contract governing contracts placed by Central 
Purchase Organisation of the Government of India".
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government or just because oi second thoughts. So even a 
government becoming wiser after the event, may undo what it 
wrongly did in the first instance, by invoking the termination 
clause.
The power of the government to determine the contract "is
always something which a contractor finds it very hard to
swallow"^ and particularly so, since the standard terms make the
2whole matter mjusticiable. Furthermore, the concept of 
"termination of contract" modifies the common law of contracts 
by denying expectation damages, thus precluding recovery of 
anticipatory profits when the government terminates a contract 
without fault on the part of a contractor.
It is submitted that such a term in government contracts 
is in crass conflict with the basic foundation of 'contract 
doctrine', because under this clause, a contract validly entered 
into may be altered, varied, changed, terminated, constricted or 
expanded at the whim and fancy of one party alone, the government, 
on whose side of the bargain the loci poenitentiae never seem to 
come to an end. A 'contract' whose basic tenet is to fulfil the 
legitimate expectations of both parties, in the context of 
government contract, caters only for the expectations of one 
party, the government. The contractor's legitimate and
1Turpin and Whelan (eds.), The London Transcript, A comparative 
Look at Public Contracting in the United States and the United 
Kingdom (American Bar Association 1973) Part III at 44.
2E.g. SC 56(4), Form GC/Stores/1 (U.K.).
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reasonable expectation to earn certain profits by satisfactorily 
performing the contract may be frustrated by the government 
almost with impunity. Thus contract which for centuries has 
served to protect the interests of both sides now rather protects 
the interests of one side only, the interests of the government.
(ii) Unilateral Variations
Another standard term included in nearly every government
contract in order to give a great degree of flexibility over
contract performance is the 'Alterations’ or 'Changes' or
'Variations' clause.^ Under this standard term the Government
has the power to order unilateral changes of the sealed patterns,
specifications, plans, drawings and samples or to order the
increase, decrease, omission or substitution of the design,
quality, character or quantity of something for which it had made
a lawful contract with the contractor at some earlier moment.
The unilaterality of this term is made obvious by addition of
these or similar words: "No variation shall be made by the
2contractor without an order" of the contracting authority. The 
two salient features of the clause are that the contractor
Australia: Condition 8, Form 'A' and Clause 40, Form W70;
U.S.A.: Article 2, Standard Form 32 (Supply Contract) and
Article 3, Standard Form 23A (Construction Contract); U.K.: SC
3, GC/Stores/I, and SCs 7 to 9, GC/Works/1; India: Condition 5,
Form No. DGS&D-71, Condition 5, Form No. DGS&D-72 and Condition
4, Form No. DGS&D-73.
E.g. in Australia, Sub-Clause 40.1, Form W70 (Construction).2
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cannot reject a change order and that he must proceed with 
performance of the contract as changed. The contractor is, 
however, assured of additional compensation and time extensions 
occasioned by such changes, but deductions may also be made for 
omissions or alterations.
(iii) Resolution of Disputes
Another example of the standard terms' substantial impact 
on the individual rights of the contractors are the widely used 
"disputes" or "arbitration" clauses which require the contractor 
to relinquish certain customary recourse to the courts. They 
establish a procedure for the administrative resolution of 
controversies arising under the contract and are designed to 
avoid formal litigation and to assure continuity of contract 
performance. While there is nothing wrong with arbitration 
clauses which call for both parties to the dispute to agree to 
appear before an independent arbitrator who considers their 
respective claims without debarring the dissatisfied contractor 
ultimately frcmtoKincjthe dispute to a court of law, subject of 
course to the arbitration laws, the clauses which prescribe that 
all disputes differences or questions between the parties to the 
contract shall be referred to the government and to which the 
decision of the government shall be final and conclusive (or to 
which the government is to be the sole judge), go very much 
further. Nor can they be valid if only because such clauses 
constitute an unlawful attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the 
courts. For example, the construction contracts of government 
often provide that the government's engineer is to resolve
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disputes and that, to use the words of Bowen LJ: "Virtually,
the engineer, on such an occasion, must be the judge, so to
speak, in his own quarrel." And if the contractor is lucky
enough "he will find that an appeal lies from Caesar to Caesar,
in that he may if dissatisfied with the decision of one official
2attempt to persuade another".
In Australia, Condition 28 (Disputes) of the General
3Conditions of Tender and Contract is one such example which 
'concludes' all disputes and virtually debars the contractor 
from taking the matter to court. It reads: "Any question or
dispute arising between the parties in relation to the contract 
or its interpretation shall be referred to the Chairman of the 
Board whose decision shall be final and binding on the parties." 
Partly because of such clauses and partly because of the resolut­
ion of most disputes at arbitration level, seldom a dispute 
comes before a court for adjudication. Thus it is not surprising 
that in the last 20 years only one dispute on a standard term of 
contract between the Commonwealth and a contractor reached the
High Court of Australia. But what is most surprising is that
4even that case was not reported in the law reports. The case 
referred to is The Commonwealth v. A.E. Goodwin Ltd., decided 
by the High Court of Australia (Menzies J) in March 1965. The
1Jackson v. Barry [1893] 1 Ch. 238, 247.
2 Brooking, Building Contracts (Butterworths 1974) 25.
3C.T.B. No. 1, Australian Government Stores and Tender Board 
(A.G.S.T.B.).
4See (1964-65) 38 A.L.J.R. 470.
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main contention of the defendant company was that cl. 23(1) (c) 
of the General Conditions of Tender and Contract,^ was not 
valid as it constituted an unlawful attempt to oust the jurisdict­
ion of the courts. Under cl. 23(1) (c) the government was 
entitled to regard the contractor's failure to make progress or 
to carry out the contract, to its (i.e. government's) satisfact­
ion, and the contractor's inability to satisfactorily account for 
that failure, as a breach of contract amounting to its repudiat­
ion by the contractor. The contract was for the supply of 154 
railway wagon bodies at the price of £698 each and the Common­
wealth claimed £26,726.11s . Od . as damages for its repudiation by 
the contractor. The latter had not supplied the contracted 
goods because it was unable to fit the bodies with certain 
"Athermos" axle boxes, which the contract required, except by 
purchasing them from the sole Australian manufacturer, Bradford 
Kendall Ltd., at what it regarded as an extortionate price. The 
hearing of the case disclosed that the government had notified 
all the potential suppliers, including the defendant company, 
while inviting offers for the contract under reference, that they 
should quote their rates only after taking into account the 
price of the "Athermos" axle boxes manufactured solely by 
Bradford Kendall Ltd. The defendant company, however, had not 
taken the latest price of the axle boxes but quoted their price 
to the government on the basis of some old price list. Menzies J
^"Clause 23(1) (c) of the old Form 'A', has now been replaced by 
cl. 30(1)(c) of the new Form 'A' (July 1975).
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rightly held that cl. 23(1)(c) was not concerned in any way 
with ousting the jurisdiction of the Court. His Honour observed: 
"Indeed, it recognizes that the Commonwealth must go to the Court 
if it desires to establish repudiation and recover damages 
therefor". The Court thus gave judgment for the Commonwealth 
for £26,726.11s . Od. plus costs.
(iv) Subjective Evaluation of Compensation 
Mention should be made here of the cognate standard terms 
which once again recognise the superior position of the govern­
ment and confer quite extraordinary government control over the 
contractor. These are terms which authorise that a contractor's 
fee or compensation will be determined on the basis of the 
government's subjective evaluations during performance or on 
completion of performance. This is illustrated by the standard 
terms which authorise the government to unilaterally make 
variations in the contract/ For example, sub-cl. 40.1 in Form 
W70 provides that in consequence of a variation order, the 
contract sum shall be varied in the manner provided by sub-cl. 
40.2. Sub-clause 40.2, inter alia, provides that in the event 
of failure of agreement on the rate or price for the variation, 
the Director of Works shall determine such rate or price as 
he considers reasonable. Similarly, upon unilateral termination 
of the contract, the standard 'break' clause provides that "the 
Commonwealth shall pay to the Contractor such sums as are fair 
and reasonable in respect of the loss or damage sustained by the
/lause 40, Form W70. See also Condition 8, Form 'A' .
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Contractor in unavoidable consequence". Observe that the
condition does not lay down any explicit standards whatever to
determine compensation. In the U.K. the standard 'break' clause
1 2in both the 'stores' and 'works' contract is explicit in the 
opposite sense for it states that "the Authority ... shall make 
such allowance, if any, as in his opinion is reasonable and his 
decision on that matter shall be final and conclusive".
The incorporation of such standard terms in government 
contracts presumptuously delegates to the government the right 
to determine the contractor's compensation. It is difficult to 
determine what a court would make of such a contract if such 
terms came into dispute under private contract theory. The 
unfettered authority of one party to a contract to establish a 
contract price or the other's compensation is certainly a 
departure from practice in any traditional contract setting.
It is interesting to note that a step was proposed to the 
American Law Institute suggesting recognition of the right of 
parties to a proposed private contract to agree to one party's 
having the authority to make selection of terms in the course
3of performance. But a comment in the draft indicates that 
absolute discretion, which seems to exist in the above government
^SC 56(4), Form GC/Stores/1.
2SC 44(5), Form GC/Works/l.
3See Restatement of the Law (Second) of Contracts (Tentative 
Draft No. 1, 13 April 1964, American Law Institute,
Philadelphia) §33 (1) .
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contract example on the part of the superior party, would still 
render the contract void for lack of consideration. "If one 
party to an agreement is given an unlimited choice, that party 
may not be a promisor; and the contract may fail for want of 
consideration .... The other party's promise may be unconscion­
able and may be wholly or partly illegal".^
(v) Recovery of Sums Due
The standard terms which confer upon the government the
right to deduct from "any moneys then due or thereafter
becoming due to the contractor under the contract or any other
contract or any other account whatsoever" the amount of any
damages, losses, costs and expenses alleged to have been
incurred by the government in consequence of any breach by the 
2contractor, may not again hold good with reference to basic
common law doctrines either because such a clause imposes a
penalty or ousts the jurisdiction of the courts or, as the
Supreme Court of India (the highest court of the land) held in
3a recent case of Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry that
"a claim for damages for breach of contract is ... not a claim
for a sum presently due and payable and the purchaser is not
entitled ... to recover the amount of such claim by appropriating
4other sums due to the contractor".
~^Id. at 162 (references omitted here) . See also Frenzen,
"The Administrative Contract in the United States" (1968-69)
37 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 270, 286.
3E.g. in Australia, Condition 26(2) C.T.B. No. 1; Condition 
31(1) of Form 'A' and sub-cl. 41.5 of Form W70.
3A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1265.
4Id. at 1273.
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In the above Union of Ir.dia case, the respondent tendered
for supply of certain quantity of foam compound to the
government and its tender was accepted subject to the usual
"Conditions of C o n t r a c t " T h e  performance of the contract ran
into difficulties and a dispute arose between the parties
giving rise to claims by each party against the other. One of
the standard terms governing the contract viz. Condition 18
(Form DGS&D 68 - Revised) provided:
Whenever any claim for the payment of a sum of 
money arises out of or under the contract against 
the contractor, the purchaser shall be entitled 
to recover such sum by appropriating ... any sum 
then due or which at any time thereafter may 
become due to the contractor under the contract 
or any other contract with the purchaser or the 
Government. ... 1 ^
The government made a claim for the payment ofacertain sum 
as damages for breach by the respondent and threatened that 
upon non-payment by the respondent by a certain date, it would 
recover the same from the moneys due to the respondent in respect 
of certain other contracts. In an application for an injunction, 
the respondent argued before the Court that on a proper 
construction of cl. 18, the government is entitled to exercise 
the right conferred under that clause only where the claim for 
payment of a sum of money is either admitted by the contractor,
^""Conditions of Contract governing contracts placed by the 
Central Purchase Organisation of the Government of India" 
Ministry of Supply, Form DGS&D .68 - Revised.
2'For similar standard terms in Australia, see Condition 26(2), 
Form C.T.B. No.1; Condition 31(1), Form ’A ’ and sub-cl. 41.5, 
Form W70. In the U.K. see SC 9 of Form GC/Stores/I and SC 43 
of Form GC/Works/1.
228
or in a case of dispute, adjudicated upon by arbitration or a
court. The Supreme Court held that the government had no
right or authority under cl. 18 to appropriate the amounts of
other pending bills of the respondent in or towards satisfaction
of its claim for damages against the respondent.^" The Court 
observed that cl. 18 did not lay down the substantive rights and
obligations of the parties under the contract but was merely
intended to provide a mode of recovery to the government, and
the government was entitled to exercise the right conferred
under that clause only where there was a claim for a sum which
2was presently due and payable. A mere making of a claim for
damages for the government, therefore, imposed no liability on
the contractor to pay and was not a sum due for which there was
. 3an existing obligation to pay in praesentr.
The above case raises questions of fundamental importance 
not only in the sphere of government contracts but also in that 
of ordinary building contracts. Here standard terms often 
empower the employer vis-a-vis the contractor or the contractor 
vis-a-vis the sub-contractor, as the case may be, to withhold 
or deduct payments due to the other party because of defects or
1A .I.R . 1974 S.C. 1265, 1273. 
^Id. at 1271 and 1272.
^Id. at 1271.
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delays in the performance of the contract.1 23 It also raises the 
question of extent of applicability of the common law and 
equitable rights to set-off and counter-claim. A short discuss­
ion of this may throw some light on the closely corresponding 
position in government contracts.
Under the common law, for a long time it appeared to have 
been generally accepted in the construction industry that an
employer was entitled to set-off or counterclaim against the
2amount certified or due to the contractor until the decision of
the Court of Appeal in Dawnays Ltd v. F.G. Minter Ltd and Trollope 
3and Colls Ltd enunciated a different doctrine. In that case 
proceedings were instituted by sub-contractors claiming a sum 
included in the architect's interim certificate (or, as they are 
often called in Australia, progress payment certificates) as the 
value of their work. The contractors, who had received that 
money from the employer, sought a stay under cl. 13 of the 
sub-contract on the ground that there had been a delay in the 
completion of the sub-contract for steelwork. Clause 13
^E.g. the English Standard R.I.B.A. Form of Contract for Local 
Authorities 1963 edition (December 1967 issue) cl. 27; Standard 
forms of building contracts of the Royal Australian Institute of 
Architects and the Master Builders' Federation of Australia 
(RAIA-MBFA) Lump Sum Contract, Ed. 5b, cl. 28; Standard 
Association of Australia - General Conditions of Contract for 
Civil Engineering Works, CA2411, cl. 43. See generally, Hudson, 
Building and Engineering Contracts (9th e d .); Keating, Law and 
Practice of Building Contracts (2nd e d .)and Brooking, Building
Contracts (1974) .
2E.g. Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd e d . 1953) Vol. 3 para. 906; 
Monde 1 v . Steel (1841) 8 M. & W. 858; Hanak v . Green [1958] 2 Q. B . 9 .
3 [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1205.
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entitled the contractor "to deduct from or set off against
any money due from him to the sub-contractor ... any sum or sums
which the sub-contractor is liable to pay to the contractor
under this sub-contract". Lord Denning MR held that cl. 13
only applied to liquidated and ascertained sums which were
established or admitted as being due^ and Edmund Davies LJ
added: "Any other view would involve that the sub-contractor
could be kept out of his money ... for an unconscionable period,
2wrth possibly disastrous financial results".
Dawnays1 234 case was followed in rapid succession by six other
3cases in the Court of Appeal. The last of these went to the 
House of Lords. In Gilbert-Ash (Northern) Ltd, v. Modern
4Engineering (Bristol) Ltd., indeed on facts very similar to 
those in Dawnays1 case, the Court was concerned with the
construction of paras. 3 and 4 of cl. 14 which provided:
If the sub-contractor fails to comply with any 
of the conditions of this sub-contract, the 
contractor reserves the right to suspend or 
withhold payment of any monies due or becoming 
due to the sub-contractor. (Para. 3)
The Contractor also reserves the right to deduct 
from any payments certified as due to the sub­
contractor and/or otherwise to recover the amount 
of any bona fide contra accounts and/or other 
claims which he, the contractor, may have against 
the sub-contractor in connection with this or any 
other contract. (Para. 4).
1Id. at 1209
2Id. at 1210
3Frederick Mark Ltd, v. Schield [1972] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 9; G .K .N .
Foundations Ltd. v. Wandsworth London Borough Council [1972] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 528; Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd, v. Gilbert- 
Ash (Northern) Ltd. [1973] 71 L.G.R. 162; three others are
unreported.
4 [1973] 3 W.L.R. 421 (H.L.).
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In his judgment in this case in the Court of Appeal,
Lord Denning MR held that the contractor was bound to pay the
moneys due to the sub-contractor without deduction.
When the main contractor [he said] has received the sums 
due to the sub-contractor - as certified or contained in 
the architect's certificate - the main contractor must 
pay those sums to the sub-contractor. He cannot hold 
them up so as to satisfy his cross claims. Those must 
be dealt with separately in appropriate proceedings for 
the purpose. This is in accord with the needs of 
business. There must be a 'cash flow' in the building 
trade. It is the very life blood of the enterprise.
The sub-contractor has to expend money on steel work 
and labour. He is out of pocket. He probably has an 
overdraft at the bank. He cannot go on unless he is 
paid for what he does as he does it.l
But the House of Lords overruled the Court of Appeal's judgment
and held that the wording of para. 4 of cl. 14 clearly permitted
the contractor to deduct the amount of any bona fide claims from
the certified sums due to the sub-contractor and the sum to be
deducted need not be a liquidated sum or an ascertained sum in
2the sense of an agreed sum or assessed by a court.
1(1973) 71 L.G.R. 162, 167 (C.A.).
2 (1973) 3 W.L.R. 421, 426, 431, 438. At 441, Lord Diplock 
observed:
The amount of the 'contra account and/or other 
claims' (in para. 4 of cl. 14) must, of course, 
be quantified before it can be deducted; but 
there is nothing in those words themselves to 
suggest that the quantification may not be made 
by the claimant himself. The addition of the 
qualification that the contra account or claim, 
in order to be deductible, must be 'bona fide' 
seems to point irresistibly to this conclusion.
It is wholly inapt if it refers only to contra 
accounts or claims which have already been the 
subject of agreement between the parties or of 
a judgment or an arbitral award.
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The House of Lords, however, held para. 3 of cl. 14 to
be a "penalty" clause and thus unenforceable. The Court pointed
out that such a right with the contractor to "suspend or withhold
payment of any monies due" with no reference to the amount of
his claim, would entitle him to withhold sums far in excess of
any fair estimate of the value of his claims and that would simply
be to impose a penalty for refusing to admit his claims. The
Court further observed that not only would the withholding of
excess by the contractor permanently deprive the sub-contractor
of the interest on that excess which would accrue while the
dispute lasted, but it might have most damaging effects on the
sub-contractor's b u s i n e s s T h u s  it concluded that such a heavily
2penalising provision ought not to be accorded any validity.
Two main reasons seem to be advanced by the House of Lords 
for holding para. 4 of cl. 14 as valid and enforceable. The 
first is that upon the interpretation of the wording in para. 4 
of cl. 14, the Court found that the sub-contractor had agreed to 
allow the contractor to make deductions of all detailed claims 
outstanding under that or other contracts from the money certified 
by the architect as being payable to him. It is respectfully 
submitted that the House of Lords, unlike the Court of Appeal, 
paid no attention to the consequences of such a contract term and 
its unreasonableness, nor did it advert to the adhesion nature of 
such standard form contracts. In a situation like this (as also 
in government contracts), where the superior party imposes upon
1Id. at 426, 430 - 
2 Id. at 438.
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the other its own standard terms, it may be too complacent to
conclude, as the Court did: "But if the sub-contractor chooses
to agree to that, that is his affair"1 234 or "Whether it is wise
for a sub-contractor to agree to a provision which may ... is
2not for us to decide".
The other reason for holding para. 4 of cl. 14 valid, that
the contractor has a common law and equitable rights of set-off
3and counterclaim, is also not convincing. Both set-off and 
counterclaim are to a large extent the creature of statute-law
4and can only be pleaded as a defence to the plaintiff's claim. 
Besides it is very doubtful whether a party is entitled to 
withhold payment due to the other (due on account for the valid 
performance of a contract) on the ground that the latter has 
allegedly not performed some other contract properly. Both 
contracts are separate from each other and the payment due under 
one cannot be stopped for another's (alleged) non-performance, unless 
it has either been admitted or held so by an arbitrator or a court of law.
In view of the above, it is submitted that in such cases 
(whether arising in the sphere of government contracts or private 
commercial contracts), a party's right is limited to the deduction 
of amounts which have been agreed between them or to amounts 
calculated by reference to a liquidated and ascertained amount.
1 [1973] 3 W.L.R. 421 at 426 (per Lord Reid).
2Id. at 431 (per Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest).
3 [1973] 3 W.L.R. 421, 443-448 (per Lord Diplock).
4Odgers, Pleading and Practice (21st ed. 1975) chapter 14.
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(vi) Other Standard Terms
Other standard terms which are uncommon in private
commercial dealings but usually present in government contracts
are: inspection and rejection of contract work,^ examination of
2boohs, records and premises of the contractor, close supervision
and control over the contractor’s method and manner of contract
3 4performance, liability for delays by the contractor, use of
5plant and materials of the contractor without compensation etc. 
The degree of control which these and other similar standard 
terms give to the government over the contractor, without any 
signs of reciprocity, is really staggering and bear$heavily on 
the rights of the contractors.
4. Validity, Force and Effect of Australian Finance 
Regulations, Directions and Standard Terms
What is the legal validity and force and effect of the
Finance Regulations and Directions issued under the Australian
Audit Act 1901-1975? Do these regulations (and directions) have
the force and effect of law? Can they be enforced at the instance
of a contractor in the court of law, if a breach is established?
‘‘Australia; Conditions 14(2), 15, 37(3), (4) and 39 of Form 'A';
U.S.: Articles 5(a), (c) and 10 of Standard Form 32 (Supply)
and Article 10 of Standard Form 23A (Construction); U.K. : SCs
4, 38 to 40 of Form GC/Stores/1 and SC 13 of Form GC/Works/1; 
and India: Condition 17 of DGS&D 68 - Revised.
2E.g. Articles 10 and 23 of U,S. Standard Forms 32 and 23A 
respectively.
3E.g. Condition 12 of Australian Form 'A'.
4E.g. Condition 30(1) of Australian Form 'A' and sub-cl. 27.1 of 
Australian Form W70. For U.S. see Article 17(b) of Standard 
Form 23A and Article 11(e) of Standard Form 32.
5E.g. sub-cl. 43.3 of Australian Form W70.
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Or are they merely "internal"or "housekeeping" regulations?
A related question arises with regard to the various standard 
terms which are inserted by government in its contracts. What 
is the position if one or more of the standard conditions is 
found to be inconsistent with or abrogative of an existing 
principle of the law of contract? A further question would seem 
to arise as to what extent is a government contractor or the 
government itself bound by regulations, directions and standard 
terms not expressly made a part of the contract by the parties?
Is the contractor or the government (or both) contractually 
bound by such regulations, directions and standard terms just as 
if they were a part of the contract? Or does one or the other 
have the option of either enforcing the contract with such 
regulations, directions and standard terms read into it or else 
of treating the contract as void? None of these questions has 
so far been judicially considered in Australia. But these 
questions have been much alive in the United States, ever since 
the famous Court of Claims judgment in G.L. Christian and 
Associates v. United States.^
The Christian case involved a Capehart Housing Construction 
contract which was terminated for the convenience of the Govern­
ment when the project was cancelled. Because of the absence of 
a termination for convenience clause in the contract, the
'^ (lgöS) 160 Ct. Cl. 1, 312 F. 2d 418, motion for rehearing and 
re-argument denied (1963) 160 Ct. Cl. 58, cert, denied (1963)
375 U.S. 954, reh. denied (1964) 376 U.S. 929, motion for leave 
to file second petition for rehearing denied (1964) 377 U.S.
1010, cert, denied (1965) 382 U.S. 821 [hereinafter "Christian"! .
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contractor sued for breach of contract damages, including
anticipatory profit which it would have earned had the contract
been completed. The Court of Claims denied the request for
unearned anticipatory profit (amounting to millions of dollars),
finding that there was no breach since the government had, in
fact, reserved the right to terminate. The Court, speaking
through Davi<; J decided that the contract in question was subject
to the ASPR requirement for insertion of the standard termination
for convenience clause. It reasoned as follows:
As the Armed Services Procurement Regulations were 
issued under statutory authority, those regulations, 
including Section 8.703, had the force and effect of 
law .... If they applied here, there was a legal 
requirement that the plaintiff's contract contain 
the standard termination clause and the contract 
must be read as if it did.-*-
The Court went on to say:
[W] e believe that it is both fitting and legally 
sound to read the termination article required by 
the Procurement Regulations as necessarily applicable 
to the present contract and therefore as incorporated 
into it by operation of law.2
1Id. at 12, 312 F. 2d at 424 (footnote omitted). 
2Id. at 17, 312 F. 2d at 427.
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Various commentators in the United States have interpreted 
Christian to stand for the doctrine that all procurement regul­
ations, including every section of the ASPR and FPR, have the 
force and effect of law and are automatically incorporated into 
any government contract to which they are applicable. Some 
commentators, however, have not accepted this broad interpretation 
of Christian that all procurement regulations have "the force and 
effect of law" and must be read into all contracts to which they 
apply. To them "This so-called broad Christian doctrine that 
all procurement regulations have 'the force and effect of law' 
and must be read into all contracts to which they apply, appears 
... to be an unjustified over-simplification and over-reaction". 
The authors are of the opinion that the Christian doctrine is limited 
only to "mandatory" regulations which implement and express basic 
or fundamental procurement policies. In cases where "mandatory" 
regulations expressing a "deeply ingrained strand of public 
procurement policy" are ignored by the contracting officer, the 
government is not estopped (they point out) from asserting the inval-
o
idity of his actions. This seems tobe the correct interpretation
^Cibinic, "Contract by Regulation" (1963) 32 Geo.Wash.L.Rev.Ill; 
Case Commentary (1963) 51 Geo. hiT. 842; Whelan & Phillips, 
"Government Contracts: Emphasis on Government" (1964) 29 Law & 
Contemp. Prob. 315; Keeffe, "Christian Government Contracts"
(1963) 49 A.B.A.J. 1225, 1226; Donnelly, "The Milkman Rings Twice 
Has Paul v. United States given Federal Procurement Regulations 
the Force of Statutory Law?"(1964) 29 Law & Contemp. Prob.347,359
2Braude & Lane, "Modern Insights on Validity and Force and Effect 
of Procurement Regulations - a New Slant on Standing and the 
Christian Doctrine" (1972) 31 Fed. B.J. 99, 101.
3Id. at 102. See also Schoenbrod v. United States (1969) 187 
Ct. Cl. 627, 634; 410 F. 2d 400, 404; Prester v. United States 
(1963) 162 F. 2d 620, 625; Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill 
(1947)322 U.S. 380; Sutton v. United States 256 U.S. 575.
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of the Christian dccision.^
Be that as it may, we find that in Australia s.71(i) of 
the Audit Act 1901-1975 empowers the Governor-General to make 
regulations, inter a1ia, for and in relation to procurement by 
the Commonwealth Government. In pursuance of this power, the 
Finance Regulations have been made which, inter alia, lay down 
the principles and procedures in relation to affairs and trans­
actions involving the expenditure of public moneys by a 11 government 
departmenus entering into contracts within Australia or overseas.^ 
In addition to the Regulations, Directions have also been issued 
from cime to time in relation to government purchasing. A contra­
vention of a direction is deemed to be a breach of a Regulation.^ 
Now the question is whether the Australian courts would, in a 
given situation, apply the Christian doctrine, say even in its 
narrow sense, to the Finance Regulations and Directions and 
Standard Terms. Let us discuss this further.
Judge Davis, in his opinion denying the plaintiff's motion for 
rehearing and re-argument, stressed the fundamental procurement 
policy aspect of the particular regulation involved, stating :
"[!]t is important ... that procurement policies set by higher 
authority not be avoided or evaded (deliberately or negligently) 
by lesser officials, or by a concert of contractor and contracting 
°^^^cer* r^° accept the plaintiff's plea that a regulation is powei
less to incorporate a provision into a new contract would be to 
hobble the very policies which the appointed rule—makers consider 
significant enough to call for a mandatory regulation. Obligatory 
-ir-ORff1"essiona 1 enactments are held to govern federal contracts 
because there is a need to guard the dominant legislative policy 
against ad hoc encroachment or dispensation by the executive 
There^is a comparable need to protect the significant policies of 
superior administrators from sapping by subordinates" (1963) 160 
Ct. Cl. 58, 66-67, 320 F. 2d 345, 350-51 (emphasis supplied).
Section71(l)(d)-(e) of the Audit Act.
3
Regulation 5A, Finance Regulations.
4
Section 71(2) (c), Audit Act 1901-1975 read with Finance Regulation 
12 7A(3) .
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(i) The Concept of Mutuality - its Effects 
on standard Terms^
It may be stated at the outset, that since the standard 
terms of government contracts are not issued under any statutory 
authority, they do not, per se, have the force and effect of 
law. No statute or regulation requires them to be inserted into 
government contracts and thus they cannot be said to be incor­
porated into contract by operation of law. Their enforceability 
emanates from the agreement between the government and the 
supplier. It follows, therefore, if any of the standard terms 
is inconsistent with or abrogative of an existing principle of 
the law of contract or any other law, it shall not be enforceable.
One such principle of the law of contract with which some of the
which, may
standard terms may possibly come into conflict andAthus make
them unenforceable, is the concept of "mutuality". But first,
2what is meant by "mutuality"? That mutuality is necessary has
The discussion of "mutuality" which follows in this section is 
mainly based on American literature, partly because of the 
availability of published material, and partly because of 
numerous American cases where the court has discussed the 
"mutuality" requirement in contracts.
2Corbin states that the concept is an "appealing"one, Corbin,
A Comprehensive Treatise on the Working Rules of Contract Law 
(1963) Vol. 1A, 1-103 [hereinafter cited as Corbin] at p. 2. See 
on "mutuality" Williston, A Treatise on the haw of Contracts 
(3rd ed. 1957) Vol. 1, 420-27 [hereinafter cited as Williston];
Treitel, "Mutuality in Contract" (1961) 77 L.Q.R.83; 17 
Corpus Juris Secundum Mutuality §100, pp. 786-809.
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been a commonly repeated statement:
The general rule of law is ... that, where the 
consideration for the promise of one party is the 
promise of the other party, there must be absolute 
mutuality of engagement, so that each party has 
the right to hold the other to a positive agreement.
Both parties must be bound, or neither is bound. ^
Nevertheless the concept of "mutuality" has not been more
clearly defined, and some eminent writers on the law of contracts
2have found it to be a "confusing" concept/ At the same time, 
however, the "mutuality" requirement has played an important part 
in the making of decisions as well as in the writing of opinions.
The basic difficulty in clearly defining mutuality has 
been that of distinguishing it from the concept of consideration. 
While some have thought that mutuality and consideration are
American Agricultural Chemical Co v. Kennedy & Crawford (1904)
48 S.E. 868, 870. See also Town of Vinton v. City of Roanoke
(1954) 80 S.E. 2d 608, 617, where the court cited with approval 
the above case and added: "Here the covenant under review lacks
mutuality of promises, in that it purports to bind Vinton-Roanoke 
Water Co to furnish all water necessary to supply the demands 
of the town, but does not bind the town to take any amount of 
water"; United Butane Sales, Inc, v. Bessemer-Suburban Gas Cq, Inc. 
(1968) 207 So. 2d 416. See further Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co 
v. Orange Crush Co (1924) 296 F. 693; Maple Island Farm Inc, v. 
Bitterling (1954) 209 F. 2d 867; Oakland Motor Car Co v. Indiana 
Automobile Co (1912) 201 F. 499.
?Williston, op. cit. 420-21; Corbin, op. cit. 5-6. In an Englisn 
case, Gaumont-British Picture Corporation Ltd v. Alexander [1936]
2 All E.R. 1686, Porter J stated at 1690 thus, "I am not, 
myself, very familiar in this connection with the phrase 'want 
of mutuality'".
3See e.g. Federal Electric Corp. v. United States (1973) 486
i1 23'. 2d 13 7 /, 1381 (Ct. Cl.)]jn Australia, see McRobertson Miller
v. Commissioner of Taxation ( V I . A . ) (1975) 8 A.L.R. 131. See
particularly at 148-149 (Jacobs J's judgment).
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synonymous, others have held that mutuality (unlike consider-
2ation) is not an essential clement in every contract. It is 
humbly submitted that neither interpretation of the term 
"mutuality" is correct.
If want of mutuality merely connotes want of consideration, 
one wonders why in the first instance the term "mutuality" has 
been used for such a long time. There is a long list of cases 
where the courts have held contracts void and unenforceable
3because of lack of mutuality though there was consideration.
Thus in a leading case in Velie Motor Car Co v. Kopmeier Motor 
4Car Co., the court said "it is a fundamental rule of law that
5contracts, m  order to be binding,must be mutual". In that case,
Williston, op. cit. 421. See also Clausen & Sons, Inc, v. Theo. 
Hamm. Brewing Co (1968) 395 F. 2d 388, 389, where the court said 
"'mutuality of obligation' is only a semantical exercise 
surrounding the real determinant of a contract, namely, 
consideration"; Meurer Steel Barrel Co Inc., v. Martin (1924)
1 F. 2d 687; Kane v. Chrysler Corp. (1948) 80 F. Supp. 360; 
Northwestern Engineering Co v. Ellerman (1943) 10 N.W. 2d 879;
F. Jacobus Transportation Co. Inc., v. Gallagher Brothers Sand 
& Gravel Corporation (1958) 161 F. Supp. 507; "Mutuality is a 
legal term of elusive meaning, but ... lack of mutuality means 
only lack of consideration.": J.C. Millett Co. v. Park & Tilford
Distillers Corp. (1954) 123 F. Supp. 484, 493.
2Corbin, op. cit. 5-6. In National Chemsearch Corp. v. Bogatin 
(1964) 233 F. Supp. 802, 809-10, the court stated that"[m]utuality 
of obligation is an old and seldom used doctrine which is often 
confused with consideration"; the latter being necessary to 
support a contract, the former not.
3For example, in Jenkins v. Anaheim Sugar Co (1916) 237 F. 278, 
(D.C. S.D. Cal.), the court said at 282: "the contract would
have lacked validity, not from a want of consideration, but, as 
herein, from a lack of mutuality".
4 (1912) 194 F. 324.
^Id. at 331.
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the defendant's right was made subject to the plaintiff's
right to arbitrarily, and without assigning any cause, cancel
the contract. The court held that the defendant might well
decline to go to the expense and trouble of advertising and
developing the territory named, when its rights might at any
time be terminated. Thus the court held that an agreement
wherein one party reserves the right to cancel at his pleasure
1cannot create a contract.
It is admitted that in a large majority of cases of lack
of mutuality, a valid consideration would also be lacking. But
there can be cases where consideration, howsoever inadequate,
is present, but mutuality is not. In the Velie Motor Car Co 
2case, for example, the consideration from the plaintiff was
that it (the plaintiff) extended to the defendant "the exclusive
right of sale during the continuance of this contract for the
Velie line of automobiles in the following territory" (some 21
counties in the State of Wisconsin). But the court held the
3contract unenforceable "by reason of want of mutuality".
The concept of mutuality is, therefore, a much broader
Id. at 330-31. In Alameda County v. Ross (1939) 89 P. 2d 460, 
the court said: "[M]utuality of obligations is an essential
element in every binding contract. In the present case there is 
an absolute absence of mutuality for the reason that the 
government may cancel the agreement and deprive the County of 
Alameda of the use or control of the bridges at any moment 
without cause" (at 464). But see Clausen & Sons, Inc, v. Theo. 
Hamm. Brewing Co. (1968) 395 F. 2d 388.
2 (1912) 194 F. 324.
2 Id . at 331.
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concept than consideration; in many cases it overlaps but in 
some it (i.e. mutuality) supplements the concept of considerat­
ion. It is a we11-recognised principle of law that the 
inadequacy of consideration does not generally affect the 
validity of a contract/ The law will not enter into an inquiry
as to the adequacy of consideration because that is a matter
2"exclusively for the decision of the parties" or "for the
3parties themselves to determine". But what is really meant by 
these or similar expressions? No one would deny that both 
parties should decide or determine the terms of their contract 
freely and with full understanding of their possible effects.
But what is happening in actual practice is that in a growing 
class of cases (containing numerous standard terms, in fine print 
or otherwise), one party realising the financial predicament of 
the other party and making full use of its own superior bargain­
ing position, is procuring an agreement which is grossly and 
flagrantly disproportionate to the promise of the other party.
In such a case, it is hard to believe that the "bargain" is the 
result of "the decision of the parties" or is "determined" by 
both of them. The principle that inadequacy of consideration is
^See e.g. in Osborne v. Locke Steel Chain Co 218 A. 2d 526, the 
court stated: "The general rule is that, in the absence of 
fraud or other unconscionable circumstances, a contract will not 
be rendered unenforceable at the behest of one of the contracting 
parties merely because of an inadequacy of consideration"(at 530) . 
2Williston, op. cit. at 426.
3Id. at 455 (quoting from Blanchard v. Haber 166 La. 1014,
118 So. 117).
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immaterial to judge the validity of a contract may in such cases 
turn the whole concept of consideration into a mere formality, 
a mere sham and hold a nominal consideration as a valid consider­
ation. That is where the concept of mutuality, it is submitted, 
plays a useful role, since mutuality would avoid contracts with 
unreal or insufficient consideration. It is to be remembered 
that the requirement of consideration is not a safeguard against 
imprudent and improvident contracts except in cases where it 
appeals that there is no bargain in fact, whereas mutuality is.
Undoubtedly, there is a thin line which separates the two 
concepts, yet each has a distinct and separate role to play.
For example, if X promises Y $1,000 in return for Y's promise 
to raise his hands once, one could argue that there is 
consideration, though not adequate (but inadequacy is no negation 
of consideration). But Y's promise might be treated as one 
in which there is only an illusion of mutuality, thus making 
the contract legally unenforceable.
Mutuality, like the American concept of "unconscionability", 
thus connotes equality, fairness and justice."^ This should not,
"Terms such as mutuality, uncertainty, and indefiniteness, 
etc. are construed in the light of the circumstances under 
which the agreement is made and such terms used, and have no 
definite and fixed meaning and are interpreted so as to deal 
equitably with the parties.": Pace Corporation v. Jackson
(1955) 275 S.W. 2d 849, 853.
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however, be taken to imply that the validity of a contract
depends upon an objective equality of advantages or values/
Each promise made by one party does not have to be matched by
an equivalent promise made by the other. Each right or power
or privilege possessed by one party does not have to have its
exact counterpart in the other. The fact that one party is
given an option not accorded to the other does not, per se,
render such contract void for- lack of mutuality of obligation.
To consider mutuality in the sense of creating reciprocal rights
2or duties, is to give it a very narrow and literal meaning.
Mere absence of reciprocal rights or duties should not, therefore,
. 3lead one to conclude that the contract lacks mutualrty.
There are cases in which courts have held that a contract is 
not valid because the obligation undertaken on one side is not 
commensurate with that undertaken on the other. See e.g. 
Frankfort Waterworks Co. v. McBride (1931) 175 N.E. 140; but 
see Lindner v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. (1952) 252 S.W. 2d 
631; Hancock Bank & Trust Co. v. Shell Oil Co. (1974) 309 N.E. 
2d 482.
2Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1959) defines mutuality as 
"the quality or condition of being mutual; reciprocity"; "A 
condition of things under which two parties are mutually bound 
to perform certain reciprocal duties".
317 Corpus Juris Secundum §100 (1), pp. 792-93.
Mention should also be rrade here of a class of cases 
where the law gives a defence to one promisor enabling him at 
his option to avoid the whole agreement and yet it does not 
prevent his promise from being sufficient consideration for 
the counter-promise. For example, an agreement between an 
infant and an adult though voidable by the infant is binding 
upon the adult. So is a promise made by an insane person, or 
a promise of one who has been induced to enter into a bargain 
by fraud, undue influence, coercion or mistake (in some cases 
of mistake) considered sufficient to support a counter-promise.
It is, however, well-settled that this rule should be regarded 
as an exception to the general requirements of mutuality.^
In the light of the above analysis, it is submitted that 
mutuality is a cardinal requirement of contracts. Fundamentally, 
an executory agreement for the sale and delivery of 
goods or supplies, to be effective, must be obligatory on
^Treitel, "Mutuality in Contract" (1961) 77 L.Q.R. 83, 84-87; 
Williston, op.cit. 414-17.
both parties, or it lacks mutuality and is not enforceable.^
That a contract, which in terras reserves the option of perform­
ance to the promisor, is insufficient to support a counter-
2promise because of lack of mutuality, is supported by case-law. 
Thus in Joliet Bottling Co. v. Brewing Co.-"* where under a 
certain provision of the agreement, the appellant had the 
option of refusing to accept beer from respondent, at its 
pleasure, upon the ground that it was not satisfactory, the 
court said: "It cannot be doubted, we think, that the contract
was unilateral and void for want of mutuality under repeated
4decisions of this and other courts [citations]."
247
Fowler*s Bootery v. Selby Shoe Co. (1938) 117 S.W. 2d 931.
A unilateral contract, which consists of a single binding 
promise (the consideration on the other side being executed), 
however, does not require mutuality and has long been recognised 
as a valid contract. Such a promise can be binding if it is 
under seal or if an executed consideration has been exchanged 
for it. Agreements are frequently made which are not, in a 
certain sense, binding on both sides at the time when executed, 
and in which the whole duty to be performed rests principally 
with one of the contracting parties. See Restatement, Contracts 
§§ 12, 75, 76 and 85-94; Williston, op.cit. 421 and Corbin, 
op.cit. 3. Again it is well-settled that in most option contracts, 
where the option holder makes no promise, but pays cash or gives 
some other executed consideration, the option giver's promise is 
enforceable, in spite of lack of mutuality of obligation. See 
Corbin, op.cit. 459-66.
2See a long list of cases cited in Williston, op.cit. 417 n.9; 
Corbin, op.cit. 67 n.59; 17 Corpus Juris Secundum §100(1), pp.
790-92. See generally, Corbin, "The Effect of Options on 
Consideration" 34 Yale L-J. 571.
3 (1912) 98 N.E. 263 .
"id. at 265.
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Thus, on principle it seems that where one party is given an 
option, not accorded to the other, of abrogating, or 
constricting or renewing the contract or any part thereof, or 
of discontinuing or extending performance or of determining the 
extent of performance, the option goes so far as to render 
illusory the promise of the party given the option and there is 
indeed no mutuality, and therefore no contract.
If the foregoing is correct, it appears to be equally 
certain that the government's retention of an "option to cancel" 
its contracts under the usual premature termination clause or 
the "break" clause invalidates such contracts on the ground 
that it prevents mutuality of obligation.^ The standard 
termination clause used in Australian Government contracts reads 
as follows:
Thus in American Agricultural Chemical Co. v. Kennedy & Crawford 
(1904) 48 S.E. 868, a written contract provided: "We [plaintiff-
seller] reserve the right to cancel this contract at any time 
we may deem proper, but in the event of such cancellation the 
provisions of this contract shall govern the closing of all 
business begun thereunder." The court held that this invalidated 
the contract ab initio, saying, "as that proposition did not 
bind the plaintiff to sell, there was no consideration for the 
defendant's promise to purchase" (_id. at 871). Again in Miami 
Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange Crush Co. (1924) 296 F. 693, 
the defendant gave to the plaintiff the exclusive privilege of 
bottling and selling "orange crush", the plaintiff promising 
various things in return, with a provision that the plaintiff 
might cancel at any time. Refusing specific performance, the 
court said that "the contract was void for lack of mutuality"
(id. at 694) .
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TERMINATION BY THE COMMONWEALTH
1. The Commonwealth may at any time upon giving 
notice in writing to the Contractor of its 
intention so to do abrogate or constrict the 
contract or any part or further part thereof 
and upon such notice being given the Contractor 
shall cease or reduce work according to the 
tenor of the notice and shall forthwith do 
everything possible to mitigate losses 
consequent thereto.
2. In that exigency the Contractor may submit a 
claim for compensation and the Commonwealth 
shall pay to the Contractor such sums as are 
fair and reasonable in respect of the loss or 
damage sustained by the Contractor in 
unavoidable consequence provided always the 
Contractor shall not be entitled to compen­
sation for loss of prospective profits.
3. The Commonwealth shall not be liable to pay 
under the provisions of this clause any sum 
which additional to any sums paid or due or 
becoming due to the Contractor under the 
contract would together exceed the full price 
of the complete work ordinarily payable under 
the contract.
4. Where the provisions of this clause are 
invoked as to any part of the contract the 
provisions of this clause shall prevail over 
all other provisions of the contract 
inconsistent herewith in respect to those 
parts so affected.
5. The Contractor shall in each sub-contract or 
order to the value of $10,000 or more placed 
with any one sub-contractor or supplier for 
the purpose of this contract reserve the right 
to abrogate such sub-contract or order or part 
thereof whenever the Commonwealth abrogates 
and to do so and give notice thereof between 
Contractor and sub-contractor in manner alike 
as in this clause hereinbefore provided and 
also as between them upon the like terms as
to compensation and otherwise.
The above quoted termination clause produces a result very 
similar to that produced by making a promise conditional on
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personal satisfaction. The government attempts by this means
to retain in as large a degree as possible its own economic
freedom of choice, observing results as performance of the
contract proceeds and terminating the contract if these results
are not satisfactory to it. The legal power created by this
clause is not made conditional upon dissatisfaction with the
results; it is a power to cancel if the government so wills
and desires. Government's option between cancelling and not
2cancelling is unlimited. Obviously therefore a promise by
the government which does not bind it or which gives an option,
not accorded to the other party, upon notice at any time to
"abrogate or constrict the contract or any part or further
part thereof" renders the government's promise illusory and
lacks mutuality. Treitel seems to admit that there is "lack
3of mutuality" in such a case, though he holds that the other 
party would still be bound because "[t]he Crown's immunity
For convenience discussion here is confined to the standard 
term dealing with "Termination by the Commonwealth". It is 
obvious that similar difficulties will arise where unilateral 
variation clause is used in government contracts.
2‘"It should be noted that in the United States, the "Termination 
for Convenience of the Government" (as it is called there) is 
not as wide as the Australian counter-part. It reads, inter 
alia: "The performance of work under this contract may be
terminated by the Government in accordance with this clause 
in whole, or from time to time in part, whenever the Contract­
ing Officer shall determine that such termination is in the 
best interest of the Government. Any such termination shall 
be effected by delivery to the Contractor of a Notice of 
Termination specifying the extent to which performance or 
work under the contract is terminated, and the date upon 
which such termination becomes effective." ASPR §7-103.21 
(emphasis supplied).
Treitel, "Mutuality in Contract" (1961) 77 L.Q.R. 83,87.
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in these cases is based on very special considerations which 
provide no basis for relieving the other party" . ^
Corbin, however, seems to think that the reservation of 
a power to cancel in one party does not amount to an illusory 
promise. He argues:
The power to cancel that is reserved is invariably 
a power to cancel the whole contract, including 
both promises alike. Where one promise is 
illusory and the other is not, it looks as if 
the one promised performance must be rendered 
whether the other is or not. This is not so 
in the case of a power to cancel .... It does 
not appear to involve an attempt to get some­
thing for nothing; and there is no such result 
whether the power is exercised or not.^
It is humbly submitted that by no means can one justify 
a one-sided and unlimited power of cancellation of one party 
by advancing an argument that the other party is also freed 
from performance after the act of cancellation. What is 
objectionable is that the other party has to stop performance 
against its will and against the terms of the initial promise. 
The will of the party reserving the right to cancel dominates 
over the written words and the threat of cancellation hangs 
like a sword over the head of the other party. The contin­
uous threat of cancellation, apart from curbing the other 
party's freedom of action, may cause great hardship in the 
planning and management of its business. It is for this 
reason, viz. to avoid such potentially harsh and unjust
Ibid. (citing Mitchell, Contracts of Public Authorities).
Corbin, op.cit. 68.2
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consequences, that an unlimited power of cancellation should 
not be held valid and enforceable. Furthermore, the use of 
a termination clause by the government in its contracts may 
mean higher prices by contractors, attempting to lessen the 
risk of lost profits which a premature cancellation might 
cause, thus becoming a drain on the public exchequer.
Such a question has not so far been the subject of any 
reported judicial decision in Australia and thus it is not 
clear what legal effect the premature termination would have 
on the validity of government contracts, or on the liability 
of contractors. However, it does not seem unlikely that a 
court may regard such a promise by government as wanting in 
mutuality. This may be done not on the basis of lack of 
consideration or an absence of corresponding privilege with 
the other party (although these factors are relevant and do 
help a court to judge whether mutuality exists or not), but 
for the reason that government contracts are contracts of 
adhesion and entered into between parties of unequal bargain­
ing power.
To return to the termination clause, we find that it 
gives unlimited and unbridled power to government officials 
to cancel a contract. For example, no reason needs to be 
assigned for the government's action and the clause may be 
invoked "at any time" implying thereby that it may be made
to operate even before the performance has begun but after
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the contract has been signed. ' Sometimes it is stated that
since the party given the option is required to give a
notice of cancellation, the contract is not invalid for
2lack of consideration or for lack of "mutuality". Corbin, 
for example, states that by giving the notice of cancella­
tion, the party having power to cancel "not only goes to
some trouble and expense" but also loses his right to
3performance by the other party. "In such a contract"
he adds, "the party having power to cancel has an option
between alternatives-between performing and giving notice
.... The giving of the notice relieves him from obligation
as well the notice-giver himself. This makes such a contract a
reasonable one under ordinary circumstances; it is certainly
A.not unconscionable . . . ." A contract which provides for
^In Berry v. Walton (1963) 366 S.W. 2d 173, 174, the court 
said that "if the agreement is wholly executory and one of 
the parties is not obligated even to commence the perform­
ance of it, there is a lack of mutuality".
2See Stern & Co. v. International Harvester Co. (1961) 172 
A. 2d 614 (either party could cancel upon notice). In 
Phalanx Air Freight, Inc, v . National Skyway Freight Corp. 
(1951) 232 P. 2d 510, the court observed: "The contract
contained a provision making it terminable by plaintiff 
'at any time by giving Air Carrier at least thirty (30) 
days notice1 2*4. • This did not render the contract illusory 
as contended by defendant. While a provision for termin­
ation by one party at will has that effect a provision 






termination of contract by one party after notice for some
specified period (according to Corbin, again) "should never
be held to be rendered invalid thereby for lack of 'mutuality'
or for lack of consideration",^ because
[tjhe party in whom the power has been reserved 
has made a real promise, one that in terms purports 
to control his action during the specified period 
of notice. For performances continuing during 
that period, he must pay at the agreed rate. His 
cancellation is effective only at the end of the 
period; thereafter he will not have to pay, but 
neither will he receive performance.2
It is submitted, that Corbin's reasoning becomes somewhat 
fallacious, when some important practical considerations are 
taken into account. One is that it is very difficult and 
sometimes impossible for contractors to foresee whether and 
at what moment the termination may take place. For that 
reason, as government sources readily admit, many contractors 
strongly object to the inclusion of such termination clauses 
which leave them in such an uncertain state. Secondly, while 
some contractors may calculate their costs in such a manner 
that even if a premature termination clause is invoked they 
will be covered financially, others file their quotations on 
the assumption that the contracts may run their full term.
But neither practice leads to satisfactory results. The 




case merely allows calculations which are mere guess-work 
and often quite irrational. In the latter practice, a 
premature termination (if it does take place) may lead 
to ruinous losses. Thirdly, as the government usually 
places contracts with the most competitive contractor, 
more reliable contractors who include the extra costs caused 
by premature cancellation may find it hard to compete with 
perhaps less reliable contractors quoting lower rates in 
disregard of the termination risk. The position would be 
made much easier if such premature termination-clauses 
provided for a reasonable period during which the contractor 
could adjust his business or adapt his investments to the 
new circumstances. Unfortunately neither the Australian 
standard terms nor their counterparts in the U.S., the 
U.K. or India provide for such interim periods of adjustment.
In the light of all the relevant considerations, such 
as that the premature termination of contract denies private 
contractors their expected profits, that government contracts 
are contracts of adhesion, that there is inequality of 
bargaining power, that they are usually on a take-it-or- 
leave-it basis, that government officials realising a 
contractor's financial predicament can procure his acceptance 
to harsh and one-sided terms, and that such and similar 
clauses can work against the public interest, it is submitted 
that a contract with premature termination right lacks
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mutuality and should be unenforceable. Since, however, 
government stands in a different position vis-a-vis private 
parties and there can be valid reasons to give such a right 
of cancellation to the government to be exercised in the 
public interest, such a right may, in certain specified 
circumstances, be given by a statute, making premature 
terminations by government enforceable
(ii) The Christian Doctrine and the Australian Finance 
Regulations and Directions
Coming now to the Finance Regulations and Directions, 
it is submitted that except in some situations (discussed 
below), they, like the standard terms, cannot be accorded 
the full effect of federal law. Legal writers have classified 
regulations as "legislative" and "non-legislative";
"mandatory" and "directory" or "interpretative"; and 
"statutory" and "internal" or "housekeeping". They have 
stated (to put it broadly) that regulations which implement, 
interpret or prescribe law or policy are "legislative" or 
"mandatory" or "statutory". Such regulations are subject 
to minimum judicial scrutiny and have the full force and
^In the United States, for example, the standard "Termination 
for Convenience of the Government" clause is contained in the 
Federal Regulations, which are issued under the authority of 
government statutes.
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effect of law. On the other hand, regulations which concern 
organisation, procedures, documentation, practices, or 
generally speaking, management functions, are usually termed 
"internal" or "house-keeping" or "non-legislative" or 
"interpretative" or "directory". Such regulations may or 
may not have the force of law depending on the circumstances 
of each case/ It is, however, submitted that a more careful 
initial examination of any given regulation as also of the 
statute authorising it, is required before a proper classif­
ication can be made. Its history, its intent, and any under­
lying specific legislative authority and policy must be 
scrutinized before one can give it the effect either of a 
"mandatory" or of a "housekeeping" regulation.
Study of the purpose, intent, scope and general impact 
on non-government rights of the provisions of the Audit Act 
1901-1975 and the Finance Regulations and Directions leads 
us to a conclusion that they are not the product of an exercise 
of legislative power, but are "internal" or "house-keeping" 
rules, concerned with financial matters, organisation, 
procedures and practices of government departments. Apart 
from the fact that in Australia, the Audit Act and Finance 
Regulations, unlike the procurement statutes and regulations 
in the United States, are not basically meant to deal with all 
aspects of government purchasing, the preamble to the Audit
1See generally, Davis, Administrative Law Treatise
(U.S. 1958 with 1970 and 1976 Supplements) §§5.01-11.
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Act makes the intent of the drafters very clear. It reads:
"An Act to make provision for the Collection and Payment of 
the Public Moneys, the Audit of the Public Accounts, and the 
Protection and Recovery of Public Property and for other 
purposes". The provisions of the regulations issued under 
the Act are in the nature of general financial rules and are 
intended to be treated as executive instructions to be observed 
in common by all Departments and Authorities under Federal 
Government, except those specified. Furthermore, the placement 
of the Finance Regulations 45 to 53 (which deal with government 
purchasing) under Division I - "certifying Officers of Part III 
- Payment of Public Moneys", corroborates the conclusion that 
they are intended only as internal directions to government 
procurement officials. In the matter of receipt, custody and 
disbursement of government moneys,the Finance Directions are 
supplementary to the Finance Regulations and are applied in 
conjunction with them.
The above analysis shows that the Christian doctrine (even 
in its narrow sense) is not applicable to the Australian 
Finance Regulations and Directions issued under the Audit Act. 
Difficulty,however, seems to arise when we find that certain 
regulations and directions, although phrased as internal 
directions to government procurement officials, nevertheless 
have a significant effect on contractor rights and obligations. 
Take, for example, Finance Regulation 52(1). It provides:
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Subject to any Act making provision with respect 
to contracts for supplies and subject to the next 
succeeding regulation, contracts shall not be 
entered into, and orders shall not be placed, for 
supplies the estimated cost of which exceeds Five 
thousand dollars unless tenders have first been 
publicly invited for those supplies.
The regulation seems to be intended to benefit contractors,
as Finance Direction 31/19 explains it:
The underlying intention of Regulations 51, 52, 52AA 
and 53 is that government procurement procedures 
should be, and be seen to be, beyond reproach: i.e.
that all who wish to participate in government 
business are given the opportunity to do so, that 
the government maintains a reputation for fair 
dealing, and that the public money is spent 
effectively and economically ....
Now suppose a Purchase Order is issued, under reg. 52A in
clear contravention of reg. 52, i.e. without an invitation
to tenders (supposing also that the case is not covered by
any of the exceptions enumerated in reg. 52AA), can (1) the
government repudiate the contract; and (2) the other
contractors challenge its validity? In the United States,
the answer would be in the affirmative in both cases. There,
in a Court of Claims decision in Schoenbrod v. United States,^
the Court found the contracting officer's negotiation of a
contract without initially soliciting price quotations from
eligible offerors to be a flagrant violation of FPR provisions,
derived from statute, requiring that procurements "shall be
2made on a competitive basis". The Court emphasised that the 
1(1969) 187 Ct.Cl. 627, 410 F. 2d 400.
2FPR §1-1.301, quoted in (1969) 187 Ct. Cl. at 630, 410 F. 2d 
at 401.
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competitive and pricing factors are perhaps the "most important" 
general policies for public contracts, and that therefore a 
contract negotiated ’without consideration of such factors was 
clearly invalid. For this reason it was held that the government's 
cancellation of the award pursuant to the opinion of the 
Comptroller General was not a breach of contract. The Court noted 
that the solicitation and award procedures were clearly beyond the 
actual authority conferred upon the contracting officer pursuant 
to the statutory regulation, and that the government could not be 
estopped from denying that limitation of authority.^ It may, 
however, be argued that the Schoenbrod principle will not apply 
in Australia because the Finance Regulations and Directions (as 
we have suggested above) are merely internal directions and not 
"legislative" rules.
But will not a regulation be still enforceable (although
internal) if it contains benefits or establishes rights of
contractors? In the United States, such a regulation (although
phrased as an "internal" direction to procurement officials) would
have the binding effect of law on both parties, under the "whose
2benefit" theory.J According to this theory, if a regulation
1_Id. at 634, 410 F. 2d at 404.
2For a most comprehensive statement of the "whose benefit" theory, 
see Chris Berg Inc, v. United States (1970) 192 Ct. Cl. 176,- 426 F. 
2d 314. In that case the Court held that the ASPR provisions on 
mistaken bids (ASPR §2-406.2) were written for the protection of 
bidders and thus the government was not entitled to rescind the 
contract. The Court accepted the contractor's argument that the 
government's award of the contract to him at his bid price, with 
knowledge of the mistake in bid and over his protest was a clear- 
cut violation of the regulations relating to apparent clerical 
mistakes. The Court therefore concluded that the actions of the 
Contracting Officer in awarding the contract contrary to the 
regulations entitled the contractor to reformation of the contract 
price .
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appears intended to define and state the rights of a class of
persons, it is presumptively intended to benefit those persons
2and binds both parties. On the other hand, if a regulation has
no significant effect on private rights and obligations of the
contractor but is solely for the benefit of the government and is
waived by the government, neither party at the litigation stage
can rely upon it; the doctrines of estoppel or waiver can be
invoked against the government, and the contractor is likewise
precluded from relying upon the regulation which the court finds
3was not made for his benefit.
^Id. at 183, 426 F. 2d at 317-318 (citing Fletcher v. United 
States (1968) 183 Ct. Cl. 1, 392 F. 2d 266).
2For an example of procedural regulations which create 
substantive benefits for contractors and are hence binding, see 
Moran Bros. Inc. v. United States (1965) 171 Ct. Cl. 245, 346 F.
2d 590. In that case an AEC (now ERDA) contract contained a 
standard Disputes Clause, requiring filing of a notice of appeal 
within a thirty day period. The AEC regulations governing 
disputes procedures permitted appeals within sixty days of the 
final decision. The Court held that the regulation had the "force 
and effect" of law and was binding on the agency and contractor 
(id. at 249-50, 346 F. 2d at 593). The Court therefore found the 
appeal timely as it was filed within sixty days after the final 
decision.
3One example of this is Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. 
United States (1955) 130 Ct. Cl. 490, 127 F. Supp. 565. (The 
Hartford decision involved procurement regulations prescribing 
a standard form of delay clause. In lieu thereof, a special 
liquidated damages clause was inserted by the contracting officer. 
The Court held that the regulations served merely as an internal 
guide and were not made for the benefit of the contractor. As 
they were promulgated for the sole benefit of the government, the 
contractor could not complain if they were not followed.) That 
case is similar to the Supreme Court decision in United States v. 
New York & Porto Rico Steamship Company (1915) 239 U.S. 88, which 
held that the government's violation of procurement regulations 
in failing to reduce the contract to writing made the contract 
merely voidable at the government's election, not void, for the 
government may waive forms designed for its protection (id. at 
89) . See also National Electronics Laboratories, Inc, v. United 
States (1960) 148 Ct. Cl. 308, 180 F. Supp. 337; Centex 
Construction Co. v. United States (1963) 162 Ct. Cl. 211.
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If, however, because of a different government procurement
set-up in the United States, or for some other reason, the
American "whose benefit" theory is not applied to the Australian
Finance Regulations, the same result can be achieved by accepting
what Professor Enid Campbell, the leading Australian Constitutional
expert on government contracts, has stated in one of her Research
Papers submitted to the Royal Commission on Australian Government
Administration 1974-76.^ The author states that the legal effect
of the regulations on the validity of contracts should be
determined according to whether the facts disclosing compliance
or non-compliance with the regulations were readily ascertainable
to the contractor/s or not. The author points out that
regulations dealing with preparation of written requisitions
(reg. 46) or certification by an Authorizing Officer about the
availability of funds (reg. 47) or issuance of Purchase Orders 
2(reg. 52A) "relate to the performance of duties by public 
officers" and "it is not unlikely that a court would characterise
^Campbell, "Australian Government Contracts" (A.G.P.S. 1975) 
Research Paper No. 47 (Microfiche Ref. R47X) 17-22.
W l ^ t i o n  52 is not wholly p rocedural in  e f f e c t . See a t LOS SV£rz.
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[such] procedural provisions ... as directory rather than
mandatory in effect".^ The reason being that "[i]ndividuals
who are negotiating for the rendering of supplies to the
Commonwealth have no control over those [government] officers,
nor could they reasonably be expected to make inquiries to
determine whether the procedural requirements had been 
2fulfilled". She adds that if the requirements of the above-
stated regulations were held mandatory, it would not "advance
any important public purpose", but instead "could work
3inconvenience and injustice to contractors".
Professor Campbell, however, puts regulations 51 and 52
in a different category (as we have also done above for reg. 52
under the "whose benefit" theory). These regulations, according
to her, not only "establish important and fundamental principles
concerning the negotiation of contracts", but also in such cases
"the facts disclosing compliance or non-compliance are more
4readily ascertainable".
Because of the general dearth of case-law on government
5contracts in Australia, the United Kingdom and India, it is 
quite difficult to predict the judicial approach in these




5The present author has made a collection of cases on government 
contracts which have been decided by the courts in India between 
1872-1974. See Ponnuswami and Puri, Cases & Materials on 
Contracts (Including Government Contracts) (Delhi 1974) ch.2.
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countries if in fact a case did arise on the binding force of
regulations dealing with procurement.^ Reference may, however,
2be made to N.P. Singh v. Forest Officer, Manipur decided by 
an Indian court in 1962 in which the petitioner sought a writ 
of mandamus directing the government to accept his tender and 
declaring the cancellation of the contract awarded to another 
party. The facts, in brief, were: In response to an invitation
for tenders for extraction and for supply of timber in round 
and square logs from the government forests, the petitioner's 
tender was the lowest. But the government found that most of 
the tenderers did not quote the names of the species of timbers 
correctly and that the items for which the tenderers quoted 
rates varied from one to another and were not comparable.
Thus a fresh tender notice was issued. In the re-tender the 
petitioner's average rates for square logs were lowest but were 
Somewlni^  VivjVieY1 for round logs. The government accepted the lowest 
rate quoted by another contractor for round logs and stated 
that it did no longer require the square logs. Hence the writ 
application by the petitioner.
The petitioner argued, inter alia, that the government's 
action in cancellation of the first tender notice amounted to 
a breach of Rule 19 (vi) of the General Financial Rules of the
^In contrast to the paucity of decisions in these countries, a 
substantial body of case law has been generated by government 
contract matters in the United States.pA.I.R. 1962 Manipur 47, Ponnuswami & Puri, op.cit. 55-63.
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Central Government for contracts.1 Rule 19 (vi) stated that 
whenever practicable and advantageous, contracts should be 
placed only after tenders have been openly invited and in 
cases, where the lowest tender was not accepted, reasons should 
be recorded. The petitioner further argued that clause 5 of the 
tender notice by which the government reserved the right to 
accept any tender without assigning any reason therefor was 
in conflict with the above-stated Financial Rule and that the 
said clause was invalid.
The court held that since the government had in fact 
accepted the lowest tender for the round logs given by another 
contractor, the question whether Rule 19 (vi) was followed or 
whether clause 5 of the tender was in conflict with Rule 19 (vi) 
did not arise. But the court's following observation, though 
obiter, gives some idea of what it would have held had the 
facts been different:
... Rule 19 (vi) has provided that where the lowest 
tender is not accepted, the reasons should be 
recorded. The [government] would certainly have 
to record its reasons in the light of Rule 19 (vi) 
in cases where they do not accept the lowest tender.
If without giving valid reasons, they fail to accept 
the lowest tender, and accept some other tender, it 
will be liable to scrutiny by the court in a petition 
like the present.^
It further stated:
Such recording of the reasons is intended to prevent 
arbitrary acceptance of a tender and to make it 
available for the purpose of scrutiny by the
The same rule is now to be found in Clause (1) of Rule 15. 
See Compilation of the General Financial Rules (Revised and 
Enlarged, 1963), as amended.
2Ponnuswami & Puri, op.cit, at 61.
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Controlling Authority and by courts when the 
matter comes before court either in a writ 
application or in a suit .... Clause 5 
cannot be used for arbitrary action, in 
violation of Rule 19 (vi) of the Financial 
Rules.^
It will be pertinent here to refer to a matter which
arose under reg. 52 (Finance Regulations) a few years back
and received considerable attention of the Australian 
2Parliament. That matter related to the purchase of six 
DC3 aircraft from Jetair Australia Limited by the Commonwealth 
Government in early 1971. The government was criticised, inter 
alia, on the ground that it had not complied with reg. 52 
(requiring public tenders) before entering into the jetair
3Contract. The government acknowledged that there was a breach
of reg. 52 and the "normal purchasing procedures" had not been
followed but argued that the "original irregularity" was later
"cleared up" and thus it (i.e. the irregularity) did not
4continue to the point of impropriety. It is important to 
note that at no point during the debate on this controversial 
contract did the government suggest that the requirements of 
reg. 52 were merely procedural and directory rather than 
mandatory in effect. On the other hand, the whole episode
1Ibid.
2A good account of the "Jetair Contract" issue is to be found 
in Campbell, "Australian Government Contracts" Research
Paper 47, Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration 
1974-76 (Microfiche Ref. R47X) 20-21. See also C.P.D. (H. of R. 
11 Oct. 1972, pp.2371-72; 17 Oct. 1972, pp. 2625-7, 2677-90;
19 Oct. 1972, 2869-90; C.P.D. (Senate) 27 September 1972, 
p p .1205-09.
3C.P.D. (H. of R.) 11 Oct. 1972, pp. 2371-2 ;19 Oct. 1972,p.2873.
4_Id. pp. 2876-77, 2878, 2 890. See also C. P. D. (H. of R. ) 28 Sep. 1972, pp. 
2100-01 (Prime Minister 's reply to a question) .
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seems to suggest, as rightly pointed out by Professor Campbell,'*'
that reg. 52 is considered in government circles as going to the
2formation of contracts with the Commonwealth.
In the light of the American "whose benefit" theory, the
Australian "Jetair Contract" parliamentary debate and the dictum
in the above Indian case, it is submitted that some of the
regulations made under the Australian Audit Act may be said to
be
have the force and effect of law and/(bindi.ng on both the government 
and the contractor alike if they appear to be intended to define 
and state the rights of the contractors. Regulation 52(1) is 
one such example for it appears intended to give a right to the 
contractors to participate in government business and require the 
government officials to publicly invite tenders, unless the case 
falls under specified exceptions. However, in those cases where 
regulations have no significant effect on private rights and 
obligations, but are merely internal guidelines promulgated 
solely for the benefit of the government, the contractor cannot 
complain that the regulations were not complied with and neither 
party is bound by them. But, if a regulation directly and
'‘"Australian Government Contracts", op.cit. at 20.
2See C.P.D. (Senate) 27 Oct. 1972, pp. 2129-31, where an opposition 
Senator (Senator Cavanagh) stated that if the value of a 
Commonwea1th contract was more than $1,000 (now $5,000) and it 
was not desired to advertise or call tenders, the Secretary "could 
not willy-nilly issue a certificate [of inexpediency] for the 
purchase of goods. The terms under which the certificate can be 
issued are limited to 'having regard to the nature of the supplies 
and to the established practice in a profession, business, trade 
or industry connected with the supply of supplies of that kind'",
(id. p. 2130) .
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reasonably implements a basic and specific procurement policy 
or has significant effect on private rights and obligations of 
the contractor, it will be binding upon both the government and 
contractors, and must be included in or applied to the contract, 
either actually or by operation of law, if the contract is to be 
valid. The government cannot be estopped from denying the 
invalidity or lack of authority of procurement actions taken 
contrary to such regulations, nor can they be waived or avoided 
by the government when detrimental to its pecuniary interests.
In summary, it is submitted that no broad generalisations 
can be made regarding the binding legal effect of Finance 
Regulations promulgated by the government. Each particular 
provision must be individually examined before its binding effect 
can be determined. The examination of a given regulation to 
determine its force and effect must extend well beyond the broad 
underlying statutory authority, and must include the basic policy 
of the regulation itself, its history, the intent of the drafters, 
and most importantly, its impact and effect on substantive and 
procedural rights of contractors. Looking at the Finance 
Regulations in Australia, their purpose, history, scope and impact 
suggests that they are, what may be termed for convenience, "non­
legislative" regulations. The Christian doctrine will not apply 
to them but these regulations must be examined under the so-called 
"whose benefit" rule. If "non-legislative" regulations are merely 
for the government's own use and benefit - occasionally described 
as "internal" or "housekeeping" regulations - they can be waived
at the government's option and the contractors cannot rely on
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them or be bound by them. On the other hand, if such a 
regulation is not merely for the benefit of the government, it 
cannot be waived and is binding upon both parties with the full 
force and effect of law. This approach is a two-way street.
It can work to the government's benefit, or to its detriment.
5. The Concept of Unconscionability^
Some of the standard terms are so stringent, one-sided,
harsh, unreasonable and basically inconsistent with contract
theory that no contractor, given a choice, in his senses, and
not under any delusion, would agree to their insertion in the
contract. To the extent that many of these clauses are required
2to be inserted into subcontracts, these standard terms also 
affect the interests of those who are technically not even in 
privity with the government. But one-sided and oppressive 
standard terms are not confined to government contracts alone. 
Although most of the above-stated standard terms have no 
equivalent in private commercial dealings, numerous other terms 
are often inserted (without dickering, of course) by the superior 
party in the commercial contracts. Such contracts, usually 
known as standardised form contracts, pad contracts, contracts 
of adhesion or contracts with fine print, present the ordinary 
consumer with Hobson's choice. The party with superior
^The writer is indebted to Professor Summers of Cornell
University Law School for his valuable suggestions on this 
section of the chapter.
^See, e.g. Articles 10(c) and 23(c) of U.S. Standard Forms 32 
and 23-A respectively. In the U.K. see e.g. SCs 48(5), 51 and 
56(6) of Form GC/Stores/1 and SC 44(6) of Form GC/Works/I.
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bargaining power has the advantage of unilaterally setting most
of the terms incidental to the weaker party's remedies for
dissatisfaction. In a few areas, such as insurance, monopolies
and restrictive trade practices, abuse of the standardised contract
practice became so flagrant that legislative action was taken to
protect the adhering party. But in most of the day-to-day sales
transactions, the courts, saddled with a body of well-defined
contract law which holds a party bound by his signature, are
caught in the dilemma of either enforcing the harsh contract or
incurring the accusation that they are violating "freedom of 
1contract". Because of these countervailing forces, no common 
pattern of judicial treatment can be discerned. However, in the 
United States, the Uniform Commercial Code has since 1952 provided 
the first legislative aid to the problem of adhesion contracts 
in commercial dealing by section 2-302 dealing with Unconscionable
The classical theory of contract is that "unlimited freedom of 
making promises was a natural right". Pound, "Liberty of Contract" 
(1909) 18 Yale L.J. 454, 456. Compare Sir George Jessel's famous 
statement in Printing and Numerical Registering Co v. Sampson 
(1875) L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465:
[I]f there is one thing which more than another public 
policy requires it is that men of full age and 
competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty 
of contracting, and that their contracts when entered 
into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and 
shall be enforced by Courts of Justice. Therefore, 
you have this paramount public policy to consider - 
that you are not lightly to interfere with this 
freedom of contract.
But see Kessler, "Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About 
Freedom of Contract" (1943) 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 642, where the 
argument is advanced that "freedom of contract must mean 
different things for different types of contracts. Its meaning 
must change ... with the degree of monopoly enjoyed by the author 
of the standardized contract".
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Contract or Clause. The main thrust of the following discussion 
is to find out whether the doctrine of unconscionability should 
be adopted in Australian government procurement. To do so it 
would be helpful to discuss first the development of the concept 
of unconscionability (i) under the American Uniform Commercial 
Code and (ii) under the Common law.
(i) Unconscionability under the American Uniform 
Commercial Code-l
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code represents the
Second statutory embodiment in a common law jurisdiction of the
2concept of unconscionability. It provides that a court may
The section of unconscionability has been the subject of much 
discussion. In his article "Unconscionability and the Code - 
The Emperor's New Clause" (1967) 115 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 485,
486 n.3, Professor Leff notes that there are in excess of
130 discussions of §2-302 in various legal periodicals and study. 
The most leading and recent literature on "Unconscionability" 
is cited below: Murray, "Unconscionability: Unconscionability"
(1970) 31 Univ. of Ptt. L. Rev. 1; Braucher, "The Unconscionable 
Contract or Term" (19 70) 31 Univ. of Ptt. L. Rev. 33 7; Leff, 
"Unconscionability and the Crown - Consumers and the Common Law 
Tradition" (1970) 31 Univ. of Ptt. L. Rev. 349; Speidel, 
"Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection" (1970) 31 
Univ. of Ptt. L. Rev. 359; Ellinghaus, "In Defence of 
Unconscionability" (1969) 78 Yale L.J. 757; Spongle, "Analyzing 
Unconscionability Problems" (1969) 117 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 931; 
Shulkin, "Unconscionability - The Code, the Court and the 
Consumer". (1968) 9 B.C. Ind. & Comm. L. Rev. 367; Gusman, "Article 
2 of the U.C.C. and Government Procurement: Selected Areas of
Discussion" (1968) 9 B.C. Ind. & Comm. L. Rev. 1; Waddams, 
"Unconscionability in Contracts" (1976) 39 Modern L. Rev. 369.
For a detailed recent study, see Angelo & Ellinger,
"Unconscionable Contracts - A Comparative Study" 1-50 Unpublished 
manuscript contributed to the Canberra Lav; Workshop II (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as Angelo and Ellinger].
^The first embodiment of unconscionability was New Zealand Hire 
Purchase Agreements Act 1939, section 8. The term "Unconscionable 
is defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
(Unabr. ed. 1961) as "not guided or controlled by conscience", 
"excessive", "exhorbitant", "lying outside the limits of what is 
reasonable or acceptable", "shockingly unfair, harsh or unjust".
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refuse to enforce a contract, or any clause thereof, which it
finds to have been unconscionable at the time it was made
This section gives the courts power to police contracts and to
refuse to enforce them in whole or in part because the contract,
or part of it, as a matter of law, is
unconscionable. In the past such policing has been accomplished by
adverse construction of language, by manipulation of the rules of
offer and acceptance or by determination that the clause is
contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract.
Indeed, one of the avowed purposes of the section is to provide
courts with a means of achieving the same results in such cases
without having to resort to such manipulations, which often distort
2the growth of contract concepts. It is important to note that the
section enables the courts to void particular terms without declar-
3ing the whole contract unconscionable, if circumstances so warrant.
"Uniform Commercial Code §2-302. The full text of the section, 
as amended to 1966, reads:
(1) If the Court as a matter of law finds the contract
or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable 
at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce 
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the 
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so 
limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to 
avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the 
contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the 
parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to 
present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose 
and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
2Uniform Commercial Code §2-302, Comment 1. See also Llewellyn, 
The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960) 326-71;
Macaulay, "Private Legislation and the Duty to Read" (1966) 19 
Vand. L. Rev. 1051; Patterson, "The Interpretation and Construc­
tion of Contracts" (1964) 64 Colum. L. Rev. 833, 855-62.
3Uniform Commercial Code §2-302(1) . See also Angelo & Ellmger, 
op.cit. at 36 and 44, where the authors distinguish this charac­
teristic of §2-302 from para. 138 of BGB (the German Civil Code).
"The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial 
background and the commercial needs of a particular trade or case, 
the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under 
the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the 
contract"/ The Official Comment states that the section is intend­
ed to prevent "oppression and unfair surprise", two rather common 
abuses of bargaining power by the stronger party to a contract.
An oppressive contract is one in which party A forces party B 
to accept burdensome terms, not justified by commercial necessi­
ties, as the cost of obtaining the contract's benefits. B accepts 
the oppressive terms, although aware of the consequences, because 
his bargaining power is such that he must do business on A's terms 
or not at all. Oppression may take the form of plain economic 
duress, damage clauses which are really penalties and may serve to 
create an in terrorem effect and thereby attempt to bring a potent­
ially breaching party into line, or total one-sidedness or want of 
2reciprocity. The contract generally provides for the rights of one
party in specified situations but fails to define the rights of the
other party in these situations or accord the other party similar
rights - a situation very commonly to be found also in the standard
terms of government contracts. The classic illustration of an
3unconscionable contract is Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz. Campbell 
Soup Co. sought specific performance of a written contract made
"^Uniform Commercial Code §2-3 02, Comment 1.
2Davenport, "Unconscionability and the Uniform Commercial Code" 
(1967-68) 22 Univ. of Miami L. Rev. 121, 131.
(1948) 172 F. 2d 80. This case is cited in the Official Comment 
to §2-302 also.
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in June 1947, with fanner grower (Wentz) for the sale of all 
chantenay red-cored carrots to be grown on the farm of the 
sellers during the 1947 season. The contract was the standard 
type used by Campbell in dealing with farmers; it contained 
numerous fine-print clauses favourable to the company such as, 
among others, that the carrots were to have their stalks cut 
off and be in clean sanitary bags or other containers approved 
by Campbell; the company had the right to refuse carrots in 
excess of 12 tons to the acre; grower not to sell carrots to 
any other person (carrots rejected by Campbell were excepted 
from this requirement), grower to permit no one else to grow 
carrots on his land; grower to pay liquidated damages of $50 
per acre for any breach (while no damages were stipulated in 
the event of a breach by Campbell). Another term in the 
contract gave Campbell the right to reject any carrots which 
it was unable to handle and use either because of any labour 
dispute or because of any circumstance beyond the control of 
Campbell. Under this clause, if the demand for its products 
(cans of soup) should decrease and production consequently 
fall off, Campbell could refuse delivery of the carrots and 
force the farmer into an unfavourable market. The farmer, 
however, had no protection in the event of a decline in the 
market, although Campbell was covered if the market price rose.
The farmer sellers harvested approximately 100 tons of 
carrots from their farm but declined delivery in January 1948, 
at a time when the market price was triple the contract price
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and chantenay red-cored carrots were virtually unobtainable.
The district court denied relief on the grounds that chantenay
red-cored carrots, although scarce, were not unique - an indirect
means sometimes employed by the courts of avoiding enforcement
of patently unreasonable contracts. The appellate court,however,
disagreed with this ground and said that if this were all that
was involved, specific performance was indeed appropriate.^
But still the court of appeals affirmed the judgment delivered
by the lower court. The reason for affirmance rather than
reversal was the court's view that the agreement was "too hard
a bargain and too one-sided". The contract was found to be
"drawn by skilful draftsmen with the buyer's interest in mind"
2and consequently "unconscionable". The provision which the
court found the "hardest" was one excusing Campbell from accepting
carrots under certain circumstances, but not permitting the
growers to sell them elsewhere without the consent of Campbell.
The court thus based its affirmance on the unconscionability
3of the contract.
1 (1948) 172 F. 2d 80 at 82.
2Id. at 83. However, the criterion of unconscionability was 
overall imbalance, not objection to any single provision (id. 
at 84) : "The plaintiff arg'UCS that the provisions of the contract
are separable. We agree that they are, but do not think that 
decisions separating out certain provisions from illegal 
contracts are in point here. As already said, we do not suggest 
that this contract is illegal. All we say is that the sum total 
of its provisions drives too hard a bargain for a court of 
conscience to assist."
3See also Denkin v . Sterner (1956) 10 Pa.D. & C. 2d 203, where 
again the court ruled against the drafting party because the 
contract was one-sided. The court remarked: "Why anyone would 
sign such a biased and one-sided agreement is difficult to 
understand", (at 205).
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Unfair surprise is found in various situations e.g., 
assent obtained by reason of ignorance or carelessness of 
one party known to the other, assent obtained by signature 
to forms in very fine print or otherwise difficult to read or 
understand or their being deceptively arranged, contracting 
out of dominant purpose of contract,^ or contractual limitations 
of remedies with respect to new consumer goods.^ Unfair 
surprise is most easily illustrated by the fine print contract* 23 4
which is seldom read or understood by the party to whom the 
contract is offered. When the party learns, subsequent to his 
agreeing to the contract, that the fine print contains a 
provision which he had not known, nor could reasonably have known 
and understood the relevant terms, there is unfair surprise 
within the meaning of the Comment to section 2-302.
^Hurne v. United States (1886) 21 Ct. Cl. 328 aff'd. (1889)
132 U.S. 406; Frostifresh Corporation v. Reynoso (1966)
274 N.Y.S. 2d 757.
2Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. (1965) 350 F. 2d 445. 
See also, Note, "Contract Clauses in Fine Print" (1950) 63 Harv. 
L. Rev. 494 and Mellinkoff, "How to Make Contracts Illegible" 
(1953) 5 Stanford L. Rev. 418.
3Andrew Bros. Ltd, v. Singer & Co. [1934] 1 K.B. 17 (C.A.);
Karsales, Ltd, v. Wallis [1956] 1 W.L.R. 936 (C.A.)
4
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. (1960) 32 N.J. 358,
161 A. 2d 69.
It is, however, wrong to conclude that the use of a form 
contract is a necessary ingredient of an unconscionable bargain.
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The application of section 2-302 is mainly (but by no means 
wholly) limited to those contracts whose unfairness arises from 
unequal bargaining power between the parties.1 It has been 
suggested that the section is not intended to apply to all 
contracts which are "unfair", but only to those contracts in which
unfairness can be said to have resulted from inequality of
. . . 2 bargaining power between the parties. But there can be cases,
it may be submitted, where though unequal bargaining power may
not be present, yet unfair surprise may occur. Unfair surprise
may, for example, take place when one party takes advantage of the
other's inadvertence, ignorance or poor judgment and these can
not be considered as cases of oppression or of unequal
bargaining power.
There is, however, no doubt that for a party alleging 
oppression, it is necessary to prove that the other party took 
unfair contractual advantages because of its(the latter's) 
superior bargaining power. That inequality of bargaining power
It may also be mentioned here that although article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code concerns only sales transactions, the 
courts have invoked section 2-302 in areas other than sales, such 
as guarantees and leases of chattels, see Blount v. Westinghouse 
Credit Corp. (1968) 432 S.W. 2d 549 and Electronics Corp. of 
America v. Lear Jet Corp. (1967) 286 N.Y.S. 2d 711. But see 
Bankers Trust Co. v. Walker (1975) 371 N.Y.S. 2d 198.
^Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex Corp. (1967) 377 F. 2d 795; 
Ilenningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. (196 0) 161 A. 2d 69; 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. (1965) 350 F. 2d 445.
But see Copen Association Inc. v. Dan River Inc. (1975) 18
U.C.C. Reporting Service 62. See generally, Raybond Electronics 
v. Glen Mar Door Mfg. Co. (1974) 528 P. 2d 160.
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is a prerequisite to a finding of oppression and hence 
unconscionability may be seen by an analysis of the relation 
between section 2-302 and the doctrine of freedom of contract.
The freedom of contract doctrine rests on the assumption that 
parties to a contract are the best judges of the value to them­
selves of the reciprocal obligations in the contract. This 
assumption is realistic only so long as the contract represents 
real bargaining between parties with freedom of choice and 
consequent ability to negotiate in a meaningful sense. But when 
one party, either because of lack of economic power or inability 
to understand what is contained in the contract, does not have 
real bargaining power, the contract's conscionability becomes a 
matter of grace with the stronger party, rather than a matter of 
negotiation. In this case, the assumption that the parties have 
really agreed that the reciprocal obligations are adequate is no 
longer tenable. It is at this point that the rationale of section 
2-302 becomes pertinent. Thus the purpose of the section is 
not to subvert the doctrine of freedom of contract but to 
limit it to situations where the assumption as to reciprocity 
of benefit is realistic.1 Where the assumption is not 
realistic, where the contract is not the product of a true 
bargain, then is a court justified under section 2-302 in 
examining the terms of the contract to determine whether they 
are so unconscionable as to require denial of enforcement.
^Note, (1960) 45 Iowa L. Rev. 843, 846.
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In summary, it is submitted, for a bargain to be considered 
unconscionable, overall imbalance and weakness in the bargaining 
process are important factors. The types of terms which have not 
been enforced, because of unconscionability under section 2-302 
are terms for unreasonably large liquidated damages, warranty 
disclaimers and remedy limitations.^ In the words of Professor 
Braucher:
[G]ross inequality of bargaining power, together with 
terms unreasonably favourable to the stronger party, 
may confirm indications that the transaction involved 
elements of deception or compulsion, or may show that 
the weaker party had no meaningful choice, no real 
alternative, and hence did not in fact assent or appear 
to assent to the unfair terms.* 2
Thus for a contract term to be unconscionable, the term must
be material and either unexpected, or expected but forced upon
the party asserting its unconscionability.
Murray "Unconscionability: Unconscionability" (1970)
31 Univ. of Ptt. L. Rev. 1, 43 n.120 See generally, Kugler 
v. Romain (No.2) (1971) 279 A. 2d 640.
2Braucher, "The Unconscionable Contract or Term" (1970) 31 Univ. 
of Ptt. L. Rev. 337 at 341. The essence of the problem in 
Llewellyn's mind revolved around assent. He remarked:
[T]he boilerplate is assented to en bloc, 'unsight, 
unseen', on the implicit assumption and the full 
extent that (1) it does not alter or impair the 
fair meaning of the dickered terms when read alone, 
and (2) that its terms are neither in the particular 
nor in the net manifestly unreasonable and unfair.
Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960) 
370; see also Murray, op. cit. at 34-43.
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(ii) Unconscionability under the Common Law
2Professor Waddams in his recent article has argued that 
the belief that "the common law of contract admits no relief from 
contractual obligations on grounds of unfairness, or inequality 
of exchange" is wrong and unjustified in view of the many 
historical antecedents to the contrary. According to him, even 
in the heyday of the doctrine of freedom of contract, "when the 
judges, by their words, refused to countenance any breach in the 
notion of sanctity of contracts, relief was, in practice, 
frequently afforded. For no civilised system of law can accept 
the implications of absolute sanctity of contractual obligations".' 
The development of contractual principles has always been effected 
by an emphasis on one or other of the two competing sets of values 
viz. freedom of contract (which has promised stability, certainty 
and predictability) and prevention of exploitation and oppression 
by one of the contracting parties (which has promised the 
protection of the ignorant, unwary and the thoughtless). In the 
past, the values of freedom of contract have been emphasised over 
all others, but now it seems that the tide is slowly turning and 
the opposing values have started receiving more attention.
Waddams strongly recommends an open recognition of a principle of 
unconscionability because, according to him, failure to recognise 
a general principle of unconscionability has resulted not only in
^For a discussion of unconscionability in French and German law, 
see Angelo and Ellinger, op.cit. at 17-34. See also, Dawson, 
"Unconscionable Coercion - the German Version" (1976) 89 Harv.
L. Rev. 1041.




the enforcement of agreements that ought not to have been
enforced, but in the striking down of agreements that ought to
1have been upheld.
The notion of unconscionability, although that word was
not then used to describe it, may be traced in the English common
2law at least as early as 1663. In James v. Morgan (often
referred to as the Horseshoe case), the defendant agreed to
purchase a horse from the plaintiff at a price calculated at a
barley corn a nail in the horse's shoes, doubling it with each
nail. There were 32 nails in the horse's shoes, and this
established the price at 500 quarters (4,000 bushels) of barley,
3a patently exhorbitant price of £100. In an action of assumpsit 
by the plaintiff, Chief Justice Hyde directed the jury to give
4the value of the horse, £8, in damages. In his renowned
5opinion in Earl of Chesterfield v . Jansseen, Lord Chancellor 
Hardwicke remarked (what is frequently quoted as the traditional 
definition of unconscionability)^ that courts of equity did
1Id. at 371, 375.
2 (1663) 1 Lev. Ill, 83 E.R. 323. See also Talbot v. Breddil 
(1683) 1 Vern. 183 and 394.
The total number of barley-corns came to 4,294,967,295 (approx. 
4.3 billion) .
^See also Thornborough v. Whiteacre (1705) 92 E.R. 270 (where 
the agreement was to deliver two grains of rye on a certain 
Monday and to double it successively every Monday thereafter 
for a year - which exceeded the amount of rye in the entire 
world) and Jennings v. Ward (1705) 2 Vern. 520.
(1750) 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 28 E.R. 82 (where an expectant heir 
entered into a bond to pay a creditor £20,000 unless he paid 
£10,000 by a certain date).
6Braucher, "The Unconscionable Contract or Term" (1970) 31 
Univ. of Ptt. L. Rev. 337, 339.
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relieve against unconscionable bargains:
It may be apparent from the intrinsic nature and 
subject of the bargain itself; such as no man in 
his senses and not under delusion would make on 
the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would 
accept on the other; which are inequitable and 
unconscientious bargains; and of such even the 
common law has taken notice; for which it would not 
look a little ludicrous, might be cited 1 Lev. Ill 
James v.Morgan.3-
And in 1762 in Vernon v. Bethell, the court said:
[T]here is a great reason and justice in this rule, 
for necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free 
men, but, to answer a present exigency, will submit 
to any terms that the crafty may impose upon them.^
The recent pronouncements of the English judges in three cases
are a clear indication that there is gradual judicial recognition
of the principle of unconscionability as a ground to set aside
contracts (or some of their terms) in those cases where one party
has used his superior bargaining power to obtain a harsh and
3oppressive contract. Thus in A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co.
4Ltd. v. Macaulay the House of Lords held a contract unenforceable 
and void which had been signed by a song-writer on the appellants' 
(who were publishers of music) standard form on the ground that 
it was one-sided and had been entered into between parties of
1 (1750) 2 Ves. Sen. at 155, 28 E.R. at 100.
2 (1762) 2 Eden 110, 113. The concept of unconscionability has 
been applied at common law in numerous later cases. See, for 
example, Floyer v. Edwards (K.B. 1774) Cowp. 112; Jestons v. 
Brooke (K.B. 1778) Cowp. 793. In the U.S., see Hume v. United 
States (188.9) 132 U.S. 406; Scott v. United States (1870) 79 
U.S. (12 Wall.) 443.
3Clarke, "Unequal Bargaining Power in the Law of Contract" 
(1975) 49 A.L.J. 229.
4 [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308 (H.L.).
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unequal bargaining power." One of the clauses, which entitled 
the appellants to terminate the agreement, but gave no such right
to the song-writer, was considered as particularly unreasonable
2 3and one-sided. In Lloyds Bank Ltd, v. Bundy, a case concerned
with the bank's right to sell the defendant's farm to enforce a
guarantee given by defendant for his son's business, Lord Denning
MR observed:
... English law gives relief to one who, without 
independent advice, enters into a contract upon 
terms which are very unfair or transfers property 
for a consideration which is grossly inadequate, 
when his bargaining power is grievously impaired 
by reason of his own needs or desires, or by his 
own ignorance or infirmity, coupled with undue 
influences or pressures brought to bear on him 
by or for the benefit of the other.4
The elaborate agreement under which the appellants engaged the 
exclusive services of the song-writer was to remain in force for 
five years, which in the event of the royalties for the song­
writer in the first five years exceeding £5,000, was to be 
extended to ten years. The Court observed: "£5,000 in five years
appears to represent a very modest success, and so if the 
respondent's work became well known and popular he would be tied 
by the agreements for ten years" (id. at 1312). Lord Diplock, 
delivering a separate but concurring judgment, observed: "It is,
in my view, salutary to acknowledge that in refusing to enforce 
provisions of a contract whereby one party agrees for the benefit 
of the other party to exploit or to refrain from exploiting his 
own earning power, the public policy which the court is 
implementing is ... the protection of those whose bargaining 
power is weak against being forced by those whose bargaining power 
is stronger to enter into bargains that are unconscionable".
(id. at 1315) .
3See id. at 1311, 1313 and 1314 (Lord Reid).
3 [1974] 3 W.L.R. 501 (C.A.).
^Id. at 509. The Court of Appeal, allowing the appeal by the 
defendant, held that there was such a relationship of 
confidentiality between the bank and the defendant that the court 
could intervene to prevent the relationship being abused; that, 
since the defendant's signing of the guarantee and legal charge 
involved a conflict of interests which could have resulted in his 
losing his sole remaining asset to the bank and being left 
penniless in his old age. The court therefore set aside the 
guarantee and charge, (see at 509, 515).
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Again in Clifford Davis Management Ltd, v. W.E.A. Records Ltd.^~
the Court of Appeal held the agreement unenforceable because of
inequality of bargaining power between the parties. Lord Denning
MR reiterated the principle that in cases where parties had not met
on equal terms, the Court will not allow, as a matter of common
2fairness, the strong party 'to push the weak to the wall'. From
these cases, it appears that the common law will relieve a party
of the burden of a one-sided, harsh or oppressive contract or terms
that are found to be unfairly onerous, if the other party has used
3his superior bargaining power to obtain such a contract or terms.
6. Application of Unconscionability Doctrine 
to Government Contracts
The standard terms of government contracts like the 
government's unilateral right to terminate, to constrict, to
[1975] 1 W.L.R. 61 (C.A.). The facts were: two song-writers
signed, on cyclostyled forms, publishing agreements assigning to the 
plaintiffs (music publishers) the copyright throughout the world in 
all their compositions for a period of five years which could be 
extended to ten years at plaintiffs' option. The agreements were 
very long and full of legal terms and phrases and drawn up by 
lawyers of the plaintiffs. The court found that the terms of the 
contract were manifestly unfair, that the consideration for the 
transfer of copyright was grossly inadequate, that the bargaining 
power of the song-writers was gravely impaired vis-ä-vis the manager 
and that, if the plaintiffs wished to exact such onerous terms or to 
drive so unconscionable a bargain, they ought to have seen that the 
song-writers had independent legal advice. For these reasons the 
court held that there was such inequality of bargaining power that 
the agreement should not be enforced and the contract set aside.
2Id. at 65.
3For a similar view, see Angelo and Ellinger, op. cit. at 14-16. For 
a detailed discussion of the case-law upon this subject and the 
circumstances in which equity will relieve against unconscionable 
bargains in Australia, see Blomley v . Ryan (1956) 99 C.L.R. 362. In 
that case, McTiernan and Fullagar JJ (Kitto J dissenting), affirmed 
the judgment of the trial judge (Taylor j), according to which not 
only the specific performance of a contract for the sale and 
purchase of a grazing property had been refused, but the court had 
ordered instead that the said contract be set aside upon the ground 
that it was an unconscionable bargain which a court of equity would 
not enforce. See also Harrison v. National Bank (1928) 23 
Tas. L. Rep. 1.
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alter, vary or change the quality, quantity or character of 
goods and services contracted for, default, delays and damages 
provisions and many others are patently one-sided and lack 
reciprocity. Such standard terms evidently cause a gross 
inequality in the rights of the parties - providing generally 
for the rights of one party in specified situations but failing 
to define the rights of the other party in those situations or 
to accord the other party similar rights. Another factor which 
worsens the situation is the absence of any real negotiations, 
a factor which sets government contracts apart from other types 
of agreements. Moreover, even when there is negotiation, 
undoubtedly the bargaining power of the government far outweighs 
that of the contractor. Shouldn't, therefore, the concept of 
unconscionability be applied to government contracts?
The concept of unconscionability has not so far been applied 
to government contracts in the United States. It has so far 
primarily protected consumers against one-sided provisions in 
standardised agreements. But there is no reason that its appli­
cation should be so limited in the United States or elsewhere."^
Gusman, "Article 2 of the U.C.C. and Government Procurement: 
Selected areas of discussion" (1967) 9 B.C. Ind. & Comm. L. Rev. 1. 
The United States Commission on Government Procurement in its 
Report in 1972 made the following observation:
In view of the fact that the Uniform Commercial Code 
has been adopted in all the States as the basis for 
governing private business transactions, Federal 
tribunals, absent a settled Federal rule, may look 
to it for guidance as to the rule to bo applied to 
Government contracts.
Report of the Commission on Government Procurement, Vol.4, 214.
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Public confidence in the fairness of government-contract policies 
is a very important factor and it has wide-ranging consequences 
with respect to the society and economy. This factor may require 
results which would not normally occur in a commercial contract 
case. A policy overlooking this factor will moreover be contrary 
to the modern governments' social policy of hyperhypocynophlliä.
That the adoption of the concept of unconscionability is as 
desirable in the government contract law as it is in the common 
law of contract, perhaps more so, is obvious from the Australian 
High Court judgment in South Australian Railways Commissioner v. 
Egan,^ wherein Menzies J stated that the present case was:
[1973] 47 A.L.J.R. 140. The facts were: Egan, alleging breach of
contract by the Railways Commissioner, brought an action for damages 
for breach, claim for moneys due on a quantum meruit in respect of 
work done and materials supplied, and for the return of his plant 
and goods. The contract was for the construction of certain 
bridges and culverts on the Mannahill-Methuen Railway line. The 
Commission alleged that the contract had been validly determined 
under cl. 30 of the standard form of contract, that cl. 35 prevented 
any action for money being brought without first obtaining a certi­
ficate etc. from the Chief Engineer and that Egan had not obtained 
any such certificate which was a condition precedent to any 
liability. Clause 30 (determination of disputes) gave power, in 
the cases to which it related, to the Commissioner to determine a 
contract so far as it related to work remaining to be done, where­
upon moneys already paid were to be taken as full payment for work 
done and provision was made for forfeiture of moneys which may be due 
to or unpaid to the contractor and implements and materials of the 
contractor. By cl. 32 (settlement of disputes), doubts, disputes 
and differences concerning matters specified in the clause were 
required to be referred to and settled and decided by the Chief 
Engineer for Railways, whose decision thereon was to be final and 
conclusive, with a proviso for appeal to an arbitrator in relation 
to a decision respecting measurement of work and prices to be paid. 
Clause 35 (requirement of a certificate) provided that no suit or 
action shall be brought or maintained by the contractor or Comm­
issioner against the other of them to recover any money for, or in 
respect of, or arising out of this contract, unless and until the 
contractor or the Commissioner shall have obtained a certificate, 
order or award from the Chief Engineer for Railways for the amount 
sued for.
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concerned with perhaps the most wordy, obscure and 
oppressive contract that I have come across. It is 
the standard form of contract which the South 
Australian Railways Commissioner requires those 
executing railways works for him to sign. It was 
probably compiled a long time ago mainly by putting 
together, with some incongruity, provisions from 
other contracts. In the compilation, I am sure 
that not one oppressive provision which could be 
found was omitted. The contract is so outrageous 
that it is surprising that any contractor would 
undertake work for the Railways Commissioner upon 
its terms.-*-
Gibbs J observed that "provisions such as those contained in the
contract under consideration find little favour in modern 
2eyes...." But despite all those obnoxious terms in the contract,
the High Court regarded the contract as enforceable, Menzies J
advancing a classic "bootstraplifting" apologia:
The employment of such a contract tempts judges to go 
outside their function and attempt to relieve against 
the harshness of, rather than give effect to, what 
has been agreed by the parties. Courts search for 
justice but it is justice according to law; it is 
still true that hard cases tend to make bad law.3
and Gibbs J adding "... but we are required to give them their
legal effect and are not to be deflected from that course because
4they appear unfair and one-sided".
1Id. at 141.
^Id. at 148. '
^Id. at 141.
^Id. at 148. It was held in the Supreme Court of South Australia 
(Mitchell J) that cl. 32 was invalid and that cl. 35 shared its 
fate. The High Court set aside the judgment of the Supreme Court 
of South Australia and held that Egan was not entitled to maintain 
the action for want of a certificate under cl. 35. Menzies J 
held cl. 32 invalid because it ousted the jurisdiction of the 
courts, but he considered cl. 35 valid. Gibbs J avoided deciding 
the validity of cl. 30 (i.e. whether it imposed a penalty) but 
it appears that he had grave doubts about its validity (see id. 
at 145).
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Another opportunity to adjudicate on the reasonableness
of government's standard terms of contract came into the hands
of the High Court of Australia in a recent case of Forestry
Commission of New South Wales v. Stefanetto.^  The General 
. . 2Conditions of Contract provided, inter alia, under sub-cl. 43.3
that in case of a default by the Contractor:
The principal may take possession of and permit 
other persons to use any materials, Constructional 
Plant and other things on or about the site which 
are owned by the Contractor and as are requisite 
and necessary for the purposes of such contract 
or employment.
It further provided that:
The Contractor shall have no right to any compen­
sation or allowance for any action taken by the 
Principal pursuant to this sub-clause, other than 
a right to require the Principal to maintain in 
good working order the Constructional Plant 
referred to in the preceding paragraph.
Stefanetto, who made default in his performance of the 
contract for the construction of a gravel road for $803,459 and 
whose extensive and very costly plant and equipment was taken 
over by the appellants, argued that sub-cl. 43.3 imposed a 
penalty upon him and was thus not enforceable. He claimed that 
the right of the appellant to take possession of his plant on the 
site, and in effect to use that plant for an indefinite period 
without payment and with no responsibility to amend fair wear
1[1976] 50 A.L.J.R. 422.
2"Save for minor changes in the wording of the clauses applicable 
to the contracts entered into by the Forestry Commission of New 
South Wales, the Conditions contain virtually the same clauses 
which are applicable to the Commonwealth's 'construction contracts' 
prescribed by Form W70 - General Conditions of Contract,
Department of Construction, Commonwealth of Australia.
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and tear' constituted a harsh and unconscionable provision in
the nature of a penalty. He argued that there were other
provisions of the contract viz., security deposit of $30,000
(sub-cl. 5.2), liquidated damages for delay in completion at
$1,000 per week (sub-cl. 35.5) and deduction of any money due
from any other moneys payable (sub-cl. 41.5), which sufficiently
secured the appellant against any breach of the contract by him
and that the provisions of sub-cl. 43.3 were not validly directed
towards that end. It was held by the Supreme Court of New South
Wales (Needham J) that a contractual right to appropriate highly
expensive equipment and materials belonging to another contracting
party for an indefinite period, without payment and without
liability to compensate, not only for damage but also for fair
wear and tear, could not be anything but a penal provision aimed
at ensuring that the contractor did not breach his contract. The
High Court, however, by a majority (Mason J dissenting) reversed
2the Supreme Court on this point. Barwick CJ thought that
sub-clause 43.3 was not punitive because the possession and use
of the machinery and plant was a direct means of achieving the
3purpose of the contract, namely, the completion of the work.
'^See sub-cl. 43.3 (third paragraph).
2The discussion regarding the appellant's right to use the 
constructional plant and machinery on the site which was the 
subject of hire purchase agreements or leasing agreements, is 
omitted here. It may, however, be noted that both the Supreme 
Court and the High Court held that the machinery and plant under 
hire purchase to Stefanetto did not come within the expression 
in sub-cl. 43.3 "which are owned by the Contractor".
3 [1976] 50 A.L.J.R. 425.
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Jacobs J seemed to agree with this view, although with due
respect, it is submitted, that his judgment is not
comprehensible.^ Mason J (dissenting) held sub-cl. 43.3 as a
penalty clause and thus void for the following two reasons:
(1) the power to take possession was not confined to possession
for the purpose of executing the contract work and the appellant
could retain possession of the materials, plant and equipment
without using them at all until completion of the contract work
and recovery of all balances due from the contractor and (2) the
clause specifically denied to the contractor any compensation or
allowance for the use or deprivation of the materials, plant
and equipment. The power conferred by the impugned term,
according to the judge, might be exercised arbitrarily and
capriciously so as to prejudice and penalise the contractor and
the power was not one which was so confined as to enable the
appellant to complete the works on a footing whereby the
contractor received some credit or allowance for the use or
2deprivation of his property. The two cases discussed above serve 
as an example to show that many of the contracts entered into 
between public authorities and private contractors contain 
standard terms grossly unfair to contractors.
In these circumstances, it is submitted that the extensive 
rights of the government under the standard terms may lead to
^Id. at 428-29.
2Id. at 427.
raising of prices by contractors to provide for various 
contingencies, and work to the eventual disadvantage of the 
government and indeed of the taxpayer. In addition, a blanket 
immunisation of the superior bargaining power of the Government 
would result in placing far too much power in the hands of 
individual bureaucrats, for the strict interpretation of these 
standard terms would place the immense power of the government 
behind their every act. It is therefore suggested here that 
the adoption of a general principle of unconscionability in 
government contract law, would act as a deterrent to an abuse of 
authority and deter inequitable government action or inaction.
We have further to remember that contract is an important 
principle of order in free society. Not an end in itself, 
freedom of contract is a means towards self-expression. In a 
very real sense, it is both an instrument of change and an 
instrument of order. Of change, in the sense that through it 
individuals are able to find a meeting place of promise and 
obligation for the achievement of individual objectives. Of 
order, in the sense that such agreements are a matter of private 
legislation between parties for the prescribing of their conduct 
one to the other. They are not directed to act by custom, 
tradition, or the commands of the realm. They decide their 
relations as a matter of their own volition. It is, therefore, 
an institution of freedom, deeply rooted in the moral sentiments 
supportive of individualism and repugnant to collective author­
itarianism. Emanating from this orientation is the principle
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that it is not the function of government to draft and impose 
such standard terms which are one-sided and wanting in reciprocity- 
in its contracts upon the contractor who is forced to accept 
them because of his unequal bargaining power and who has little 
chance to vary them to meet his own particular circumstances.
The recognition of a general principle of unconscionability in 
the common law of contracts^ as also in government contract law 
would manifest a realisation that a contract is not a signature 
affixed to a long printed form but rather a mutual understanding 
reached through a process of bargaining. The concept of uncon­
scionability would merely give the courts authority to strike or 
modify a contract where free choice was absent, or where a term of 
contract to which the parties had never agreed was invoked, or 
where a literal reading would extend the contract beyond all 
intention of the parties. The court would, of course, not 
determine a term to be unconscionable without first affording an 
opportunity for a hearing on the commercial setting and background 
of the term and trade and judge it against the standards existing
^It may be noted that major changes to the law of contract to 
protect consumers from harsh conditions and to entitle the courts 
to re-open and review any type of contract alleged to be harsh 
or unconscionable, were recommended to the New South Wales 
Government by Professor Peden, Professor of Law at Macquarie
University in the Report on Harsh and Unconscionable Contracts 
(October 1976). See also The Sydney Morning Herald 22, 23 and 
27 December 1976. It may further be mentioned that in their 
comparative study of unconscionability concept in England, France, 
Germany and the United States, Angelo and Ellinger, op. cit. at 
41, 43, that unconscionability rules be introduced into
the legal systems of Australia and New Zealand.
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at the time of contracting. Such action would not violate a
realistic interpretation of "freedom of contract". The presence
of government's pre-printed standard terms or boilerplate clauses
drawn by skilful draftsmen with the buyer's interest in mind,
unequal bargaining power of the parties, unilateral right of
termination, alteration, constriction, modification of the
contract, stringent inspection clauses, penalties, liquidated
damages and forfeiture of deposits clauses, prescription of
method and manner of contract performance and various other
controls, examination of books and records of the contractor and
the utter disregard of the contractor's interest, absence of real
negotiations and the lack of mutuality of obligations can be some
of the criteria for refusing to enforce the contract that never
was. Utilising these guides, the courts can enforce head-to-head
2contracts and void unconscionable terms. Far from limiting 
contractual liberty or disrupting commercial affairs, the concept 
of unconscionability will contribute to the stability and 
freedom of contract.
^It may be submitted here that the adoption of unconscionability 
rules into government contracts will in some exceptional circum­
stances provide a remedy to government too e .g. where the government 
is dealing with a monopoly supplier and finds itself in a poor bar­
gaining position. It is understood from a reliable source that in 
some contracts, particularly defence, the government has little 
actual freedom of choice of negotiation of terms. It is surprising 
to note there fore,that Professor Peden precludes, inter alia, 
government departments from seeking relief against another party 
for harsh or unconscionable contracts (see the draft bill with the 
report - Contracts Review Act, cl. 5, Peden Report, op. cit. at 16-17) . 
For a criticism of this limitation, see Angelo and Ellinger, op. cit. 46 .
2Perhaps the simplest application of the policy against uncon­
scionable contracts will be to deny specific performance where the 
contract as a whole was unconscionable when made. But where a 
term rather than the entire contract is unconscionable, the 
appropriate remedy will be ordinarily to deny effect to the 




Unlike English law, the French developed a concept 
of administrative contract that is entirely different 
from the ordinary civil contract. Whereas in England 
and Australia, contracts made by the administration or 
government are governed by the ordinary law of contract, 
in France the administration has the choice of doing 
business by ordinary private contract (contrat privde) 
or of concluding a contrat administratif with the supplier 
in which case the contract is governed by special rules of 
administrative law (droit administratif), administered 
by a separate hierarchy of courts, the administrative courts.
In France judicial control of administrative acts is entrusted 
to a special corps of judges who sit in special courts. These 
courts form a two-tier hierarchy headed by the Conseil d 'Etat 
(Council of State). In the lower tier are grouped the twenty- 
five Tribunaux Administratifs (formerly the interdepartmental 
Councils of Prefecture), acting as the administrative courts 
of first instance for their particular region (in the upper 
tier, the Conseil d'Etat sits as a Court of Appeal). In 
addition to these administrative courts of general jurisdiction, 
there are a number of 'administrative tribunals' of special 
jurisdiction. Although France possesses a separate system of 
administrative courts having a general jurisdiction ( which «3TC 
courts in the ordinary English sense), these should not be 
identified with English Administrative tribunals. France has
(carried on to p. 295 )
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In France, therefore, many of the difficulties of the kind
which have arisen in England were easily avoided. Indeed the
administrative contract has developed principles specially
1suited to it. For as Professor Mitchell has pointed out, the
existence of a separate system of administrative courts in
France facilitated departures from the rules of the Code Civil,
such as the doctrines of improvision and fait du prince. The
decisions taken in the administrative courts were decisions
by persons aware of the needs and the failings of administrative
bodies, thus leading to a much broader conception of liability
of administrative bodies (including much greater readiness to
. 2allow indemnity for loss resulting from the administrative
(footnote 1 continued from p. 294)
comparatively few administrative tribunals of the English type, 
that is, tribunals with a narrowly limited jurisdiction. In 
England, their number has been put at some 2,000; in France, 
only some 40 or so categories of such 'administrative tribunals' 
can be listed: see Brown and Garner, French Administrative Law
(2nd ed. 1973) 27. For an account of the working of the remark­
ably successful institution of the Conseil d 'Etat, see 
Hamson, "Le Conseil d'Etat statuant au Contentie" (1952) 68
L.Q.R. 60; Drago, "Some Recent Reforms of the French Conseil 
d'Etat" (1964) 13 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 1282; Rendel, "How the
Conseil d'Etat Supervises Local Authorities" [1966] Public Law 
213; Weil, "The Strength and Weakness of French
Administrative Law" [1965] Camb. L.J. 242; Le Conseil d'Etat- 
Livre Jubilaire [published in 1952 to commemorate the 150th 
anniversary of^the Conseil d'Etat]; Charles E. Freedeman,
The Conseil d 'Etat in Modern France (New York 1968).
^Mitchell, The Contracts of Public A uthorities: A Comparative
Study (1954) 165 [hereinafter cited as Mitchell]. Langrod
calls the administrative court 'the natural regulator, the
arbitrator, and - in default of legal provisions - the actual
maker of specific administrative contracts': "Administrative
Contracts" (1955) 4 Am. J. of Comp. L. 325, 330 [hereinafter "Langrod"]
2 ^See e.g. Cie Marseillaise de Navigation, Conseil d'Etat 20 May
1904, Sirey 1906 Vol. Ill p.109 and Bardy, Conseil d'Etat 29
December 1906.
296
and legislative activities of the government) - all circumstances 
which have greatly contributed to the success of the administra­
tive courts in gaining popular confidence and acceptance.
Moreover, the administrative courts have shown how impartially 
they can handle disputes between the administration and citizens 
as they have consistently sought to strike a just balance between 
the requirements of efficiency of the service public and the 
rights of the individuals. In some instances the individual has 
received possibly better treatment than in civil law jurisdiction,
so much so that there have been complaints that some decisions
3unduly favour the individual.
To understand how French, unlike common law^ came to evolve
See e.g. La Fleurette, Conseil d'Etat 14 January 1938,
Sirey 1938 Vol. Ill p.25.
2Pequignot suggests that the contrat administratif is based on 
the principle of le but de service public in his work entitled 
Thdorie Gdndrale du Contrat Administratif (Paris 1945) 66. See 
also the remarks of Blum in Cie Gdndrale Francaise des Tramways, 
Conseil d'Etat 11 March 1910, Sirey 1911 Vol. Ill p.1, where he 
speaks of 1 234L 1 Equivalence honnete entre ce qui est accordd au 
concessionnaire et ce qui est exigd de lui'.
3 . . .For a recent decision which led the government to pass a law to 
nullify the judgment of Conseil d'Etat see the Canal Case,
Conseil d'Etat 19 October 1962, discussed in detail in Bergsten, 
_Community Law in the French Courts (1973) 47-48 [hereinafter cited 
as Bergsten]. See also Socidtd du Gaz de Nice, Sirey 1920 Vol.Ill 
p.32 on the same point. See generally Notes by Mauriou to
.Cqnipagnie_Nouvelle du Gaz de Deville— les—Rouen, Conseil d'etat
10 January 1902, Sirey 1902 Vol. Ill p.17, and to Compagnie du 
Gaz de Saint Etienne, Conseil d'Etat 26 December 1891, Sirey 1894 
Vol. IIIp.l. For an illustration where an individual was better 
treated under administrative than civil law see Epoux Grandcldment, 
Dalloz 1927 Vol. Ill p.41.
4
Under English and Australian law, there is a single system of 
courts and as a general rule it is the same law of contract which 
is applied to public authorities as to private individuals. See 
Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Gibbs (1866) L.R. 1 Eng. and 
Irish Appeal Cases 93 (H.L.).
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a special system of administrative courts, together with a
special kind of contract, the contrat aclministratif, we need
to appreciate some aspects of French constitutional history.
To trace the story, albeit very briefly, we may begin with the
well-known fact that the course of French political history
since the Revolution has been characterised by repeated shifts
of power between the executive and the legislature."^ The
Constitution of the Fifth Republic, established in 1958, occupies
a midway position between the Bonapartist and parliamentary
traditions. Article 34 of the 1958 Constitution states that
'All statutes [lois] shall be passed by parliament', but it
proceeds to give a closed list of the matters upon which
parliament may legislate. Article 37 then provides, by way of
complement, that all matters not listed in art. 34 shall fall
exclusively within the regulatory power of the executive (by 
2'däcrets1). Moreover, under art. 38, even in the domain reserved 
to parliament, the government may legislate by 'ordonnance' for a 
limited period. This distinction between the 1pouvoir 
r^glementaire1 of the government (executive) and the'pouvoir
legislatif' of parliament is fundamental in French constitutional
3theory and is enforced in two ways. If parliament tries to 
pass a statute (loi) on a matter outside the ambit of art. 34,
^"[I]n almost every French Constitution since 1789 the legislative 
and executive branches of government have alternated in 
dominating the state": Bergsten, op. cit. at 21.
^Government measures of a legislative character are described as 
1ddcrcts' in French law.
3For this distinction, see Nicholas, "Loi, Reglement and Judicial 
Review of the Fifth Republic" [1970] Public Law 251.
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the government may refer the bill to the Constitutional Council
to decide upon its constitutionality.^ On the other hand, a
regulation (reglement) is subject to the jurisdiction of the
Conseil d'Etat, which ensures that it neither trespasses upon
the domain of parliament nor infringes the 'general principles
of the law' (principes gdndraux du droit). Once a statute has
been enacted and promulgated, the courts (whether civil or
administrative)have no power to question its constitutionality.
Thus, while resembling the United States in having a written
constitution, France differs from that country and follows the
British pattern in having no judicial review of the constitution-
2ality of statutes.
It is an outstanding characteristic of modern French
administration that the higher fonctionnaires or officials enjoy
3a remarkable degree of executive discretion. The administrator
can be trusted because he always has the Conseil d'Etat breathing
down his neck. As Shonfield has written, administrative
discretion, which "is meat and drink to the French, is anathema to
4the British official. " The French civil servants have always had a
great deal of responsibility, and it is sometimes said in France that
5'we are not governed, but administered'. The career structure
"'‘The Constitutional Council is an innovation of 1958 and is, inter 
alia, responsible for ensuring that parliament keeps within the restri­
cted legislative domain prescribed for it by the Constitution.
2"The theory of the separation of powers as exacerbated by 
Rousseau gave French democratic political theory a matrix into 
which judicial review could not fit": Cappelletti and Adams, 
"Judicial Review of Legislation: European Antecedents and 
Adaptations" (1966) 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1207, 1211.
3Brown and Garner, French Administrative Law (2nd ed. 1973) 10.
4 5Modern Capitalism (1965)94. Freedeman, op. cit. at 3-
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of the fonetionnaires (civil servants) has contributed to the same 
result; indeed the French civil service has been described as 'one 
of the main driving forces, if not the driving force in French 
life'.^  The Conseil d'Etat was a direct consequence of the 
Montesquieu theory of the separation of powers by which the 
revolutionaries of 1789 tried to break the power of the Parlements. 
Article 13 of the famous Law of 16-24 August 1790 which is still 
in force expressed the principle of the separation of powers, 
providing that
Judicial functions are distinct and ... separate from 
administrative functions. Judges in the civil courts 
may not ... concern themselves ... with the operation 
of the administration, nor shall they call administrators 
to account before them in respect of the exercise of 
their official functions.
And it is this which directly led to the creation of Conseild 1 23£tat
by the Constitution of the Year VIII (1799), which has remained
2ever since the supreme administrative court in France.
In French law, while the principle of administrative 
3liability is accepted in order to do justice and to annul any
Ridley and Blondel, Public Administration in France (2nd ed.
1970) 54. For a detailed discussion of the French civil service,
see Brown and Garner, op. cit. at 15-18.
2 '  .For a detailed study of Conseil d'Etat, see Freedeman, op. cit. ;
for its early origins, the dual (legislative and administrative) 
role and growth, see Brown and Garner, op. cit. at 19 et seq.
See also Bergsten, op. cit. at 21.
3 The term 'administrative liability1 is adopted in preference to 
'governmental' or 'state' liability since, as we shall see, the 
principle extends in France to all public authorities. For an
account see Street, Governmental Liability (1953) 15-19.
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unlawful administrative act, the rules governing this liability 
differ in important respects from those found in the droit civil 
and applied by the civil courts in suits by or against private 
individuals. An administrative contract does not imply a bilatera.l 
agreement between two equal parties which cannot be unilaterally 
modified or repudiated by either party during its stated tenure. 
Bergsten notices two factors which distinguish dealings with the 
administration. The first is that the administration acts not only 
as a party to the contract but also as the 'sovereign', in which 
capacity it can modify all contracts, public and private, by price 
and currency controls, moratoria on debt payments, and other such 
means; indeed an agreement not to exercise these sovereign powers 
would be automatically void. The second is that any alleged 
breach of contract by the administration is to be adjudicated 
in the administrative courts which can enable the administration 
to limit either the remedies to which it will be subjected or the 
matters which can be disputed before the courts.^ The principle 
that administrative liability is distinct from civil was expressed
^Bergsten, "The Administration of Economic and Social Programs 
in France by the Use of the Contractual Technique" (1975) 48 
South Calif. L. Rev. 852, 857. See also the references made 
there to other authorities, in some respects the French 
contrats administratifs seem to come very close to plan-contracts 
in the Soviet Union. See Lücke, Review of Dietrich
Loeber's book on Government Contracts, (1970) 3 Modern Law 
and Society (Section II) 157, 159.
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in the case in Blanco1 23 where the Tribunal des Conflits stated 
that the liability which fell upon the state for damage caused 
to individuals by the act of public servants was not governed 
by the principles laid down in the Civil Code for relations 
between one individual and another. The liability of the state 
was neither general nor absolute, but it had its own special 
rules which varied according to the needs of the service and 
the necessity to reconcile the rights of the state with private 
rights.^
32. Characterisation of a Contrat Administratif
A dual system of courts, whether the dichotomy be between 
common law courts and chancery courts or between administrative 
and civil courts inevitably leads to conflicts of jurisdiction. 
In France, such conflicts have assumed even greater significance 
than they did in England before the Judicature Acts of 1873 and
Tribunal des Conflits 8 February 1873 61; Les Grands Arrets
de la Jurisprudence Administrative (5th ed.) Sirey 1969 5. This
decision is the keystone of modern French administrative law.
The facts were: Agnes Blanco, five years old, was injured on a 
public thoroughfare by a wagon belonging to* the state and pushed 
by the employees of the state-owned tobacco factory in Bordeaux. 
The question arose to which court, civil or administrative, the 
claim should be brought. The Tribunal des Conflits held that the 
injury arose out of the activities of a 'service public1 and for 
this reason the administrative court had jurisdiction.
2 Blanco was a case in tort, but it may be submitted that the 
underlying principle also applies to contract da.ses'.
3 See Puisoye, Caractdristigues du Contrat Administratif par 
nature, Sirey 1961 1.
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and 1875 because, as Brown and Garner put it, "the French approach
is to segregate according to the nature of the factual issue
1rather than according to the nature of the relief sought".
Therefore, there is in each case a preliminary question of
characterisation of a government contract as either civil or
administrative. For not every government contract is necessarily
an administrative contract, subject to rules of administrative 
it
law, but/^is only so if one party to it is an agent of the
Administration, and the contract is made in the exercise of an
2administrative function. These criteria have been evolved both
3by the Tribunal des Conflits and in French legal writing 
4(doctrine). More broadly, a contract is an administrative
French Administrative Law (2nd ed. 1973) 76. See also Friedmann,
Law in a Changing Society (2nd ed. 1972) 398-402.
2 For a discussion on this point see Street, Governmenta1
Liability (1953) 83 et seq. See also Bergsten, op. cit. (1975)
48 South. Calif. L. Rev. 852, 896, and Waline, Droit
Administratif (9th ed. 1963) 565-74.
3 The final arbiter for the determination of respective competence 
of the two orders of courts in France is the Tribunal des Conflits
4 The distinction between administrative contracts and those of 
the civil law is well recognised by perhaps all except Duguit
(see Duguit,Traitd de Droit Constitutionnel (2nd ed. )Vol.IIIp.402i 
For the cases in which distinction is drawn see Socidtd des 
Affrdteurs Rdunis, Conseil d'Etat 23 May 1924 and Socidtd 
Gdn£rale d'Armement, Conseil d'Etat 23 December 1921. For a 
standard work where the distinction has been recognised, and the 
contrat administratif dealt with separately, see Pdquignot, 
Thdorie Gdndrale du Contrat Administratif (Paris 1945).
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contract if the contractor is entrusted with the discharge of 
a public service, or if it contains terms that are inappropriate 
to the ordinary contractual relation between private individuals/ 
The characterisation of a government contract as belonging 
to, respectively, public or private law was not a simple process, 
however much it was important to establish clear tests by which an
9administrative contract could be recognised. Indeed even today
3the relevant criteria are variously defined. Under earlier 
criteria, a government contract was regarded as public if (i) 
the state was a debtor (l'Etat ddbiteur) in a contract, in which 
case the Consei1 d 1 23Etat denied the ordinary courts competence to 
condemn the state to any money payment; (ii) a contract was made 
as an act of public authority (acte de la puissance publique or 
acte d'autoritd), though here a distinction was drawn between 
those acts which involved public authority and those which were 
mere acts of management. The former were held to be outside the
Turpin, Government Contracts (1972) 69.
2
Tne development of any general theory of administrative contracts 
was for a long time impossible": Mitchell, op. cit. at 160. It
may be stated that the classification of contracts as administrative 
and private was important not merely from the point of view of 
jurisdiction, but also because the two types of contract differ 
radically in their consequences. The rights of the administration 
and of the contractor depend upon this classification.
3 T7>tor a discussion of trends, see Langrod, op. cit.
at 328 et seq.
3 04-
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, the latter within it; and 
(iii) a contract formed part of public administration (question 
publique) as distinct from private administration; if the latter, 
the administration used the same process as the private citizen 
and came therefore within the scope of the ordinary courts, but 
disputes arising out of its question publique belonged to the 
administrative courts.
These early criteria, tentative and overlapping, in effect
giving a choice of proceeding to the administration in its
contracts under private or public law, were discarded later
by two alternative theories. Firstly in 1873 in the case in
Blanco  ^ a new principle was enumerated, that of 'public service'
2which Rolland defined as 'any activity of a public authority
aimed at satisfying a public need'. This definition lays emphasis
on two elements of public service which must be present: the
activity of a public authority, and 'satisfying thereby of a
public need', both of which elements have received extensive
3attention in the case-law. The principle of public service is
more essential since from it derive the two essential features of
administrative contracts, the necessity for continuity, and the
necessity of continuous adaptability despite the terms of the 
4contract. However, the doctrine of public service though
Tribunal des Conflits 8 February 1873. For the facts and 
decision see supra.
2 . 1 234Rolland, Pröcis de droit administratif (10th cd. 1951).
3
See Odent, Cours de contentieux administratif (1965-66) 288.
4 Mitchell, op. cit. at 172. This criterion has been emphasised 
by many authors, see e.g., Geiger, "The Unilateral Change
of Economic Development Agreements" (1974)23 Int'1 & Comp. L.Q.
73, 83 [hereinafter cited as Geiger].
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providing the courts with a single criterion to apply to very 
different situations, Was found to be an inadequate and uncertain 
criterion, because (inter alia) of the difficulty of defining 
service public in a precise manner.
A second theory designed to characterise administrative 
contracts was advanced by M. Pdquignot. According to him, the 
real test lay in the presence of clauses exorbitantes de droit 
commun, that is, terms or clauses wholly inappropriate to a 
private contract. It is true that 'public service' was still an 
essential prerequisite of an administrative contract, but great 
emphasis was now to be put on the presence of ' exorbitant clauses '
This criterion, for distinguishing administrative from private 
contracts, involves an examination of the terms of the particular 
contract rather than its 'public' object. The terms are viewed as 
'exorbitant' if 'they are different in their nature from those
2which could be included in a similar contract under the civil law' 
or 'where their object is to confer rights or impose obligations 
upon the parties quite unlike in their nature, those which anyone 
would freely agree to in the context of civil or commercial law'.* 23 
For example, a clause imposing a penalty upon the contractor, or 
giving the administration (but not the contractor) an option to 
rescind, or allowing the administration to vary the terms of the
 ^Theorie Gendrale du Contrat Administratif (Paris 1945) 109.
2 This formula was approved in Societd des Combustibles et 
Carburants Nationaux, Tribunal des Conflits 19 June 1952.
3 Stein, Conseil d'Etat 20 October 1950.
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contract in the course of its performance. An illustration is a 
clause such as that usually included in the standard contract 
used by the Public Roads Administration (Ad.ministration des Ponts 
et Chaussees), according to which the contractor is required to 
comply with such alterations as are notified to him in the course 
of the work and to observe the orders of the Service Engineers 
even if those involve a modification in the specification of the 
work which he has already completed.^ The inclusion of such 
and other similar clauses in the contract justifies its subjection 
to jurisdiction of administrative courts,which are also the courts 
with greater experience in matters of service public.
Still this approach is not without its difficulties. Each
of the above theories is helpful in defining an administrative
contract to a certain extent but then each tends to exaggerate
the weight to be given to the 'public service' or 'exorbitant
clauses' element in a given contract. The via media seems to be
to look at the contract in a broad sense so as to take note of
the whole background, the parties, the nature of the administrative
organ with which the contract has been made, the nature of the
material or work required and the terms and conditions of the
contract and then decide whether it is an administrative contract 
, 2or not.
Waline, Droit Administratif (9th ed. 1963)86[hereinafter 
cited as Waline].
2 See Mitchell, op. cit. at 176-80.
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3. Rules Relating to Contrats Adminis tratifs
Assuming then that the contract in question is a contrat
administratif, and thus subject to the droit administratif, our
next concern is with the rules governing such a contract, made
between what the French regard as essentially unequal parties,
an organ of government on the one hand and the citizen on the
other. Now examining the extent to which the droit administratif
differs from the ordinary civil contract law, we find that the
general principles relating to the formation of contract are the
2same in each case, although certain special formalities (such 
as prior approval of another administrative agency or rules 
regarding the appointment of a contractor by public tender 
(ad~iudication or marchd de grd a grd) ' are required
1 Brown and Garner, op. cit. at 93.
2 This is so because administrative law has adapted the rules 
which originated in the private law sphere. Referring to the 
administrative contracts, Langrod states: '[T]he predominant
theory is that "loans" are made by administrative law from private 
law. This implies that all obligations originate in the area of 
private law and are "transposed" or "loaned" to the administrative 
sphere, either unchanged or with specific modifications required 
by the particular needs of public administration': "Administrative 
Contracts" (1955) 4 Am. J. Comp. L. 325, 327 (footnote references 
omitted).
3 Public adjudication normally is required by law in all admin­
istrative contracts. As regards exceptions, see the French ddcret. 
of 6 April 1942. Laubadere points out that the requirement of
advertising for bids is receding in French law: Traite Thdorique 
et Pratique des Contrats Administratifs (1956) 321. See also 
Bergsten, "The Administration of Economic and Social Programs in 
France by the use of the Contractual Technique" (1975) 48 South 
Calif. L. Rev. 852, 863.
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to be satisfied in respect of an administrative contract. It is, 
however, in the enforcement and execution of the terms of the 
contract that the droit administratif has worked out special 
principles which stem mainly from the underlying idea of the need 
to recognise the predominance of the public interest. The public 
interest must always prevail, even to the extent of over-ruling 
the express terms of the contract; this is a doctrine imported 
ab extra by the law, and is in no sense dependent on the intention 
of the parties to the contract (not even by implication, as some 
authorities suggest is the origin of the English so-called 
doctrine of 'executive necessity').  ^ Continuity in adminis­
trative action requires that the contractor accepts unforeseen 
obligations or additional charges without being entitled to cease 
performance on the ground of its being outside the express 
contract. That does not mean that the private interest of the 
contractor is disregarded, but merely that it is regarded as 
subordinate. His remedy is to look for monetary compensation.
In case the administration exercises any of its pouvoirs exorbit- 
ants , the contractor automatically acquires a right to indemnific­
ation. This serves equity, reconciles the interests of the parties 
(without endangering the public welfare), and encourages con­
tractors to do business with the administration.
"^ See Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite v. The King [1921] 3 K.B.
500.
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From this general principle have come several more precise 
doctrines:
(i) La Thdorie de 11 234Imprdvision
(Theory o£ unforeseen Circumstances)
The fundamental principle in an administrative contract is 
that the contractor must ensure continuity of service unless this 
continuity becomes objectively impossible. Thus in one of the 
leading cases it was remarked that 1Le Contrat Administratif 
dtant conclu en vue d 1assurer le fonctionnement du service public, 
son execution ne saurait etre interrompue sous aucun prdtexte sauf
en cas d 1 impossibility materielle absolue1 (the administrative
contract being concluded in order to ensure the functioning of
public service, its execution ought not to be disturbed in any way
2save in the case of absolute impossibility of performance).
On this principle, accordingly, one case refused any extension
3of time of performance to the contractor, while another did
not excuse the contractor from performance by the fault of the 
4administration; although on the other hand the administration
Waline, op. cit. at 622 et seg.
2 Tramways de Cherbourg, Conseil d'Etat 9 December 1932.
3 E.g. Gagnieux, Conseil d'Etat 14 March 1928.
4 Socidte Generale Franchise de Publicite et d 1Edition, D.C.
1942, j.lll. Again in Ville de Nantes, Conseil d'Etat 15 February 
1895, it was held that the contractor is not discharged from 
performance of his part of the contract if there is delay in pay­
ment on the part of the administration. See also Cie de Gaz a 
la Fertd-Milon, Conseil d'Etat 5 January 1924; Cie d 1 Eclairacje 
de Longny, Conseil d'Etat 6 February 1924; Fille, Conseil d'Etat 
17 February 1888 and Ville de Saint-Pol, Conseil d'Etat 2 November 
1927.
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is discharged of its responsibility, if the contractor has 
defaulted. Again, in another case, the contractor was obliged 
to continue performance even though this ruined his business as 
performance became more expensive and troublesome and even 
impossible. Obviously, such consequences deterred contractors 
from dealing with the administration, with the consequence that 
administrative contracts were entered into by either inefficient 
contractors or by those expecting huge returns to cover unforeseen 
losses. These results were obviously unwelcome, and in order to 
make administrative contracts more acceptable the doctrine of 
irnprevision was evolved.
This doctrine of imprdvision provided that if supervening 
circumstances arise after the formation of the contract for which 
no provision or inadequate provision has been made in the express 
terms of the contract, circumstances which make it uneconomical 
for the contractor to perform his part,* 2 he will not be allowed 
to resile from the contract but may be compelled to perform it 
and then seek an indemnity (recours en indemnity) from the admin­
istration for his additiona 1 expenses. This was insisted upon by the 
administrative courts in circumstances where the public interest 
demanded that the contract must be performed-
The first clear exposition of the doctrine comes in the 
leading case of Compagnie Generale d 'Eclairacre de Bordeaux,3
Astruc et Socidtd du Thdatre des Champs Elysdes, Conseil d'Etat 
7 April 1916.
2 E.g., steep rise of prices of raw materials used for the per­
formance of the contract due to war, devaluation, economic crisis 
or earthquake.
Conseil d Etat 30 March 1916. See glso Freedeman, op. cit. 
152-53; Hospice de Vienne, Conseil d'Etat 10 March 1947.
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where the rising prices of coal due to the 1914-18 war had ren­
dered totally uneconomical the continued operation of gas con­
cessions at the rates originally laid down. The price of coal 
increased in fifteen months from 35 Francs per ton at the time 
when the contract was made to 117 Francs per ton; an increase 
which, unless the company was allowed to increase the contract 
charges for the gas supplied, would have compelled the gas company 
to go into liquidation. The Conseil d'Etat took the view that 
it was not in the public interest that this should happen, for, 
if the company became defunct, the streets of Bordeaux would not 
be lit. Therefore the Court ordered the company to continue to 
perform the contract, but substantially increased the price of 
gas charged to the administration under the contract.
The doctrine of imprdvision denotes not only unforeseen 
circumstances which the court may take into account in modification 
of the terms of a contract between a private contractor and a 
public authority, but also goes much further than the common 
law doctrine of frustration. The theory of frustration releases 
the obligor by termination of the contract. It does not permit, 
however, one party or the court to modify the express contractual 
terms in order to adapt them to changed conditions. Imprdvision 
does not operate to determine the contract; performance continues, 
for imprdvision is especially designed to facilitate or ensure the 
continuity of performance. The doctrine operates in those cases 
1 Friedmann (ed.), Public and Private Enterprise in Mixed 
Economies (London 1974) 32.
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in which the circumstances under which the contract was originslly 
entered into have completely changed and performance has become 
more onerous, expensive, dilatory or risky. The pecuniary 
interest of the contractor is not jeopardised, he can recover 
monetary compensation for the additional burdens or unexpected 
losses which result from the happenings of unforeseen events. 
Again, it is not necessary for invoking the doctrine of 
imprdvision that the contract should have become physically or 
legally incapable of performance, although the party claiming 
indemnity must show the existence of unforeseen circumstances 
which result in a 1 2bouleversement de l'dconomie du contrat'(an 
upsetting of the economic substance of the contract). Such 
circumstances justify the contractor in seeking from the admin­
istration an indemnity,^ as a result of which these unforeseen 
losses are shared by both parties, and are not shouldered in 
their entirety by either one or the other: in practice, the 
administration bears most of the actual losses, rarely more 
than five per cent are imposed on the contractor. Indeed, 
where the contractor is unwilling to continue his performance
1 For the mode of calculating the indemnity, see Mitchell, op. 
cit. 192 and the authorities cited there.
2 Geiger, op. cit. (1974) 23 Int. & Comp. L. Q. 73, 98. For 
the successful working of the doctrine of imprdvision and the 
theory of the financial equilibrium of administrative contracts, 
see an article by Waline, 'L'dvolution des rapports de I'Etat 
avec ses co-contractants,' published in Revue du Droit Public et 
de la Science Politique 1951, 5; see also by the same author, 
Droit Administratif (1963) 622 et seq.
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on any terms (or any realistic terms) the administration may 
take over the performance of his part of the contract and provide 
the service, etc. itself (en rdgie). If there is a total imposs-
1ibility then of course the doctrine of force majeure is operative. 
Thus in Compagnie des Tramways de Cherbourg  ^ the concessionnaire 
was on the verge of bankruptcy, but if the tram fares had been 
increased any more, the company would have lost its customers.
The Conseil d'Etat considered that this was an example of force 
majeure, beyond the powers of either of the contracting parties 
to overcome; the object of the contract (to run a tramway service 
at a reasonable price) had been destroyed, and so the contractor 
was entitled to be released from his obligations under the contract.
3(ii) Fait du prince (Act of State)
Whereas imprdvision is concerned with abnormal and unforeseer 
disturbance of the contractual equilibrium (where the performance 
is a long-range one) , arising from events externa 1 to both con­
tracting parties and involving extra-contractual charges for the 
contractor, the doctrine of fait du prince is concerned with
^Waline, Droit Administratif 629.
2Conseil d'Etat 9 December 1932.
3Waline, op. cit. at 620, 729 et seg. ; Badaoui, Le fait du prince
(Paris 1954). For the relationship of this doctrine with 
impr£vision, see Mitchell, op. cit. at 197-98- On the doctrine, 
see Societd de 1 'Energie Industrielle, Conseil d'Etat 24 November 
1944.
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such modifications of the contractual equilibrium as result 
from fiscal, economic or labour regulations prescribed by an 
acte administratis that is, prescribed by the administration 
itself.^ An example would be increased taxes on coal that 
affect a concessionnaire of gas light- The former doctrine 
relating to unforeseen events not caused by the contracting 
administrative authority, divides the loss between both parties 
so as to re-establish the altered financial equation; the latter 
includes any prejudice to the contractor's situation, whatever 
its extent may be, and allows full compensation (reparation 
integrale) for the loss incurred.
The general rule applicable to a contrat administratif is 
that unless the governmental act consists of some general 
legislation affecting all citizens equally such as general 
taxation (the theory of 1egalitd devant les charges publiques1, 
i.e. all must support equally the burdens imposed by the state), 
the contractor is entitled to an indemnity. This indemnity 
may take the form of an authorisation of increased charges to 
consumers or other measures of financial relief, or a 
diminution of the obligations of the contractor.
^Ville d'Elbeuf, Conseil d'Etat 15 July 1949. Black-out 
provisions during wartime reducing electricity consumption: 
Ville de Toulon, Conseil d'fitat 23 June 1944. See also 
Ville de Valence, Conseil d'Etat 10 December 1958. See 
generally, Vedel, Droit Administratif (3rd ed. 1964) 632 et seq. 
2Ville de Paris, Conseil d'Etat 14 February 1936; Chouard, 
Conseil d'Etat 17 July 1950.
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The doctrine of fait du prince is similar to that of 'act 
of state' in English law- In English law it is recognised that 
an administrative agency cannot by contract fetter its right - 
or duty - to exercise an administrative discretion vested in it 
by statute; nor can a public authority by its conduct estop it­
self from exercising such a discretion, and thus the private 
party to the contract may well have no remedy in damages.''" in 
France, however, a contractor with the administration enjoys a greater 
degree of protection against the effects of legislative and 
administrative acts than does a contractor under a civil law
contract; indeed the contractor is entitled to a full indemnity
2including the expectation of profits- The doctrine of fait du 
prince is applicable even though there is no bouleversement 
(upsetting) of the contract, provided the contractor can show 
the following: (1) that the acte administratif which has affected the
contract is an act of the administrative body which is a party to 
the contract. If the legislation in question is passed by an 
administrative body, other than the contracting party, the contra­
ctor may bring himself within the scope of the doctrine of La 
3Fleurette and obtain an indemnity in the same way as any other
See ch.2 supra.
2Socidte des Alcools du Vexin, Conseil d'Etat 15 July 1959- For 
an analysis of the recent case law, see Geiger, op. cit- at 99.
Conseil d'etat 14 January 1938. The facts were: a dairy company 
claimed damages against the state in respect of the losses which 
it sustained when it had to discontinue marketing its brand of 
artificial cream and hence to go out of business. The manufacture 
and sale of any article under the name 'cream' had been banned by 
statute unless the article consisted of real cream. The statute 
allowed no compensation. The Conseil d'etat held that it was not 
the legislature's intention to impose an unequal sacrifice upon 
the complainant company and granted its claim.
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Citizen particularly affected, provided that the loss is both 
direct and special; (ii) that the contract has been particularly 
affected in its substance, e.g. by the imposition of a tax or 
other charge or excise upon the main raw material used by the 
contractor in performance of his obligation, such as the imposit- 
ion of excise upon coal in relation to a gas concession; and 
(iii) that the act of the administration which has affected the 
contract is an act which involves public authority (acte de 
puissance publique). Thus an act of entering into contracts with 
other parties, which though it may render the performance of the 
contract more expensive, is not an act which involves public 
authority. In such a case, fait du prince will not be applicable^
(iü) Pouvoir de Controle et de Sanction (Supervision)^
It is a trite principle of French administrative law that 
the necessities of public law are not those of private law and 
that the administration has at all times the right to ensure that 
the contract is properly performed in accordance with the public 
interest. In one case, the Conseil d'Etat went so far as
1 Caucheteux et des Mont, Conseil d'Etat 21 January 1944.
2 Tanti, Conseil d'Etat 28 November 1924.
3 See e.g. Prevet, Conseil d'Etat 8 March 1902.
4
See Debbasch, Droit Administratif (1968) 281-82.
See the early case of Rothschild,Conseil d'Etat 6 December 1855. 
See also Mitchell, op. cit. at 198; Brown and Garner, op. cit. at 
112 and Street, Governmental Liability (1953) 100-101.
5
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to state that the administration can impose controls on the
contractor even if such conditions are not expressly provided in
the contract.^ One well-known writer has stated that this right
of control is incapable of being excluded by contract though it
2might be modified as to the manner of its exercise. A contract, 
for example, might require warning notices to be served on the 
contractor, before penalties could validly be imposed on him but 
the contract could not exclude the possibility of the imposition 
of penalties. The justification for granting a large measure of 
control to the administration is to be found in the close connect­
ion between administrative contracts and the idea of service public.
(iv) Pouvoir de Modification Unilaterale 
(Power of Unilateral Modification)^
4Since the decision in Cie Gdndrale Francaise des Tramways 
the modifiability or what the French call 'mutability' of 
administrative contracts is an established principle in French 
administrative contracts. 'Mutability1 234 implies that the con­
tractor cannot oppose adjustments made in the public interest 
in any claims for strict performance of the original contract.
His remedy is to seek monetary compensation for the additional 
burdens or unexpected losses which result from these adjustments.
Deplangue, Conseil d'Etat 31 May 1907. See also Geiger, op. 
cit. at 96.
2 Jeze, Thdorie Gdndrale des Contrats de 1 'Administration (Paris 
1945) Part I p.222.
3
For a comparative analysis of unilatera 1 modification of contract 
clauses in the English, American, French and German laws, see 
Geiger, op. cit. at 95-9. See also Turpin, Government Contracts 
(1972) 69.
4
Conseil d'Etat 11 March 1910.
318
The administration can, therefore, unilaterally modify contracts 
in the public interest. The predominant position of the adminis­
tration is based on the necessity for government effectiveness, 
coupled with the notion of 'service public* 1. The administration, 
even where it transfers by a concession agreement functions 
involving the interests of the community cannot thereby divest 
itself of its responsibility for the performance of these 
functions. It retains inherent powers of control and can adjust 
the terms of the agreement to the changing needs of the public 
service. The variation of the contractual terms may take the 
form either of an increase or of the diminution of the services or 
even of the termination of the contract. The administration may 
even make an alteration in the mode of carrying out the contract. 
For this purpose it can without any default on the part of the 
contractor suspend, vary or rescind the contract, transfer it to 
another party or take it over itself.  ^ Modification may be by 
means of legislation, administrative action of a general nature 
or by individual measures directly interfering with the contract.
According to one French view, the administration cannot
unilaterally modify a contract unless there is an express term
2m  the contract. But the modern position seems to be that stated 
by Mitchell, namely that the power to modify exists without any
V^ille de^St. Etienne, Conseil d'Etat 29 October 1939; Barfinf 
Conseil d'Etat 24 April 1959.
2Debbasch, Droit Administratif (1968) 282: 'L'Evolution des
exigences de 1'intdret gdndral implique que 1'on reconnaisse a
1 1 administration le droit de ddpasser la lettre contractuelle 
pour imposer au contractant une adaptation du contrat. La portde
(carried on to p. 319)
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express contractual clause, 'and indeed even in the face of
contractual clause purporting to exclude it1 234. ^  Mitchell's
view seems to be correct and the same view of the law has been
taken by later authorities.“ The administration cannot contract
away its ultimate freedom to modify or terminate the contract for
reasons of public interest. T K 6  BdinivilsträLtion Viot Onkjjf the
right to unilaterally modify the contract; it has the duty to
do so. The contract is always subject to the changing needs of
the public interest: hence the contract can be altered, 1suivant
les besoins sociaux, dconomigues du moment1.
3In a number of cases, concerning the supply of gas,
electricity and water, the Conseil d'Etat has allowed the
administration to vary the terms of the contract under which
long-term monopolies had been granted to concessionnaires, where
the relevant circumstances had changed very radically. In
4Compagnie Generale des Eaux; a water company had a monopoly 
contract since 1882 for the supply of water in La Seyne. By
(footnote 2 continued from p. 318)
de cette regle de la mutuabilitd du contrat administratif a 
discutde et on a soutenu gue 1 1 administration ne ddtient le pouvoir 
de modification unilaterale gue dans les hypotheses ou une clause 
explicite de la convention in.ltia.lC le lui confere.
Mitchell, op. cit. at 186 (emphasis supplied).
2 See Bergsten, op. cit. (1975) 48 South. Calif. L. Rev. 852, 857; 
Langrod, op. cit. at 340-44; Geiger, op. cit. at 99.
3 See e.g. Compagnie Nouvelle du Gaz de Deville-les-Rouen, Consei.1 
d'Etat 10 January 1902. See also Waline, op. cit. at 711.
4 Conseil d'Etat 12 May 1933.
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1930 the population of the town had more than doubled and the 
quantity of water provided for in the contract was insufficient. 
The Conseil d'Etat thus authorised the commune to invite the 
company to provide adequate water at a price pro rata to that 
stipulated for in the contract, with the proviso that if the 
company failed to agree the commune would be free to enter into 
negotiations with another concessionnaire for the supply of the 
extra water. In another case'*' a long term concession for street 
lighting by gas was converted into a demand for lighting by 
electricity since that was required by later scientific develop­
ments and public needs.
The unilateral power of the administration, however, is 
2not without limits. Apart from the fact that its exercise is 
subject to the review by the administrative courts and - in the 
last instance - by the Conseil d'Etat, the administration has 
simply the power to modify those provisions of the contract which 
have a close nexus with the contractor's public duty to adapt his 
performance to conform to new technological developments. But the 
pecuniary interest of the contractor is protected and the law 
provides him with a double-guarantee, namely (i) if the changes 
prescribed by the administration cause an upsetting of the origina
1  •<*Socidtd le Centre Electrique, Conseil d'Etat 30 November 1928.
2 Distillerie de Magnac-Laval, Conseil d'Etat 2 May 1958. See 
also Laubadere, L 1 2Evolution r^cente du rdgime juridigue des 
marches de 1'Etat, published in Actuality juridigue 1959 Vol.I 
p. 17.
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contract, he can seek the cancellation of the contract and
(ii) if the new obligations disturb the financial equilibrium
(Equation financiere) of his contract, he can seek an indemnity.
As seen from the above analysis, the rights of the contractor
are well recognised.^ Like the inalienable right of the admin-
2istration to modify contractual terms, the right of the contractor
to an indemnity is a matter of public policy and cannot be excluded
3by the provisions of the contract. In practice, however, the
administration exercises its overriding powers only as a last
resort, if no consensual arrangement can be achieved. The Conseil.
d 1 Etat has made it clear that the inherent powers of control of
the administration do not negate the binding force of administrat- 
4ive contracts.
(v) Restrictions on Freedom of Contract
Because of the need to stress the importance of the public 
interest, the administrative courts exercise a good measure of 
control over the terms of a contract. Detailed principles 
implementing such control are to be found in the decisions 
(jurisprudence) of the Conseil d'Etat and in the opinions of 
jurists (doctrine). There has developed, therefore, a body of
T Cie G4n£rale Frangaise. des Tramways, Conseil d'Etat 11 March 
1910. See also Waline, op. cit. at 617-18; Geiger, op. cit. at 
96-99.
2 See Braibant, Conclusions to Syndicat National du Commerce en 
Gros des Equipments, Pieces pour Vdhicules et Outillages, Conseil 
d'Etat 2 March 1973.
3 Std Bordeaux-Maroc, Conseil d'Etat 7 March 1930.
4 See Geiger, op. cit. at 96-7 (citing from the leading decision 
in Gaz de Bordeaux pronounced by Conseil d'Etat on 30 March 1916) .
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law which differentiates between the administrative contract
and ordinary private contracts in many particulars, especially
with respect to its operation and effects. The contrat adminis-
tratif is also regulated by the provisions contained in the
cahiers des charges (specifications promulgated by
the various public authorities), which contain model contractual
terms for inclusion in the appropriate contracts."*' Through the
cahiers des charges, which, inter alia, contain the procedure
for awarding the contract, the administration seeks to effectively
regulate the activities of its officers, who are obliged to act
2upon them in drawing up individual contracts. The contractor
however, is not bound unless the cahiers are expressly incorporated
in the contract. "In this way the cahier des charges ensures an
important degree of uniformity in the terms of contracting and so
makes possible the growth of both jurisprudence and doctrine with
3respect to the terms of administrative contracts".
The cahiers des charges may be made applicable either to all the 
procurement contracts of a particular authority(cahiers des charge? 
administratives gdndrales) or to all contracts for the procurement 
of a particular type of goods or services (cahiers des prescript­
ions communes): Turpin, Government Contracts (1972) 70.
2 For an analysis of the rules governing the authority of the 
agents of the administration, see Jeze, Principes Gendraux du 
Droit Administratif Vol. Ill p.178 et seq.
3 Turpin, op. cit. at 70.
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More recently rules concerning the conclusion of contrats 
administratifs and the choice of contractors have been formulated 
by statute. Under two decrees of 17 July 1964 and 28 November 
1966 there is now in force a 'Code des Marches' which covers 
contracts concluded by both central and local authorities. This 
Code imposes various sets of standard clauses and conditions 
( 'cahiers des clauses et conditions 1 2 and 'cahiers des charges 1) 
upon the different administrative authorities. But at the same 
time the administrative courts can influence the contents of the 
contract through their very wide powers of interpretation of the 
standard clauses or of the common intention of the parties and 
by this means they can insist that the most reasonable terms 
(from the administration's viewpoint) that can be obtained are 
in fact secured.
(vi) Rights of the Contractor and his Special 
Liabilities and Disadvantages
The administrative agency entering into a contract is often
obliged to obtain approval of a superior agency; thus a commune
requires the assent of the prefect under his powers of tutelle.^
If the requisite approval is not obtained, the contract is a
nullity. There can be no validation of such an agreement by
preventing the administration from setting up the defect or by
2subsequent conduct of the administration (estoppel). Again,
1 This system of control (tutelle) is very detailed and important; 
in practice it goes much further than any comparable feature in 
England and Australia. See Rendel, "How the Conseil
d'Etat supervises local authorities" [1966] Public Law 213.
2 Pdquignot states that all the necessary stages should be com­
pleted to make a valid contract: Theorie Gdndrale du Contrat 
Administratif (Paris 1945) 204. See also Commune de Ousse-Suzan> 
Conseil d'Etat 8 April 1911.
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the administration is not bound by contracts in which its agent
has exceeded his authority,'*' or where in a contract parliamentary
2approval was required but not obtained. But, as in Australian
and English law, the absence of appropriations or the fact that
the contract exceeds the appropriation does not affect the
3validity of the contract.
A contractor who has wholly or partially performed his part
under an agreement which is unenforceable for want of compliance
with the law is, however, entitled to an indemnity, on the basis
of what in common law terminology would be described as a quantum 
4meruit. Alternatively, a contractor can challenge the validity
of the superior authority's decision to withhold approval.
Similarly, a contractor can question an exercise of la puissance
publique in the modification of a contract: particularly so where
that administrative agency makes variation while being a party
6to the contract.
As is to be expected, in interpreting an administrative 
contract, a rule of strict construction is applied but one almost
X ^Chartron, Conseil d'Etat 7 May 1926.
2 Jeze, Theorie Gdndrale des Contrats de 1 ‘Administration 
(Paris 1945) Part 1 p. 29.
3 Id. at 16-18.
4 .See e.g. Phillippe, Conseil d'Etat 27 June 1930; Bonniol, 
Conseil d'Etat 16 January 1931. See also Mitchell, op„cit.at 200.
5 . . . . .The droit administratif provides two principal remedies to the 
contractor - the recours en annulationand the recours en indemnity.
6 -Compagnie des Scieries Africaines, Conseil d'Etat 9 March 1928.
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wholly in favour of the administration. Pdquignot states that 
there may be a temptation to equate the contrat d*adhesion of 
civil law with the administrative contract, but he points out 
one important and significant distinction. The French civil 
court has a tendency to side with the weaker party to a contrat 
d 'adhdsion, yet there is no such tendency in a contrat adminis- 
tratif, based as it is on the subordination of all also to 
le but de service public.  ^ Since the emphasis throughout is 
on the need to consider the requirements of the public interest 
in all matters of construction, the administration is not pre­
cluded from applying a lesser sanction (if the greater, which 
had been stipulated, might cause a disruption to the public 
interest, which is intended to be avoided), or from applying a
greater when the consequences of breach are more severe than
2were appreciated at the time of contracting.
But there are also several serious disadvantages that accrue
to a contractor under an administrative contract. Apart from the
fact that a contractor, as against the civil law rule, does not
3have the right of astreintes, he cannot assign his contract, or 
secure substituted performanceor give a sub-contract, without the
Thdorie Gdnerale du Contrat Administratif (1945) 65.
2 Veuve Girdu, Conseil d'Etat 2 July 1924.
3 To impose a fine for delay in the performance of a contract, 
which can have much of the effect of a common law decree of 
specific performance.
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prior permission of the administration.1 if a contractor commits 
serious fault in performance, the administration is entitled to 
cancel the contract and to enter into another contract at the 
risk and cost of the defaulting contractor. In such an event, 
the defaulting contractor is liable for any loss which the admin­
istration sustains on that account including the loss sustained 
in the interim period (i.e. the period between the cancellation 
of the contract and the fresh adjudication) during which period 
the administration entrusts the contract to another party for 
the sake of continuity.
To these may be added the ability of the administration to 
impose executive sanctions upon a contractor without any prelim­
inary recourse to the courts, whereas a contractor is always 
expected to approach the courts before stopping performance, no 
matter what justification he may have; otherwise his position 
may be prejudiced. Again, a contractor's liability to pay 
penalties does not have a compensatory character (as do ordinary
contractual damages) but is in the form of penal sanctions,
2unknown in private law.
Lastly, attention may be drawn to clauses of an administrative 
contract which require that government suppliers maintain fair
JL x  t vSee e.g. Socidtd l1Energie Electrique du Littoral Mediterannden, 
Sirey 1924 Vol. I p. 65.
2 See Compagnie des Scieries Africaines, Conseil d'Etat 9 March 
1928. These penalties are unilateral. They may be financial 
(pdnalitds) or coercive (mise en regie, sdquestre, rdsiliation 
a titre de sanction) without previous recourse to a court; they 
may also take ehe form of control over the execution of the 
contract, introduction of imposed tariffs, modification of the
scope or thetmodalities of the contractor's obligations and 
finally rescission (without penal character).
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employment practices, provide safe and healthy working conditions, 
pay fair wages etc. to their employees. These stipulations for 
the benefit of a third party (pour autrui)^ have a much wider
2scope than the analogous Australian and British standard terms 
to be found in government contracts since an administrative
3contract's conditions, unlike the Australian and British ones,
4confer enforceable rights upon the workmen.
4. Administrative Contracts in the Common Law
It is clear from the above discussionthat an 'administrative 
contract', what in French law is a 1 234contrat administratif ', denotes 
a contract between the government or administration and a con­
tractor with the following main features: (i) a fundamental
inequality of the contracting parties; (ii) submission by the 
contractor to a set of special conditions which are implied by 
law such as the unilateral modification of the contract; (iii) 
collaboration of the contractor who is not considered as the 
'opposite party' but co-operates actively by his participation 
or by providing capital, or by both, serving the public interest 
as represented by the administration; (iv) the legal right of 
the contractor to indemnification; and (v) subjection to the
Amos and Walton, Introduction to French Law (3rd ed. 1967) 175-77.
2  oSee ch„ IV supra.
3 Under English and Australian laws, the principle of privity 
prevents the exercise of any contractual remedy by the affected 
employees themselves, see Simpson v. Kodak Ltd [1948] 2 K.B. 184. 
For a discussion, see Turpin, Government Contracts
(1972) 254-7.
4 See e.g. Syndicat des Employes et Contremaitres des Secteurs 
Ülectrigues de la Seine, Conseil d'Etat 22 July 1927.
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jurisdiction of administrative tribunals or courts to the 
exclusion of 'civil' or ordinary courts. Though the term 
'administrative contract' is essentially a creature of French 
law, it may be used to signify similar contracts in the common 
law countries if such contracts exist there. But to call some 
of the government contracts (or sometimes all the government
contracts) 'administrative contracts' may prove to be
confusing. Especially, American authors have ventured to label,
by a somewhat hasty analogy, 'research and development' contracts
2or 'contracting-out' arrangements as ' administrative contracts '.
It is true that there now exist various contracts in Australia, 
England and the U.S. which no longer are merely conventional 
procurement of supplies and services contracts but which are 
long-term contracts involving a continuing co-operative relation­
ship between government and private contractors, with terms 
hitherto considered unenforceable in the courts, particularly 
long-term relationships to stimulate research and development 
(or as now in Britain to re-equip industry). But it is 
important to remember that such contracts (or government 
contracts generally) in the common law world are as yet not 
governed by a law different from that governing private contracts:
For example, Langrod uses the term 'administrative contracts' 
as a substitute for government contracts: see op. cit.at 333-34, 33 7, 
2 Ramey and Erlewine, "Introduction to the Concept of the 
'Administrative Contract' in Government Sponsored Research and 
Development"(1957)17 Fed.B.J.354; by the same authors, "Mistakes 
and Bailouts of Suppliers under Government Contracts and Sub­
contracts - A Study of Doctrine, Practice and Adhesions" (1953-54) 
39 Cornell L.Q. 645; Frenzen, "The Administrative Contract in the 
United States"(1968-69) 3 7 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 270; Langrod, op. cit.
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the basic equality between the parties is still assumed, they 
are adjudicated in the ordinary courts and there are no specific 
legal rules, though there are specific contractual terms and 
conditions applicable to these contracts, providing for compen­
sation to a private contractor prejudiced by the overriding 
powers of the government. Furthermore, public law in the common 
law system is not yet regarded as a separate branch.
5. Conclusion
The recognition of the inequality between the parties"*' 
has greatly influenced the French system of contrat administratif. 
The dominance of the administration is recognised in various ways 
- in its ability to impose executive sanctions without any prior 
recourse to courts and to make variations unilaterally in the 
contract; in the contractor's liability to continue performance 
even if the administration has failed to perform its part or to 
pay instalments due, to take a few examples. The fiduciary 
character of the administration is recognised in the rule of 
strict construction and in the insistence upon continuity of 
performance.
In practice, however, the interests of both the adminis­
tration and contractors seem to be well balanced in French 
administrative law. The fundamental presumption of inequality
Langrod, op. cit. at 325, 328, 330; Friedmann, op. cit. 
at 399; Brown and Garner, op. cit. at 93; Geiger, op. cit. 
at 83.
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between the parties has not led to great hardships to
contractors. The basic aim of serving the public interest
is reconciled, as much as possible, with contractors'
contractual rights and even their economic interests. Though
the private interests of contractors must not endanger the
public interest, principles of equity and good faith are
applicable assuring advantages unknown in the civil or
commercial laws. The decisions duly take into account the
legitimate interests of private contracting parties and an
effort is constantly made to maintain the financial
equilibrium of the contract so as to respect the original
2intentions of the parties, and to prevent the individual from 
bearing alone all the detriment to his situation caused by the 
changing requirements of the public welfare. It is because of 
this that the private rights of the contractor have received 
special protection and consideration, notably in the doctrines 
of imprdvision and fait du prince. As Mitchell has rightly 
observed, where such contracts of public authorities are 
regarded as a special class of contract, it is much easier 
to develop rules appropriate to the requirements of the whole
^Langrod, op. cit. at 344 states (citing Laubadere) that
the right of the contractor to get indemnified accrues not only 
when the contract explicitly states it, but when it does not 
and even when there are explicit clauses excluding it.
2See the conclusions by Blum (Cornmissaire du government
au Conseil d'Etat) in Compagnie Gdnerale Francaise des Tramways, 
Conseil d'Etat 21 March 1910; see also Pdquignot, Thdorie 
G4ndrale du Contrat Administratif (Paris 1945) 448.
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situation in which those contracts are made, taking into 
account the interests of the public involved and the need 
of the private contractor for protection.1
Mitchell, op. cit. at 215.
CHAPTER VI
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CONTRACTS*
1. Introduction
In the past two decades, research and development has been 
perhaps the fastest growing segment of government procurement.
As a result, a major development in government contracting has 
been the extensive use of contracts with commercial organisations, 
non-profit institutions and universities to provide for the 
operation and management of R & D facilities and programmes, for 
analytical studies and advisory services, and for technical 
supervision of weapons systems and other programmes administered 
on a systems basis.^ In part, the use of such contracts has 
been made necessary by the government's entry into new fields, 
such as atomic energy, missile development and space exploration, 
and the need for talents and services not previously
■kThe terms 'research' and 'research and development' are, as is 
often done, used interchangeably and called R & D.
^E.g., 86 percent of all R & D performed in the United States is 
done by private sector and funds approximately 46 percent of the 
total national R & D effort: United States Report of the
Commission on Government Procurement (1972) Vol.2, 5. The 
Commission on Government Procurement was created in November 
1969 to study and recommend to Congress methods 'to promote the 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness' of procurement by the 
executive branch of the United States Government. The Report of 
the Commission was made in December 1972 and consists of ten 
parts packaged in four volumes. The Report is hereinafter cited 
as Report of the C.G.P. followed by volume and page number.
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employed. In part, the use of contracts has been encouraged 
by the change in the nature of government that has taken 
place in recent decades - the rise of the 'Positive State' 
to replace the negative 'Nightwatchman State' - which has 
enlarged the area of governmental activity compelling it to 
enter those fields which were hitherto either ignored or left 
to accomplishment through individual and group action.^ The 
vast amount of government funds currently used to support 
R & D activity and its significance to the survival of a 
nation in the modern age makes the present subject one that 
clearly warrants discussion and understanding.
2. Classification of R & D Activity
During the last few decades, scientific advances and 
evolution of new manufacturing techniques have led to a 
growing requirement on the part of Government for original 
research and developmental work as well as adaptation of 
existing designs. Before World War II, technology was 
largely developed in peacetime by non-governmental organis­
ations motivated by the commercial incentives of the market 
place. The progress of the automotive, electrical and 
chemical industries in the early decades of this century 
resulted from the organisation and management of resources
‘'’For an interesting account of events forming a history of 
the recognition of research and development by the United 
States' Government from the early days, see Bledsoe and 
Ravitz, "The Evolution of Research and Development as a 
Procurement Function of the Federal Government" (1957)
17 Fed. B.J. 189.
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in the private, profit-seeking sector of the economy.
Private industry, utilising funds which came from the 
investing public or from the earnings of profitable enter­
prises, directed the scientific and engineering effort which 
resulted in the creation of new and improved goods and 
services. Success in commercial R & D rested primarily in 
the profit possibilities of future production; and the 
prudent manager of an industry's research work could not 
afford to disregard that factor. There were, of course, a 
few areas of research and development activity, such as 
military aviation, which were financed and directed by 
government rather than by private industry, but they were 
a relatively minor element in the total peacetime research 
and development effort of the nation. At the present time, 
however, government has assumed a completely new role vis-a- 
vis private industry. The urgent national interests which 
are at stake no longer permit science and technology to 
advance at the pace that economic factors would alone dictate. 
Principally because of the importance of atomic energy and 
aerospace technology to the achievement of national goals 
lying beyond the economic sphere, and because of the huge 
sums required for their development, government has taken 
over from the private sector the dominant role in selecting 
the ends to be sought and in organising and directing the 
means of attaining them.^
^One author called it a 'new federalism', see Price,Science and Government (New York University Press 1954) 65.
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Despite this massive reorientation of the nature and
purpose of much of the nation's research and development
work, the preponderance of the nation's scientific and
engineering talent remains in the private sector. Thus
while industry and the universities have become increasingly
dependent upon governmental direction and financing, the
government (in the United States of America and the U.K.,
but not in Australia, as we will see later) in turn has
continued to depend on non-governmental organisations for
the actual execution of the greater portion of the total
work.^  The R & D contracts have been the means of harnessing
2the two sectors in a common effort.
The major performers of R & D, which are called sectors, 
viz, government, private industry, higher education and
See in the U.K., HC Deb. v.891 c.333 (5 May 1975); see
also White Paper, Defence Research and Development (December 
1969) Cmnd. 4236 para.36 and (1971) Cmnd. 4641 paras.18-20 
(Rayner Project Team Report).
2Compared with the U.S.A. and the U.K., Australia has a very 
large proportion of R & D performed in-house and consequently 
very few R & D contracts are entered into with private 
industry. See infra.
3A sector is an aggregate of organisations or bodies which 
is identified by some important element that the members 
have in common, and which disburses money for R & D, some 
of which at least, is performed within the sector itself.
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private non-profit institutions, embrace all but a few 
isolated and minor R & D activities.'^"
Government (Federal and State) sponsored or financed 
R & D is accomplished mainly through three means: by direct
governmental operations, laboratories and research establish­
ments and other installations (generally known as 'in-house
2R & D'); by grants to private industry and universities
3and further educational establishments, and by contract.
In Australia, the Department of Science, has conducted a 
survey seeking information on expenditure and manpower 
resources devoted in 1968-69 to research and development 
in both the natural and social sciences in these four 
sectors: government, business enterprises, higher education
and private non-profit. The results of this survey are 
published in the Project SCORE Reports 1-5 (SCORE is the 
acronym for Survey and Comparisons of Research Expenditure).
A separate report Survey of Industry Research and Development 
Expenditure in Australia 1968-69 published by the Department 
of Trade and Industry in 1972, gives official statistics on 
the expenditure in Australia on industrial research and 
development activities.
2In Australia, grants to private industry are made under the 
provisions of the Industrial Research and Development Grants 
Act 1967-1976 and Industries Research and Development 
Incentives Act 1976. The term "grant" means a grant of 
financial assistance (Section 5 of I R & D Grants Act 1967- 
1976). Under the I R & D Incentives Act 1976, "grant" means 
a commencement grant or a project grant (Section 4). The 
Industrial Research and Development Grants Board provided 
$10.338 million for R & D performed by the Business Enterprise 
in 1968-69 - Project SCORE, Research and Development in 
Australia 1968-69, Department of Science, Canberra, 1974.
3In Australia, see Project SCORE, Commonwealth Government 
Sector 1968-69, Department of Education and Science, Canberra, 
Australia, 1972 . See also Project SCORE, Research and Devel­
opment in Australia P.P. No.271 of 1973. In the United States, 
out of the total R & D budget of $15.5 billion for fiscal 
year 1971, Federal in-house laboratories performed R & D 
work for $4,166 million and private industry for $7,630 
million. The other performers, to whom the rest of the money 
was allocated, were Federally Funded Research and Development 
Centres (FFRDCs), Universities and Non-Profit institutions: 
Report of the C.G.P. Vol. 2, 13-15 and 20.
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An important advantage of 'in-house' direct operation
R & D is that it enables a government to monitor and evaluate
the quality and effectiveness of work undertaken for it by
industry. Government's R & D establishments also play an
important part in the choice of weapon system programmes
and evaluation on technical grounds of the submissions from
industry."^ Moreover, there are certain types of work which
are not attractive to civil industry and which the government's
research and development establishments are able to undertake
2e.g. the development of explosives.
R & D activity is also carried out by industry, 
independently of government funds or direction. Independent 
R & D (generally known as I R & D or private R & D or private 
venture R & D, or as it is called in Australia - Industrial 
R & D) embraces that technical effort performed by private
commercial industry which is not required by any given contract
A good discussion of the functioning of in-house establish­
ments in Australia is to be found in the Defence Reports 
1972-1976, issued by the Department of Defence, Canberra, 
Australia, and the Supply Reports 1959-1974, published by 
the Department of Supply, Canberra. For a comprehensive 
list of Government Establishments in Australia, see Supply 
Report 1974 at 26-27, A.G.P.S., Canberra 1974. In Australia, 
there is too much concentration of R & D in government estab­
lishments: Industries Assistance Commission Report, Aerospace
Industry, P.P. No. 34 of 1976, 44-48. See also Millar, 
Australia's Defence (2nd ed. 1969) 146-49 (hereinafter cited 
as Millar). For the role of In-house laboratories in the 
United States, see the Report of the C.G.P. Vol.2, 13 et seq.
2Defence Research and Development (December 1969) Cmnd. 4236 
para.29 (U.K.)
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nor performed with respect thereto. Rather the effort is 
typically undertaken in order that the private manufacturer 
may remain competitive in a world of technological innovation, 
overnight obsolescence and defence oriented expectations of 
continuous advancement/ Broadly, I R & D covers systematic, 
critical investigations (carried out by or for manufacturing 
or mining enterprises) directed towards increasing knowledge 
or understanding of the subject studied and the application 
of the new knowledge acquired to the improvement or intro­
duction of products, processes, systems or methods. It is
also a means of maintaining the inside track for new awards
. . 2 in anticipated areas of government need.
Private or Industrial R & D in Australia is well behind 
many other industrialised countries: Millar, op.cit. 146.
The Industries Assistance Commission in its report on 
'Aerospace Industry1 23 observed "... it is apparent that the 
proportion of R & D at present being performed in the private 
sector of the industry is very low" P.P. No.34 of 1976, 47 
(Australia).
2For further information on I R & D see: Australia: Survey
of Industry Research and Development Expenditure in Australia
1968- 69 Department of Trade and Industry, Canberra 1972; 
Industries Assistance Commission Report, Aerospace Industry 
P.P. No.34 of 1976, 46-47; Millar, op.cit. 150; U .K ,:
3rd Report from the Committee of Public Accounts, HC 297 of
1969- 70, paras. 63-72; U.S.A.: Report of the C.G.P., Vol.2,
3 et.seq.; Kelly, "Independent Research and Development:
The First Twenty Five Years" (1974) 7 Public Contract L.J.
81; Flint, "Independent Research and Development Expendit­
ures: A Study of the Government Contract as an Instrument
of Public Policy" (1964) 29 Law and Contemp. Prob. 611.
See also Nieburg, In the Name of Science (Chicago 1966) 191.
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The two other sectors - Universities and private non- 
2profit - carry out R & D work under grants obtained from the 
government and other sources. The Universities and further 
educational establishments' sector sometimes perform R & D 
under contracts too with the government.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to determine the 
magnitude of total R & D as carried out by these four major 
performers. We are here concerned only with that portion of 
R & D which is funded by government and performed by private
The total expenditure by Australian Universities on R & D 
in 1969 was $67 million ($54 million in the Natural Sciences). 
Advancement of science was considered to be the primary 
objective of all R & D performed by Universities (98 percent 
of this expenditure was incurred intramurally). The R & D 
efforts of Australian Universities are financed almost entirely 
from Research Funds, General University Funds, Building Grants 
and other Commonwealth Funds. For details, see Project SCORE, 
Higher Education Sector 1968-69, Department of Science, Canberra, 
Australia 1973.
2The total expenditure by Australian private non-profit sector 
on R & D in 1968-69 was $3.1 million ($2.8 million in the 
Natural Sciences). Community Welfare was considered to be the 
primary objective of all R & D per formed by the private non-private 
sector (71 percent of this expenditure was incurred intramurally) 
Funding of the R & D efforts of this sector is mainly by grants. 
The names of four major private non-profit organisations per forming 
R & D (66 percent of the total expenditure in 1968-69) are:
Walter and Eliza Hall Institute of Medical Research (Victoria); 
National Safety Council of Australia; Institute of Medical 
Research (New South Wales), and Royal Children's Hospital 
Research Foundation (Victoria) . For details, see Proj ect SCORE, 
Private Non-Profit Sector 1968-1969, Department of Science, 
Canberra, Australia 1973.
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industry (and in a few cases by higher education) under contracts
between the government and private industry.^ Thus the discussion
of R & D which is performed in-house or by industry (government-
funded or not) or by higher education, is excluded, since these
activities do not involve contracts, but their role in the whole
sphere of R & D activity is no less significant than the
2contractual R & D. Again the present discussion is confined
to the R & D in the natural sciences only, on the assumption that
contracts are usually entered into to obtain R & D in the natural 
3sciences.
For the discussion of the various methods by which government 
can encourage industrial research and development, see 
Douglas (ed.), Research and Development in Australian Industry 
(Sydney University Extension Board Symposium, 1967) 68-69.
2It may be noted that each of the four sectors stated above 
incurs intramural and extramural expenditure. For each, funds 
may come from within the sector itself, from one another, or 
from outside sources. Intramural R & D is the totality of 
R & D performed within a particular sector, whatever the source 
of funds may be. Extramural R & D connotes disbursement of 
funds by a particular sector to other sector/ s for the performance 
of its (i.e. the financing sector's) R & D.
3The term R & D in its totality covers research and development 
in the natural sciences and the social sciences, i.e. R & D 
which is concerned with the products processes, systems or 
methods of the mining and manufacturing industries, R & D in 
industries other than mining and manufacturing, such as 
agricultural research, R & D in non-industrial areas of the 
natural sciences such as medicine, and R & D in the social 
sciences, which covers activities such as the development of 




'Research and development' means, in general terms, all 
those activities which are directed towards the acquisition of 
scientific facts and techniques, or towards their application, 
to the design of new or improved materials, or equipment, or to 
the devising of new processes, often involving, in the later 
stages, the construction of prototype equipment or of pilot 
plants.’*’ It has also been defined as 'an innovative process 
of scientific and technological preparation for change.'^ 
Research and development has internationally been agreed to 
mean, under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), 'creative work undertaken 
on a systematic basis to increase the stock of scientific and
In the U.K. see The Report of the Committee on the Management 
and Control of Research and Development (HMSO 1961) para. 17. 
The Committee was appointed (under the Chairmanship of Sir 
Claude Gibb and after his death, of Sir Solly Zuckerman) in 
1958 by the Lord President of the Council to inquire into the 
management and control of government research and development 
- the greater part of which is carried out by contract. The 
Committee's Report [hereinafter cited as the 1Zuckerman Report1] 
made important recommendations (published in 1961) with regard 
to, inter alia, the placing and control of research and develop­
ment contracts by government departments, by research councils 
and by the Atomic Energy Authority upon industry and the 
universities. The recommendations of the Committee were sub­
stantially adopted by the government.
2Andrews, "In the Guise of Research" (1974) 6 Public Contract L. 
J. 201, 202-3; Report of the C .G . P. Vol. 2,1; see also Bledsoe and 
Ravitz, "The Evolution of Research and Development as a 
Procurement Function of the Federal Government" (1957) 17 Fed.
B.J. 189, where the authors state: "The pursuit of new knowledge,
the application of existing knowledge and the resulting 'end 
items' in the way of scientific reports, books, designs, proto­
type developments, up to the point of production constitute the 
area commonly known as 'research and development'."
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technical knowledge and to use this stock of knowledge to devise
new practical applications.'^  The Zuckerman Report stated that
the portmanteau term, research and development included five
categories of activity, namely, pure basic research, objective
basic research, applied (project) research, applied (operational)
2research and development. More often a distinction is made
3between 'basic' research, 'applied' research and 'development'. 
Basic research is research directed towards an increase of 
knowledge in science and the primary aim of the investigator is 
a fuller knowledge or understanding of the subject under study,
OECD Manual of Standard Practice for Surveys of R & D. The 
manual goes on to define three exhaustive and mutually exclusive 
categories of R & D: (i) basic research; (ii) applied research;
(iii) experimental development, which are defined in the following 
terms: (i) 'Basic research is original investigation undertaken
in order to gain new scientific knowledge and understanding. It 
is not primarily directed towards any specific practical aim or 
application'. (ii) 'Applied research is also original investig­
ation undertaken in order to gain new scientific or technical 
knowledge. It is, however, directed primarily towards a specific 
practical aim or objective'. (iii) 'Experimental development is 
the use of scientific knowledge in order to produce new or sub­
stantially improved materials, devices, products, processes, 
systems or services'.
2For the definition of each, see Project SCORE, Research and 
Development in Australia 1968-69, Department of Science, P.P.
No. 271 of 1973. See also Zuckerman Report, para. 18. In the 
United States, the National Science Foundation suggested the 
following categorization of R & D contracts viz, 'basic', 
'specific' and 'management'. For details, see Miller, 
"Administration by Contract" (1961) 36 N.Y. Univ. L. Rev. 957, 
969-70. See also ASPR (Armed Services Procurement Regulations) 
§4-100 et seq. (1975) (The United States Procurement Regulations 
cited here can be converted to the Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR) by prefixing the agency procurement regulation number by 
32 CFR for the ASPR, 41 CFR 18 - for the NASA Procurement 
Regulations,and 41CFR for all other agency procurement regulations) .
3For the figures regarding government spending in the U.K. 
separately on 'Basic Research '/Applied Research ' and 'Development' . 
see Studies in Official Statistics No.21, R & D Expenditure 
(HMSO 1973).
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rather than any practical application thereof- Basic research
is an investment in the future, such as, to give one example,
the study of the properties of high energy cosmic ray particles.
Basic research lays the foundation for applied and development
efforts toward creation of usable products or services that
sometimes require years of effort before the findings and
follow-on development can be practically applied. As a result,
most basic research efforts are concentrated in the academic
community and in in-house government laboratories. Applied
research is research that attempts to determine and expand the
3potentialities of new scientific discoveries, for example,
4to provide design data for a nuclear-powered submarine.
Letter from A.T. Waterman, Director, National Science Foundation, 
to the President (18 June 1958) cited in Grossbaum, "Federal 
Support of Research Projects through Contracts and Grants: A 
Rationale" (1970) 19 Am.U.L. Rev. 423, 424. See also Andrews,
"In the Guise of Research"(1974)6Public Contract L.J. 201, 203;
Kahn, "The Lawyer and the Scientific Community - Procuring Basic 
Research" (1964) 29 Law & Contemp. Prob. 631, 632; ASPR §15-205.35 
(a)(1)(1975).
2Cited in Zuckerman Report, para.18.
3In the United States, Armed Services Procurement Regulations 
(ASPR) define the term as follows: 'Applied research is that
effort which (a) normally follows basic research, but may not 
be severable from the related basic research, (b) attempts to 
determine and exploit the potential of scientific discoveries 
or improvements in technology, materials, processes, methods, 
devices or techniques, and (c) attempts to advance the state 
of the art. Applied research does not include efforts whose 
principal aim is design, development, or test of specific items 
or services to be considered for sale; these efforts are within 
the definition of the term "development", as defined below.1 234
ASPR §15-205.35(a)(2)(1975).
4Zuckerman Report, para,. 18.
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Development is that systematic use of scientific knowledge
which is directed toward the production of useful products.
An example of development is: the work required to determine the
appropriate process for manufacturing penicillin on a large scale,
research having established its antibiotic properties, and small
2scale trials, its clinical usefulness. Development thus 
bridges the gap between research and production. In other words 
it may be defined as the work necessary to take, for example, 
a new process or piece of equipment to the production stage.
It often includes the erection and operation of pilot plants or 
the construction of prototypes. The essence of development is 
therefore the testing of design.
In the United States, the Report of the Commission on 
Government Procurement, concluded that universities should 
continue to be the primary performers of basic research, that 
industry should be the primary source of applied research and
1 Development is the systematic use, under whatever name, of 
scientific and technical knowledge in the design, development, 
test, or evaluation of a potential new product or service (or 
o'f an improvement in an existing product or service) for the 
purpose of meeting specific performance requirements or objectives. 
Development shall include the functions of design engineering, 
prototyping, and engineering testing1 2. ASPR §15-205-35(a)(3)(1975
2Zuckerman Report, para.18.
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product development, and that in-house laboratories should be 
strengthened and should maintain the technical competence to 
properly sponsor and manage the research and development programmes, 
as well as to perform basic and applied research and carry out the 
required test and evaluation function.^ The Zuckerman Report had 
also favoured the carrying out of basic research in an academic
2environment, rather than m  government research establishments.
Report of the C.G.P., Vol.2, 1-2. In the United Kingdom, the 
Science Sub-Committee (of the Select Committee on Science and 
Technology), which is engaged on a broad ranging inquiry into 
the relationship between scientific research and industrial 
innovation, has recently observed (see HC 136-i of 1975-76 
(22 January 1976)) that there are a number of similarities 
between the United States and the United Kingdom with regard 
to R & D patterns. The Sub-Committee has pointed out: "To 
the extent that one can find figures, both countries appear to 
spend on Research and Development about the same percentage of 
gross national product running at 2.7 to 2.8 per cent a few 
years ago. About the same proportion of total Research and 
Development (somewhat over 50 per cent) is funded by the govern­
ment. Industrially oriented R & D in both countries, is highly 
concentrated in a few industry areas - aerospace, electronics, 
chemicals." For the Minutes of Evidence of the Sub-Committee, 
see HC 23-i to 23-viii (1975-76).
2Zuckerman Report, para.81. The following two reports have 
recently been made by the Science Sub-Committee as a result of 
an inquiry into the organisation and funding of scientific 
research in British universities: (1) Second Report from the
Select Committee on Science and Technology: Scientific Research 
in British Universities HC 504 of 1974-75 (23 July 1975) and 
(2) First Report from the Select Committee on Science and 
Technology, Second Report on Scientific Research in British 
Universities HC 87 of 1975-76 (17 December 1975).
4.
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Government Organisation for Research 
and Development Procurement
A. AUSTRALIA
In Australia, the major Commonwealth Government R & D
agencies are: Defence Science and Technology Organisation
(DSTO) in the Department of Defence, Commonwealth Scientific
and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the Australian
Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC). Till the amalgamation of the
Department of Supply with the Department of Secondary Industry
as the new Department of Manufacturing Industry on 11 June 1974,
the. Department of Supply performed most of the R & D undertaken
to meet Australia's defence needs.^ In line with the Defence
Re-Organisation during 1974-75, on 2 July 1975 the Research
and Development Division of the Department of Manufacturing
Industry (which later became the Department of Industry and
Commerce) was transferred to the Defence Science and Technology
2Division of the Department of Defence. At present the Chief 
Defence Scientist conducts the policy, administrative and 
technical control of defence R & D. He is assisted by the 
Defence Science and Technology Committee (which has replaced 
the Defence Research and Development Policy Committee) on the
"^ For an appraisal of the R & D activities of the Department of 
Supply, see Millar, Australia's Defence op. cit. at 147 
et seq. See the Supply Reports 1959-1974 for a detailed account 
of the Department's R & D activities and attainments during that 
period.
2Defence Report 1975at29r34-A.G.P.S. Canberra 1975- Non-defence 
activities - in particular operation of the NASA space-tracking 
stations - were transferred to the Department of Science on 1 
January 1975: see Report, Manufacturing Industry 1975, Department 
of Manufacturing Industry, Canberra 1975.
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defence research activities. Whereas DSTO conducts research,
development, trials and evaluation in 11 establishments throughout
Australia, a small proportion of the R & D work is also obtained
from private industry under contract through the Purchasing
Division, Department of Administrative Services. The programmes'
of DSTO1 23s laboratories are co-ordinated to provide for the needs
of the Services and the Defence Department and to maintain an
effective technology base. Formal consultation occurs at all
levels between the Department, the Services and the laboratories
2and this provides a basis for planning activities. The total
expenditure on Research and Development in the defence field in
3Australia since 1970-71 is presented in the following table. 
Expenditure on Defence R & D in Australia
Year Amount
1970 - 71 $47,351 million
1971 - 72 $48,831
1972 - 73 $53,568
1973 - 74 $59,440
1974 - 75 $71.3
1975 - 76 $84.1
1976 - 77 $88.9*
* Estimated
Source: Compiled from Defence Report 1975, Table 3, 
Department of Defence, Canberra 1975 and Defence Report 
1976, Tables 3 and 12, Department of Defence, Canberra 1976.
'^Defence Report 1975, op. cit. at 3 0.
2For more recent developments see White Paper, Science and 
Technology in the Service of Society-The Framework for Australian 
Government Planning, Department of Science, Canberra 1975.
3For figures regarding Defence R & D from 1950-51 to 1968-69, 
see Bellany and Richardson, Australian Defence Procurement 
(Canberra 1970) 4-5.
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On the civil side, Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Organisation (CSIRO) is the largest and most 
diversified scientific body in Australia conducting R & D . ^ 
This agency is a statutory body and functions under the 
Department of Science. The Organisation's primary function 
is to carry out research for the development of primary and 
secondary industries in the Commonwealth and its Territories. 
Most of the R & D activity is carried out intramurally and 
thus a very small proportion of R & D is obtained under 
contract with private industry.
The Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC) is 
another R & D agency responsible for encouraging the search 
for, and mining of, uranium, and for developing the practical 
applications of nuclear energy by constructing and operating 
plant, and by co-ordinating research. AAEC is a statutory 
body, answerable to the Minister for National Resources and 
like CSIRO, it conducts most of the R & D activity intra­
murally .
B. U . K . * 2
Virtually every department of the United Kingdom 
government is involved to some extent in R & D contracting,
^See generally, Douglas (ed.), Research and Development
in Australian Industry (Sydney University Extension Symposium 
1967) 43-44.
2See Cmnd. 5177 (1972): Government's Observations on First
and Fourth Reports of the Select Committee on Science and 
Technology (Session 1971-72).
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although the Ministry of Defence occupies the most prominent
place. Other important departments which enter into R & D
contracts are the Department of Environment, the Department
of Health and Social Security, the Department of Education
and Science, Department of Trade and Industry (formerly the
Ministry of Technology), and the Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food.^  Responsibility for the R & D required
to support specific national policies lies with departmental
Ministers having responsibilities for those policies; the
Lord President of the Council is charged with ensuring that
there is adequate co-operation and co-ordination between
departments in the R & D field. He is assisted in this work
2by the Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government. The
organisational arrangements for commissioning, carrying out
and monitoring of R & D work in the government departments
3is in accordance with customer/contractor principle.
A lot of research and development work is conducted by 
government Research and Development Establishments e.g.
Mining Research and Development Establishment near Burton- 
on-Trent, England; Harwell Atomic Energy Research Establish­
ment at Harwell. See "Research and Development in Britain's 
Mining Industry" by Norman Siddall (24 October 1975) Vol.2l(4) 
Trade and Industry 218-21.
2HC Deb. v.872 c.293 (written answer by the Prime Minister,
11 April 1974) .
3White Paper. Framework for Government Research and Development 
Cmnd. 5046 July 1972 Para.13. See also HC Deb. v.876 c.144 
(written answer by the Lord President of the Council, 2 July 
1974).
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In the defence field, R & D procurement is now the sole
responsibility of the new procurement organisation.^ The
Ministry's Chief Scientific Adviser co-ordinates from a
scientific point of view the needs of the department as a
customer for R & D; the Procurement Executive as the
contractor has to meet the requirements of the three services
for weapons and equipment. R & D requirements are determined
by committees on which the central military, scientific and
finance staffs, the service departments and the Procurement
Executive are represented. Within the Procurement Executive,
responsibility for the execution of extramural programmes
2lies with four Systems Controllers and responsibility for 
the management of R & D establishments, including the Atomic 
Weapons Research Establishments, for the execution of intra­
mural work and for all research rests with the Controller 
for Research and Development Establishments and Research.
The Controller of R & D Establishments and Research 
receives advice and guidance from the Defence Research
The procurement organisation, headed by a Procurement 
Executive (who is the chief executive and directly respon­
sible to the Secretary of State for Defence) has been set 
up in 1971 following the implementation of the recommenda­
tions in the White Paper on Government Organisation for 
Defence Procurement and Civil Aerospace, Cmnd. 4641, 1971. 
The White Paper contains the Report of the Project Team 
under Mr D.G. Rayner which was accepted by the government 
in toto. The Report outlines the main structure of a new 
defence procurement organisation [hereinafter cited as 
'Rayner Project Team Report'].
2Three Controllers for Sea, Land and Air Systems and a 
Controller for Guided Weapons and Electronic Systems.
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Committee. The work is organised into eighteen major fields 
of research, such as aero-dynamics, electronics, armaments, 
ships, and submarines. Most of it is done in de fence-related 
industries and the R & D establishments, but some help is 
also provided by university laboratories. Rationalisation 
of R & D establishments, which is being undertaken in two 
stages, will complete the framework of an R & D organisation 
based on four main systems establishments - sea, land, air 
and underwater - complemented and supported by a number of 
technology establishments.^
C. U S.A.
In the United States, procurement of R & D is examined 
by several levels of the legislative and executive branches. 
Various legislative and appropriation committees of both the 
Senate and House of Representatives (e.g. the Senate Committee 
on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, the House Committee on 
Science and Astronautics, the Armed Services Committees of 
both Houses, etc.) review and assess the R & D programmes 
of the procuring agencies. The Congressional Office of 
Technology Assessment assists the legislative branch of the
"^Cmnd.6432 (White Paper March 1976) Statement on the Defence 
Estimates.
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government in reviewing the R & D activity. Broad reviews 
of the Federal R & D are also provided by the President of 
the United States who is assisted by the Office of Science 
and Technology, the President's Science Advisory Committee 
and the Federal Council for Science and Technology. The 
agencies and departments with R & D responsibilities have 
an Assistant Secretary for Research and Development, who is 
generally responsible for R & D procurement functions. 
Various other high administrative officials are appointed 
to deal primarily with R & D programme content and 
direction.^
5. Expenditure on R & D by Contract
A. AUSTRALIA
The statistics published by the five Survey Reports 
by the Department of Science for R & D in Australia in
Honey, "Federal Government Organization and Program for 
Research and Development - an Overview" (1957) 17 Fed.B.J. 
216; Report of the C.G.P. Vol.2, 9-11.
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1968-69 (called Project SCORE Reports 1-5)^ clearly show
that, during that year, compared with U.K., U.S.A. and 
2Canada, Australia spent less per capita on R & D, that 
it was high on the list dependent on government funding 
for R & D, that it had the smallest transfer of funds from 
the government sector to the business enterprise sector and 
that it had the largest proportion of expenditure in the 
government sector (see the following table). In the field 
of defence R & D only 6 percent of expenditure devoted to 
total defence R & D was incurred extramurally. This differed 
from the situation in the U.K., U.S.A. and Canada, where a 
larger proportion of defence R & D was performed outside 
government establishments. The following table is designed 
to give some idea about (1) Australia's GNP and GERD as 
compared with the U.K., U.S.A. and Canada, and (2) government 
funded R & D in Australia and other countries by sector of 
performance.
The five reports in the Project SCORE series present detailed 
information on the national commitment to R & D . A companion 
document is Survey of Industry Research and Development 
Expenditure 1968-69, Department of Trade and Industry,
Canberra 1972.
2See also Bellany and Richardson, Australian Defence
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Complete data regarding government:-funded R & D performed
by private industry under R & D contracts is not available for
Australia or other countries and thus such comparisons cannot
be made. But it is apparent from the overall figures and some
statistics in the Commonwealth Government sector for the year
1968-69, that in Australia very little R & D is obtained by
Government from the private industry under contracts. For
example, in 1968-69 out of total expenditure in the natural
sciences by the Commonwealth Government sector on extramural
R & D ($52.4m), R & D contracts that were let to private industry
2and others amounted only to $2.4m (5 percent). The rest of
the funds were disbursed in the form of grants, patents and
3licences and fellowships etc.
^Project SCORE, Commonwealth Government Sector 1968-69 
Department of Education and Science, Canberra 1972.
2Total expenditure on R & D equalled 3 percent of the total 
Commonwealth Budget outlay ($6,559m) for 1968-69 and 0.7 percent 
of the Australian National Product (GNP) ($27,215m) in that same 
year. Total value of scientific R & D performed in Australia 
in 1968-69 was $306 million, out of which the Australian Govern­
ment provided $234 million. Most of the R & D was performed 
intramurally ($181m) and business enterprise performed only a 
small part ($10.4m) of the total R & D work for the Government. 
See for details, Project SCORE, Commonwealth Government Sector 
1968-69, Department of Education and Science, Canberra 
1972 and Proj ect SCORE, Research and Development in Australia 
1968-69, P.P. No.271 of 1973.
3Proj ect SCORE, Commonwealth Government Sector 1968-69 at 5, 
Figure 18 and Tables 29 and 30, Department of Education and 
Science, Canberra 1972.
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Even the bare bones of these figures suggest that as an
economic, industrial, defence problem, R & D procurement in
Australia is a subject different in kind and not merely in
scale from its counterparts in the U.S.A., U.K. or other major
economies. In the defence area, for example, low volume
production because of Australia's relatively small, fluctuating
2and fragmented defence requirement, low exports, large importations
3of new technology, heavy concentration of R & D in government
One good example is the Reserve Capacity Maintenance Scheme in 
Australia, which has no equivalent in the U.S.A. and the U.K.
The Reserve Capacity Maintenance- an annual Government appropriat­
ion (which has existed in one form or another since 1945-46) is 
intended to meet various costs incurred in maintaining production 
capacity in both Government and civil factories for emergency 
defence needs but which are not covered by receipts arising from 
current use of that capacity. Where production capacity of a 
factory required for emergency defence needs is being only 
partially used, that part of the costs of maintaining that 
capacity - including overhead expenditure of a fixed nature and 
costs of maintaining plant and equipment- which cannot reasonably 
be regarded as production costs at current level of production, 
is treated as a charge against the Reserve Capacity Maintenance 
Appropriation. The Industries Assistance Commission has suggested 
that the scheme be retained: see IAC Report, Aerospace Industry 
P.P. No. 34 of 1976 at 43.
2The greater the volume of the production run, the greater the 
number of units over which non-recurring pre-production costs 
can be amortised. A large production run also provides the 
opportunities for obtaining full benefits of learning, for 
justifying the use of more productive capital intensive processes 
and for securing economies in the bulk purchasing of materials. 
See generally, Douglas (ed.), Research and Development in
Australian Industry (1967) 19-20.
3New technology is imported in Australia mainly as a by-product 
of licence production programmes.
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establishments are some of the main causes which have restricted
the opportunities for private sector participation through
government R & D contracts. The defence industry, outside the
Australian Government sector, with a few exceptions, has tended
to engage in little original R & D activity and manufactures to
precise service specifications. A research contract for $600,000
awarded in 1968 for the establishment of a micro-electronic
facility was the biggest of its kind ever let to private industry
in Australia - a fair indication of the scale of spending and
2effort involved.
In recent years however, Australian Government has moved 
to strengthen local industrial R & D capability by placing more 
R & D contracts upon the industry. For example, an R & D 
contract was awarded in January 1975 for pre-production activities
"Practically the whole of the local R & D effort has been 
initiated and executed within three government establishments - 
ARL, WRE and GAF" : Industries Assistance Commission Report on 
the Aerospace Industry at 45, P.P. No. 34 of 1976 (ARL is an 
abbreviation for Aeronautical Research Laboratories, Fishermen's 
Bend, Victoria; WRE for Weapons Research Establishment,Salisbury 
South Australia and GAF for Government Aircraft Factory, Port 
Melbourne, Victoria). See also the paper by Robinson
"Defence and Australian Industry" at the Seminar on Defence 
Policy and Procurement, sponsored by Sydney University Extension 
Board and the Centre for Continuing Education at the Australian 
National University, 23 April 1971. At p.3 the author states:
"In no other developed, non-socialist country in the world is 
such a high proportion of defence production and research carried 
out directly by Government agencies."
2 Robinson, op.cit. 3, 15.
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concerning Project MULLOKA (an advanced sonar system being
developed for the RAN)^ with E.M.I. Electronics (Aust) Pty Ltd.
Since 1973 many contracts have been placed with Australian
2companies concerning the BARRA sonic system.~ In the first 
stage of the BARRA development contract, the Phase 1 (Engineering 
Study) contract for $200,000 was let to Amalgamated Wireless 
(Australasia) Ltd. and four other companies in 1973. Later, 
approval was given for Phase 2 (Project definition and initial 
development) at an estimated cost of $2.7 million. Phase 3 
(full development, and establishing production facilities) began 
in 1974 with a three-month $1 million allocation. In March,
The contract covers assistance to Weapons Research Establishment 
(WRE) with the setting to work of the Mulloka prototype, an 
examination of the prototype hardware and documentation to see 
where cost savings in production may be effected, and the 
preparation of manufacturing drawings and handbooks. E.M.I. 
Electronics (Aust) Pty Ltd. has formed a project team including 
personnel from British Aircraft Corporation (Aust.) Pty Ltd., 
Fairey Australasia Pty Ltd. and Philips Industries Holdings Ltd. 
This project will enable industry to assimilate sonar equipment 
expertise and introduce technologies new to the Australian 
defence industry.
2Barra project is an advanced submarine detection system for use 
in association with long-range maritime patrol (LRMP) aircraft 
and comprises a highly-sensitive sonic detection buoy with a 
supporting data-processing system in the aircraft. For details, 
see Report, Manufacturing Industry 1974-75, A.G.P.S. Canberra 
1975; Defence Report 1975 A.G.P.S. Canberra 1975; Supply 1973 
Department of Supply, A.G.P.S. Canberra 1973 and Supply 1974 
Department of Supply, A.G.P.S. Canberra 1974.
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the government approved an additional $13-6 million to complete 
Phase 3 by the end of 1977. Contracts totalling just over 
$8 million were let to the five Australian companies which 
participated in the earlier phases of the project. These were 
Amalgamated Wireless (Australasia) Ltd, Sydney; Commonwealth 
Aircraft Corporation Pty Ltd., Melbourne; Plessey-Ducon Pty 
Ltd., Sydney; Electronic Systems and Management Services Ltd., 
Sydney; and Cable Makers Australia Ltd., Sydney. Development 
contracts, totalling $75,000 were also placed with private 
industry during 1974 for military electronic equipment develop­
ment. In the aerospace (the earth's atmosphere and outer space), 
where research and development is most important in modern times, 
the Australian Government's contracts to private industry for 
research and development work totalled $3.8 million between 
1965 and 1974 and were mainly confinedto the Ikara anti-submarine 
missile system1 2 [total value of contracts: $3.5 million, the 
major recipients were E.M.I. Electronics (Aust) Pty Ltd. ($1.6m), 
Amalgamated Wireless (Australasia) Ltd. ($1.2m), and Hawker
Siddele^ Electronics Ltd. ($0.7m)] and the Jindivik target
2aircraft system [total value of contracts: $0.3m, shared by
1This Australian-designed anti-submarine guided-weapon system 
for the RAN, Royal Navy and Brazilian Navy has been developed 
by the combined efforts of Government's R & D establishments 
and private industry.
2Pilotless target aircraft designed and developed in Australia.
360
Fairey Aviation (Australia) Pty Ltd. and Bendix Corporation
(Australia) Pty Ltd.]. Unlike many overseas countries, R & D
contracts by the Australian Government amount to very small
government funding of R & D work outside the public sector.
The practice in other countries of placing a larger share of
government R & D contracts with industry has helped to spread
technological benefits into commercial or non-defence industries.
But m  Australia, historical concentration of virtually
all R & D work in government facilities has meant that
private industry is unable to maintain specific R & D resources.
Contracts are undoubtedly very important to the maintenance of
industry's R & D resources. The Industries Assistance Commission
3in its recent report on the 'Aerospace Industry' has observed
that "the proportion of R & D at present being performed in the
4private sector of the industry is very low" and recommended 
that "the Government direct a reasonable proportion of total 
R & D expenditure to the industry, and more than at present to
trthe private sector of the industry".
Industries Assistance Commission Report, Aerospace Industry 
P.P. No. 34 of 1976 at 46.
2For an account of historical factors, see Robinson, "Defence 
and Australian Industry" op cit. 8 et seq.
3
Industries Assistance Commission Report, Aerospace Industry 
P.P. No. 34 of 1976.
4 Id. at 47.
5 _Id. at 58-59. "Research and development contracts should be let 
far more extensively to industry. ... This will not only add to 
our defence capacity, it will also provide a more meaningful boost 
to industrial development than any policy of across-the-board high 
tariff protection : P. Rooinson, op.cit. 16. See also to the same
effect, Douglas (ed.), Research and Development in
Australian Industry op. cit. at 82.
361
B. U.K.
Statistics showing the exact amount spent by the U.K. 
government by contract with private industry and universities 
and further educational establishments (including private non­
profit making bodies such as Cancer Research Campaign) for 
Research and Development work, are nowhere available. The 
latest data on British R & D spending is to be found in a 
publication of the Government Statistical Service entitled 
'Research and Development Expenditure'.^ This volume presents 
an historical conspectus of estimates of spending on 'scientific 
R & D' and includes tables which fall into four main groups, 
namely (a) summary tables which cover all sectors of the economy 
involved in R & D activity and show the value of the work carried 
out in each sector; the value of the work that each sector provides 
the finance for, and the flow of funds showing whence each sector 
obtains the funds for the work it carries out and also what
payments are made from any given sector to others to finance work 
2done there; (b) tables regarding work performed in, and other
3work financed by, central government; (c) tables regarding work
4performed in, and other work financed by, industry; and (d) 
tables giving certain data about transactions between the United 
Kingdom and the rest of the world in respect of royalties,
^Studies in Official Statistics No.21 HMSO 1973. Some information 
on U.S. R & D spending is contained in the Report of the C.G.P. 
Vol.2, 11-12.
2See Tables 1-5, Studies in Official Statistics No.21 HMSO 1973.
3Id. Tables 6-14.
4 Id. Tables 15-20.
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including those paid for new technological developments.
One thing which is most conspicuous by its absence in this quite
exhaustive volume is a separate table stating the volume of
government R & D work done by contract. Be that as it may, the
2following information has been collected from various sources
3to provide an index of the economic impact of R & D contracting.
(a) The following table relates to (1) the value of the R & D
4carried out in the United Kingdom from 1964-65 to 1969-70, the
^Id. Tables 21-24.
2The sources are Studies in Official Statistics No. 21 HMSO 1973, 
the House of Commons Papers and Debates, Departmental Reports on 
Research and Development, Command Papers, and the Supply 
Estimates.
3Information about R & D spending can also be found in a piecemeal 
manner in the following: United Kingdom House of Commons Debates
Volume Nos. 806 c.1-2 (1970-71); 809 c.191-4 (1970-71); 810 
c .94-5 (1970-71); 812 c.476-75 (1970-71); 867 c.326-8 (1974);
868 c.87-8; 892 c.574, 637 (1975); 894 c.4, 38, 144-5 (1975) 
and 908 c.438 (1976). See also Cmnd. 4814 (November 1971),
Lord Rothschild Report - The Organisation and Management of 
Government R & D; Cmnd. 5046 (July 1972) paras. 14, 18, 20 and
23; Report on R & D 1974, Department of Environment; "Research 
and Development by Manufacturing Industry in Britain"
(2 May 1974) Vol. 15(5) Trade and Industry 201-17.
4In the United States, the total Federal R & D expenditure 
reached a peak of $17.0 billion in fiscal 1968. It declined to 
$15.5 billion in fiscal 1971. According to the Commission on 
Government Procurement, the R & D obligations were expected to 
total $15.2 billion in fiscal 1972 and $17.8 billion in fiscal 
1973 - Report of the C.G.P. Vol. 2, 11-12. See also Nieburg,
In the Name of Science (Chicago 1966) 187. For a table stating 
(a) the total funds for the conduct of scientific R & D in the 
United States; (b) R & D inside the government; (c) R & D grants 
and contracts, etc. for the years 1955, 1956 and 1957, see 
Colman,"Small Business and Research and Development" (1957)
17 Fed. B.J. 285, 289.
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latest year for which the complete estimates are available;
(2) the total government expenditure on R & D; (3) the value of
the R & D work financed by government but actually performed
by contract^ by private industry and (4) work performed by
2university and further educational establishments.
R & D work is performed by the private industry through the 
instrumentality of contracts entered into with the government, 
but with universities and further educational establishments the 
work is not always performed by contract. Sometimes grants are 
made for the purpose. Since the break up of figures between 
contracts and grants for the performance of R & D work by the 
universities and further educational establishments is not 
available, it is hard to state how much work is being done by 
grants. For the literature on grants and the difference between 
a grant and a contract, see Glöckler, "The Contractual versus the 
Grant Approach to Basic Research Activities" (1957) 17 Fed. B.J.
265; Richardson, "Methods of Supporting Basic Research" (1957)
17 Fed. B.J. 281. It may be noted that the United States 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Research and Engineering (John H. 
Rubel) pointed out that out of U.S. Defense Research and 
Engineering budget of 1963 which exceeded $7 billion, 
approximately $5.5 billion was expended by private industry under 
contract to the Defense Department: R & D Contracting (Conference
Papers on Research and Development Contracts, published by the 
George Washington University and Federal Publications, Inc. 1963) 
19 [hereinafter cited as R & D Contracting] .
2There are a number of ways in which links are maintained between 
government research establishments and the universities, e.g. 
through extramural contracts, the use of university consultants 
(both for short-term advice and also for work in government 
laboratories during the long vacation), grants, and membership 
by university scientists on advisory committees: see Zuckerman
Report paras. 257-9. See also the two recent reports made by 
the Science Sub-Committee's enquiry into the organisation and 
funding of scientific research in British universities:
Scientific Research in British Universities HC 504 of 1974-75 
(23 July 1975) and HC 87 of 1975-76 (17 December 1975) .
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Year



















(1) (2) (3) (4)
£ 1000*
1964—65 771, 382 421, 242 183,177 48,835
1966-67 926,332 479,370 195,357 54,590
1967-68 962,067 493,104 196,012 61, 517
1968-69 1,016,575 514,114 203,959 69,007
1969-70 1,081,879 558, 831 221,800 74,791
•k£ Sterling
(b) The total expenditure by the Ministries of Supply and 
Aviation on R & D contracts with U.K. industry in the ten 
years up to 1966-67 was £1,550 million.^
(c) In the field of defence procurement, it is estimated that 
the procurement organisation will be spending on R & D by contract 
£103.6 million in 1975-76 and £116.6 million in 1976-77.2
^HC Deb. v. 756 c.344. For 
R & D funding, see Part C,
2Supply Estimates 1976-77,
the U.S. Department of Defense 
ch.4, Report of the C.G.P. Vol.2.
Class 1, Defence. HC 266 of March 1976.
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6 - Distinctions between R & D Contracts 
and Other Government Contracts!
R & D. contracts, like most government contracts, consist 
of standard or 'boiler plate' clauses together with a break 
clause; changes clause; costs, price and payment provisions; 
provisions relating to the furnishing of government property; 
delivery provisions; security provisions; and other special 
provisions as provided for by negotiation. Thus on the surface
they resemble most ordinary 'supply' or 'construction' contracts.
2However, beneath the surface there are substantial differences.
The basic difference between R & D and the government's 
commercial contracts is that R & D contracts, more often than 
not, involve contracts for personal services, while the latter 
are for supplies. In an R & D contract, the government, in effect 
buys the brain-child, the scientific and engineering knowledge 
and techniques of individuals and organisations to seek solutions 
to problems, to improve existing items, to design new items, or 
to make new discoveries in knowledge; what is supplied is not an 
off-the-shelf item, nor one listed in a catalogue. While the
For a list of distinctions, see Lazure, "Why Research and 
Development Contracts are Distinctive" (1957) 17 Fed. B.J. 255, 
261-62 .
2 "And even in the business of procurement, the contractual 
relation is not the traditional market affair: the contract is
not let on competitive bids, the product cannot be specified, 
the price is not fixed, the government supplies much of the plant 
and capital, and the government may determine or approve the 
letting of sub-contracts, the salaries of key executives, and a 
host of other managerial matters.": Price, "The Scientific
Establishment" (1962-63) 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 713, 726.
366
government's commercial contracts generally specify large 
quantities of end items to be supplied strictly in accordance 
with prescribed specifications and drawings, R & D contracts 
either set forth objectives to be pursued in broad terms; or 
call for the design of one or more prototypes wherein guidance 
is usually not available through preconceived drawings or 
specifications- It follows that a sound appraisal of the 
competence of the individuals and organisations that perform 
the contract is the most critical determination required by 
those responsible for the procurement of R & D, an appraisal 
which is different from that required for the procurement of 
supplies.
Another basic distinction of R & D contracts which set
them apart from other contracts is that in R & D contracts
the requirements are indefinite and results are not guaranteed.^
The end result is frequently not known at the time the terms
2of the contract are settled. That is why R & D contracts
^"Much procurement, especially that for research and development, 
is carried out in conditions of unpredictability and risk, giving 
rise to difficult problems of public accountability", Turpin, 
Government Contracts (1972) 18. in the U.S., the Director of
Defense Research and Engineering, in his testimony before the 
Congressional Sub-Committee on Military Appropriations, listed 
57 R & D programmes which had been cancelled during the previous 
ten years and on which $6.2 billion had been spent [cited in 
Downey Report (infra.388) Vol.l.para. 174],
2Cf. in the U.K., Report by Lord Rothschild - The Organisation 
and Management of Government Research and Development Cmnd. 4814 
(November 1971) para. 5." One must remember that the Research and 
Development effort of a country will have no effect on that 
country's welfare for at least seven years after the date of the 
effort in question."
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are entered into by negotiation, as an exception to the general
rule requiring formal advertising and competitive tendering.’*'
2R & D procurement is not susceptible to formal advertising 
since it (i.e. formal advertising) contemplates the inclusion 
in the invitation for bids of the specifications or descriptions 
defining the product to be supplied in clear and specific terms 
so that each 'sealed offer' will comply with the terms and be 
based on substantially the same product. In R & D however, 
identity of product is intrinsically impossible because of the 
importance of such qualities as innovation, related experience, 
and individual qualifications.
E.g., in the United States, there is a statutory exception to 
the general requirement for formal advertising: 10 U.S.C. §2304 
(a) (11) (1970) as amended (Supp. IV, 1974).
2Bledsoe and Ravitz, "The Evolution of Research and Development 
as a Procurement Function of the Federal Government" (1957) 17 
Fed.B.J. 189, 207, 208.
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R & D contracts
by their very nature include exploratory pursuits, unknown and
intangible elements upon which answers are to be sought by
investigation and experimentation, and other elements which
cannot be described with a definiteness which would enable
contractors to bid with the same approach and technique in mind:
only the ultimate objectives and general scope of the project
can be outlined. This type of work must be negotiated in
order to permit full discussion of new ideas, work approaches,
etc. The contractor is to be selected for his reputation,
skill, or exceptional facilities in much the same manner that
an individual selects another to seek an expert's services or
professional advice. It has been stated that if actions leading
to research objectives were all sufficiently well known as to
permit accurate specifications, they would be so well known as
to preclude the need for R & D effort. In the U.K., the Rayner
Project Report pointed out that though competition was an
essential ingredient of good purchasing, the design, development
and manufacture of defence weapon systems was quite different
from normal commercial operations.^ However, the Project Team
observed further, open competition could have the disadvantage
of inhibiting the buyer from exercising his supposed skills and
2judgment m  selecting the right R & D contractor.
1Cmnd.4641 (1971) para. 24.
^Ibid.
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Another feature of R & D contracts which distinguish them 
from other government contracts is that they are concerned with 
a continuing relationship in carrying on a project over a sub­
stantial period of time, in contrast to a more defined and 
limited procurement action such as the purchase of off-the-shelf 
items or the construction of (say) a conventional building. From 
this flows still another feature: the parties do, or can,
negotiate a genuine agreement tailored to cover the essentials 
of their relationship with express or tacit recognition that the 
details will be worked out as the relationship proceeds. The 
relationship between the government and a private organisation 
under R & D contract has been characterised as a 'partnership 
arrangement', a 'co-operative relationship', and a 'mutual 
undertaking'. Although the contracts themselves frequently state 
that the contractor is an 'independent contractor' the parties 
actually operate on a somewhat closer basis than the arms-length 
relationship signified by the 'independent contractor' legal 
concept.^ This 'partnership' relationship as developed in large 
scale R & D contracts involves the mutual working out of problems
"The market place for defense research and engineering is not 
the sort of 'supply and demand' market place studied in freshman 
economics courses. It is less diverse, but more complex. The 
choices open to customer and supplier alike are both different 
and less. It is subject to a form of control by the Government 
that is very rare in other market places. And contractors often 
acquire a de facto partnership in decisions and in determining 
projects trends that is also rare in most business situations": 
John H. Rubel, Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Defense Research 
and Engineering, "R & D Contracts: Policies and Problems",
R & D Contracting op. cit. (1963) 21.
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by the government and the contractor all the way through the 
contract process, beginning with the negotiations and continuing 
through execution, performance, and completion or termination of 
the contract. Thus, during negotiations, considerable emphasis 
is placed upon establishing policies and procedures by represent­
atives of the parties, and on effecting necessary adjustments in 
them at the time the contract is entered into, with the under­
standing that such policies and procedures may be further adjusted 
by mutual agreement as experience is gained and other problems 
are encountered under the contract. During the later stages of 
negotiation and immediately after execution of the contract, the 
parties usually work out more detailed guides and procedures on 
such matters as personnel, procurement and property management. 
Mutual agreement is reached annually as to the budget and work 
programme for the succeeding year, during which the entire pro­
gramme is reviewed. Important problems which arise during the 
life of the contract are discussed and solved again by mutual and 
not by unilateral action. It should, however, be observed that 
the relationship under an R & D contract varies depending upon a 
number of factors, including the size and subject matter of the 
contract, the nature of the parties, and their experience in 
handling R & D contracts. It is particularly with large scale cost- 
type contracts, usually at government-owned installations, that the 
full-blown partnership arrangement is established. With respect to 
medium and small scale work at the contractor's own facilities , the 
government usually takes a, so to speak, 'evolutionary1 approach, 
with it normally exercising somewhat greater controls until
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the contractor has demonstrated that he is capable of greater 
responsibility under mutually agreed upon policies and procedures. 
In the United States the Bell Committee, which was appointed to 
report to the President on government contracting for research 
and development reported in 1962 that it was their firm conclusion 
that it was in the national interest for the government to continue 
to rely heavily on contracts with non-federal institutions to 
accomplish scientific and technical work needed for public purposes. 
It observed that a partnership among public and private agencies 
is the best way to enlist the nation's resources and achieve the 
most rapid progress."*"
In supply procurements, where the type and quantity of the 
item to be procured is set forth specifically in the invitation 
for bids or request for proposals, the contract is generally 
awarded to the lowest bidder or proposer. In research and 
development, however, price is not the most relevant factor 
in contractor selection and evaluation, because the work to be 
performed is not fixed, and actual evaluation based on results 
and costs is possible only after the project has been completed. 
Moreover, most R & D procurements seek innovative ideas and 
frequently cannot be considered as essentially cost or price
U.S. Bureau of the Budget, Government Contracting for Research 
and Development: Report to the President, commonly called the 
"Bell Report". Submitted by the President of the United States 
to the U.S. Senate and reproduced as Senate Document No. 94,
87th Cong., 2nd sess., 1962.
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competitive. The selection of the R & D contractor is usually 
based primarily on the competence of the technical personnel 
who perform the work, the attitude and ability of management, 
and the facilities and experience available in the contractor's 
organisations.
The U.K. Rayner Project Report^” warned that the procurement 
organisation must be wary of falling into the trap of treating 
second-rate suppliers as cost-effective simply because they quote 
lower prices. The Report proceeded to point out that suppliers 
who did not make a profit were rightly considered less effective 
in giving value for money than those with good profit records, 
except in short-term once-for-all transactions.
The size of its purchases usually makes the Government a 
significant, frequently the dominant, and in many fields the 
sole buyer of R & D. Moreover, in R & D procurement, freedom 
to enter or leave the market place is sharply constrained by 
security classifications, protection of proprietary information, 
and lack of usefulness of R & D capabilities in other kinds of 
enterprises. These factors give rise to a difficult problem in 
R & D contracts: to what extent should the government commit 
itself to awarding the future mass production contract to the 
contractor doing the development work? Contractors are most 
often unwilling to commit key personnel and facilities to a 
development contract, owing to the relatively small scale of
^Cmnd. 4641/1971 para. 27.
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development operations, and the 'headaches' so frequently a part 
of such operations (as compared to production operations), unless 
they can have some assurance that they will be ^warded the 
first production run contract. Yet this conflicts with one of 
the fundamentals of government procurement, that all competent 
contractors should be given the chance to compete for government 
business.^ Of course, it is true that even in strictly open 
competition, the development contractor has a decided advantage 
in the competition for first production both by reason of the 
'know how' acquired in development and the possession of much
2of the tooling, equipment, and machinery required for production,
and also because development and the first stage of production
are usually interlocked, the production contract being often
3awarded before development is complete. In the U.K., the
See the discussion in Turpin, Government Contracts (1972) 134, 
251.
2"This type of situation is recognised in ASPR §3-214.1 and 2 
(1975) which authorise the negotiation of contracts if "for 
technical or special property that he [the Secretary] determines 
require a substantial initial investment or an extended period 
of preparation for manufacture, and for which he determines that 
formal advertising would be likely to result in additional cost 
to the Government by reason of duplication of investment or 
would result in duplication of necessary preparation which would 
unduly delay the procurement of the property. The authority of 
this paragraph will in general be used in situations where it 
is preferable to place a production contract with the supplier 
who had developed the equipment, and thereby either assure to 
the government the benefit of the techniques, tooling, and 
equipment already acquired by that supplier, or avoid undue delay 
arising from a new supplier having to acquire such techniques, 
tooling, and equipment".
3Turpin, op. cit. 161-2.
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Rayner Project Team stated that contractual policies which
expected a supplier to devote his scarce scientific resources to
the development phase without any assurance for future business
would stand effectively between the development of a partnership
between buyer and seller which, in their view was essential for
long-term planning and the minimisation of manufacturing costs/
The Project Team further observed that continuity of work would
enable suppliers to acquire the skills and maintain the trained
2personnel necessary for effective process quality control.
To avoid giving undue advantage to a development contractor
3over other possible competitors for subsequent production contracts,
what the Australian Government does is to give all potential
contractors an opportunity to tender in the first instance, i.e.
when a requirement arises for a new item. A complete coverage
at this stage ensures as far as possible that the most efficient
equipment is finally obtained at the best price available.
Finally, an R & D contract , unlike most 'supply' and
'construction' contracts of Government, is not a contract of 
4adhesion . Although R & D contracts do usually contain 'boiler
^Cmnd. 4641 (1971) para. 24.
2Id. para. 26.
3In the United States, this is termed as a "conflict of interest" 
situation. For details, see Report of the C.G.P. Vol.2, 47-49.
4It is interesting to note that the skills and expertise 
developed in R & D in the Industrial Research Establishments of the 
Government are sometimes made available to industry on contract: 
3rd Report from the Select Committee on Science and Technology 
HC 302 of 1971-72 (U.K.) paras. 57 and 58-
plate' or 'standard conditions' regarding the changes and
termination of contracts, the basic nature of these contracts
is so different that the government is not often in a position
to dictate one-sided terms. R & D contracts more or less involve
a sort of collaboration between the government and the contractor
on a long-term basis. Since much of the work is done at the
forefront of scientific and technological fields where things
are uncertain and unpredictable, and often (as in the defence
procurement), the monopoly buyers deal with monopoly suppliers,^
the details of contracts are negotiated between the parties,
with few exceptions, almost on equal level as the contract 
2proceeds. At the same time, however, the manner in which the 
R & D procurement functions, is very different from the ordinary 
commercial government contracts. In R & D procurements, 
particularly for defence, the Government decides what will be 
developed and when; it decides what will be produced and when 
and in what quantities. Its decisions, right or wrong, are 
often final decisions. Similar factors and considerations 
seldom apply with anything like equal force to the non-defence 
contracts nor is the Government so likely to be largely or even 
entirely dependent upon a single supplier or a group of them
1Cf. Cmnd. 4641/1971, para. 23.
2It was the recommendation of the Zuckerman Committee that the 
oversight of a development contract should, as far as the 
government is concerned, be by a team or management board chaired 
by a technical official of the Supply Department and represented 
by members from the technical, financial and contracts divisions 
of the Supply Department concerned, as well as the potential user 
and a representative of the prime contractor: Zuckerman Report 
para.217 (iv).
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for the non-defence products that it needs. There are no 
standard conditions specifically laid down for the purposes of 
R & D contracts. In some cases where the terms are not negotiated 
or intelligently picked up from the standard conditions of 
government contracts for stores purchases, the contractual 
relationship is carried out under the conventional legal language 
of the standard form contract, complete with the usual whereas 
clauses, boiler plate and fine print. But in order for a going 
co-operative relationship to work under such a contract, the 
parties, particularly the government, strive to make sense out of 
the situation by a scheme of informal administration outside the 
formal arms-length relationship prescribed in the contract 
document. Another method is to postpone the evil day of entering 
into a standard form contract as long as possible. But whatever 
may be the case, the fact remains that the contractual relation­
ship is entered into and carried through on a far more equal 
footing than the supply contracts because the R & D contracts 
involve a technical and professional job for very long periods 
of time and in some cases the private party is in a stronger 
position as far as the scientific and technological knowledge is 
concerned. In the U.K., the Zuckerman Committee reported this 
in 1961: "Considerable numbers of professional and technical 
staff from industry work alongside the Authority's [Atomic Energy 
Authority] own staff on particular projects.... Through contracts 
for extra-mural work, links are maintained with university
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scientists who also make frequent use of the large experimental 
installations at Harwell.""*"
7. Contracting-out
There are three main means by which R & D contracting 
takes place: (1) R & D contracts for the management and operation
of government-owned facilities; (2) R & D contracts in which 
government finances research which is of the contractor 's choice - 
generally of a basic or fundamental nature and generally with 
universities and academic institutions; and (3) R & D contracts 
entered into with private commercial organisations requiring the 
contractors to solve particular problems assigned by the govern­
ment. The choice between the various means of accomplishing 
an R & D task ultimately boils down to relative efficiency and 
effectiveness of the means selected. Before dealing with the 
contractual forms of an R & D contract, it will be pertinent to 
discuss what, in the United States, has been termed
1 contracting-out'.
2Nieburg , tracing the developments which have occurred in 
American society in this scientific age, observes that R & D 
contracts have become the wedge that opens the door to larger 
procurement awards and in effect controls the fate of companies, 
corporate managements, financial elites, geographical areas, and 
political leadership. According to him,scientific research and
^Zuckerman Report, para,66. See also para,87.
2 Nieburg, In the Name of Science (Chicago 1966).
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development are open-ended undertakings. In the chapter 
entitled 'The Contract State'^  he points out how public control 
has been eroded:
The dominant centres of corporate power have largely 
usurped the government's evaluation and technical 
direction responsibilities .... The Government's 
Bell Report of 1962 expressed concern at the erosion 
of its ability to manage its own affairs and to 
retain control over contracting .... The 
proliferation of quasi-public corporations, both 
profit and non-profit, springing from the soil of 
R & D spending (such as Bellcomm, Aerospace 
Corporation, or Comsat Corporation) , symbolizes 
the bewildering innovations of the Contract State.
Another well-known author similarly observes that:
No sharp line separates government from the private 
firm; the line becomes very indistinct and even 
imaginary. Each organization is important to the 
other; members are intermingled in daily work; 
each organization comes to accept the other's 
goals; each adapts the goals of the other to its 
own. Each organization, accordingly, is an 
extension of the other. The large aerospace 
contractor is related to the Air Force by ties 
that, however different superficially, are in 
their substance the same as those that relate the 
Air Force to the United States government. Shared 
goals are the decisive link in each case.3
^"Chapter X, 184-99.
2 Id. at 192.
Galbraith, The New Industrial State (London 1967) 314.
This state of affairs has been dubbed by many American
scholars as 'contracting-out'^ and defined as "the transfer of
responsibility for the performance of desired functions, mostly
of a personal service (i.e. administrative) nature, to private 
2institutions". Power to administer governmental programmes
is 'delegated' to the managers and directors or non-governmental
organisations 'who in turn use their own personnel to fulfil
3contract obligations'. 'Contracting-out' has been described
Some of the problems, philosophy and techniques of 'contracting- 
out' have been discussed in a symposium: "Administration by
Contract: An Examination of Governmental Contracting-out"
(1963) 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 685-783. See generally the 
following materials on 'Contracting-out': Ramey and Erlewine,
"Introduction to the Concept of the 'Administrative Contract' 
in Government Sponsored Research and Development" (1957) 17 Fed. 
B.J. 354; Kimball Prince, "Sandia Corporation: A Science-
Industry-Government Approach to Management of a Special Project" 
(1957) 17 Fed. B.J. 432; Hearings entitled Contracting-out 
Government Responsibility for Administrative and Management 
Services (Part I - Military Assistance Institute) before the Sub­
committee on Manpower Utilization of the House Committee on Post 
Office and Civil Service, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); Hearings
entitled Contracting-out Procedures before the Sub-Committee for 
Special Investigations of the House Committee on Armed Services, 
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); a Report entitled Air Force 
Ballistic Missile Management (Formation of Aerospace Corporation) 
H.R. Rep. 324, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); Systems Development 
and Management, Hearings before a Sub-Committee of the Committee 
on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 
2nd Sess. (1962)(5 vol.) and Whelan and Taptich, "Legislative 
and Regulatory Activity" ch.2, R & D Contracting op. cit.
2Miller, "Administration by Contract: A New Concern for the
Administrative Lawyer" (1961) 36 N.Y.Univ. L.Rev. 957, 968.
^Ibid.
380
also as "a system that allows the government to farm out a
complete range of administrative and executive responsibilities,
accompanied by money, authority, and responsibility".^ Thus
the term implies a divestiture of responsibility, an arrangement
by which the functions which ought to be performed wholly within
the precincts of government are turned over - lock, stock and
2barrel - to a non-governmental organisation.
The tag of 'contracting-out' has been attached to a broad 
range of contractual relationships between government agencies 
and private organisations, including contracts for weapons 
systems management and technical supervision, management analysis 
and consultant services, contracts for the maintenance and repair 
of facilities and equipment, personnel training, educational 
services, technical co-operation, operations analysis, research 
and advisory services in the planning and policy fields, the 
conduct of basic and applied research, management and operation 
of government research establishments and laboratories, and for 
the services of a contractor in the areas of systems engineering, 
integration, testing and overall 'technical direction' of 
complicated development projects. Each of these functions is 
often believed to fall in the 'in-house' category utilising only 
government employees. On the other hand, there are many avenues 
of contractual activity where the 'in-house' alternative is not
^Heyman, "Government by Contract: Boon or Boner?" (1961) 21
Public Admin. Rev. 59, 61.
2Johnson, "The Expanding Role of Contract in the Administration 
of Research and Development Programs" (1962-63) 31 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 747.
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present. No one today conceives of the government manufacturing 
the automobiles it uses, refining the oil it consumes, or 
producing the infinite variety of standard commercial items it 
procures from industry. The purchase of such items involves 
the most conventional and stereotyped use of the government 
contract, and the 'contracting-out' label is never thought to 
be applicable to them; nor, for that matter, is it ordinarily 
applied to the quantity production by industrial corporations 
of some of the unconventional items, even though those involve 
some research and development, or to the field of big construction 
contracts, although such contracts vest extensive responsibility 
with the contractor for the actual performance of the work. In 
these areas the pattern of government-industry relationship is 
so long established that one hardly ever thinks of choosing 
between governmental and private means of getting the job done.
It is only where government agencies appear to have a choice, 
and especially where there is a shift away from an exclusively 
'in-house' method of doing the work, that the process of reaching 
beyond the ranks of government employees to accomplish the task 
is labelled as 'contracting-out', and the dangers of undue 
delegation and transfer of managerial responsibility are 
highlighted.
]_For the nature and extent of contracting-out, see Miller, 
"Administration by Contract (1961) 36 N.Y.Univ. L.Rev.
957, 968-76.
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Those who criticise 'contracting-out' observe that 
government agencies have come dangerously close to abdicating 
responsibility by relying to an excessive degree upon 
contractors in the decision-making process and in the perform­
ance of functions of an inherently 'governmental' nature. 
Professor Arthur Miller maintains that under the contracting- 
out process "power over governmental decisions is turned over 
to private groups and individuals", thus magnifying "the 
problem of discretion in administration". That has led to the 
undesirable result that 'private administrators' are making 
policy or at least strongly influencing it. Thus, "the 
power to interpret, to implement, to advise and to analyze 
becomes a governmental power privately e x e r c i s e d . D r  Heyman 
fears that simple dependence of the government on certain 
contractors may result in a dangerous increase in bargaining
on the part of organisations which become virtually
2 3indispensable. The same view seems to be held by Galbraith.
4While the Bell Committee Report stated the "fundamental 
conclusion that it is in the national interest for the
1Id. at 981-83.
2Heyman, op. cit. 61.
Galbraith, The New Industrial State(London 1967) 311-12,315.
4President Kennedy wrote to the Director of the Budget (Mr David 
E. Bell)on 31 July 1961, asking for an exploration of "the 
circumstances and conditions under which contractor operations 
provide the most effective means of accomplishing the govern­
ment's objectives in the areas under review". S.Doc.No.94, 87th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. 25-26 (1962). [These extracts are reprinted 
in Miller, "Introduction: The Rise of an 'External Bureaucracy1 2*4"
(1962-63) 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 685, 689-97] .
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government to continue to rely heavily on contracts with 
non-federal institutions to accomplish scientific and 
technical work needed for public purposes", it also pointed 
out very firmly that the management and control of all 
federal R & D programmes must not be delegated to private 
organisations.-*- Such functions are: determining whether
a certain project shall be undertaken, setting the pace at 
which it shall be performed, deciding on the organisation 
to carry it out, instituting appropriate means of controlling 
that organisation's performance, and, finally evaluating 
the results.
The use of R & D contracts has grown because new social 
conditions have brought problems which cannot be resolved 
adequately with government's existing apparatus. The protag­
onists of 'contracting-out' remark that it is not the result 
of any desire on the part of government agencies to divest 
themselves of responsibility. The motivation, rather, has
come from the need of the government to avail itself of talent
2where it already exists - in the private sector - on terms 
which provide a sufficient incentive for participation. 
Moreover, the 'contracting-out' device effectively pleases
^In the United Kingdom, the Treasury Officials exercise 
financial control on R & D: see the discussion in Turpin,
op.cit. 122 et seq.
2In the United States only 13 percent of the nation's R & D 
scientists and engineers are employed by government: Report
of the C.G.P. Vol.2, 25.
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those who clamour against 'big government' but want big new 
governmental programmes. It allows projects to be carried 
on without a regular staff with which the 'government 
would be saddled It allows full flexibility of personnel 
policies and salaries, fringe benefits and working 'atmosphere', 
which can be changed as the work changes. People with fresh 
ideas are free to be hired and released without a single 
service regulation being applied. Whole institutions and 
their prestige can be hired when needed, in effect temporarily 
'nationalizing' them. Special equipment for special projects 
need not be purchased, only to lie unused at the end of the 
programme. People who would not work for the government 
because of salary, red tape, pension and personal commitments, 
etc. are obtainable.
These are not small benefits. However, it is apparent 
that here, as elsewhere, 'fleas come with the dog', and it 
is to a discussion of these that we now turn. 'Contracting- 
out' is a sharp break with tradition and creates unresolved 
problems - constitutional and technical. It has been observed 
that 'contracting-out' results in delegations of legislative 
and administrative power to private groups and is thus 
“constitutionally invalid*.' In the United Kingdom, the Select
^See Heyman, op.cit. 61; Johnson, op.cit. 763.
2Miller, "Administration by Contract ...", op.cit. 981 et seq.
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Committee on Science and Technology (Second Report 1968-69) 
making the first comprehensive parliamentary inquiry into 
defence R & D, recommended that industry should participate 
in the formulation of defence R & D policy. But the British 
Government very cautiously pointed out that "its [industry's] 
involvement in responsibility for policy is to the extent 
which the Committee recommend would raise constitutional 
issues which go much wider than research and development"."^
In the defence field, the government observed further, 
industrial firms, "are primarily agents for the execution 
of government defence equipment policy; it is for the govern­
ment to take the ultimate decisions and it cannot share the
n 2responsibility for these decisions. The government stated 
that the major objective of its policy was to build up a 
closer partnership with industry in the framing and execution 
of research and development policy and programmes so that 
decisions could be taken with the best possible advice. But 
it then hastened to add that sight must not be lost of 
differing responsibilities of government and industry: "In
particular, they must not be such as to derogate from the 
ultimate responsibility of the Minister concerned for
^"Para.12, Cmnd. 4236/December 1969. Defence Research and 
Development. See also the First Report on Research and 
Development, Department of Environment, 1973.
2Cmnd. 4236/December 1969 para.12.
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implementing government polrcy as expressed in the
objectives of the programme and the priorities within it,
or for the control of defence expenditure."''" These
observations clearly show that the British Government is
aware of the constitutional problem. But it is very hard
to say how far the strict judicial doctrine of delegability
2of power has been applied in practice. Be this as it may, 
the growth of private administration of public affairs is 
carrying traditional delegation practices into a new area.
Another problem of 'contracting out' is that government 
is never able to attain the knowledge and experience to 
perform its assigned functions with civil service and 
military personnel since it contracts for them every time 
they are needed. Again, R & D contracts provide an opportunity 
for patentable inventions to be created, the ownership of 
which createi' a serious source of conflict and unpleasantness. 
The simple dependence of the government, particularly the 
military, on contractors is most undesirable. In the United 
States the Department of Defense and the three military 
services already find themselves heavily dependent on their 
'think group' contractors, like RAND (Research and Development)
_^Id . para . 35 .
2It is the admitted policy and practice of the government to 
leave the total management responsibility of development 
projects of great importance e.g. in the aircraft and guided 
weapon field, in the sole hands of the contractor, see 
Defence Research and Development Cmnd.4236 (December 1969) 
para.29.
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Corporation, and would be severely handicapped without them.
With such dependence, what may happen if the contractor and
the government disagree as to fee, patent rights, or any of
the many other features of the contract, can be anybody's
guess. At least one congressional committee in the U.S.
them
finds it 'difficult to conclude otherwise'^ that all impasses 
are resolved in favour of the contractor.
8. Sequence of Operations: The Range from Basic Research
to Production via Development
To better understand R & D contracting problems, it is
helpful to outline the various stages between basic research
and production (basic research and development are stated by
the Zuckerman Report as bands at opposite ends of a continuous
spectrum^") . The categories which make up this spectrum
include the research area, comprising basic and applied
research, and the development area, including feasibility
studies, design, construction and testing of prototypes.
After approval by the 'user' department (civil or defence,
as the case may be), the prototype moves out of research and
2development and into production and supply channels. But
before reaching the 'production' contract stage, a lot of
effort, time and money has still to be spent. Seldom is
this achieved by means of one contract. At each phase
contracts are entered into with the private parties to
^Para.18, Zuckerman Report.
2It should not be inferred however, that each category is 
a discrete step in the R & D process with a clear beginning 
and end entirely separate and distinct each from the other 
See ASPR §3-402 (b) (1975) .
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accomplish a particular task. Thus a contract may cover 
research only or research and development, development only 
or development coupled with production on a greater or lesser 
scale. Decision to proceed from one step to the next is 
based on all available information about likely progress, 
cost and time scales.^ Though there is no single system of 
processing which can be applied to R & D projects in the 
interval between their conception and the moment they become 
the basis of a development contract, the following sequence 
of operations has been recommended in the U.K. by Zuckerman 
Report and improved upon by the Downey Steering Group Report:
R & D consists of a series of stages of trial and error, 
each of which may involve equipment redesign and retest 
and unforeseen difficulties may arise at any stage.
2The 'Zuckerman procedure' was further developed rn a report 
of a steering group set up in 1964 by the Permanent Secretary 
of the Ministry of Aviation (under the chairmanship of Mr 
W.G. Downey), to examine and consider the methods used in 
industry and in the Ministry of Aviation for cost estimation 
and control of defence development projects; and to make 
recommendations. The Report of the Steering Group on 
Development Cost Estimating (HMSO 1969) is in two volumes 
[hereinafter cited as the 'Downey Report1 volume 1 and 2] .
The recommendations have been adopted by the British 
Government (See HC Deb.v.792 c.1476, 3 December 1969 - 
oral answer by the Secretary of State for Defence). The 
Downey Report and the Zuckerman Report provide the framework 
of principles for the government research and development 
contracting in the United Kingdom. (See Turpin, op.cit.at 
83). In the United States, the categories of Research, 
Exploratory Development, Advanced Development, Engineering 
Development and Operational Systems Development (see ASPR 
§4-101), represent the spectrum of the R & D development 
cycle. For the details of this classification see ASPR 
§3-402(b)(i),(ii) and (iii)(1975). See also Downey Report 
Vol.l, chapter 8. In Australia, the usual sequence of a 
research and development project includes most or all the 
stages discussed here.
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(i) Basic and Applied Research Contracts 
These are directed towards the expansion of knowledge 
in various scientific areas and are generally entered into 
with universities and academic institutions. Some of the 
results of these contracts lead to the formulation of a 
draft operational requirement (Staff Requirement or Staff 
Target)“^ and this is followed at an appropriate stage by 
the initial sketch of a technical specification.
(ii) Feasibility Study Contracts
Normally on major development projects a feasibility
study is carried out in industry, with advice and guidance
from government establishments where necessary. Feasibility
studies are often carried out by a number of contractors in 
2competition. The government may or may not make a contrib­
ution to the cost of work by the contractors. The main 
object at this stage is to secure competition in ideas (i.e. 
any alternative ways of meeting the government's require­
ments) in order that the government can select the most 
suitable and promising idea for detailed project study.
The feasibility study contract also enables the government 
to identify the scientific and technical problems involved
^Zuckerman Report paras.187-94.
2Zuckerman Report para.198. In Australia, it is Government 
policy to make best use of whatever possibilities for 
competition exist, although this is limited by the scarcity 
of suitably equipped firms.
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in meeting a staff target and to assess whether those can be 
solved. Normally it does not involve any experimental work or 
engineering, but does include approximate indications of the cost 
and time that would be necessary to complete the project. The 
British Downey Steering Group Report^ recommended that the 
feasibility study may last up to six months and cost around one 
half per cent of the estimated total development cost.
(iii) Project Definition Study Contracts
The results of the feasibility study are studied by
government agencies to determine whether the project should
proceed beyond that stage. In some cases the feasibility study
may reveal the need for further research and appropriate contracts
are then entered into for that purpose. In other cases, the
contract is made with the selected contractor for the Project
Definition Study. It involves a detailed examination of the
scientific and technical problems in developing a weapon or
equipment to meet a staff requirement - leading up to a plan of
design, development, and testing (quantified in terms of money,
manpower and time) and to an indication of subsequent production
2costs. This study is generally not competitive but is covered 
by a single contract, normally on a cost-reimbursement basis, 
calling for work to be done in two phases: Project Definition
Stage 1 and Project Definition Stage 2. The contract includes
D^owney Report Vol. 2, Handbook of Procedure Programming, 
Estimating and Control of Development Projects 1.
2Competitive project studies may be obtained for selecting a 
contractor only in rare cases: Downey Report Vol. 1. para. 160.
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the standard break clause so that it can be terminated at the
end of Project Definition Stage 1, if necessary/ Stage 1
corresponds broadly with the project study envisaged by the
2Zuckerman Report. It may last up to nine months and cost up to
3five per cent of the total development cost. During this phase 
the contractor carries out design and experimental work so as to 
reduce the technical uncertainties and to evolve a draft 
specification. The contractor also prepares a first development 
cost plan. Unless the government decides to terminate the 
contract at this point, it proceeds without interruption to 
Project Definition Stage 2. In this stage the contractor carries 
out more detailed design and experimental work. The experimental 
programme includes the construction of models - such as space 
models of complete equipment and working prototypes of sub­
systems . In addition, tests are carried out to examine components 
and further reduce technical uncertainties. The Downey Report 
recommended that on major projects this may occupy some twelve
to fifteen months and cost up to a further ten per cent of the
4estimated total development expenditure. It is used to prepare 
detailed specifications covering performances, development trials 
and engineering characteristics. These specifications form the 
basis for a revised development/cost plan and for the 
government's decision on whether to proceed with the development
D^owney Report Vol. 2, 5 et seq.
2Zuckerman Report para. 203 et seq.
3Downey Report Vol. 2, 5.
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to completion. Two products of project definition contract are 
thus - a development specification and a synthetic estimate of 
cost.
(iv) Development Contracts
The transition from a project-study contract to a
development contract represents a critical stage of decision.
It forms the basis for a final examination of the desirablility
2of proceeding from a project study to a development contract.
In the course of a project study it usually becomes apparent
whether it is likely to be successful. But in some cases
consideration of a project study report takes time, and it is
important to ensure that the teams which have been built up in
industry to study the project are not left idle, or worse still,
disbanded because of the time-lag between the completion of the
project study and the letting of a development contract. Both
the Zuckerman and Downey Reports were of the opinion that in
order to maintain the momentum of promising projects, a sort of
stop-gap arrangement (sometimes called a 'holding contract')
3may be made. In other cases a development contract is placed 
upon the contractor to meet a specific requirement on lines
D^owney Report Vol.l, paras. 253-70. In the United States, this 
is called the "Program Definition Phase". For details see 
R & D Contracting op. cit. 25-26.
2Zuckerman Report paras. 207-11.
3Downey Report Vol.l para. 261; Zuckerman Report para. 212.
See also the report submitted by two firms of management 
consultants who, commissioned by the Downey Committee, studied 
twelve projects: "Industrial Case Studies: Summary of Agreed
Statements of Fact," Appendix K, para. 12, Downey Report Vol.l.
393
indicated by a preceding project study. Development contracts
normally involve much larger sums than research contracts and
involve many aspects which are not usually material or applicable
to research contracts, such as change orders, critical delivery
targets, large quantities of government-furnished machine tools,
large numbers of sub-contracts, manufacturing drawings,
2production engineering etc. It must, at this point, also' be 
stated that once a prototype has been accepted by the user 
department and the production contract has been placed, a new 
cycle of R & D with respect to that item continues with the end 
in mind of improving that product or weapon.
9. Type of Contract most appropriate for R & D Work
A wide selection of types of contracts is prevalent in 
government procurement which provide^the requisite flexibility 
needed in the purchase of large variety and volume of civilian
^Zuckerman Report paras. 213-19.
2The Downey Committee Report recommended "[W]e consider it 
desirable that, before placing any new major development contract, 
the Supply Department should look again at the selected company's 
proposed system of [cost] control in order to be sure that the 
requirements of an effective system have been introduced, 
consistent with the estimating, budgeting, and cost collection 
procedures recommended in the Handbook of Procedures .... We 
also recommend that where the supply department is doing 
continuing major business with a contractor, his financial and 
accounting system should be checked at regular intervals, every 
five years." op. cit. para. 97. See also 'The Handbook of 
Procedures' (contained in Vol.2 of the Downey Report) which 
describes an integrated set of procedures for programming, 
estimating, and control, on ministry-sponsored development 
projects. These procedures are intended as an aid to 
contractors in the effective management of development projects 
and also to assist government project officers in the evaluation
of proposed projects, and in the oversight of development 
contracts.
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and military supplies and services. The respective contract 
types mainly vary as to the degree and timing of responsibility 
assumed by the contractor for the costs of performance and the 
amount and type of profit incentive offered to the contractor 
to achieve or exceed specified standards or goals. With regard 
to the degree of cost responsibility, a wide variety of 
arrangements is constructed; the following three being the major 
ones which are arranged in order of decreasing contractor 
responsibility for the costs of performance: fixed price
contracts, incentive contracts and cost-reimbursement contracts. 
With regard to contract types, which are rated according to the 
incentive, they provide for the contractor to improve his 
performance in one or other or all aspects of the contract.
There is again, an infinite variety of arrangements which is 
available for inclusion in an incentive plan. Incentive 
contracts currently in use however are: Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee
(CPIF), Fixed-Price-Incentives (FPI) and Cost-Plus-Award-Fee 
(CPAF). In the following pages, we consider the suitability or 
otherwise of each of the three major types of contracts for 
research and development work.
(i) Fixed-Price Contracts for R & D Work
As for the procurement of supplies and services, also for 
R & D work, public policy favours the use of fixed-price 
contracts, except where a cost-reimbursable or incentive contract
A general discussion of the methods and types of government 
contracts is to be found in chapter II, supra.
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promises some net advantage over a fixed-price contract. In 
competitively negotiated procurements, the fixed-price contract 
provides the greater assurance that the benefits of competition 
have been obtained and employed. In this type of contract, the 
contractor undertakes the performance of a definite scope of 
work for a fixed amount of compensation. The amount is 
determined at the time of entering into the contract. From a 
financial viewpoint, it is the best type of contract for the 
contractor, providing him with the greatest .incentive because 
any reduction of costs below those originally estimated in his 
price normally results in added profit. This type of contract 
is used when the work is well defined and the cost of performance 
can be determined in advance with reasonable accuracy. There 
are certain clear-cut advantages to the government in placing 
R & D work on a fixed-price basis. Among them are: (1) an
incentive to the contractor to reduce contract costs and 
accelerate the completion of the work; (2) a reduction of 
administrative costs, both for the government and the contractor, 
due primarily to the absence of detailed records and audit; and 
(3) an increased stability in the government's funding, due to 
the reduction (but not elimination) of the cost over-run problems. 
But, at the same time there are substantial hazards involved 
in undertaking research and development work on a fixed-price
"^ Turpin, op. cit. 188. Report of the C.G.P. Vol.l, 22. For the 
various types of fixed-price contracts used by the United States 
procurement agencies see FPR§l-3.404 (1976); ASPR§3-404 (1975).
See also the discussion in chapter II, supra.
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basis. To a greater extent than in any other type of 
procurement, a contractor is faced with these risks:
(1) impossibility of performance; (2) miscalculation of 
cost and time; and (3) likelihood of a dispute concerning 
the prior interpretation of the specifications.^ In summary, 
the high degree of uncertainty in R & D contracts obviously 
militates against the use of fixed-price contracts.
(ii) Cost-Reimbursement contracts for R & D work 
For R & D work it is generally felt that the cost- 
reimbursement contract or cost-type contract is more 
appropriate than the fixed-price type, for the same reasons
2that negotiation is preferable to bidding in R & D contracts.
That is, fixed-price contracts contemplate that the subject
matter of the contract can be substantially specified before
the execution of the contract. R & D projects, however,
generally are not subject to fixed requirements or definite
work approaches, and the anticipated costs and variations in
approaches necessary to pursue best the objectives cannot be
forecast accurately at the time of contract negotiations.
Flexibility in pursuing the R & D objectives being essential,
the cost-reimbursement contract offers such flexibility and
~^See in Australia, Industries Assistance Commission Report 
on Aerospace Industry P.P. No. 34 of 1976 at 30 where some 
of the difficulties in adopting fixed price arrangements 
are stated. For a detailed account of the risks involved 
and their possible solution, see Pettit, "Fixed
Price R & D Contracts" 121-30, R & D Contracting (Conference 
Papers on Research and Development Contracts) (U.S. 1963).
See also Report of C.G.P. Vol.2, 45-46.
2See the discussion chapter II, supra.
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it is the most common type used for R & D activities.
The cost-reimbursement or cost-type agreement is used 
for most large scale research, development, and demonstration 
work and for production type activities carried on in govern­
ment-owned facilities. Under this type of arrangement, the 
government reimburses the contractor for his direct costs 
together with payment of an overhead allowance and a fixed 
fee. Thus, in effect, on large scale R & D work where costs 
are at best an educated estimate and a comparison of cost 
estimates is not a good basis for contractor selection, the 
management and technical 'know-how' of contractors is 
obtained on a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee (CPFF) basis. In this 
arrangement profit rather than price, is fixed and the 
contractor's cost responsibility is minimal. The government 
therefore, assumes all or most of the financial risk for 
the work. However, the contractor, particularly in a 
difficult new research and development project, risks his 
technical and managerial reputation to some extent. 
Conversely, the contractor, in addition to receiving payment 
of all costs, and a fixed fee, may obtain valuable training 
of its personnel in new fields which may later be applied 
in his regular commercial or academic pursuits.^*
discussion of advantages and disadvantages is to be 
found in Nash's paper "Cost Plus Fixed Fee
Contracting" in R & D Contracting, op.cit. 109-19.
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Another type of profit arrangement which is made is
a cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost (CPPC). In the CPPC
contract, the initial agreement fixes the percentage of
the ascertained costs which is to be added as profit. Since
in this type of contract, the actual amount of profit
increases with costs, the contract is said to have an
inherent disincentive to economy and is generally viewed
with disfavour in the United Kingdom.^ In Australia, too,
a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee (CPFF) , rather than a cost-plus-a-
percentage (as it is called here) is considered the more
2appropriate type of price basis. In the United States,
cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting is
3prohibited by law.
There are two other types of cost-reimbursement 
arrangements which are sometimes used by government in 
obtaining R & D work, viz. a 'cost contract' and a 'cost 
sharing contract'. A 'cost contract' or as it is sometimes
^Turpin, op.cit. 188. See also Downey Report Vol.l, para.210. 
2Statement of Mr Bernie Long, Assistant Secretary, Purchasing 
Division, Department of Administrative Services, in a Seminar 
given by him on 20 July 1977. A series of seminars on 
Purchasing Program for 1977 were held in the Department of 
Administratives Services, Canberra under the auspices of the 
Institute of Purchasing and Supply Management, A.C.T. Branch.
310 U.S.C. 2306 (a) (1970) and 41 U.S.C. 254(b) (1970) . For 
the specific provisions in the Procurement Regulations, see 
FPR§l-3.401 (b) (1976); ASPR§3-401(a) (2) (1975) . See also
Smith, "Overhead Rate Determination - the Use of Negotiated 
Rates" (1973) 6 Public Contract L.J. 128,129.
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called cost-without-fee-contract, is the same as CPFF type, 
except that the contractor receives no fee. It is normally 
used for R & D contracts with non-profit institutions, such 
as the universities. The 'cost sharing contract1 resembles 
the cost contract in that the contractor receives no fee, 
but differs in that he is reimbursed only an agreed portion 
of his allowable costs. This type is considered appropriate 
for R & D projects which are jointly sponsored by the 
government and the contractor, theory being that the 
contractor will obtain other benefits in lieu of full 
monetary reimbursement of costs. It is used in cases of 
jointly sponsored R & D projects with educational or other 
non-profit institutions, or in cases where the results of 
the research result in commercial benefit to the contractor.'*' 
In reviewing the use of cost-reimbursement types of 
contracts for obtaining research and development, it is 
apparent that they also are not best suited. The cost- 
plus- a-percentage-of-cost contract (CPPC), as stated above, 
not only fails to provide an incentive to economy, but may 
actually encourage uneconomic working and performance. In
^See in the U.K. Cmnd.3927(1969) Chapter VIII, "Research and 
Development" and Cmnd.4236, Defence Research and Development 
para.43, where cost-sharing contracts have been called 
'partnership agreements'. In the United States, see FPR§l-3. 
405-2 and §1-3.405-3; ASPR§3-405.2; and §3-405.3. It
should, however, be noted that the U.S. Commission on 
Government Procurement (1972) recommended the elimination
of the cost-sharing on R & D projects - see Report of the 
C .G , P. Vol.2,2.
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a CPFF contract too, a contractor has little inducement to 
keep his costs at a minimum. Since he is paid for all 
allowable costs, a cost-plus scheme does not discourage 
the extravagance of cost overruns/ The more he experiments, 
the more he learns, and with little or no out-of-pocket 
expenses. He, in essence, receives an education at government 
expense, and the government may well pay for more research on 
a particular project than it needs or wants. When it is also 
considered that the R & D contract is quite often the fore­
runner of the production contract, much of which is on cost-
plus- incentive- fee (CPIF) basis (i.e. the government and the
2contractor share in any 'saving' below the 'target price')
the research contractor has a positive incentive to boost his
research and development costs as high as possible so that the
production target price will similarly be set high. This
presents a very difficult problem of cost control. Moreover,
since the contractor is assured that the incurred costs of
certain types will be reimbursed, and any mistakes he makes
will not reduce his profits, a negative incentive develops
3leading to stretch-outs and increased costs.
^In Australia, see Industries Assistance Commission Report, 
Aerospace Industry P.P. No.34 of 1976, 24.
^See infra.
3Nash and Cibinic, Federal Procurement Law (Washington 1969) 
281 et seg. and Pasley, "Research and Development Contractual 
Instruments" (1957) 17 Fed.B.J. 329, 342.
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The United States Defense Department summarised the
disadvantages of CPFF contracts as follows:
It provides little or no incentive for private 
managers to reduce costs or otherwise increase 
efficiency. Indeed, the cost-plus-fixed-fee 
contract, in combination with strong pressures 
from Governmental managers to accomplish work 
on a rapid time schedule, probably provides 
incentives for raising rather than for reducing 
costs. If a corporation is judged in terms of 
whether it accomplishes a result by a given 
deadline rather than by whether it accomplishes 
that result at minimum cost, it will naturally 
pay less attention to costs and more attention 
to speed of accomplishment. On the other hand, 
where there is no given deadline, the cost-plus- 
fee contract may serve to prolong the research 
and development work and induce the contractor 
to delay completion.'*"
(iii) Incentive Contracts for R & D work
The various incentive contracts which provide for
varying degrees of contractor cost responsibility, depending
upon the degree of uncertainty involved in contract perform-
2ance, are the third type of government contracts. In 
these types of contracts, the parties agree to a target 
cost, a target profit and a target formula which provides 
that profit increases if actual costs are less than the
Bureau of the Budget, Report to the President on Government 
Contracting for Research and Development 35 (30 April 1962) 
(cited in R & D Contracting, op,cit. 98).
2It may be noted that in the United States, the Procurement 
Regulations treat incentive contracts as one of the cost- 
type or cost-reimbursement contracts: FPR§l-3.405-4 (1976);
ASPR§3-405-4 (1975).
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target cost and that profit decreases if actual costs are 
more than the target cost. The aim of an incentive contract 
is to induce the contractor, by means of rewards or penalties, 
to meet or improve upon either performance and/or delivery 
requirements and to reduce costs. These objectives are best 
achieved by development and negotiation of an incentive plan 
which encourages the contractor to accept more risk in return 
for greater profit.
In essence, nearly all contract incentives use a 
'target' approach as an alternative to the 'cost-plus' 
approach. They take the form of a sharing arrangement, 
expressed as a percentage ratio. For example, if a 60:40 
cost sharing formula is negotiated as part of the contract, 
the terms and conditions of the contract will require that 
the government must pay 60 cents and the contractor 40 cents 
of every dollar by which actual costs increase above and 
beyond the agreed target cost figure. Conversely, for 
every dollar saved (that is, for every dollar allowable 
costs are below the agreed target cost figure), the govern­
ment retains 60 cents and the contractor's profit or fee 
increases by 40 cents. These cost sharing arrangements 
ensure that the profit or fee of the contractor reflect his 
management skills in controlling cost overruns against the
target cost estimate.
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In addition to cost incentives, performance and 
delivery incentives are also used sometimes, the theory 
being that a positive emphasis, spurring the contractor 
through the profit motive, is more effective and adminis­
tratively more convenient than reliance on legal remedies 
such as determination of contract for default and provisions 
for liquidated damages. Such incentive arrangements hinge 
on quality and timeliness of performance as well as cost. 
Performance incentive contracts are generally developed 
to cover a requirement where complete specifications cannot 
be written, the methodology of production is undecided, and/ 
or the technology and appropriate industrial capacity are 
unknown. Hence equipment performance targets are set in 
relation to specific standards and agreed test procedures.
The targets are tied to such characteristics of performance 
as range, speed, thrust, manoeuvrability, reliability, 
maintenance costs, interchangeability, standardisation, 
compatibility and failure probability.
Delivery incentive contracts are developed where 
supplies are urgently required or where government desires 
accelerated completion of the contract. A delivery incentive 
is normally written in days, weeks or months, with a target 
on a calendar date or time. The delivery targets set in 
the schedule are then related to rewards or penalties for
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prototype acceptance delivery dates, first batch production 
run completions, slippage or delinquency, and achievement of 
interim milestone or critical interface dates. However, 
where delivery by a specified date is a prime requirement 
warranting consideration of incentive provisions, the 
incentive plan must provide for the cost targets to be met 
in conjunction with the delivery targets. Use of delivery 
targets alone could see costs run rampant and specifications 
being barely met while the contractor seeks to deliver early 
to earn increased profit on the contract/
Contracts containing two or more incentives are called 
multiple incentive contracts. A multiple incentive contract 
not only uses cost targets but also performance and delivery 
schedule targets and incentive rewards as well. Each element 
within such a contract establishes neat balancing of trade- • 
offs, giving appropriate recognition to relative weighting 
of the various elements making up the contract and the 
critical activities required to carry large or small 
incentives. The method of 'structuring' the multiple
^In the United States, Armed Forces Procurement Regulations 
provide that a multiple incentive contract may contain two 
or more incentives in any combinations; for example, cost 
and delivery, cost and performance, or cost, delivery and 
performance incentives. Delivery or performance incentives 
alone are not authorised by the Defense Department. These 
provisions obviously reflect hard-earned lessons in this 
area of contracting whereby contractors have sought 
incentive goals in their own interest at the expense of 
the government. See, for example, ASPR §3-407.2 (c) (1) (1975) .
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incentive consists of first determining the total target fee 
(representing normal profit for an acceptable job) and then 
to divide this in the desired proportions between the cost, 
performance and delivery incentives; the target fee for 
each of these aspects is then varied up or down for success 
or failure. However, the application of the incentive varies 
according to the stage of the project. In the development 
phase the main emphasis is usually on performance; cost 
and delivery are stressed in production contracts. In the 
United States, performance and delivery incentives in R & D 
contracts are used extensively.
To summarise this discussion of multiple incentives 
in R & D contracts, it is apparent that an effective use 
of incentive contracts depends upon the successful control 
of certain factors in contracting. The first, and most 
basic of these is of course the definition of requirements.
The ASPR regulations governing the selection of the proper 
type of contract contain the following statement regarding 
the preferred contract type for development work: "The
cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is suitable for use primarily 
for development and test when ... a target and a fee adjust­
ment formula can be negotiated which are likely to provide 
the contractor with a positive profit incentive for effective 
management. In particular, where it is highly probable that 
the development is feasible and the government has determined 
its desired performance objectives, the cost-plus-incentive- 
fee contract should be used in conjunction with performance 
incentives in the development of major systems, and in 
other development programs where use of the cost and 
performance incentive approach is considered both desirable 
and administratively practical ...". ASPR §3-405.4(b)
(1975). The cognate provision in the FPR is contained in 
§1-3.405-4(b)(1976).
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The government must know what it wants. A corollary to this 
is the designing of the incentive formula. Again, the 
methods of measuring performance should be based on the 
existing means and standards and these methods must be 
agreed to before the development effort is performed.
There are large numbers of permutations and combinations
of incentives. The basic types of incentive contracts which are often
employed in R&D are (1) cost-plus-incentive-fee and (2) fixed-
price— incentives. The distinction between these two is
that whereas in a cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) contract
there is no ceiling price and thus all allowable costs are
paid by the government and with no obligation for the
contractor to continue working if the government does not
provide sufficient funds, with fixed-price-incentive (FPI)
contract a ceiling price is included and the contractor
is obligated to complete the work at this amount. Again
in a CPIF contract, normally a maximum and minimum profit
fee is prescribed but in the FPI contract no such maximum
2or minimum profit is prescribed. In the United Kingdom
1In the U.S. see FPR§l-3.404-4 (1976); ASPR§3-404.4(1975).
Another type of contract which is used in defence and NASA 
procurement of research and development is called cost- 
plus- award- fee (CPAF) contract (see ASPR§3-405.5 and NASA 
PR§3-405.6). CPAF provides a means of applying incentives 
in contracts which are not susceptible to finite measure­
ments of performance necessary for structuring incentive 
plan. The amount of special fee (award fee) is paid to 
the contractor upon a subjective evaluation by the govern­
ment of the quality of the contractor's performance. See 
also Burt, "Contracts that Save Money" (Aug/Sept 1976)
Australian Purchasing 5,6.
^For an illustration of these two kinds of contracts, see 
Burt, op.cit. 5.
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unlike the United States, these two types of incentive 
arrangements are classed together as 'target cost contracts'.
Unfortunately, it is only within rather narrow limits 
that an incentive approach can be effectively employed. For 
instance, a CPIF contract cannot be used where costs are 
completely unknown, as in advanced state-of-the-art or basic 
research/ Neither is it likely to be used where costs can 
be estimated with great accuracy and with a substantial 
historical base - a situation suited to fixed-price contract­
ing. One of the hazards of CPIF contracting is that a very 
strong incentive to inflate estimated costs is built into 
the system. According to Turpin, the success of the system 
depends "on the negotiation of a good target" and its useful­
ness is confined to that "narrow but important sector of 
procurement in which the knowledge and predictions of the 
parties do not provide sufficient certainty for a fixed price
but do allow of the calculation of a reasonable target or 
2target range". Moreover, experience in the United States 
and the United Kingdom suggests that the incentive approach 
is unsatisfactory in circumstances where substantial changes
/or example, in the United States, NASA found it difficult 
in the initial stages to write into its contracts cost and 
performance incentives. There was so little cost history 
in the areas in which NASA was contracting that fair cost 
targets could not be arrived at. See the paper by 




in specifications or work to be done are required in the 
course of the contract performance.
10. Current Practices for R & D Procurement
A. AUSTRALIA
The Australian Government contracting authorities usually 
arrange fixed-price contracts wherever possible and this 
applies to developmental as well as production contracts. In 
most R & D contracts the unknowns are, however, so incalcul­
able that a fixed-price contract is considered too hazardous 
or uncertain either to the contractor or to the government 
and these contracts are, therefore, generally arranged on 
the basis of 'ascertained costs' plus profit basis (as the 
cost-plus-a-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract is called in Australia). 
Under this 'ascertained costs' plus profit system, costs are 
seldom accurately estimated in advance. The total cost of a 
job is estimated on completion of the work and a pre-determined 
percentage profit mark-up is added. Major reasons for the use 
of this system are that it is time-saving and simple, partic­
ularly when there are frequent modifications to original 
specifications, that there is a lack of opportunity for 
competitive tendering when often only one industry has the 
necessary R & D resources to undertake the work, and that 
accurately estimating costs of dissimilar jobs is difficult.
The selection of a contractor for an R & D project is made 
by the contracting authority, in consultation with the competent
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technical and financial authorities, on the basis of responses 
to such questions as whether the total cost estimates 
are submitted, whether the relative labour hours and materials 
allowed for each item/stage of the task are realistic, whether 
the proposals show an adequate understanding of the task, the 
relative technical chances of each proposal to be completed 
successfully, the supporting managerial, industrial and financial 
resources of each tenderer, the suitability of each tenderer to 
undertake subsequent production, the suitability of each design 
for quantity production, Commonwealth equipment/facilities held 
or required by each tenderer for testing or other contract 
purposes and so forth.
The price basis of "ascertained costs" plus profit (i.e. 
CPFF) is chosen by the contracting authority if the nature of 
R & D task is (i) insufficiently defined by specifications, 
drawings or other means and the Commonwealth and the tenderer 
cannot reach a reasonably accurate assessment of costs, or 
(ii) involves solving of developmental problems, or (iii) 
concerned with development and production of prototypes, but 
with a continuing development factor in each prototype. In 
some cases, the contracting authorities stipulate that a cost- 
plus contract may be converted into a fixed-price type e.g. 
where the developmental content is expected to be largely 
resolved early in the life of the contract, and by which stage 
a reasonably accurate assessment of the cost of the balance of the
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contract is possible. But in those cases where the first prototype 
has been accepted and the task involves production of fully 
engineered units, a fixed-price contract type is entered into 
in preference to any other price basis.
Incentive contracts are not as yet common in Australia.
The only instance of the application of incentive arrangements 
to a research, development and production project is the contract 
for supply of wireless sets from Amalgamated Wireless (Australasia) 
Ltd (AWA) in 1969. The essential features of that contract which 
was on a cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) basis were as follows:-








$207,000 (9 percent of 
target cost)
$322,000 (14 percent of 
target cost)
$92,000 (4 percent of 
target cost)
5 0:50
$2.5 to $2.1 million 
( + 10 percent 
of target cost)
The company maximised its return by completing the project 
at an actual cost which represented 86 percent of the agreed 
target cost estimate. Thus it received the maximum fee payable 
on the target cost, i.e. 14 percent of target cost.
Experience with the developmental order for the Wireless Sets 
clearly indicated to the contracting authority that, because of
411
the risk and uncertainty inherent in the project, there was no 
possibility of reaching agreement on a mutually acceptable fixed- 
price contract for the production stage. The company's preference 
had been for a cost-plus-percentage-profit contract (CPPC) on the 
grounds that an incentive-type arrangement would erode expected 
profit, if it did not result in an outright loss, when there was 
an overrun of costs. The Commonwealth's view at the time was 
that, because there was a defined "build standard", historic 
costs were available of the material content, and some cost data 
was known on manufactured costs, the requirement was ideal for 
use of a cost-incentive contract arrangement. While the company 
showed some reluctance initially to the use of a cost-incentive 
approach, once the negotiations were completed, the motive to 
increase profit by cutting costs in the productive processes 
ensured that the contract was successful, with benefits going 
both to the government and the contractor. This success was 
followed up in 1970 by placing with AWA further three 
orders involving target cos t incentives for supply of wireless 
set spares for the Army and Navy. Again the actual costs were well 
below the estimated target costs, and the contractor received 
the maximum fee of 14 percent of target cost.
No further incentive-type contracts have been let in 
Australia since 1970, other than a cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) 
contract valued at $15 million arranged with Fairey (Australasia) 
Pty Ltd for operation and maintenance of three NASA tracking
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stations in the A.C.T. and the support facility at Fyshwick 
for a period of three years ending 31 August 1977. The main 
reason for not having incentive arrangements for R & D 
procurement is stated to be that the purchasing authorities 
do not at present have the facilities or ability (such as 
appropriate management techniques supported by pricing, audit, 
logistics and engineering considerations and all the sophis­
ticated supporting procedures that the participation of 
personnel representing these functions entails)^ necessary
to determine target costs with sufficient accuracy for use
2as part of an incentive arrangement.
The Industries Assistance Commission, which recently
3released a report on the 'Aerospace Industry' , has strongly
recommended that incentive contracts should replace cost-
plus contracts wherever practical for defence work undertaken
4by local industry. The Commission stated that as a general 
rule fixed price contracts should be arranged but where
^The supporting procedures include new techniques of price/ 
cost analysis, Project Definition, Development Categorisation, 
Contractor Performance Evaluation, PERT/Cost and the Cost of 
Economic Information System.
2This was stated by Mr Bernie Long (Assistant Secretary, 
Purchasing Division, Department of Administrative Services) 
in a seminar given by him on 20 July 1977 held under the 
auspices of the Institute of Purchasing and Supply Management 
(IPSM).
3Industries Assistance Commission Report, Aerospace Industry 
P.P. No. 34 of 1976.
4Id. at 58. It may be noted that this recommendation of the 
IAC has been recently implemented by the government.
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uncertainties regarding costs were likely to be significant,
the application of more moderate forms of incentive contracts
should be considered. The Commission observed: "Whether
based on a fixed price incentive or cost-plus-incentive-fee
arrangement, the main feature of such a system should be that
the contractor is permitted to retain some part of any cost
savings, relative to a target cost named in the contract, and
is penalised by some part of any costs in excess of the
target.""*' The Commission felt that the introduction of
incentive contracting in Australia would lead to an improvement
2in the overall efficiency of industry.
Although the recommendation by the Commission has been 
made mainly for the production contracts, there seems to be 
no reason for not extending it to R & D procurement.
B. U.K.
Current government practice is to try to negotiate where-
ever possible a form of contract which provides the contractor
with a financial incentive to keep the costs to the minimum
3compatible with the satisfactory performance of the work. In
~*~Id. at 30.
2The evidence given to the Commission by the aerospace industry 
showed general agreement that the cost-plus scheme, including 
the necessity of complying with complicated check on costing, 
did not encourage an increase in efficiency. The industry 
advocated as a method of encouraging greater productivity, 
the introduction of incentive schemes allowing the government 
and contractors to share cost savings resulting from greater 
management and production efficiencies (_id. at 24) .
3Third Report from the Committee of Public Accounts, HC 297 of 
1969-70, paras. 42, 74-88; Report of the C & A G, Civil 
Appropriation Accounts (Classes I - v ). For the French approach 
to the initiation and control of development contracts, see 
Downey Report Vo1.1 Ch.9.
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the past few years the use of incentive contracts by procure­
ment authorities is on the increase. In 1961 the Zuckerman 
Committee stated that the Ministry of Aviation was attempting 
to improve the contractual arrangements it made with industry 
by the greater use of incentive contracts rather than those 
based on cost-plus-profit basis.^ In 1966 the Downey Committee 
considered in detail the application of incentives in develop­
ment contracts in the U.K. It supported the policy of seeking 
incentive arrangements for development work wherever possible. 
The Committee concluded however, that only in exceptional cases 
would the essential conditions exist for the successful negot­
iation of an incentive contract at an early stage. It emphas­
ised that negotiation of incentives was largely dependent upon 
establishment of firm and realistic specifications and on the 
ability to make realistic estimates of cost and time based on 
those specifications. Advanced development work involved, 
according to the Committee, a degree of uncertainty which 
militated against this, but that there was scope for incentive 
contracting on the smaller, less risky projects and on the main
phase of development of bigger projects if the project studies
2were carried out with greater thoroughness. The Committee 
then remarked that although incentives had considerable merit
^Cmnd. 3927 (1969).
2Downey Report Vol.l, paras.210-46.
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in certain applications, their use in the U.K. could only 
be introduced if additional technical expertise was available. 
It did not, therefore, recommend the adoption of any 
particular type of contract for R & D contracts but suggested 
that the circumstances of each project should be examined by 
the technical staff, in consultation with the finance and 
contracts branches. It further stated that before a project 
definition contract was placed, the contractor should be 
required as one of the outputs of that phase to put forward 
proposals for incentive arrangements for any subsequent full 
development contract or for such parts of the programme as 
appear suited to that form of contracting. The government 
would then need to decide in each case whether and what 
incentive arrangements were appropriate and the stage at 
which they should be introduced.^"
The Committee of Public Accounts in its report made 
2in 1970 has also drawn attention to the difficulties 
which the government has experienced in negotiating target 
cost (i.e. incentive) contracts. In a number of cases it 
found that targets had to be revised because the specific­
ations had been modified after the finalisation of target 
costs. In other cases, great difficulty
^Downey Report Vol.l Ch.10, "The Scope for Incentives in 
Development Contracts" paras. 210-246.
2Third Report from the Committee of Public Accounts HC 297 
of 1969-70, paras. 76-88.
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was experienced in estimating and negotiating realistic cost 
and performance targets at an early stage in the development 
or production process, in agreeing to such targets in relation 
to specifications which had not been finally determined, or in 
negotiating profit rates commensurate with the risks likely to 
be involved. The Committee cited the instances of the Concorde 
and Harrier Aircraft contracts for the engines and airframe 
where such difficulties were experienced in the negotiation 
of incentives.
C. U.S.A.
Until the March 1962 ASPR Revision, the U.S. Defense
Department made widespread use of cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF)
contracts for R & D work.1 As a result of findings by the
2Bureau of the Budget there was a shift to incentive contracts. 
Since then the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) have made increasing use of 
CPIF contracts. The successful use of incentives in defence 
development contracts in the U. S. has reduced considerably 
the need for the Defense Department to monitor the contractor's 
progress during development. It has also helped the government 
in forward budgeting for defence expenditure.
Thus in 1961, $8.9 billion worth of defence awards (39 percent 
of total DoD contracts) were made under the CPFF type of con­
tract: R & D Contracting op.cit. 98.
^Ibid.
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The idea of procuring the development of a weapon 
system under an incentive contract however is not new there.
In fact the contract which, for practical purposes, established 
the present American system of procuring aerospace weapon systems 
contained an incentive clause. This was the contract signed in 
1908 between the Wright brothers and the Aviation Division in 
the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. It was a fixed price 
contract with a performance incentive. It called for an airplane 
with a speed of 40 miles per hour, a range of 125 miles, and a 
payload of 350 pounds. In addition, the Signal Corps Specific­
ation No. 486 included incentives for performance up to 140 
percent of the price for 44 miles per hour and down to 60 percent 
of the price for the minimum acceptable performance of 36 miles 
per hour. The price was $25,000. The Wrights were paid $30,000 
or a 20 percent incentive, for a 42 miles per hour performance. 
This early example of a performance incentive illustrates one 
of the basic requirements for incentive development contracts 
- that is, the determination of desired performance objectives.
11. Terms of R & D Contracts
(i) The terms for an unsatisfactory performance 
of an R & D Contract
The legal remedies available to the government in the case 
of an unsatisfactory performance of an ordinary procurement 
contract are either the determination of contract for default
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or payment of damages - liquidated or otherwise - or in
appropriate cases both. In addition to the legal remedies/
there are certain 'administrative remedies' that may be taken
against a contractor such as profit reduction or disallowance
2and not placing future contracts. Performance is said to be 
unsatisfactory if the contractor has not performed the contract 
to the expectations of the government - either in the sense of 
quality, quantity or time. Whether the performance of the 
contract is in accordance with the specifications or whether it 
has progressed satisfactorily is a very difficult question to 
decide. These difficulties are aggravated in the field of R & D 
contracts because there it is often not possible to foresee, when 
the contract is placed, the results perhaps several years ahead, 
that will be achieved by the contractor. It is in the nature of
3R & D work that the final answers are uncertain and problematic. 
The whole area of R & D work is surrounded by uncertainty about 
the specifications which translate the staff requirements into 
engineering terms and about the work that will have to be done 
to meet it; and uncertainty about the technical problems that
"The practice in recent years ... has been to rely on common 
law rights for breach of contract to safeguard the government's 
interests in the event of delay in preference to liquidated 
damages clauses stipulating fixed sums." Second Report from 
the Estimates Committee (U.K.), Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment for the Services, HC 53 of 1966-67, 6.
2See generally, Turpin, op. cit., "Disputes, Remedies and 
Termination" (Chapter 8).
3 Paul, United States Government Contracts & Subcontracts 
(1964) 102 et seq.
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will arise and the effort and time that should be allowed for
their solution. Moreover there is the paramount difficulty of
the availability of qualified personnel fit to oversee
performance. Performance supervision is vitally dependent on
definition of parameters and methods of testing and these aspects
are very complex. Nevertheless, despite all these difficulties,
unsatisfactory performance by the contractor must not pass
without notice. In a report presented to the United Kingdom
Parliament by the Comptroller and Auditor General in 1965, it
was stated that the normal practice of the Ministry of Aviation
was to impose an appropriate penalty against the contractors to
the extent that inefficiency on their part could be demonstrated
to have contributed to increased costs of the R & D projects.'*’
In the following year the Ministry of Aviation was asked by the
Committee of Public Accounts for examples of cases since 1963 in
which contractors' profits had been reduced for unsatisfactory
performance and six illustrative cases were given in a memorandum
2presented to the committee. All were cases of unsatisfactory 
technical performance in development work and all but one were 
cost plus contracts. It would appear from these six illustrative 
cases that some of them may have involved actual breaches of 
contract (e.g. failure to meet a technical target by the date
^Report of the C & AG, Civil Appropriation Accounts (Classes I-V) 
HC 28 of 1964-65, para. 79.
2Second Report from the Committee of Public Accounts HC 158-1 
of 1966-7, Evidence, Appendix I.
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stated in the contract, and 'lateness in delivery') but others 
did not, or could not easily have been demonstrated to amount to 
a breach (e.g. 'poorer' performance of technical tasks than 
could reasonably have been expected, 'inferior' technical 
performance, 'failure' to provide adequate control of sub­
contracts). In all the six cases, the profit of the contractor 
concerned was reduced and in the last three cases it was reduced 
by £3,513, £36,125 and £3,440 respectively. It is dHright if 
the defaulting contractor accepts a profit reduction or 
disallowance in settlement of a claim by the government for 
damages, but the legal validity of such a measure is in doubt 
where no actual breach of the contract has occurred. Fortunately 
for the British government, no contractor has taken the matter 
to court so far, but one really wonders what criteria the court 
would apply if faced with such an issue.
(ii) Break Clause
R & D contracts are ordinarily subject to a 'break' clause,^
In the U.K. see Standard Condition 56 of Government Contracts 
for Stores Purchases (Form GC/Stores/1, Edition, October 1970). 
In the United States, government contracts are usually subject 
to 'termination for the convenience of the government' (see 
FPR §1-8.702 and §1-8.704 (1977)). The Department of Defense 
and the NASA require use of a termination for convenience clause 
for all contracts over $10,000 (see ASPR §8-701 (1975) and 
NASA PR §18-801 (1976)). The ASPR §7-302.10 (1975) Termination 
for Convenience of the government clause used in fixed price 
research and development contracts contains the following:
"(a) The performance of work under this contract may be 
terminated in whole or from time to time in part, by the 
Government whenever for any reason the Contracting Officer shall 
determine that such termination is in the best interest of the 
Government...." See further Nash and Cibinic, Federal 
Procurement Law (2nd ed. 1969) chapter 20.
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a procedure whereby the government may unilaterally determine
the contract, notwithstanding absence of fault on the contractor's
part, at any time by giving to the contractor written notice.
In the U.K. the Zuckerman Committee recommending the retention
of the 1 break1 clause in defence R & D contracts stated that the
clause was justified because the general pattern of an R & D
programme may be affected by some major change in national policy
determined by political or economic considerations, either at
home or abroad. However, the Committee thought that the use of
feasibility and project studies would go far to prevent the need
for operating the break-clause except where major technological,
as
strategic or economic changes were such^to justify its 
application.^" The Downey Committee in 196 7 envisaged the use of 
the standard break-clause at the end of Project Definition
2Stage 1, if the government decided not to proceed further.
The express right of the government to terminate the 
contract unilaterally is one of the most significant 
distinctions between government contracts and customary private 
commercial practice. In an ordinary contract between two private 
parties, if one party has reserved to itself a unilateral right 
to terminate the contract at any time, for any reason or for 
no reason and without being liable to pay the damages for breach, 
the other party may still perform the contract. But if the 
validity of such a clause is challenged in the law court the
"^Zuckerman Report, para. 22 0.
2Downey Report, Vol.2, 5.
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court would perhaps, even in the absence of a precedent, declare
the clause unenforceable on ordinary contract principles, such
as that there was a lack of consideration or mutuality, or of free
consent or good faith or that the contract is against public policy.^
But in the sphere of government contracts and specially in
R & D contracts, fast changing technology and new development
often make uncompleted work under existing contracts obsolete or
unnecessary. When this occurs, it is usually in the government's
best interests to cancel or terminate the contract, thereby
preventing the contractor from completing performance. Adjusting
the rights of the parties when a contract is terminated is a
complex and difficult matter. If the government is required to
indemnify the contractor for unavoidable loss as well as loss of
anticipated profits, obviously the purpose of the termination
clause is frustrated. In recognition of this difficulty,
government contracts include 'break' clauses, giving the
government the right to terminate and setting out in detail the
procedures to be followed in settling and adjusting the rights
of the parties under the contract. But, although the inclusion
of a 'break' clause has become accepted by those doing business
with the government as a reasonable and necessary incident of 
2sovereignty, from a pure legalistic contract theory point of
^This is discussed in chapter IV supra.
2The Rayner Project Team (U.K.) observed: "It is recognised that
nothing can be firm and final in the environment in which defence 
procurement operates, but it should not be impossible to make 
contracts with adequate break clauses which would be acceptable 
to manufacturers and would allow sufficient flexibility in 
dealing with changing defence needs" (emphasis supplied).
Cmnd. 4641/1971 para. 25.
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view, its validity is open to grave doubts. Besides, the 'break' 
clause does not lay down any standards or reasons for its appli­
cation and makes the whole matter of sufficiency of 
indemnification injusticiable. Neither has this clause ever been 
litigated in the courts. Can the contractor contend that the 
determination of contract was not done in good faith? or that 
it contravenes the principles of administrative law? or that 
it confers unfettered powers on the administrative officers who 
may exercise their discretion arbitrarily?^" These questions, 
too, have not been canvassed.
12. Conclusion
R & D procurement is an investment that the government makes 
to meet its obligations to provide for defence and the general 
welfare of the Nation. It is not capable of precise lines of 
demarcation. Its spectrum extends from a contract for basic or 
pure research on the one hand 'what makes the grass green' type 
of project, to a contract for construction and delivery of 
prototypes, say of a spaceship or of a highly complex experimental 
weapons system. Historically, the predominant use of contracts 
has been for procurement of supplies and construction services 
from commercial organisations, and contract provisions as well 
as government contracting personnel have been oriented to this 
type of procurement. The use of these provisions for R & D work 
raise many problems for the contractors. Furthermore, the wide 
and nebulous range of research requirements and projects; the
■*"See chapter IV, supra for discussion.
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variety of research contractors - commercial, non-profit 
laboratories, academic institutions, large business, small 
business, individual researchers - contribute to the complex 
problem of procuring research under contracts predicated 
primarily on standard supply contract laws and regulations. Not 
long ago the Rayner Project Team in the U.K. made a sharp 
criticism of prevailing practices when it stated that "the 
complexity and rigidity of some of the existing contractual 
procedures, particularly as they have been operated following 
the 'Bloodhound' and 'Bristol Siddeley Engine' cases, are also 
matters of concern. They are time-consuming and costly in terms 
of staff for both government and industry and result in long 
delays in price and cash settlements".^ The Project Team hoped 
that the Review Board for Government Contracts in agreement with 
the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) would simplify the 
procedures.
It is submitted that the desirability of uniform procurement 
standard conditions may be debatable where the uniformity is 
applied to such widely divergent items as 'nuts and bolts' and 
'research and development'. In the United States the Commission 
on Government Procurement also believed that the procurement of 
R & D was sufficiently different from other types of procurement 
and that special treatment of the process was desirable. The 
Commission recommended,inter alia, that statutory changes be 
made in the Procurement Statutes and Regulations to recognise 
negotiation as the normal procurement technique for R & D; that
^Cmnd. 4641 (1971) para. 28.
uniform regulations be developed for R & D; that changes in
source-selection procedures be made to maximize competition
rather than the number of competitors; and that unsolicited
proposals be more often encouraged and accepted.^
In the absence of a clear government-wide direction, the
procuring departments do not use any particular terms and
2conditions for their R & D contracts. This lack of uniformity
amongst procuring authorities inevitably leads to confusion as
well as delays adoption of contract provisions specifically
'tailored' for R & D procurement objectives. It is submitted
that specific contract clauses, different from supply contracts,
may be provided regarding the description of work, contractor's
compensation, cancellation of contract, default, government
property, inspection, military security requirements, patents,
3copyrights and other proprietary rights, liability insurance,
^Report of the C.G.P. Vol.2, Part B - Acquisition of Research 
and Development.
2In the U.K., there are, however, certain internal instructions 
on the procedure for the control of R & D set out in a number of 
notices issued by the Controller of Aircraft and the Controller 
of Guided Weapons and Electronics (under the Procurement 
Executive set up in 1971 in the Ministry of Defence). For a list 
of notices, see Appendix L of the Downey Report, Vol.l.
3For excellent articles, see Stewart, "Government Patent Policy", 
R & D Contracting op. cit. 163-78; Forman, "Proprietary Rights 
in Research and Development Contracting - A Case Study" (1957)
17 Fed. B.J. 298; Lazure and Church, "The Shadow and Substance 
of Intellectual Property in Department of Defense Research and 
Development Contracts" (1954) 14 Fed. B.J. 296; Beach, "The 
Government and Industrial Know-How" (1955) 41 A.B.A.J. 1024; 
Whale, "Government Rights to Technical Information Received 
Under Contract" (1957) 25 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 289.
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extra hazardous risks, ' ct cetera.
In the United States the Federal Procurement Regulations'
2(FPR) do not furnish much guidance concerning contracting for
R & D. However, significant refinements in contracting for R & D
have been made by those agencies having the largest stake in the 
3area. In the defence R & D  procurement, Armed Services Procurc-
4ment Regulations deal with the procurement of R & D separately.
After the fashion of ASPR, the NASA Procurement Regulations
prescribe terms and conditions to be used in R & D  contracts
5distinguished from those employed in supply contracts, and the 
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) has develop­
ed a variety of standard clauses applicable to research contract- 
6ing. In addition, ERDA and NASA have developed contract
Lyons, "Government Indemnification Against Unusually Hazardous 
Risks for Military R & D  Contracts" (1957) 17 Fed. B. J. 314.
2The FPR system governs procurement of all non-military agencies 
except NASA.
3E.g., Energy Research and Development Administration Procurement 
Regulations (ERDA-PR) (previously called Atomic Energy Commission 
Procurement Regulations - AEC-PR) §§9-4.5800 to 9-4.5807 (1976). 
These sections establish procedures for the submission, evaluation 
and selection for award or support of proposals offered in 
response to specific Program Research and Development Announce­
ments issued by ERDA to conduct research, development and 
related activities in the energy field (see 41 FR (Federal 
Register) 10606, March 12, 1976).
4ASPR §§3-402(b), 4-100 to 4-118, 7-301 to 7-404, 8-710, 9-107 
and 272 (1975). See also ASPR §§13-308, 13-403, 15-205.35, 
15-205.49, 15-302, 15-304.2, 15-305.3, 15-309.18 (1975). See
generally, Paul, United States Government Contracts and
Subcontracts (1964) 105-9.
5See NASA-PR §§18-7.400 et seq., 18-8.704,18-8.705-50 (1974).
See also Andrews, "In the Guise of Research" (1974) 6 Public 
Contract L.J. 201, 209 and Ramey and Erlewine, "Introduction to the 
Concept of the 'Administrative Contract' in Government Sponsored 
Research and Development" (1957) 17 Fed. B. J. 354, 372.
6 See above. See also ERDA-PR §9-4. 52 and §9-7.50 (1976).
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provisions and forms specifically suitable for research at 
universities or non-profit organisations.^ In the United 
Kingdom, the two forms which are generally used for all govern­
ment procurement viz. Standard Conditions of Government Contracts 
for Stores Purchases (GC/Stores/1) and General Conditions of 
Government Contracts for Building and Civil Engineering Works 
(GC/Works/1) make no mention of R & D contracts.
Actually the whole field of government contracts needs 
investigation. It is unfortunate that the British Government 
did not ask the Law Commission to inquire into question D.,
which was one of the questions raised by the Commission with 
regard to reforms in administrative law in its Working Paper
2No. 13 and recommended for inquiry in Law Commission No. 20.
The Commission, it may be recalled, had recommended an inquiry, 
inter alia, as to how far, if at all, special principles should 
govern contracts made by the administration. It is hoped that 
as and when an inquiry is made into this area, sufficient 
attention will be paid to the government's R & D contracts 
as well.
1E.g. ERDA-PR §§9-4.51 and 9-16.5002-8 and -9 (1976); NASA-PR 
§§18-7.450, 18-16.201-5 and -7 (1974).
2Cmnd. 4059 (May 1969) 4. See generally, Law Commission's (U.K.) 
Working Paper No. 40, Remedies in Administrative Law (October





As will have appeared from the foregoing chapters, 
government contracts are not only procurement contracts but 
can have other purposes too. Thus besides the acquisition 
of goods and services, government contracts can also function 
as instruments for the achievement of various national, 
mainly industrial but incidentally also economic and social 
objectives on a case-to-case basis. Such government 
contracts are designed to promote the nation's industrial 
growth and strength, including its technological resources 
which, in turn will depend on the encouragement of research 
and development. In this way a government is actually 
financing large segments of industry: some industries
operate almost exclusively on government funds, others 
rely on lesser but still significant amounts of government 
subsidies. In this area it is therefore unrealistic to 
perpetuate the fiction of the independent, private contractor
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dealing at arm's length with a government which docs not 
care how he performs his contract so long as the end result 
is satisfactory. In a very real sense, the government 
contractor now becomes, so to speak, a quasi-agent of the 
government as he disburses and deploys public funds for 
public purposes. Conversely, the government has a duty to 
supervise the manner in which the contractor does this, 
not just in terms of dollars and cents, but also in terms 
of the contribution he makes in furthering industrial 
innovation and product development.
Again, it will now be clearer that government contracts 
cover a very wide spectrum of agreements. At one end there 
are contracts which have all the elements of an ordinary 
commercial contract; at the other end, they appear as 
quasi-administrative or regulatory instruments, used as 
an alternative means of implementing government policies; 
and at this latter end of the spectrum, a so-called 
government contract may sometimes even cease to remain an 
enforceable contract. The system of planning agreements, 
recently introduced in the United Kingdom, is perhaps the 
best example of this. This chapter will now deal with 
such planning agreements, although their discussion will 
be brief as we are not concerned with their details, which 
are in any case extra-legal, but rather with the way they
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contrast with more orthodox government contracts. Our 
consideration of planning agreements is thus meant to 
round off our discussion of government contracts in general.
2. What are Planning Agreements?
"Planning Agreement" is one of the two institutions
recently introduced by the British Government under the
Industry Act 1975; the other is the National Enterprise
Board.^ The basic theme of planning agreements is to bring
about a closer relationship between the government and industry
2for the achievement of national needs and objectives.
Section 21(2) of the Industry Act 1975, defines "planning 
agreement" as
... a voluntary arrangement as to the strategic 
plans of a body corporate for the future develop­
ment in the United Kingdom over a specified 
period of an undertaking of the body corporate 
... being an arrangement entered into by the 
body corporate and any Minister of the Crown 
which in the opinion of that Minister is likely 
over the specified period to contribute signi­
ficantly to national needs and objectives.
The White Paper - the Department of Industry's The
3Regeneration of British Industry produced by the Benn/Heffer 
team in August 1974 - gave pride of place to the notion of
45 Halsbury1 23s Statutes (3rd ed.) 2289. The Act came into force 
on 20 November 1975. For a short commentary on the Act, see
Sharpe, The Industry Act 1975 (London 1976) [hereinafter 
cited as Sharpe]. A separate chapter (ch.5) of the book is 
devoted to the discussion of planning agreements. For a review 
of the Act, see Hadden, "Industry Act 1975" (1976) 39
Modern L. Rev. 318.
2The planning agreement system is being operated through the 
Department of Industry: Trade and Industry Vol. 25 (13) , 24/31 Dec. ' 76.
3Cmnd. 5710.
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planning agreements between major companies and government. It 
stated that these were to be non-enforceable arrangements under 
which private and public investment and development plans would 
be co-ordinated in the interests of more stable economic manage­
ment. The Agreement, it was further pointed out, will, however,
be given sufficient recognition by statute to enable the company
1concerned to rely on assistance promised under it. Later on,
a spokesman for the government observed that although a planning
agreement would not be a civil contract enforceable by law, it
2would represent a statement of firm intention by both sides.
The agreements were to be regarded not so much as documents but
as a new relationship between the government, a company and its
3workers where consultation was of the essence. The planning 
agreement has been variously described as a co-operative, or 
continuing, or growing, or developing or voluntary arrangement.
It is said to be based on an exchange of information and under­
standing and on the development of relationship between the 
government and the company, its employees and trade unions and
not merely on an exchange of financial benefits or an exchange
4of legal or technical obligations. Although a document will 
be drawn up which will form the basis, the agreement will get
^Id. at 3.
2HC Deb. v.907 c. 179 (written answer by the Under-Secretary of 
State on 9 March 1976).
3HC Deb. v.886 c. 1069; Cmnd. 5710 (August 1974) at 3.
4Official Reports, House of Commons Standing Committee E on the 
Industry Bill 1975,columns 1171,1173,1184,1185,1301 [The Committee 
held 40 sittings between 4 March - 12 June 1975 and its proceedings 
extend from columns 1 to 2304. Hereinafter1 Standing Committee E"].
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under way deeply and profoundly only after a certain period of
time. The agreement is therefore not an explicit exchange of
bits of paper,^ but is the development of a closer relationship,
2a partnership between government and a company. The government 
would not make a planning agreement with a company that had not 
achieved, or shown signs of the development of a satisfactory
3relationship over a range of issues and topics with its employees^
4The concept of planning agreements is not a new one. It
reflects a development of a practice in a number of European 
5countries. In implementing its various Economic Plans the French 
administration, for example, often enters into contracts, called 
'contrats de programme1 2345, with private- industry in which the 
latter agrees to do something desired by the administration.^
The French have used this 'special' tool for achieving economic 
administration and economic democracy in a technologica1 society. 
The contractual mechanism has also been used by the French 
Government to discuss with an individual company that company's 
problems and prospects. For example, companies have been allowed
^Id. c. 1824.
2Trade and Industry Vol. 20 (6) , 8 Aug. 1975,338; Cmnd. 5710 (Aug. '7412.
3Standing Committee E c. 1446.
4Although the term 'agreement' is often used as synonymous with 
"contract" [Radin, Law Dictionary (2nd ed.1970) 13], here it is 
used in a much broader sense.
5Hayward and Watson, Planning, Politics and Public Policy - The 
British, French and Italian Experience (Cambridge University 
Press 1975). Sharpe, op. cit. para.214, has stated: "There is
little doubt that the French experience lies behind Part III of 
the Act".
^For an excellent article see Bergsten, "The Administration of 
Economic and Social Programs in France by the use of Contractual 
Technique" (1975) 48 Southern Calif. L. Rev. 852.
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under these agreements, to raise prices in order to finance 
investment subject to their compliance with the objectives on 
output, investment and exports of a national plan.'*'
Italy has also used since 1968 similar contracts called 
"Planned Bargaining" with leading companies as part of its 
national plan. These agreements are meant to establish a 
constructive dialogue between government and industry with 
the aim of examining and harmonising their respective programmes 
of action. Like the British planning agreements, the Italian 
planned bargaining procedure consists of an exchange of inform­
ation between the government and industry on their respective
investment plans, so that their projects can be effectively 
2harmonised. Belgium has also employed similar contracts since 
1969 and the parties are the government, trade unions and the 
relevant companie s .^
2A. Planning Agreements in Australia
Mention should here be made of arrangements under which 
large numbers of industries have received, and are continuing 
to receive, government subsidies in Australia. These subsidies 
are made by the Government with a view to achieve some of its 
social, political, economic, or national objectives. Besides, 
grants are also made to Australian industry under the provisions
"*"Trade and Industry Vol.26(10), 11 March 1977, 624. See also 
HC Deb. v. 886 c. 975.
2For details see Hayward and Watson op.cit. ch.6.
3Trade and Industry Vol.26(10), 11 March 1977, 624. Mention may 
also be made of 'state-imposed contracts' prevalent in West 
Germany and 'plan contracts' in Soviet Russia: see Lücke,
Review of Loeber's book, (1970) 3 Modern Law and Society 157.
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of the Industrial Research and Development Grants Act 1967-1976 
and Industries Research and Development Incentives Act 1976.
While grants are regulated by statute, government subsidies are 
often not so regulated. The legal nature of subsidy arrangements 
is as yet not free from doubt: are these arrangements contracts,
governed by the principles of the private law, or are they adminis­
trative or planning arrangements and therefore not cognizable by 
courts of law? Below we discuss two leading Australian cases 
which clearly show that the question of enforceability has given 
rise to difficulties.
It will be recalled that in Australian Woollen Mills case,^ 
the High Court was faced with such a problem. In June 1946 the 
Commonwealth Government announced that it would pay a subsidy to 
manufacturers of wool, on purchases made and used for local 
manufacture. The main objective of the Government for the making 
of subsidies was to maintain price of wool low in the country.
The plaintiff company, which was a manufacturer, purchased very 
large quantities of wool and duly received payments by way of 
subsidy. The Government, however, refused to pay subsidies for 
some of plaintiff's later purchases. The company brought action 
against the Commonwealth claiming money which, it alleged, was 
due to it by the Commonwealth under a contract to pay a subsidy. 
The Commonwealth denied the existence of any such contract. The 
High Court unanimously held that there was no intention on the 
part of the Commonwealth Government to assume a legal obligation
Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v. The Commonwealth (1954)
92 C.L.R. 424.
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when it offered to pay a subsidy to a manufacturer for purchasing
wool for local use, and thus no contract was constituted at any
stage binding the Government/ The Court continued:
On the whole case the conclusion is unavoidable that 
the Commonwealth authorities never for a moment 
intended to make an offer capable of leading to a 
contract binding the Crown, and that nobody ever 
supposed for a moment that they did so intend. A 
wide discretion in a variety of matters was clearly 
regarded by the authorities as residing in them, and 
was, in effect, acknowledged as residing in them.^
Another case in which the High Court again held the arrange­
ments non-contractual is The Administration of the Territory of
3Papua and New Guinea v. Leahy. There the plaintiff had claimed
damages for breach of contract by the Administration of the Papua
and New Guinea. The plaintiff's case was that the Administration
through its officers having undertaken to carry out the campaign
to eradicate cattle tick from his cattle skillfully and thoroughly
wasfailed to do so and thus /guilty of breach of contract. It was
contended that the campaign was conducted by officers of the
relevant Department in a very inefficient manner resulting into
the death of a number of cattle. The Court held that the parties
had not intended the arrangement to be legally enforceable: the
conduct of the parties constituted only"an administrative arrange 
4ment". McTiernan J continued:
'*"(1954) 92 C.L.R. 424 at 463. The Court, consisting of Dixon CJ, 
Williams, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ, delivered a joint judgment.
2Id.at 465.
3 (1961) 105 C.L.R. 6.
4JEd.at 11 (par McTiernan J) .
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The work done by the Administration was analagous (sic) 
to a social service which generally does not have 
as its basis a legal relationship of a contractual 
nature and from which no right of action would 
arise in favour of the citizen who is receiving 
the services if the Government acts inefficiently 
in performing them".l
Kitto J, with whom Dixon CJ agreed, said that assistance
had been rendered to the plaintiff as a function of government in
accordance with its settled policy to eradicate cattle tick, not
2as a matter of private contract.
The two judgments cited above reveal judicial attitude in
Australia towards subsidy arrangements. It seems that these and
3other similar arrangements will fall (in the widest sense) into the 
class of which illustration may be found in the planning agreements 
in the U.K.
3. Objectives and Contents of Planning Agreements
In their application to the private sector, the system of 
of planning agreements is expected to provide a new and improved 
framework for co-operation between the government and leading 
industrial companies. The primary purpose of a planning agreement 
is that the government's projections and the companies' 
own intentions and plans should interact on each other.
^Ibid.
2Id. at 21 (per Kitto J); at 10 (per Dixon CJ). See also Milne v. 
Attorney-General for the State of Tasmania (1956) 95 C.L.R. 460; 
John Cooke & Co Pty Ltd v. The Commonwealth (1922) 31 C.L.R. 394; 
Munday v. Western Australia [1962] W.A.R. 65. See generally, 
Lücke, "The Intention to Create Legal Relations" (1970) 3 Adelaide 
L. Rev. 419, 425 et seq.
3Other instances of governmental assistance are, programmes for 
the provision of social services, such as relief of disasters 
like bushfires, floods, droughts, cyclones, etc., for the control 
of diseases of cattle, for the promotion of the production and 
marketing of agricultural or industrial items, and the like.
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They are also expected to improve and influence the develop­
ment of government's own central ecomomic policy. They are 
further designed to provide a new and improved opportunity 
for workers to be consulted about and involved in a company's 
forward plans.
The definition of planning agreements (s.21(2)) envisages 
that they will include such arrangements between industry and 
government which are likely to contribute significantly to 
national needs and objectives. The agreements will be 
concerned with economic objectives which will serve perfectly 
proper commercial purposes. However, they are not to be 
viewed strictly as purely and uniquely commercial since they 
(the agreements) would also be concerned with the widest 
social and political objectives of the government, e.g., the 
regional location of jobs, protection of interests of 
consumers and the community etc., on which other than wholly 
commercial criteria may sometimes operate.
The concept of planning agreements represents a new 
initiative, the purpose of which is to improve the quantity 
and quality of industry's contribution to the development 
and growth of the economy. It will do this by providing a 
framework within which decision-taking by government and manage­
ment is improved by sharing information about plans and objectives
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and in which the effectiveness of action to achieve agreed 
objectives is enhanced by co-ordinated use of the resources 
of government and industry.
The exact form which planning agreements will take will 
therefore be tailor-made to each case} A series of consultations 
between the government and companies, eventually leading to an 
agreement about strategic plans, will take place annually but 
there will be scope for revising the agreement during the course 
of the year, should circumstances require. These annual 
consultations will be timed to coincide with the companies' own 
planning cycle. In their discussions with companies, the 
government will be essentially concerned with strategic issues.
2In a Discussion Paper entitled "Contents of a Planning Agreement" 
the Government has stated that it was well aware that commercial 
plans and forecasts of companies frequently have to change at 
short notice to keep up with changes in the market. Clearly it 
was essential that planning agreements should not restrict the 
freedom of companies to respond to market fluctuations, above 
all where companies are in competition with overseas manufact­
urers. This would have to be reflected in the final form that 
planning agreements take and for that reason alone the agreements 
will not be rigid. As well as including firm statements of 
intentions, the agreement may therefore also set out the kind
^Standing Committee E c.1164.
2Published in Trade and Industry Vol.20(6) , 8 August 1975,
337-342.
436
of circumstances which might lead to changes in particular 
plans and projects and provide arrangements for consultation 
as necessary.
To sum up, the issues covered by planning agreement 
discussions will be: economic prospects, the company's
broad strategy and long-term objectives, United Kingdom 
sales, exports, investment, employment and training, 
productivity, finance, prices policy, industrial relations 
and arrangements for negotiation and consultation, interest 
of consumers and the community, and the product and process 
development.^
Although no statutory limitation is placed upon the
nature of the enterprise that may make a planning agreement,
the Government has recently announced that the principal
application of planning agreements will be to large
2companies, that is Category One companies. Category One
companies, broadly speaking, include manufacturers with
total annual home sales of £50 million or more and service
3companies with total home sales of £20 million or more.
^"Contents of a Planning Agreement" Discussion Document 
published in Trade and Industry Vol.20(6), 8 August 1975, 
337-342. See on this more fully Sharpe, op.cit. paras. 
218-230.
2Trade and Industry Vol.27(8), 27 May 1977, 387.
3 Ibid.
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Mr Eric Varlcy, Secretary of State for the Department of
Industry recently stated in answer to a parliamentary
question, that a planning agreement had been concluded
with Chrysler (UK) Ltd. within the meaning of section 21(2)
of the Industry Act 1975, and that seven other major
companies had agreed to enter planning agreement discussions.
Since the planning agreement with Chrysler (UK) Ltd. is
confidential, the contents of the agreement cannot be 
2known. However, it has been disclosed that payments
totalling £40 million have been made by the Government to
that company. Additionally, certain advances in respect of
a guaranteed loan have also been made under that agreement,
but for confidentiality reasons, the amount of these
3advances has not been disclosed. The agreement covers
4the period 1976 to 1980.
Trade and Industry Vol.26(10), 11 March 1977, 610. The 
names of seven companies which are in the process of 
entering into planning agreements with the government are: 
British Leyland, Babcock & Wilcox, Clarke Chapman, Head 
Wrightson, Whessoe, GEC, and Reyrolle Parsons.
2Trade and Industry Vol.26(ll), 18 March 1977, 698.
3Trade and Industry Vol.26(8), 25 February 1977, 494.
4Trade and Industry Vol.26(10), 11 March 1977, 610. It may 
be noted that the Industry Act 1975 is silent as to the 
duration of a planning agreement: the White Paper (Cmnd.
5710) refers to a normal period of three years, although 
the agreement would be reviewed annually in the light of 
progress over the previous year and rolled forward for 
a further year.
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4, Benefits of a Planning Agreement
There are genuine substantial benefits for companies 
in the planning agreement system. First, as already stated, 
they will help the development of a better understanding by 
government of industry, and a better understanding of the 
individual company's plans and problems, which will in turn 
influence the Government's development of industrial, 
economic and other relevant policies. Large companies 
have in the past felt that the greatest weakness of their 
forward planning is the uncertainty of government action.
When the Government decides that there has to be a change 
in industrial direction in the national interest, that can 
be very damaging to companies. Thus a closer relationship 
with government through planning agreements will assist 
companies in their forward planning. There will inevitably 
also be a greater commitment by government to the economic 
objectives of companies - to their investment, to their job 
creation and to all their economic purposes.
Secondly, planning agreements will provide an improved 
framework for consultation with government and for solving 
difficult issues, bringing in all government departments 
involved. Within this framework the discussion might, for 
example, aim to identify any specific constraints which are 
inhibiting profitable growth and identify areas for 
co-ordinated action by government departments and the company.
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Thirdly, and leading on from this, they will provide 
the opportunity for a company to secure specific commitments 
by government to tackle the particular problems experienced 
by the company, commitments which, because they are recorded 
in the agreement, can be monitored by the company.
Fourthly, since it is intended that companies should 
consult their workforce, planning agreements will provide a 
means of improving employee participation, building in a flex­
ible way on a company's existing participation arrangements to 
help secure co-operation by the workforce in carrying out the 
company's plans.
And fifthly, the system will provide considerable financial 
benefits to planning agreement companies. Sub-section (1) of 
s.2l enumerates two main financial incentives for an undertaking 
to enter into a planning agreement, which we discuss below 
very briefly!"
"^ "Section 21(1) of the Industry Act 1975 reads as follows:
When a body corporate has made a planning agreement -
(a) the amount of grant under Part I of the Industry Act 1972 
(regional development grant) in respect of approved capital 
expenditure incurred during the period mentioned in sub­
section (2) below in respect of any project identified in 
the agreement may not be less than -
(i) the percentage which is the prescribed percentage at 
the date of planning agreement, or,
(ii) in the case of a project which was also identified in 
a previous planning agreement, the percentage which 
was the prescribed percentage at the date of that 
agreement, and
(b) financial assistance in respect of any such project may 
be given under Part II of that Act,
without regard to any order under that Act or the Local Employ­
ment Act 1972 made after the date of the planning agreement by 
virtue of which, as the case may be, the grant or part of it 
could for any reason not have been paid or the financial 
assistance or part of it could not have been given.
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(1) Regional development grants under Part I 
(ss.1-6) of the Industry Act 1972
The first financial incentive emanates from the provisions
of Part I of the Industry Act 1972. Under s.l(l) of the Act,
the Secretary of State may make a grant to a person towards
approved capital expenditure incurred by that person on new
buildings, or works or on the adaptation of existing buildings
or works where they form part of "qualifying premises" in
development areas or intermediate areas; on new machinery and
plant for use in qualifying premises in development areas or in
the construction of industry in development areas.^ Grants may
be subject to conditions, including a condition for repayment
in whole or in part, and comprehensive provisions with regard
to the enforcement of conditions are attached to them, including
2provisions as to offences and penalties. Now cl.(a) of 
sub-s.(l) of s.21 of the Industry Act 1975 enables the Secretary 
of State to guarantee the planning agreement companies the 
level of regional development grant made to them under 1972 Act 
in respect of approved capital expenditure on projects identi­
fied in the Agreement, at rates which are not lower than those 
applying when the agreement was concluded. In addition, it 
provides that "in the case of a project which was also identi­
fied in a previous planning agreement" the rate of grant will 
not be less than that which was prescribed at the date of the
^Regional development grants totalling £325 million were paid 
out under 1972 Act in 1975-76; Trade and Industry Vol. 24(12), 
17 December 1976, 706.
2Section 4 and Schedule 1 of the Industry Act 1972.
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earlier planning agreement. The planning agreement companies
a
are thus given/statutory guarantee that the level of their 
grants will not be reduced during the lifetime of each agreement.
(2) Financial Assistance under Part II 
(ss.7-9) of the Industry Act 19722
The second advantage which the planning agreement
companies would have will be the availability of financial
assistance to such companies under Part II of the Act for
projects so identified notwithstanding subsequent variations in
the assisted areas. Selective financial assistance is provide-
ed for industry where the assistance is likely to provide,
3maintain or safeguard employment in those areas ; or where it
is likely to benefit the economy of the United Kingdom or any
4part or area of the United Kingdom.
The aforementioned statutory guarantee given under s.21(l)
Section 21(1)(a)(ii). Unfortunately, this no less significant 
benefit accruing to the planning agreement companies has so 
far been overlooked. No mention is made of it in the whole of 
the long proceedings of the Standing Committee E .
2Sections 7 and 8 of the Industry Act 1972 have been extensively 
amended by the Industry Act 1975. The sections, as amended, are 
set out in Part II, Schedule 4 to the latter Act. For a good 
discussion see Sharpe, op. cit. ch.3.
3Section 7 of the Industry Act 1972.
4Section 8 of the Industry Act 1972. Up to 30 June 1976, offers 
of assistance totalling £92 million were made in respect of 
about 1,700 projects under s.7 of the Act: Trade and Industry
Vol.24(5), 30 July 1976, 315- Up to 26 October 1976, offers of 
selective financial assistance under s.8 totalled £435 million: 
Trade and Industry Vol.25(6), 5 November 1976, 357. In 
December 1976 the Government announced the initial allocation 
of £100 million for selective financial assistance under s.8: 
Trade and Industry Vol.27(5), 6 May 1977, 206. For more 
information, see IIC Deb. v.864 columns 502-3 (22 November 1973); 
HC Deb. v.865 columns 9-12 (26 November 1973); HC Deb. v.861 
columns 234-35 (29 March 1974); HC Deb. v.883 columns 579-80 
(19 December 1974).
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of the Industry Act obviously confers substantial financial 
benefits on a planning agreement company as against a non­
planning agreement company. Therefore, to call the financial 
incentive a "somewhat jejune guarantee",'1' it may be submitted, 
is a gross under-statement. The guarantee is indeed an import­
ant response to the demands from industry that there should be 
greater certainty in its dealings with government and provides 
a firmer base for company decision-making.
5. Can a Planning Agreement be enforced?
The Government of the United Kingdom has repeatedly 
declared that planning agreements are non-enforceable arrange­
ments, i.e. they are not agreements in the sense of civil con-
2 3tracts enforceable at law. According to Sharpe also, there
is no contractual basis to a planning agreement. He has stated
that "there is no duty placed upon the Government to undertake
4the risks attached to Government grants".
Sharpe, The Industry Act 1975 (London 1976) para. 233.
2The Regeneration of British Industry Cmnd. 5710 (August 1974) 
at 3; HC Deb. v.907 c . 179 (written answer by the Under-Secretary 






Nevertheless the full meaning of 'non-enforceability' has 
never been fully explained. If by non-enforceability is meant 
that planning agreements are not binding on the parties, that 
a company having received a certain grant or financial assistance 
from the government for a certain project along with a guarantee 
not to reduce it during the lifetime of the agreement, may 
flout the agreement or squander the grant for extraneous purposes 
with impunity, or that a company having been promised a certain 
level of regional development grant or financial assistance by 
the government for a project named in the planning agreement 
for the period of the agreement, may never get it, or the grant 
be discontinued or reduced, as the case may be, then, it is 
submitted, planning agreements would be rendered absurd. But
the
complete non-enforceability does not seem to bey^intention of
the government. A Minister of the Crown recently confirmed that
a promise by the Government to guarantee the level of appropriate
financial assistance for a project identified in the planning
agreement will be legally binding."^ Furthermore, it would seem
to follow from this that a company which has received financial
assistance under a planning agreement will be legally bound to
spend the money in the manner prescribed or be liable to legal 
2consequences. Undoubtedly the granting and continuation of
Speech by Mr Gerald Kaufman, Minister of State, Department of 
Industry at the Institute of Bankers in York on 17 February 1977 
published in Trade and Industry Vol.26(8)# 25 February 1977, 476.
^See infra.
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the guarantee is conditional on the company fulfilling its
obligations under the agreement. This is not to say that the
company must guarantee that it would perform its obligations
absolutely, for the Government expressly acknowledged that:
Market situation can change over the course of 
operation of a planning agreement in a manner 
which is entirely beyond the control of a company.
The fact that that situation can occur - indeed, 
might be expected to occur in many cases - in no 
way diminishes the commitment, at least on the 
side of the Government, to a planning agreement.
What we are concerned about are the other aspects 
of a company's performance which are within its 
field of competence to ensure that the agreement 
is fully carried out.^
That the respective obligations which may be created
under a planning agreement upon a company and the government
have a legal effect and are binding, seems clear both from the
provisions of s.2l(l) of the Industry Act 1975 and s.4 read
with Schedule 1 to the Industry Act 1972. As earlier stated,
s.2l(l) gives a statutory guarantee to the planning agreement
companies that the level of their grants for identified projects
will not be reduced during the lifetime of each agreement.
This part of a planning agreement is legally binding and 
2enforceable. On the other hand, s.4 of the Industry Act 1972
enables the Secretary of State to impose conditions on the
^Standing Committee E, c .1175 (Mr Meacher) (emphasis supplied). 
2A Government Minister has stated that this will be legally 
binding, see supra.
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making of regional development grants under Part I of the Act 
and introduces Schedule 1.^ Schedule 1 contains comprehensive 
provisions with respect to the enforcement of conditions attached 
to grants, including provisions as to offences and penalties.
For example, paragraph 1 of the Schedule makes it obligatory 
upon a company which has received a grant, on notice to furnish 
such information, or to produce- such books etc. for the purpose 
of enabling the Secretary of State to determine whether any 
condition subject to which the grant was made is satisfied or 
is being complied with, or whether the grant had become repay­
able in whole or in part in accordance with any such condition. 
Paragraph 2 gives a right to entry and inspection of the premises 
where any asset in respect of which a grant has been made is 
located. Paragraph 3 provides that a breach of the provisions 
of paragraphs 1 or 2 would make a person guilty of an offence 
and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £400 
or £50 respectively. This paragraph also provides that any 
person who in purported compliance with a notice under paragraph 
1 knowingly or recklessly makes any statement or produces any 
document which is false in a material particular shall be guilty 
of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding £400 or to
^Both s- 7(3) and s.8(2) of the Industry Act 1972 also provide 
that financial assistance under Part II of the Act may be given 
on any terms and conditions which may be prescribed by the 
Secretary of State. But unlike regional development grants, 
the sections are not supplemented by Schedule 1 or any other 
provisions providing for enforcement of such conditions.
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imprisonment not exceeding two years, or to both. Paragraphs 4 
and 5 of the Schedule cover certain other provisions for the 
enforcement of conditions attached to grants.
There is no doubt that the abovementioned provisions 
regarding enforcement of conditions would be equally applicable 
to planning agreement companies. Obviously, then, to describe 
planning agreements as entirely non-enforceable arrangements, 
or perhaps even as entirely 'voluntary', is more than a little 
misleading.
At the same time, however, planning agreements are of 
course not completely enforceable like contracts. For instance, 
remedies like the recovery of damages (including loss of antic­
ipatory profits), specific performance and injunction, which 
are usually available to an aggrieved party for a breach of an 
agreement by another, will not be available to planning agree­
ment parties. For planning agreements, unlike contracts, 
involve development of a closer relationship and a continuous 
commitment by parties in a very flexible and informal setting, 
so that making this sort of partnership relationship enforceable 
will not serve any useful purpose. Some of the government's 
R & D contracts, particularly long-term research contracts, 
involve a similar sort of close relationship between the parties 
and in those cases too, enforceability has got a completely 
different connotation. Actually it seems from the above analysis 
that the planning agreement system confers more rights
upon private* industry than ordinary government contracts, for
447
under the former either party may resile from the agreement in 
certain events, whereas under government contracts only the 
government can do so, e.g. under unilateral termination or 
break clauses.
6. Planning Agreements and Government Contracts
The system of planning agreements resembles closely
government contracts. A planning agreement, like a 
government contract, is between the same parties, viz.
government and private industry; is put into writing in a 
formal document; contains mutual promises, i.e. an agreement by 
an industry to do something desired by the government in 
exchange for some benefit conferred by the government; and 
above all is voluntary, in the sense that a party may not 
enter upon such an agreement/ Negotiation of a planning agree­
ment provides the mechanism for a dialogue between a private 
concern and the government. It allows the former to participate 
in shaping the rules that will bind it. If the company does not 
agree to the proposed agreement,it is not obligated; if it does 
agree, it is of its own free will.
Whatever the precise legal status of the obligations which
planning agreements may create, it is not unarguable that in
certain circumstances (though not as an inflexible rule) the
Government may seek to make the granting of such discretionary
^The White Paper, The Regeneration of British Industry stated at 
para,11"There will ... be no statutory requirement upon a 
company to conclude an agreement". Cmnd.5710 (August 1974).
See also Trade and Industry Vol.25(ll), 10 December 1976, 723;
HC Deb. v.906 c.908 (oral answer by the Under-Secretary of 
State for Industry on 1 March 1976) .
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benefits, like contracts with Government Departments or the 
nationalised industries, conditional upon the conclusion of a 
planning agreement.^" Since government is overwhelmingly the 
biggest buyer of manufactured goods and planning agreements 
involve those very parties in this novel arrangement, the 
institution of planning agreements can significantly influence 
the development of government procurement law. Planning agree­
ments can, for example, by creating closer links between the 
government and industry, bring a better understanding between 
the parties in their commercial dealings. They can provide 
information to government contractors about the projected 
demands of government and, in return, government can get infor­
mation about how its suppliers are working, what new designs 
they have on the stocks, what new plant they propose to buy, 
et cetera, et cetera. This information can, inter alia, lead 
to financial and other assistance by government to indigenous 
industry to encourage it to match more closely govern­
ment requirements so as to reduce the proportion of government 
procurement from overseas.^
"'’Besides placing contracts and granting other benefits enumer­
ated in the above pages, the Government may also give the plan­
ning agreement companies benefits listed below: Industrial
Development Certificates, Office Development Permits, grants 
under Local Employment Act 1972, grants made by the National 
Research Development Corporation and the Development of 
Inventions Act 1967 and export credit guarantees.
2See also Industrial Strategy - A Progress Report published in 
Trade and Industry Vol.25(7), 12 November 1976, 410-11. Conver­
sely, public purchasing can be used constructively in order to 
develop the export potential of appropriate industries - White 
Paper, An Approach to Industrial Strategy, Cmnd.6315 (November
1975), para.31.
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It can also help to reduce variety and cut out wasteful prolif­
eration of specifications in public purchasing.^
7. Conclusion
In terms of high technology, space research, aircraft, 
computers, and so on, it is difficult to imagine the success of 
industry without a substantial degree of government support 
given either in the way of direct financial interest or in the 
way of major research contracts. There is a need also for sub­
stantial support in regional policy where, without it, there 
would be grave and serious distortion in regional investment. 
The British Government believes that Britain's prosperity and 
welfare depend on the wealth generated by its industry and all 
those who work in it. This requires a closer, clearer and more 
positive relationship between government and industry; and the 
construction of that better relationship requires the develop­
ment of new institutions. Planning agreements are one such
institution. The British Government seems to remain fully
2committed to planning agreements.
^Cmnd.6315. op.cit. It may be noted that the Public Sector 
Standardisation Team of the British Standards Institution is 
already working on this particular aspect of government 
purchasing.
2Mr Robert Cryer's (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
Industry) written reply to a parliamentary question on 19 May 
1977 - Trade and Industry Vol.27(8), 27 May 1977, 386. See 
also Trade and Industry Vol.26(3), 21 January 1977, 161.
CHAPTER VIII
GENERAL CONCLUSION
Though we have sharply separated various types of 
government contracts and agreements, it should not be 
inferred that each is a discrete category entirely separate 
from the others'. A government contract may fit several 
definitions. Thus, a contract properly classified as 
research and development may include terms and conditions 
more usually found in adhesion contracts, or in rare cases,
private commercial
even in k contracts. In any case, the terms of a gov­
ernment contract are selected to fit the work required, 
not selected solely on the basis of the classification of 
the overall programme.
A major era in Australian government procurement began 
in the 1960's. Technological industry
grew in sophistication and complexity. This created a new 
set of needs and objectives, just as it speeded up efforts 
to apply the new scientific techniques, including those of 
systems analyses, to industry. Apart from the fact that the 
government's needs for commercial products haveconstantly 
grown, it is the development of procurement programmes for
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military and aerospace systems from here and abroad which 
particularly required new contractual and organisational 
arrangements. New legal and administrative approaches were 
required to create new and sometimes unorthodox relationships 
between government and private enterprise. The new organ­
isational patterns still seem strange as we have for so 
long been used to earlier and simpler arrangements. As the 
above chapters have shown, the government has emerged as the 
most powerful purchaser of goods and services - an activity 
that involves so much money and so many people, and has such 
important economic implications.^ As we have also seen, 
contract has become an instrument of economic policy through 
the extension of government functions and the socialisation 
of industries. From being mainly a bargain between parties, 
contract has to a large extent become a vehicle for the
2realisation of social, economic and industrial policies.
This thesis has, amongst other things, attempted to 
demonstrate that the government procurement rules, procedures 
and standard terms have an enormous impact on non-govern­
mental interests and that government contracting is not 
simply a "housekeeping" activity, with contracts being made
"^Chapter I, supra.
2 ,Chapters IV and VII, supra.
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solely for the benefit and protection of the government.
It is therefore suggested that the process of formulating 
procurement rules and standard terms should be made more 
politically visible through enlarged opportunities for 
public involvement. Subjecting government contract terms 
to the crucible of public scrutiny is likely to result in 
the development of validly authorised and reasonable contract 
terms, capable of withstanding attack on their merits.
Further we have tried to show that courts have not been 
unmindful of the disparities of bargaining power in govern­
ment contracts, though they have been handicapped by the 
absence of appropriate devices in the existing law to curb 
oppressive or harsh government provisions. If we are to 
prevent government contracts from becoming overpowerful 
instruments in the hands of procurement agencies, "enabling 
them to impose a new feudal order of their own making upon 
a vast host of vassals"/ we shall need to reappraise very
2drastically that ambivalent concept "freedom of contract".
3Often, in the sphere of government contracts as well as in
4private contracts, freedom of contract has prevailed over
"^ Kessler, "Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts about Freedom 
of Contract" (1943) 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 640. See also 
Ch.III, supra.
2Chapters III and IV, supra.
3See e.g. South Australian Railways Commissioner v. Egan (1973) 
47 A.L.J.R. 140, 141, 148.
4Chapter IV, supra.
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the individual's plea that a contract held up against him
was not what he agreed to do. Unless our contract law is
to become an "antiquated strait jacket and then [a] dead
letter",^ it will have to adapt itself to new exigencies;
in particular, some judicial recognition will have to be
given to the American concept of unconscionability in
government contracts so as to deal more effectively with
2oppressive and unfair contracts.
Finally it is suggested that Australian lawyers should
give fuller consideration to the report of the Scott
Committee and its various recommendations after a thorough
3inquiry into Australian Government Procurement Policy.
Recommendation 4 of that Committee which suggests the setting
up of a centralised purchasing body deserves particular 
4attention. It may be noted that such a centralised purchas­
ing agency has been working in India for a long time with
5considerable success.
.S. v. Standard Oil Co. of California (1947) 332 U.S. 301, 
313.
2Chapter IV, supra.
3Government Procurement Policy Report by Committee of Inquiry 
(Scott Committee) P.P. No. 124 of 1975. See ch. II, supra♦
4Scott Committee Report paras. 9.12-9.16. See also paras. 
8.26-8.34.
5See chapter IV, supra.
APPENDIX
LAWS, REGULATIONS AND DIRECTIONS AFFECTING 
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
1. The Commonwealth Constitution "^
51. The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, 
have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good govern­
ment of the Commonwealth with respect to:-
(i) Trade and commerce with other countries, and among 
the States:
(ii) Taxation; but so as not to discriminate between 
States or parts of States:
(iii) Bounties on the production or export of goods, but 
so that such bounties shall be uniform throughout 
the Commonwealth:
(iv) Borrowing money on the public credit of the Common- 
wea1th:
(v) Postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and other like 
services:
(vi) The naval and military defence of the Commonwealth 
and of the several States, and the control of the 
forces to execute and maintain the laws of the 
Commonwea1th:
(vii) Lighthouses, lightships, beacons and buoys:
(viii) Astronomical and meteorological observations:
(ix) Quarantine:
(x) Fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial 
limits:
(xi) Census and statistics:
(xii) Currency, coinage and legal tender:
(xiii) Banking, other than State banking; also State banking 
extending beyond the limits of the State concerned, 
the incorporation of banks, and the issue of paper 
money:
(xiv) Insurance, other than State insurance; also State 
insurance extending beyond the limits of the State 
concerned:
























Bills of exchange and promissory notes:
Bankruptcy and insolvency:
Copyrights, patents of inventions and designs, 
and trade marks:
Naturalization and aliens:
Foreign corporations, and trading or financial cor­
porations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth
Marriage:
Divorce and matrimonial causes; and in relation 
thereto, parental rights, and the custody and 
guardianship of infants:
Invalid and old-age pensions:
The provisions of maternity allowances, widows' 
pensions, child endowment, unemployment, pharmaceut­
ical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical and 
dental services (but not so as to authorize any form 
of civil conscription), benefits to students and 
family allowances:
The service and execution throughout the Commonwealth 
of the civil and criminal process and the judgments 
of the courts of the States:
The recognition throughout the Commonwealth of the 
laws, the public Acts and records, and the judicial 
proceedings of the States:
The people of any race, for whom it is deemed necess­
ary to make special laws:
Immigration and emigration:
The influx of criminals:
External affairs:
The relations of the Commonwealth with the islands 
of the Pacific:
The acquisition of property on just terms from any 
State or person for any purpose in respect of which 
the Parliament has power to make laws:
The control of railways with respect to transport 
for the naval and military purposes of the Common- 
wea1th:
The acquisition, with the consent of a State, of any 
railways of the State on terms arranged between the 
Commonwealth a-nd the State:
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(xxxiv) Railway construction and extension in any State 
with the consent of that State:
(xxxv) Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and 
settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond 
the limits of any one State:
(xxxvi) Matters in respect of which this Constitution makes 
provision until the Parliament otherwise provides:
(xxxvii) Matters referred to the Parliament of th’b Commonwealth 
by the Parliament or Parliaments of any State or 
States, but so that the law shall extend only to 
States by whose Parliaments the matter is referred, 
or which afterwards adopt the law:
(xxxviii) The exercise within the Commonwealth, at the request 
or with the concurrence of the Parliaments of all the 
States directly concerned, of any power which can at 
the establishment of this Constitution be exercised 
only by the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by 
the Federal Council of Australasia:
(xxxix) Matters incidental to the execution of any power 
vested by this Constitution in the Parliament or in 
either House thereof, or in the Government of the 
Commonwealth, or in the Federal Judicature, or in 
any department or officer of the Commonwealth.
75. In all matters -
(i) Arising under any treaty:
(ii) Affecting consuls or other representatives of other 
countries:
(iü) In which the Commonwealth, or a person suing or being 
sued on behalf of the Commonwealth, is a party:
(iv) Between States, or between residents of different 
States, or between a State and a resident of another 
State:
(v) In which a writ of Mandamus or prohibition or an 
injunction is sought against an officer of the 
Commonwea1th:
the High Court shall have original jurisdiction.
78. The Parliament may make laws conferring rights to 
proceed against the Commonwealth or a State in respect of 
matters within the limits of the judicial power.
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2. The Judiciary Act 1903-1973 1
56. (1) A person making a claim against the Common­
wealth, whether in contract or in tort, may in respect of the 
claim bring a suit against the Commonwealth -
(a) in the High Court;
(b) in the Supreme Court of the State or Territory in 
which the claim arose; or
(c) in any other court of competent jurisdiction of the 
State or Territory in which the claim arose.
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (c) of the last
preceding sub-section -
(a) any court exercising jurisdiction at any place in the 
capital city of a State, or in the principal or only 
city or town of a Territory, that would be competent 
to hear the suit if the Commonwealth were, or had at 
any time been, resident in that city or town, or in
a particular area in that city or town, is a court 
of competent jurisdiction; and
(b) any other court is not a court of competent juris­
diction if its competence to hear the suit would 
depend upon the place where the Commonwealth resides 
or carries on business or at any time resided or 
carried on business.
57. Any State making any claim against the Commonwealth, 
whether in contract or in tort, may in respect of the claim 
bring a suit against the Commonwealth in the High Court.
58. Any person making any claim against a State, whether 
in contract or in tort, in respect of a matter in which the High 
Court has original jurisdiction or can have original jurisdiction 
conferred on it, may in respect of the claim bring a suit against 
the State in the Supreme Court of the State, or (if the High 
Court has original jurisdiction in the matter) in the High Court.
59. Any State making any claim against another State may 
in respect of the claim bring a suit against that State in the 
High Court.
^"Sections 56-67, 79 and 80, as altered to date.
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60. In a suit against a State brought in the High Court, 
the High Court may grant an injunction against the State and 
against all officers of the State and persons acting under the 
authority of the State, and may enforce the injunction against 
all such officers and persons.
61. Suits on behalf of the Commonwealth may be brought 
in the name of the Commonwealth by the Attorney-General or by 
any person appointed by him in that behalf.
62. Suits on behalf of a State may be brought in the 
name of the State by the Attorney-General of the State, or by 
any person appointed by him in that behalf.
63. Where the Commonwealth or a State is a party to a 
suit, all process in the suit required to be served upon that 
party shall be served upon the Attorney-General of the Common­
wealth or of the State, as the case may be, or upon some person 
appointed by him to receive service.
64. In any suit to which the Commonwealth or a State is 
a party, the rights of parties shall as nearly as possible be 
the same, and judgment may be given and costs awarded on either 
side, as in a suit between subject and subject.
65. No execution or attachment, or process in the nature 
thereof, shall be issued against the property or revenue of 
the Commonwealth or a State in any such suit; but when any 
judgment is given against the Commonwealth or a State, the 
Registrar or other appropriate officer shall give to the party 
in whose favour the judgment is given a certificate in the form 
of the Schedule to this Act, or to a like effect.
66. On receipt of the certificate of a judgment against 
the Commonwealth or a State the Treasurer of the Commonwealth 
or of the State as the case may be shall satisfy the judgment 
out of moneys legally available.
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67. When in any such suit a judgment is given in favour 
of the Commonwealth or of a State and against any person, the 
Commonwealth or the State, as the case may be, may enforce the 
judgment against that person by process of extent, or by such 
execution, attachment, or other process as could be had in a 
suit between subject and subject.
79. The laws of each State, including the laws relating 
to procedure, evidence, and the competency of witnesses, shall, 
except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or the laws of 
the Commonwealth, be binding on all Courts exercising federal 
jurisdiction in that State in all cases to which they are 
applicable.
80. So far as the laws of the Commonwealth are not applic­
able or so far as their provisions are insufficient to carry 
them into effect, or to provide adequate remedies or punishment, 
the common law of England as modified by the Constitution and 
by the statute law in force in the State in which the Court
in which the jurisdiction is exercised is held shall, so far 
as it is applicable and not inconsistent with the Constitution 
and the laws of the Commonwealth, govern all Courts exercising 
federal jurisdiction in the exercise of their jurisdiction in 
civil and criminal matters.
3. The Audit Act 1901-1975^
71. (1) The Governor-General may make regulations (not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act) for carrying out 
the provisions of this Act and in particular for and in relation 
to -
(a) the collection, receipt, custody, issue, expenditure, 
due accounting for care and management of all 
public moneys and the guidance of all persons 
concerned therein,
Section 71, as altered to date.
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(b) the more effectual record examination,inspection 
and departmental check of all receipts and expendit­
ure and the keeping of all necessary books and 
accounts,
(c) the necessary forms for all books and documents 
whatever required under the provisions of this Act 
or the regulations,
(d) the execution of works and the supply of services 
for or by the Commonwealth,
(e) the purchase of chattels and other property for or 
by the Commonwealth, and
(f) the custody, issue, sale or other disposal and writing 
off of stores and other property of the Commonwealth, 
and the proper accounting for, and stocktaking of, 
those stores and that property.
(2) The regulations may -
(a) authorize the Secretary to the Department of Finance 
to give to persons employed in the service of the 
Commonwealth or to any other persons who are subject 
to the provisions of this Act directions, not incon­
sistent with this or any other Act or with any reg­
ulations under this or any other Act, far or in 
relation to any of the matters referred to in para­
graphs (a) to (f), inclusive, of the last preceding 
sub-section;
(b) authorize a prescribed officer of a Department to 
give to officers of, or persons employed in, that 
Department directions, not inconsistent with this or 
any other Act, with any regulations under this or any 
other Act or with any direction referred to in the 
last preceding paragraph, for or in relation to any 
of the matters referred to in paragraphs (a) to (f), 
inclusive, of the last preceding sub-section; and
(c) provide that a contravention of, or failure to comply 
with, a direction referred to in either of the last 
two preceding paragraphs shall be deemed to be a 
breach of the regulations.
* * * * * *
(4) The regulations may provide for the imposition 
upon any accounting officer or person subject to the provisions 
of this Act of a penalty not exceeding Ten dollars for any 
offence for the breach of any regulation and such penalty may 
be recovered either in the same manner as a penalty incurred
461
under this Act, or by deducting the same from any money due 
or thereafter becoming due to such accounting officer of person.
14. Finance Regulations
4. (1) In these Regulations, unless the contrary
intention appears -
"Authorizing Officer" means a person appointed by the Treasurer 
under sub-section (1) of section 34 of the Act to author­
ize payment of accounts;
"Certifying Officer" means a person appointed by the Department 
of Finance under sub-section (1) of section 34 of the Act 
to certify accounts as correct;
"Chief Officer" means -
(a) a person who is, or is performing the duties of, the 
Permanent Head of a Department;
(aa) the person for the time being holding, or performing 
the duties of, an office established by or under an 
Act, the holder of which has all the powers of, or 
exercisable by, a Permanent Head under the Public 
Service Act 1922-1973 in respect of a branch of the 
Australian Public Service;
(ab) a person who is, or is performing the duties of, 
the Chief Executive Officer of an Authority estab­
lished under an Act;
(b) the officer for the time being occupying an office 
which the Public Service Board has determined con­
stitutes the occupant of that office a Chief Officer 
in a Department; or
(c) the officer appointed by the Public Service Board, 
on the recommendation of the Permanent Head, to be 
a Chief Officer of a Department,
as the case requires;
"Collector" means a Collector of Public Moneys appointed under 
these Regulations or under the repealed Regulations;
Regulations 4(1), 4(2), 46-53 and 127A, Forms 11 and 13. The 
Finance Regulations, in force under the Audit Act 1901-1975, 
comprise Statutory Rules 1942, No. 523, as amended by Statutory 
Rules 1943, No. 32; 1953, No. 3; 1959, No. 9; 1961, Nos. 77 and 
122; 1964, No. 21; 1965, Nos. 32 and 169; 1966, No. 176; 1968,
No. 87; 1972, No. 31; 1974, No. 129; 1975, No. 156; 1976, Nos. 
91 and 260, and 1977, No. Ill (Issue No. 91).
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"head of expenditure" means -
(a) a division in the Schedule to an annual Appropriation 
Act that has no sub-division or items;
(b) a sub-division of a division in the Schedule to an 
annual Appropriation Act that has no items;
(c) an item of a division, or of a sub-division of a 
division, in the Schedule to an annual Appropriation 
Act;
(d) a Special Appropriation;
(e) a separate account of the Trust Fund; and
(f) a separate account of the Loan Fund;
"licence" includes any permit the issue of which is subject to 
the payment of a fee;
"Receiver" means a Receiver of Public Moneys appointed under 
these Regulations or under the repealed Regulations; 
"supplies" means supplies that are to be executed, furnished or 
performed for or by the Commonwealth, and includes works, 
stores and services that are to be so executed, furnished 
or performed;
"Territory" means Territory of the Commonwealth;
"the Act" means the Audit Act 1901-1975;
"the Auditor-General" means the Auditor-General for the 
C ommo nwe a11h;
"Accounting Office" means an office of the Department of 
Finance established under regulation 123;
"the Authorizing Officer", in relation to an advance, means the 
Authorizing Officer who authorized the payment of the 
account for the advance;
"The Commonwealth Public Account" means the bank account 
referred to in section 21 of the Act;
"the repealed Regulations" means the Regulation repealed by 
these Regulations;
"the Secretary" means the Secretary to the Department of 
Finance.
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(2) A reference in these Regulations to directions 
given by the Secretary shall be read as a reference to direct­
ions given by the Secretary under regulation 127A of these 
Regulations.
46. (1) A Requisition for supplies -
(a) shall relate only to supplies that are necessary 
for the proper conduct of the public service;
(b) shall be prepared -
(1) in the case of supplies that are to be obtained 
from or through the Department of Construction 
and the appropriation for which is under the 
control of that Department - in accordance with 
a form determined by the Minister of State for 
Construction; or
(ii) in any other case - in accordance with Form 11; 
and
(c) shall contain a description of the supplies, stating, 
where appropriate, the quantity of the supplies.
(2) A Requisition for supplies shall specify the 
contract under which the supplies are to be obtained and the 
contract price expressed, where practicable, as a rate.
(3) Where supplies specified in a Requisition can
be obtained under an existing contract between the Commonwealth 
and a supplier, those supplies shall not be obtained otherwise 
than under that contract or, if there is more than one such 
contract, under one or more of those contracts.
47. (1) A Requisition for supplies (other than a 
Requisition to which the next succeeding regulation applies) 
shall be submitted to the appropriate Authorizing Officer for 
a certificate whether funds are available for the purposes of 
the Requisition.
(2) The last preceding sub-regulation does not 
apply in relation to a Requisition if -
(a) an Authorizing Officer has, with the approval of the 
Treasurer, before the issue of the Requisition, given 
a certificate that an amount specified in the certif­
icate is available for expenditure on supplies 
required for a purpose specified in the certificate;
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(b) the Requisition relates to supplies that arc 
required for that purpose; and
(c) the sum of -
(i) the amount specified in the Requisition to 
be the cost or estimated cost of the supplies 
specified in the Requisition; and
(ii) any amount specified in previous Requisitions 
covered by the certificate to be the cost or 
estimated cost of supplies specified in those 
Requisitions,
does not exceed the amount specified in the 
certificate to be available.
48. (1) A Requisition for supplies that are to be
obtained from or through the Department of Construction and
the appropriation for which is under the control of that 
Department shall be submitted for approval to the Minister of 
State administering the Department from which the Requisition 
originated or to an officer appointed by that Minister for the 
purpose and shall not be sent to the Department of Construction 
until that approval has been obtained.
(2) After the approval has been obtained, the 
Requisition shall be submitted to an Authorizing Officer for 
the Department of Construction for a certificate whether funds 
are available.
49. When an Authorizing Officer has certified that funds 
are available for the purpose of a Requisition or has given a 
certificate of a kind referred to in paragraph (a) of sub­
regulation (2) of regulation 47 of these Regulations by virtue 
of which a certificate whether funds are available for the 
purpose of a Requisition is not required, the Requisition shall 
be submitted for approval -
(a) in the case of a Requisition for supplies the
appropriation for which is under the control of 
a Department of the Parliament - to the President 
of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives or both, as the case requires, 
or to an officer appointed for the purpose by the
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President or the Speaker or both, as the ease 
requires;
(b) in the case of a Requisition to which the last 
preceding regulation applies - to the Minister 
of State for Construction or to an officer 
appointed by that Minister for the purpose; or
(c) in any other case - to the Minister of State 
administering the Department in which the 
requisition originated or to an officer appointed 
by that Minister for the purpose.
50. (1) In cases of emergency, expenditure in respect 
of the purchase of articles of small value, the transport of 
parcels or the performance of other minor services may be 
incurred, before the issue of a Requisition in respect of that 
expenditure, by a person referred to in the last preceding 
regulation to whom the Requisition, when issued, is to be sub­
mitted for approval in accordance with that regulation.
(2) Where expenditure is so incurred, the Certifying 
Officer shall enter the details of the transaction to which the 
expenditure relates in a book to be kept by him for the purpose.
(3) The amount of expenditure that may be incurred 
under this regulation on any one occasion shall not exceed -
(a) in the case of expenditure on articles or services 
included in a class of articles or services in 
relation to which the Treasurer has determined the 
maximum amount of expenditure that may be incurred 
- the amount so determined; or
(b) in any other case - Fifty dollars.
51. (1) Subject to any Act making provision with respect 
to contracts for supplies and to regulation 52AA of these 
Regulations, where -
(a) any supplies the estimated cost of which exceeds 
One hundred dollars;
(b) there is no existing contract between the Commonwealth 
and a supplier under which the supplies so required 
can be obtained; and
(c) the supplies are not obtained under a contract 
between a State and a supplier,
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at least three representative quotations for the supplies 
shall, wherever possible, be obtained unless tenders are 
publicly invited.
(2) [Repealed]
(3) Where the estimated cost of any supplies exceeds 
One hundred dollars but does not exceed Two hundred and fifty 
dollars, a quotation obtained under this regulation in respect 
of the supplies may be oral or in writing, but, in the case of 
an oral quotation, the details of the quotation shall be 
recorded in the appropriate Departmental file.
(4) Where the estimated cost of any supplies 
exceeds Two hundred and fifty dollars, each quotation obtained 
under this regulation in respect of those supplies shall be in 
writing.
52. (1) Subject to any Act making provision with respect
to contracts for supplies and subject to the next succeeding 
regulation, contracts shall not be entered into, and orders 
shall not be placed, for supplies the estimated cost of which 
exceeds Five thousand dollars unless tenders have first been 
publicly invited for those supplies.
* * * * *
52AA (1) Regulation 51 of these Regulations and the last 
preceding regulation do not apply to -
(a) supplies the expenditure on which is authorized 
by the Governor-General;
(b) supplies to be obtained under an existing contract 
between a supplier and the Commonwealth or a State;
(c) supplies to be obtained from the Australian Govern­
ment Publishing Service, the Commonwealth Government 
Printing Office, a State Government Printing Office, 
Commonwealth factories, Commonwealth workshops, 
Commonwealth stores or Commonwealth dockyards;
(d) supplies that by their nature can be obtained only 
from a State Government Department, an authority of 
a State or Territory or a municipal or other local 
governing body;
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(e) supplies of radioactive isotopes for medical
purposes to be obtained by the Commonwealth X-ray 
and Radium Laboratory of the Department of Health 
from the Australian Atomic Energy Commission.
(2) Where the Secretary certifies that compliance 
with regulation 51 of these Regulations, or with the last 
preceding regulation, in respect of supplies of a kind specified 
in the certificate is, having regard to the nature of the supp­
lies and to the established practices in a profession, business, 
trade or industry connected with the supply of supplies of that 
kind, impracticable or inexpedient, regulation 51 of these 
regulations or the last preceding regulation, as the case may 
be, does not apply to supplies of that kind.
(3) The next succeeding sub-regulation applies to 
supplies of the following kinds:-
(a) metals for use in the manufacture, by or on behalf 
of the Commonwealth, of coins, medals, medallions, 
plaques and other like objects at a mint;
(b) supplies relating to the defence of the Commonwealth;
(c) supplies for the Department of Construction;
■(d) supplies obtained by or on behalf of the Administrator 
of the Territory of Christmas Island in connection 
with the administration of the Territory; and
(e) supplies approved, or to be obtained, by the Austral­
ian Government Stores and Tender Board or by a Tender 
Board of a Department.
(4) Where the Secretary, or an officer authorized by 
him by instrument in writing for the purpose, certifies, in 
respect of particular supplies, being supplies of a kind to 
which this sub-regulation applies, that compliance with regul­
ation 51 of these Regulations, or with the last preceding 
regulation, is, by reason of the urgency with which those 
particular supplies are required, the sources of those particular 
supplies or otherwise, impracticable or inexpedient, regulation 
51 of these Regulations or the last preceding regulation, as the 
case may be, does not apply to those particular supplies.
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52A (1) When -
(a) an Authorizing Officer has -
(1) certified that funds are available for the 
purpose of a Requisition; or
(ii) given a certificate of a kind referred to in 
paragraph (a) of sub-regulation (2) of 
regulation 47 of these Regulations by virtue 
of which a certificate whether funds are 
available for the purpose of a Requisition 
is not required; and
(b) the Requisition has been approved after submission
for approval under regulation 49 of these Regulations
the appropriate Chief Officer, or an officer authorized for the 
purpose by the appropriate Chief Officer, shall issue a Purchase 
Order in accordance with Form 13 in respect of the supplies 
specified in the Requisition.
(2) Unless the Treasurer otherwise approves,
Purchase Orders shall be prepared in triplicate and shall be 
numbered consecutively.
(3) A Purchase Order shall not be issued except in 
accordance with the Requisition as approved-
52B (1) Immediately after the issue of a Purchase Order,
the officer who issued the Order shall forward the Requisition 
for the supplies to which the Purchase Order relates to the 
Certifying Officer.
(2) The Certifying Officer shall not, except where 
the Treasurer otherwise approves, certify an account for expend­
iture in respect of supplies specified in a Purchase Order unless 
the duplicate of the Purchase Order upon which the officer res­
ponsible for receiving, or for the execution or performance of, 
the supplies has certified that the supplies are, or have been 
executed or performed, in accordance with the Purchase Order is 
attached to the account and the Order number is quoted on the 
account.
(3) The Certifying Officer shall make a memorandum 
on both the Requisition and on the duplicate of the Purchase 
Order that the account has been certified.
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53 (1) Subject to this regulation, where a contract
for supplies is entered into by, or on behalf of, the Common­
wealth and the total liability of the Commonwealth under the 
contract for those supplies will be not less than One thousand 
dollars, the Chief Officer of the Department that required the 
supplies, or, if tenders for the contract were considered by a 
Tender Board, the Chairman of that Board, shall publish, or 
cause to be published, in the Gazette as soon as practicable 
after the contract is made, a summary of the provisions of the 
contract setting out such matters as are specified in directions 
given by the Secretary.
(2) The last preceding sub-regulation does not apply
where -
(a) the contract is a contract for supplies to be supplied 
by a Department of a State, by a State Government 
Printer or'by an authority or body established by or 
under a State Act;
(b) the contract has been made with a person who has 
entered into a contract in respect of supplies of 
the same kind with a State or an authority or body 
established by or under a State Act and the contract 
with the Commonwealth provides for the supplies to
be supplied to the Commonwealth on the same terms and 
conditions as are contained in the contract with the 
State or with such an authority or body;
(c) the contract has been made for supplies required by 
the Administration of the Northern Territory of 
Australia and a summary of the provisions of the 
contract has been published in the Northern Territory 
of Australia Government Gazette; or
(d) the Chief Officer of the Department that required 
the supplies, or, if the tenders for the contract were 
considered by a Tender Board, the Chairman of that 
Board, determines that the terms of the contract are 
such, or the contract is for supplies of such a kind, 
that, in the public interest, the provisions of the 
contract should not be so published.
(3) Subject to any directions given by the Secretary, 
where a contract referred to in sub-regulation (1) of this regul­
ation has been made, the Chief Officer of the Department that 
required the supplies or, if tenders for the contract were con-
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sidered by a Tender Board, the Chairman of that Board, may 
authorize the disclosure to such persons as the Chief Officer 
or the Chairman thinks fit of such information relating to that 
contract as the Chief Officer or the Chairman thinks fit.
127A (1) The Secretary may give to persons employed in 
the service of the Commonwealth or to any other persons who are 
subject to the provisions of the Act directions, not inconsist­
ent with the Act or any other Act or with any regulations under 
the Act or any other Act, for or in relation to any of the 
matters referred to in paragraphs (a) to (f), inclusive, of 
sub-section (1) of section 71 of the Act.
(1A) Where -
(a) in pursuance of a direction given under a provision 
of these Regulations, that provision does not apply 
in the circumstances specified in the direction; or
(b) the operation of a provision of these Regulations 
depends on a direction or approval referred to in 
that provision and such a direction or approval is 
given,
the power conferred by the last preceding sub-regulation ex­
tends to the giving of directions, not inconsistent with the 
Act, with any other Act, or with any other regulations under 
the Act or any other Act, in relation to the matter dealt with 
by that provision.
(2) A Chief Officer of a Department may give to 
officers of, or persons employed in, that Department directions, 
not inconsistent with the Act or any other Act, with any reg­
ulations under the Act or any other Act or with any directions 
given under sub-regulation (1), for or in relation to any of 
the matters referred to in paragraphs (a) to (f), inclusive, of 
sub-section (1) of section 71 of the Act.
(3) A contravention of, or failure to comply with, 
a direction given under this regulation shall be deemed to be 
a breach of these Regulations.
F orm 11.
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5. Finance Directions'
SECTION 31 - PURCHASING PROCEDURE 
Purchase of Supplies
1. Adequate departmental directions shall be issued to 
ensure that officers are made aware of the need to pay due 
regard at all times to economy in purchasing- The directions 
should make provision, inter alia, for using appropriate con­
tracts (as discussed below) and also for the inviting of public 
tenders wherever it is reasonable to expect that this will 
result in more economical purchasing - notwithstanding that the 
amount of the purchase is below $5,000 (see Direction 31/20). 
Regulation 46(2) provides that requisitions shall specify the 
contract under which supplies are to be obtained. It is the 
duty of a requisitioning officer, after consultation with the 
person requiring supplies, to determine whether or not there 
is an appropriate contract. In making this decision he should 
consider:-
(a) whether there is a contract for supplies of the 
same kind as those required;
(b) if not, whether there is a contract for supplies 
of a similar type which could reasonably be used 
in substitution for those required.
Action under sub-regulation (3) and (4) of regulation 51 or
regulation 52 should be taken only if he is satisfied that each
of these questions should be answered in the negative. The
general principles contained in these Directions are subject to
the limitations imposed for specific matters, e.g. Direction
31/41.
Section 31/1-55 and Section 32/24-47, as amended, up to 31 Jan­
uary 1978. Directions given by Issue No. 19 of 17.9.1966, as 
amended by Directions in Issue Nos. 31A of 27.3.1968; 66 of 
1971; 76 of 7.9.1972; 82 of 20.9.1974; 83 of 20.9.1975; 84 of 
3.10.1975; 85 of 25.2.1976; 86 of 6.8.1976; 87 of 31.8.1976;
88 of 11.12.1976; 89 of 9.3.1977 and 90 of 6.4.1977.
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2. Responsibility for ensuring that the charges for any 
goods or services purchased by departments are not excessive 
rests on all officers who approve the acceptance of quotations 
or tenders.
Register of Commitments
3. A register shall be kept, under the direction of the 
Authorizing Officer, to record by item all commitments incurred, 
other than salaries. The register shall be designed to show at 
any time whether or not funds are available (Direction 31/4) 
for the purposes of regulation 47. It will be recommenced at 
the beginning of each financial year, the amount of outstanding 
commitments at 30 June being carried forward to the new year.
4. Funds are available:-
(a) If the amount of the commitment to be funded, plus:-
(i) the net expenditure under the item from 
the beginning of the year to date;
(ii) the outstanding commitments for the year 
to date (including outstanding balances 
of Requisitions brought forward from the 
previous year); and
(iii) recurring or other known charges which must 
be met later in the year do not exceed
(iv) the amount of the appropriation or approved
allocations (see Section 17 of these Directions) 
of the appropriation for that purpose in the 
year current; or
(v) the amount of the credit available in a head 
of Trust Fund or a Trust Account for that 
purpose;
(b) if the Treasurer has approved that the commitment 
specified in the Requisition may be incurred (a 
reference to the approval shall be given on the 
Requisition).
(c) in the case of a Trust Account of the revolving fund 
type, if the Authorizing Officer forms the view that 
it can reasonably be expected that there will be a 
sufficient balance in the Trust Account to meet the 
expenditure to be incurred against the Requisition
and all other known or anticipated commitments as and when payments fall due.
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When certifying that funds are available, Authorizing Officers 
should also ensure that Warrant Authority or Warrant Advice 
will be available at the time the related accounts become due 
for payment.
Requisitions and Purchase Orders - Appointments
5. Where under the provisions of the Regulations an 
Officer is appointed in writing:-
(a) by the Minister, for the purpose of approving 
Requisitions (regulation 49); or
(b) by the Chief Officer, for the purpose of issuing 
Purchase Orders (regulation 52A(1))
the relevant appointments should be renewed when a new Minister
or Chief Officer assumes office. It will suffice if the written
authority to approve Requisitions or to issue Purchase Orders,
as the case may be, is given to the occupants for the time being
of particular positions.
Requisitions
6. Requisitions (Form 11) shall be completed for all 
purchases of supplies except where an Authorizing Officer deter­
mines that a Requisition is not required in respect of recurring 
expenditure such as quarterly telephone and electricity accounts; 
when he so determines, the Authorizing Officer shall ensure that 
the estimates of the recurrent expenditure are regularly reviewed 
by the person appointed to approve Requisitions pursuant to 
regulation 49 and are entered in the Register of Commitments. 
Requisitions shall be completed to show:-
(a) the description and quantity of the supplies 
required;
(b) where there is a contract:-
(i) the contract under which the supplies are 
being obtained;
(ii) the contract price or rate;
(c) the known or estimated amount of commitment to be 
entered into by the purchase; and
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(d) the item of expenditure, head of Trust Fund 
or Trust Account to be debited.
Funding of Requisitions
7. All Requisitions, except those covered by Direction 
31/8, shall be submitted, before approval, to an Authorizing 
Officer for the Department concerned, for a certificate that 
"funds are available" (see Direction 31/4). The Authorizing 
Officer shall ensure that the correct item of expenditure is 
shown on the Requisition.
Bulk Allocation of Funds
8. The alternative procedure (prescribed by regulation 
47(2)) to funding each Requisition prior to approval is not to 
be used unless the Treasurer or his delegate has approved the 
variation. Applications for approval should indicate clearly 
the necessity for departure from the provisions of regulation 
47(1).
Purchases in an Emergency
9. In cases of emergency, regulation 50 permits expendit­
ure on certain specified supplies to be incurred by the delegate 
of the Minister (regulation 49), in anticipation of the funds 
certificate required under regulation 47(1).
Filing of Requisitions
10. A separate numerical series should be maintained for 
Requisitions (Form 11) in each financial year. Requisitions 
shall be filed in numerical sequence. Accounts for requisitioned 
expenditure, when certified for payment, shall be noted on the 
relative Requisitions, which when fully discharged shall be 
transferred to a separate "paid" file.
Requisitions on Department of Construction
11. Works Requisitions are to be limited to supplies 
required from the Department of Construction and the appropriat­
ion for which is under the control of that Department. The
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Requisitions arc to be signed by the Minister of the requisit­
ioning Department or by an officer authorized by him in writing. 
The designation of each of the officers authorized to sign the 
Requisition is to be advised to the local branch of the Depart­
ment of Construction and is to be placed on the Requisition by
the officer signing it.
12. [Deleted].
Purchase Orders
13. The three copies of a Purchase Order shall be signed 
by the officer authorized to issue and distributed as provided 
in Direction 31/16.
14. The officer authorized by the Chief Officer under 
regulation 52A to issue Purchase Orders shall, where purchases 
are made under an existing contract, ascertain the terms of 
settlement provided in the contract and where purchases are made 
as a result of quotations, acquaint himself with trade practices 
regarding terms of settlement and clearly insert the relevant 
terms on the Purchase Order. This action will ensure that the 
best possible discounts on purchases are obtained and enable the 
terms of settlement of any account to be kept under notice during 
the examination of the account prior to certification.
Exemption from Sales Tax on Purchase Orders
15. In issuing a Purchase Order for goods which are 
required for departmental purposes, the following certificate 
may be placed by means of a stamp on the original of the Purchase 
Order:-
"I hereby certify that these goods are free of Sales Tax 
as they are for the official use of the Department of 
....................  and are not for resale."
Distribution of Purchase Order Forms
16. Copies of Purchase Order Forms (Form 13) shall be 
distributed as follows:-
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Original - to the supplier;
Duplicate - to the officer who will receive, or who
is responsible for the execution or per­
formance of the supplies;
Triplicate - to be retained by the officer issuing the
Purchase Order.
Although regulation 52A refers to the preparation of Purchase 
Orders in triplicate, additional copies on plain paper may be 
made for departmental purposes.
Filing of Completed Orders
17. Regulation 52B provides that unless the Treasurer 
otherwise approves, an account shall not be certified unless 
the duplicate of the relevant Purchase Order, duly indorsed as 
to the delivery of stores or as to the satisfactory execution 
or performance of the works or services, is attached to the 
account. After certification of the account, the duplicate may 
be left attached to the account, returned to the officer receiv­
ing the stores (where the delivery of the whole of the goods 
ordered has not been made) or to the officer responsible for 
certifying that the works or services have been executed or 
performed (where a part payment only is being made), or filed
to suit departmental requirements, provided that the arrangements 
so made are acceptable to the Auditor-General's Office.
Procurement Procedure
18. Regulations 51, 52 and 52AA prescribe the procedures 
to be followed when departments wish to purchase supplies and 
no Commonwealth or State contract is available. The following 
Directions amplify the provisions of those regulations and are 
issued for the guidance of Chief Officers in framing directions 
for the preparation, use and maintenance of lists of potential 
suppliers.
Tenders and Quotations
19. The underlying intention of regulations 51, 52, 52AA 
and 53 is that government procurement procedures should be, and
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be seen to be, beyond reproach: i.e. that all who wish to 
participate in government business are given the opportunity 
to do so, that the government maintains a reputation for fair 
dealing, and that public money is spent effectively and econom­
ically. This intention is best achieved by the public invitat­
ion of tenders by press or Gazette advertisement (regulation 52) 
and the subsequent publication in the Gazette of details of 
contracts arranged (regulation 53). It is not, however, always 
appropriate to call tenders or publish details of contracts and 
the Regulations provide alternative procedures which are covered 
by Directions 31/22-4 and 31/32-4. The underlying intention 
should always be borne in mind when these alternative procedures 
are applied.
20. Administrative cost may make it inappropriate to apply 
the full tendering procedures to small orders, and regulation 51 
provides for the obtaining of representative quotations where 
the supplies are estimated to cost $5,000 or less. Although 
regulation 51(1) prescribes numbers of suppliers who shall be 
invited to quote for specified cost-categories of supplies, the 
regulation uses the word "at least", and it is not intended that 
the number of quotations obtained should always be restricted
to the prescribed number. In the public interest and with the 
object of achieving the best and the most economical purchase, 
consideration should be given to inviting quotations from all 
suitable suppliers included in a list of potential suppliers 
(see Directions 31/26 et seq.) who are available to undertake 
supply. Moreover, circumstances will arise in which it would 
be advantageous publicly to invite tenders for such supplies, 
and regulation 51 does not preclude the invitation of tenders 
for items costing less than $5,000.
21. It is not permissible to divide a single requirement 
into a number of separate orders so as to bring each purchase 
within any of the limits prescribed in regulations 51 and 52.
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Exemptions by Regulations
22. The exemptions from the tender and quotation pro­
cedures provided in regulation 52AA(1) are self-explanatory. 
Authorization by the Governor-General should be used as little 
as possible and only when the supplies are of a kind not other­
wise specified under regulation 52AA. When it is necessary to 
use this procedure the authority of the Governor-General in 
Council should be obtained before any commitment is incurred. 
Departments should take advantage, as far as possible, of any 
State contracts, except where:-
(a) there is an existing Commonwealth contract (see 
Direction 31/39); or
(b) it is considered that more favourable terms and 
conditions than are contained in the State contract 
could be obtained by obtaining representative 
quotations or publicly inviting tenders, e.g., 
because of the quantity required.
Details of State contracts are advised by State Authorities
from time to time.
Exemptions by Secretary to the Department of Finance
23. Regulation 52AA(2) empowers the Secretary to the 
Department of Finance to certify that, for certain kinds of 
supplies, it is impracticable or inexpedient to use the tender 
or quotation procedures. In addition, legal advice indicates 
that the regulations do not apply to the appointment of legal 
counsel and to other appointments in circumstances in which, as 
a matter of business practice, a system of tendering does not 
operate. The kinds of supplies listed in Appendix A to this 
Section are either not subject to regulation 51 or 52 or have 
been the subject of a certificate by the Secretary and it is 
not therefore necessary to obtain the prescribed number of 
quotations or publicly invite tenders for such supplies or 
obtain certificates of inexpediency. The Secretary to the 
Department of Finance should be advised if a department con­
siders that a further category of supplies should be included 
in Appendix A.
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23A. When obtaining supplies which have been exempted 
from the quotation/tender procedures, departments should take 
particular care to ensure that the procedures used for the 
selection of suppliers will stand up to public scrutiny; it 
should be evident that all potential suppliers have been given 
an opportunity to obtain Commonwealth business and that in the 
selection of the supplier and the terms of the contract the 
basic criterion has been the best interests of the Commonwealth. 
In particular, where there is a continuing need to obtain the 
services of members of a particular profession, lists of potent­
ial suppliers shall be compiled (in appropriate cases, with the 
assistance of the relevant professional body). Lists shall not 
remain static but shall be reviewed from time to time. Where 
there is only an occasional need for such a service, other 
departments which regularly use the required service should be 
consulted for advice as to suitable firms and the selection 
procedure.
Certificates of Inexpediency
24. Regulation 52AA(4) provides for certificates of 
impracticability or inexpediency in respect of particular 
supplies which fall within the categories set out in regulation 
52AA(3). Under these provisions a certificate cannot be given 
granting a general exemption to cover a series of contracts - 
the exemption can apply only to 'particular supplies', i.e. to 
the supplies covered by a particular contract. The certificate 
can be restricted to the tendering procedures, in which case it 
will be necessary to obtain quotations in accordance with regul­
ation 51, or to the quotation procedures, or it can cover both 
tenders and quotations. A certificate is not necessary in 
relation to the quotation procedures where it is not possible 
in the circumstances to obtain the number of quotations required 
by regulation 51.
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25. The person authorized to give certificates of 
inexpediency will exercise his judgment upon the facts of each 
proposed purchase: he will consider, e.g. the non-availability 
of competing sources of supply or the real urgency of the 
requirement. The responsibility for the issue of a certificate 
that it is impracticable or inexpedient to obtain the prescribed 
number of representative quotations or publicly invite tenders 
rests finally with him. The grounds upon which a dispensation 
is sought from the requirement either to obtain representative 
quotations or publicly invite tenders shall be clearly stated
in writing by the recommending officer and contracts shall not 
be signed or orders placed until a certificate of inexpediency 
is given. If a situation arises where the obtaining of repres­
entative quotations or the public invitation of tenders is con­
sidered impracticable or inexpedient in the case of particular 
supplies, and the department has no person authorized to issue 
certificates of inexpediency, application may be made for the 
issue of a certificate to the Chief Executive Officer, Australian 
Government Stores and Tender Board, Box 2820AA, G.P.O.,
Melbourne, Vic. 3001.
Lists of Potential Suppliers
26. Except where requirements are likely to be small in 
volume (see Direction 31/32) or for the purchase of common-use 
items (see Direction 31/38), lists of potential suppliers, drawn 
up in such form as the Chief Officer determines, shall be used 
by departments as part of their purchasing procedure, whether or 
not tenders are to be called. Where tenders are to be called, 
likely suppliers on the departmental lists who are capable of 
meeting the requirements may be specifically invited to tender. 
Where tenders are not to be called, the Ids ts should be used 
for the purpose of selecting suitable suppliers to be asked to 
submit quotations.
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27. Where it is possible to deal with principals only, 
agents who do not render a useful service need not be regis­
tered.
Compilation and Maintenance of Lists
28. Lists shall be compiled from all available sources 
(advertisements, trade directories, classified sections of 
telephone directories, previous satisfactory suppliers, etc.). 
Records already in existence may be used as the basis for the 
lists to be approved in accordance with Direction 31/29. Lists 
may be compiled (or sub-divided) in respect of such branches, 
regions, districts, etc. , as the Chief Officer determines.
Where there is a continuing requirement for the services of 
any class of person or supplies listed in Appendix A to this 
Section, lists will consist of persons who have indicated their 
willingness to provide their services.
29. The lists, when compiled, shall be reviewed and 
approved by the Chief Officer or by a senior officer authorized . 
by him for the purpose. Additions to and deletions from the 
lists shall not be made except with similar approval. Deletions 
may be made if, e.g. the supplier goes out of business, becomes 
bankrupt or goes into liquidation, fails to respond to three or 
more successive invitations, consistently submits unreasonably 
high tenders, has an unsatisfactory performance record. In 
these cases the reason for the deletion should be properly 
documented on the departmental file.
30. Lists must not be allowed to remain static but must 
be subject to continuous review by the purchasing officer.
For the larger purchasing departments which have an exclusive 
interest in a particular class of supplies, the Chief Officer 
should give consideration to advertising annually for potential 
suppliers to be registered on the departmental lists. If more 
than one department has large purchases of the same class of
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supplies, unnecessary advertising should be avoided by co­
operation between the departments concerned. As a precaution 
against overlooking new sources of supplies, particularly in 
cases when the public tender procedure is not regularly used 
as a means of selecting suppliers (either generally or for 
particular classes of supplies), a useful form of control and 
check will be the periodical public invitation for tenders.
Unsatisfactory Suppliers
31. Firms, etc., proving unsatisfactory in the perform­
ance of contracts, or who, for any other good and sufficient 
reason are considered unsuitable for participation in depart­
mental business may, on the approval of the officer who approved 
the list, be transferred to an "ineligible" list. Until the 
firm,etc., proves to the satisfaction of the department that it 
should be removed from this list, it shall not be considered 
eligible for departmental business. When a firm, etc., is 
transferred to an "ineligible" list, the department should 
notify other departments which may have dealings with the firm, 
etc., if the reason for transfer is such (e.g. fraud, bankruptcy, 
etc.) that it is undesirable that it participate in any future 
Government business.
Access to Lists by Departments with Minor 
Interests in Procurement
32. Departments need not keep formal lists of potential 
suppliers if their purchases of supplies, either generally or 
of a particular type, are only small in volume. If they want 
to purchase supplies costing more than $50 and have no lists, 
the Chief Officer shall arrange for his department (or branch 
of a department) to have access to the lists maintained by a 
large purchasing department, as appropriate for the nature of 
the supplies to be obtained.
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Notification of Contracts Arranged
33. Where a summary of the provisions of a contract 
entered into by, or on behalf of, the Government is required 
to be published in the Gazette in accordance with regulation 
53, it shall contain the following details:-
(a) Reference - the tender schedule, quotation, order 
number or other reference used for identification 
purposes.
(b) Description of Supplies - a brief description of the 
supplies including the place where the works or 
services are to be performed, where appropriate, and 
the period, if any.
(c) Value - fixed quantity contract - the total value; 
period and approximate quantity contracts - the 
estimated total value, based on the estimated 
quantities, etc., notified in the Invitation to 
Tender. (Monetary amounts are to be expressed in
$A. Estimates are to be indicated by the contraction 
"(est)").
(d) Contractor - the full name of the contractor and 
location i.e. capital city, city or town, as approp­
riate, and the State.
Disclosure of Information relating to 
Contracts
34. Regulation 53(3) enables information relating to 
contracts, additional to that published in the Gazette, to be 
disclosed at the discretion of the Chief Officer or the Chairman 
of a Tender Board to such persons as unsuccessful tenderers, 
potential tenderers and other genuinely interested parties.
Such information may include unit prices. Information to an 
unsuccessful tenderer about the reasons for non-acceptance of 
his tender should be in terms of his tender's insufficiency 





Australian Government Stores 
and Tender Board
38. The Australian Government Stores and Tender Board 
is responsible for the purchase of all stores, including 
office machines, in general use throughout departments.
Details of the goods held in stock and of current contracts 
under which supplies may be obtained, are contained in the 
Circulars issued by the Board. Departments should ensure 
that those Circulars are brought to the notice of appropriate 
officers. Orders for supplies placed with the Board or the 
Board's contractors should clearly identify the items requir­
ed. Stores required from Australian Government Stores and 
Tender Board stocks shall be ordered on Form T.B.3 provided 
by the Board.
39. Where the Government has contracted to purchase all 
its requirements for a particular class of supplies from the 
one contractor, departments must obtain individual require­
ments for those supplies from the Government contractor as 
failure to use the Board's contracts could involve the 
Government - in actions for breach of contract. If supplies
to be obtained, other than those to which Direction 31/44 is 
applicable, are not covered by a contract, adequate specific­
ations must be submitted to the Australian Government Stores 
and Tender Board, which will invite public tenders. These 
specifications should contain a detailed description of the 
supplies, compiled in such a manner that their nature will 
be apparent to all potential tenderers, e.g., measurement, 
capacity, similarity with an article manufactured by a 
particular firm, etc. Adequate instructions regarding deliv­
ery date, packing, marking, etc., should be given in all 
orders.
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40. The address of the Australian Government Stores 
and Tender Board is Box 282044 G.P.O., Melbourne, and all 
enquiries should be addressed to the Chief Executive Officer.
Advertising
41. Advertising within Australia for the Australian 
Government shall be arranged through the Australian Govern­
ment Advertising Service unless approval for other arrange­
ments is obtained from the Service. The planning and prod­
uction of advertisements and the selection of agencies to 
assist in or carry out this work shall be arranged by the 
Service in conjunction with the department concerned.
Payment of Accounts for Advertising
41A. The payment of advertising accounts must be made as 
a matter of urgency in conformity with arrangements made with 
the Australian Advertising Council representing the agencies. 
Detailed procedures and dates for the payment of advertising 
accounts which have been agreed with the charging/placing 
agencies have been advised to departments by Treasury Circular 
1974/17. To assist in the prompt delivery of cheques, depart­
ments shall attach priority paid mail stickers (obtainable 
from Post Offices) to the Advice to Payee section of the 
Department of Finance Forms 12. Separate Department of Fin­
ance Forms 22A shall be prepared for advertising accounts.
Christmas Cards
42. Strict economy is to be exercised in the printing 
and distribution of Christmas cards. Directions issued from 
time to time by the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet are to be followed. Printing costs should be debited 
to the printing item of the Administrative Expenses sub­
division of the department.
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Office Requisites and Equipment, Stationery 
and Printing
43. Purchases which are correctly chargeable to the 
appropriation for office requisites and equipment, stationery 
and printing shall not be made from petty cash except in cases 
of emergency, the circumstances of which shall appear on the 
petty cash voucher.
Printing/Publishing Requirements
44. Departments shall not arrange for the supply of 
printing and publishing requirements otherwise than in accord­
ance with the procedures set out in Australian Government 
Publishing Service Circulars, unless other arrangements are 
approved by the Controller, Australian Government Publishing 
Service. This Direction does not apply to the procurement of 
publications or forms through the Sales and Distribution 
Section in accordance with Directions 31/44C and 31/45.
44A. Where arrangements are made by the Australain 
Government Publishing Service for work to be carried out by 
the Printing Branch or an outside printer, purchase orders 
will be issued by officers of that Service under authority 
provided by Chief Officers of departments in terms of regul­
ation 52A. Suppliers' invoices for work carried out, checked 
and verified against the contract documents and endorsed 
accordingly by the Australian Government Publishing Service, 
will be passed to the appropriate department for further 
examination and subsequent payment. The endorsement, dealing 
with rates of charge and compliance with specifications, may 
be accepted as sufficient evidence for the purposes of the 
relevant certificates required under section 34 of the Audit 
Act.
Procurement of Publications
44B. The Australian Government Publishing Service makes 
available to departments lists indicating the Government and
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other publications distributed through the Sales and Distrib­
ution Section and the various sources from which those public­
ations are obtainable. Where a publication is available from 
these sources, supplies other than small urgent requirements 
shall not be obtained through bookselling or other agencies.
Procurement of Forms
45. A forms stock list issued by the Sales and Dis­
tribution Section, Australian Government Publishing Service, 
shows the prescribed Department of Finance and other forms in 
general use in departments. Departments should consult this 
list before ordering their requirements and follow the direct­
ions thereon when preparing purchase orders. Special care is 
to be taken in placing orders for prescribed and other forms 
so as to avoid excessive stockholdings and consequent waste
in the event that forms are amended. In this connection, 
orders for Public Service Board and Department of Finance 
forms placed on the Sales and Distribution Section are not to 
exceed twelve months' estimated requirements.
Purchase of Office Machines
46. Unless otherwise directed by the Department of 
Finance, a copy of all requests to the Australian Government 
Stores and Tender Board to approve the purchase of office 
machines in the categories listed in Direction 31/49 shall 
be forwarded concurrently to the Management Improvement 
Division, Public Service Board, Canberra. This procedure is 
designed to assist the Australian Government Stores and 
Tender Board properly to determine the numerous requests of 
this nature that it receives. Copies of requests for 
approval to purchase office machines not included in these 
categories should not be forwarded to the Public Service 
Board's Management Improvement Division, but an explanatory 
statement supplying the information set out in Direction 
31/47, as far as it is appropriate, should be forwarded to
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the Australian Government Stores and Tender Board for its 
guidance. In these cases, the Australian Government Stores 
and Tender Board will exercise its discretion as to whether 
the Public Service Board's Management Improvement Division 
should be consulted. For the purpose of this Direction and 
Directions31/47 - 31/49 the term 'office machines' does not 
include printing equipment detailed in Direction 31/53.
47. The request to the Chief Executive Officer,
Australian Government Stores and Tender Board (copy to the 
Public Service Board's Management Improvement Division where 
required), shall give the following information:
(a) whether the machine is in replacement of an 
existing machine and, if so, whether, and in 
what number, other machines of the same type 
are in use, the reason for replacement and the 
age and condition of equipment to be replaced 
(see also Direction 32/37);
(b) expected machine work load;
(c) for other than replacements:
(i) whether a new procedure is involved and, if 
so, a summary description of changes contem­
plated. (Note: If the proposed installation 
is on a trial basis and subsequent requests 
for purchases are foreseen, this should be 
stated) ;
(ii) whether the department holds other machines 
of the same or similar type;
(iii) whether the department has conducted any 
machine tests prior to requisition and a 
brief indication of the reason for the 
particular selection made; and
(iv) estimated costs or savings.
48. A copy of the quotation obtained from the suppliers
of the equipment required shall be submitted with the proposal. 
The quotation should indicate:-
(a) if the equipment is imported, whether the price 
covers supply ex bond (if purchase of imported 
equipment ex duty paid stock is desired, the reason 
why purchase ex bond is not practicable should be 
stated);
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(b) the supplier's charge per annum for maintenance 
of the equipment;
(c) the country of manufacture of the equipment;
(d) the supplier's guarantee for the equipment;
(e) the supplier's trade-in offer for any equipment 
to be replaced.
49. The categories of office machines in respect of 
which copies of requests for approval to purchase should be 
forwarded to the Public Service Board's Management Consult­
ancy and Review Division are:-
Accounting machines (including analysis and dissecting 
machines and ledger posting machines)
Adding and listing machines
Addressing machines and associated embossing equipment 
(excluding plates, frames and furniture) 
Calculating machines
Cheque writing and/or signing devices 
Dictating and transcribing machines
Duplicating and reproducing machines (including photo­
copying equipment but excluding equipment used 
by Drawing Offices)
Franking machines
Internal Communications Systems, other than P.M.G.
installations 
Punched card equipment
Specialised filing equipment, such as rotary index
systems and motorised card filing cabinets, but 
excluding mobile shelving 
Typewriters - electric, semi-electric, and other 
specialised machines
Orders for Postage Stamps
50. Orders on the Postmaster-General's Department for 
the supply of postage stamps or the re-setting of franking 
machines shall be accompanied by a cheque in favour of that 




Purchase of Printing Equipment
53. Proposals to purchase printing machines or printing 
equipment shall be referred in the first instance to the 
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, which may 
arrange for their examination by its Printing Branch. When 
submitting the proposals, information in accordance with 
Direction 31/47 (a), (b) and (c) shall be supplied. For the
purposes of this Direction printing machines or printing 
equipment shall include:-
(a) composing machines capable of composing type or 
preparing matter which simulates typesetting 
(including hot metal casting equipment, photo­
mechanical equipment or devices, justowriters, 
varitypers, etc.);
(b) printing machines, either letterpress, offset, 
gravure, silk screen or photo-mechanical, which 
print or reproduce from type, metal plate, plastic, 
rubber, film or paper-master (including xerox, map 
or plan-printing equipment and offset duplicators 
similar to multilith machines, but not including 
stencil duplicators and office photo-copying 
equipment);
(c) ancillary equipment for process engraving, block 
making, stereotyping, electro-typing, lithographic 
plate making, xerox, or ektalith plate making, die 
stamping, or gold blocking;
(d) binding machines for folding, gathering, collating, 
stitching, punching, perforating, drilling, slitting, 
sewing, covering, mounting, ruling, binding, and 
cutting paper or other printing materials for use 
with any of the types of equipment included in (a) , 
(b) and (c) above, and the cost of which exceeds 
$100.
"Consultancy Services - Management"
"Management Consultancy - Services"
55. For the purposes of this Direction, the term manage­
ment consultancy services means services of fered by management 
consultants (or other agencies) by way of investigating 
assigned problems and submitting recommendations for improve­
ment of the organisation, management, planning, direction,
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control and operations of a department, including direct 
assistance with implementation of agreed recommendations 
and with staff selection and development, education and 
training. Departments proposing to use the services of 
management consultants shall, before entering into any 
negotiations with a consultant, refer their proposals to 
the Management Consultancy and Review Division of the 
Public Service Board's Office for advice whether the 
engagement of a consultant is justified, having regard 
to the availability of suitable staffing resources in the 
department, the Public Service Board's Office or other 
departments. The Division will assist with the selection 
of a suitable consultant and with the control of the 
assignment. Guidelines to assist departments in these 
matters are issued separately by the Public Service 
Board's Office. The selection of a particular consultant 
shall normally be made only after carefully considering 
the experience, resources and particular skills of at 
least three consultants.
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Section 31 Appendix A
APPENDIX A
(See Direction 31/23) 
FINANCE REGULATION 52AA(2.)
The following kinds of supplies are exempt from the 
requirement to obtain quotations or publicly invite tenders
The services of 
Accountants
Acoustical and Environment Consultants
Advertising Agents and Media






















Management Consultancy Services (see Direction 31/55) 
Transport of Assisted Migrants in pursuance of an 
Intergovernmental Agreement 
Travel and freight on Scheduled Services 
Welfare Reports for the Family Law Court 
Works of Art
494
SECTION 32 - STORES AND STORES ACCOUNTS
Authority for Sale of Stores
24. Unless otherwise provided by Act or Regulation, 
sales of stores shall be made only under the authority of the 
Minister or an officer appointed by him for the purpose. The 
original or assessed original cost of stores items to be sold 
shall be stated for the information of competent authority and 
also, in cases where Ministerial delegations are given within 
monetary limits, the aggregate of such costs shall be shown 
for the purpose of determining the delegate who will approve 
the sale.
Directions Relating to Sales
25. Directions issued by the Chief Officer pursuant to 
regulation 127A(2.) in relation to sales of stores shall 
ensure that there is a proper link between the Register of 
Assets (including stock ledger and inventory), approvals to 
sell, stores held pending sale and the accounting for proceeds 
of sales. The directions shall also ensure that there is 
adequate internal check throughout the system. They shall 
have regard to the different treatment which may be required 
for the following types of sales or as many of them as are 
applicable to the Department:-
(a) stores which it is the proper function of a Depart­
ment to produce or purchase and subsequently to 
offer for sale to the public, to a government con­
tractor, to a Commonwealth Department or to any 
Government or Instrumentality;
(b) stores which in an emergency or where unprocurable 
from trade sources are sold to Governments, 
Instrumentalities, government contractors and 
private firms, where such action is in the public 
interest;
(c) buildings, land and improvements which have been 
declared surplus to Commonwealth requirements;
(d) waste material, scrap metal, food refuse, empty 
containers and the like;
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(e) stores forfeited to the Commonwealth, which are 
subsequently sold;
(f) stores which have been declared surplus to depart­
mental requirements or are being sold due to un­
serviceability, obsolescence, etc.
Wherever appropriate, approval of competent authority may be
given in respect of classes of items rather than individual
transactions. It is not necessary to notify the Auditor-
General of stores to be sold except in cases where the
Treasurer otherwise determines.
Disposals Record
26. Disposals shall be registered in such a way as to 
provide a ready record for internal check and audit of all 
approvals for sale and the subsequent accounting for proceeds 
of sales. For the purpose of this Direction the Register may 
take the form of recommendations to competent authority, re­
commendations by an Inspecting Officer or a Board of Inspect­
ors, Board of Survey recommendations, Disposals Schedules or 
other suitably controlled record on which approval to sell 
will be recorded. Whatever form the Register might take, it 
should contain some cross-reference of the items for disposal 
to the Assets Register (including the stock ledger and 
inventory).
Disposal of Surplus Stores
27. All land, buildings and improvements surplus to 
departmental requirements shall be declared to the Depart­
ment of Administrative Services for disposal action.
28. All surplus furniture shall be declared to the 
Department of Construction. No financial adjustment of any 
kind shall be made for furniture declared surplus by Depart­
ments. Departments requiring furniture shall submit their 
requirements to the Department of Construction, which is 
responsible for ensuring that, as far as possible, require­
ments will be met from the furniture pool. Under no circum­
stances shall purchases of common items of furniture be made
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without a clearance from the Department of Construction that 
requirements cannot be satisfied from the pool or the unused 
furniture holdings of other Departments or Authorities.
29. Typewriters not required by Civil Departments, 
elsewhere than in the Northern Territory, shall be returned 
to the Australian Government Stores and Tender Board store in 
the capital city of the State concerned under cover of Board's 
Form T.B.8. Civil Departments in the Northern Territory and 
all Service Departments, shall declare their machines direct 
to the Department of Administrative Services for disposal.
That Department will forward appropriate details of the 
machines to the Australian Government Stores and Tender Board 
representative and shall not dispose of the machines unless 
notified by the representative that he does not require them 
for any purpose.
30. Departments which have surplus stores other than 
land, buildings and improvements, furniture and office 
machines (including typewriters) should advise the Department 
of Administrative Services which periodically circulates 
lists of items available for disposal. Departments requiring 
stores that may be held surplus by other Departments should 
first confirm that their requirements cannot be met from 
surplus stocks. Notification to, and enquiries from, the 
Department of Administrative Services should be made prior
to disposal or purchase. The price at which stores are to 
be transferred is the lesser of book value plus any depart­
mental oncost, or current market value. Transfers of surplus 
stores between Departments in the Defence group are to be 
without financial adjustment with the exception of raw 
materials, aids to manufacture of Service requirements, 
stores on charge to Trust Fund and land, buildings and 
improvements.
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31. Stores approved for sale, other than those trans­
ferred to another Department or Authority or referred to in 
Direction 32/25 (a) and (b), shall be sold by one of the 
following means:-
(a) through the Disposals Authority, Purchasing 
Division, Department of Administrative Services;
(b) by public invitation of tenders;
(c) by public auction.
While for other than the Service Departments the disposal of 
stores is the primary responsibility of Departments, the 
services of the Disposals Authority, Department of Manufactur­
ing Industry should be availed of if the technical services 
and machinery of that Authority would be of assistance and 
might result in better prices being obtained for the stores 
concerned. The Departments of the Defence group shall declare 
all surplus stores for disposal (except land, buildings and 
office machines) to the Disposals Authority, Purchasing 
Division, Department of Administrative Services.
32. Delivery of stores sold to the public shall be made 
under one of the following conditions:-
(a) prior payment in cash;
(b) payment by cheque, under conditions outlined 
below; or
(c) under bank guarantee or other arrangements 
approved by the Treasury, which ensure that 
no loss of public moneys will occur.
Normally all sales shall be for cash, but payment by cheque
may be accepted:-
(i) where the cheque is a bank cheque;
(ii) if the cheque is from a firm etc. approved 
by the Disposals Authority;
(iii) if a personal cheque is within the limits 
prescribed by the Chief Finance Officer of 
the Disposals Authority or his nominee or 
on the approval of the Receiver of Public 
Moneys or an officer of similar standing
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in the Holding Department concerned.
A cheque is only to be accepted where 
the purchaser is well-known and is of 
satisfactory financial standing.
Where Department of Finance approval has been given under 
paragraph (c) above for sales on credit on extended terms, 
interest at the rate approved by the Department of Finance 
shall be charged. The present approved rate is 9.5 per cent 
per annum. Provision may be made in contracts for the charg­
ing of a penalty rate not exceeding 2 per cent added to the 
original approved rate.
33. Sales by public invitation to tender and auction 
shall be in accordance with the normal procedures followed 
by the Department of Administrative Services.
34. Sales to Commonwealth Departments or Authorities, 
State Departments or State Instrumentalities may be on terms 
that settlement shall be made promptly at the end of the 
month of delivery on the invoice price as rendered. Any 
disputed amount or other adjustment shall be rectified sub­
sequently. Once delivery is taken by a Commonwealth Depart­
ment and a receipt given to the Holding Department, full pay­
ment shall be made in accordance with the receipt given.
Any deficiencies subsequently disclosed shall be adjusted in 
accordance with the provisions of the Act and Finance 
Directions.
35. The act of sale and the consequential entries 
remove the stores sold from the stores ledger account and, 
except in the case of stores on charge which have been con­
demned, are declared obsolete or unserviceable and are sub­
sequently destroyed or sold as scrap,action to write off is 
not necessary.
Trade-ins
36. Trade-in offers may be accepted on stores that are 
being replaced, except motor vehicles being replaced in
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Australia (for trade-in of motor vehicles overseas, see 
Direction 34/89A), furniture and typewriters. Details of 
offers received, together with a report on the condition 
and serviceability of the stores, shall be submitted to the 
relevant disposal authority. The authority approving the 
purchase may accept a trade-in offer only where the disposal 
authority advises that acceptance is to the best advantage 
of the Commonwealth.
37. When office machines other than typewriters are 
being replaced, trade-in offers are to be obtained whenever 
possible. Details of offers are to be notified to the Chief 
Executive Officer, Australian Government Stores and Tender 
Board (who is the disposal authority under Direction 32/36 
for the class of stores which are purchased through the 
Board) when approval to purchase the new machine is being 
sought. The report on the condition of the machines will 
enable the Chief Executive Officer to decide whether they 
can be taken into stock for re-issue.
38. When a trade-in arrangement is approved, only the 
net amount paid to the supplier is to be charged to the 
appropriation.
Customs duty, sales tax, etc. 
on Stores Sold
39. Where stores procured by Commonwealth Departments 
and Authorities free of customs duty, sales tax and like 
charges are sold to other than Departments and Authorities 
which are entitled to immunity from indirect taxation, such 
charges shall be taken into account in determining the 
amount payable by the purchaser of the stores.
40. If the stores have gone into use in Australia prior 
to the sale, sales tax is not payable in respect of the sale 
but, in order to ensure that the advantage of the original 
immunity from duty and sales tax is not passed on to the
buyer, the selling price should, as far as possible, be
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ascertained by adding to the actual cost of the stores the 
duty and sales tax which would have been payable, had the 
stores not been acquired for governmental use, subject to an 
appropriate allowance for depreciation.
41. Where the stores have not been used in Australia, 
payment of sales tax is required in respect of the sale as 
applies to ordinary commercial transactions.
42. Where the purchaser is a Commonwealth Authority, 
exemption from the inclusion of the equivalent of customs 
duty in tie purchase price will depend upon whether the 
acquisition of the stores by that Authority can be regarded
as being in the same category as articles imported by or being 
the property of the Commonwealth not being for the purposes of 
trade within the meaning of the relative Tariff Item.
43. Exemption from the inclusion of the equivalent of 
sales tax in the purchase price shall be permitted only if 
the purchasing Department or Authority furnishes an Exemption 
Certificate in the form prescribed under Sales Tax legislation.
Gifts of Stores
44. No stores are to be issued as gifts except with the 
approval of or under delegation from the Treasurer, or alter­
natively with the approval of Cabinet on a report from the 
Treasurer. The question whether Parliament shall be informed 
of the gifts proposed to be made will be decided by the 
Department of Finance on the merits of each case and on the 
understanding that wherever a large sum is involved Parlia­
ment will be duly informed at the earliest practicable date.
In view of the functions and responsibilities of the Disposals 
Authority, applications for free issues of surplus items 
should first be made to that Authority which in turn will 
seek the approval of the Department of Finance as necessary.
In considering the general question of free issues, the 
Disposals Authority will consider such questions as:-
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(a) the possible requirements of Commonwealth Depart­
ments other than the one which has the surplus 
property for disposal;
(b) whether the particular surplus property has any 
commercial use or appreciable market value;
(c) the fixing of a nominal charge in order to dis­
courage indiscriminate applications;
(d) the rationing of free issues with a view to fair 
distribution and the avoidance of discrimination.
Free Issues and Sale of Stores 
to Officers
45. Free issues of stores to officers shall not be 
permitted unless authorized by the Treasurer. The sale of 
stores to an officer shall not be permitted except under the 
following conditions
(a) the stores to be sold have been declared by 
competent authority to be surplus to departmental 
requirements; and
(b) no concession whatever is given in regard to price 
or in any other direction; and
(c) the sale is conducted by public tender or public 
auction.
Stores Condemned, Unserviceable etc.
46. The Chief officer shall specify in writing the 
procedures to be followed in relation to the disposal of 
stores. The procedures should:
(a) identify the types of stores that the department 
will itself dispose of and those to be declared 
to the appropriate Disposal Authority;
(b) recognise the different arrangements required for 
the differing reasons for disposal e.g. condemned, 
obsolete, unserviceable, unrepairable, worn out, 
damaged etc., and set out the action to be taken 
in each instance. Disposal action to be taken 
shall be based on the requirements of Directions 
32/24 to 32/45 and 32/46(a);
(c) provide for the appointment of an Inspecting 
Officer (except in relation to (f) and (g) here­
under) , or, when considered necessary, a Board
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of Inspectors, to report upon the stores to be 
disposed of. The appointment of a Board of 
Inspectors should only be considered if the 
particular circumstances or the nature of the 
stores, in the opinion of the Chief Officer, 
warrant this additional safeguard. Neither 
an Inspecting Officer nor the majority of a 
Board of Inspectors should be officers who are 
responsible for the physical custody of the 
particular stores. Reports should include 
recommendations for retention or disposal and, 
where appropriate, the method of disposal e.g. 
sale, transfer, reduction to scrap, destruction;
(d) require that the recommendations of the Inspecting 
Officer(s) be submitted to the Chief Officer or 
his delegate for approval;
(c) make it clear that where other than fair wear and
tear is suspected to have occurred e.g. negligence, 
misappropriation etc., the Inspecting Officer(s) 
should submit a detailed report to the Chief 
Officer or his delegate for consideration whether 
further action should be taken in accordance with 
section 33 of these Directions;
(f) if appropriate, in the light of departmental 
operations, provide for the abandonment of stores 
when necessary, e.g. where recovery or retention 
would endanger life or other property, or where 
the cost of recovery or retention is excessive in 
the circumstances. In such cases the appointment 
of an Inspecting Officer(s) would clearly be in­
appropriate, but a report as to the circumstances 
of the abandonment would be required. Write-off 
action under section 70C of the Audit Act would, 
in the light of the report etc., be a matter for 
the Treasurer's delegate;
(g) specify the disposal action to be taken for stores 
with a pre-determined life and which can be retired 
on a time or usage basis e.g. motor vehicles, type­
writers. In such cases the appointment of an 
Inspecting Officer would normally be unnecessary 
unless the department's records of the operation
of the equipment indicated that unfair wear and 
tear may have occurred; and
(h) ensure that stores approved for disposal are sub­
sequently disposed of in such a way as will prevent 




47. The value of stores destroyed or converted to scrap 
may be written-off by the Treasurer or his delegate under the 
authority of section 70C of the Act. Stores transferred to 
another department or sold do not require to be written-off 
under section 70C; upon disposal by these means entries shall 
be made to remove the stores from the Stores Ledger. "Value" 
for the purposes of write-off action under section 70C of the 
Act means the original cost charged to a head of expenditure, 
or, if this is not available, an assessed original cost. 
Officers exercising delegations under section 70C of the Act 
should ensure that all administrative action, including 
reduction to scrap, disposal, etc., has been taken, and that 
destruction certificates are provided.
6. Overseas Accounts Directions "^
Application of Audit Act and Finance 
Regulations outside Australia and 
the Territories
4. (1) Sub-sections (2), (5), (6) and (6B) of section
34 of the Audit Act 1901-1975 and regulations 6, 8, 12, 13,
14, 15, 17, 18, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 37, 48, 52, 53 and
56B, sub-regulation (2) of regulation 60, regulations 67, 68, 
71, 72, 73, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92 and 95, sub­
regulation (2) of regulation 100, regulations 101, 103, 104,
105, and 108, paragraph (b) of sub-regulation (2) of regulat­
ion 112 and regulations 116 and 126 of the Finance Regulations 
do not apply in relation to -
(a) the collection, receipt, custody, expenditure, care 
and management, outside Australia, of public moneys 
and the due accounting for those moneys;
Clauses 4, 10A, 11-13. Directions given on 18 March 1965, as 
amended,by Directions given on 25 November 1965, 23 February 
1967, 8 December 1967, 29 May 1975 (Issue No. 84), 25 February 
1976 (Issue No. 90 [sic]),31 August 1976 (Issue No. 87), and 7 
December 1976 (Issue No. 88).
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(b) the keeping of books and accounts and the furnishing 
of statements, returns and vouchers in respect of 
the matters referred to in the last preceding para­
graph;
(c) the execution of works and the supply of services 
outside Australia for or by the Commonwealth;
(d) the purchase outside Australia of chattels and 
other property for or by the Commonwealth;
(e) the custody, issue, sale or other disposal and 
writing, off of stores and other property of the 
Commonwealth outside Australia, and the proper 
accounting for, and stocktaking of, those stores 
and that property; and
(f) the inspection and examination (otherwise than by 
the Auditor-General), and the departmental check, 
of books, accounts, statements, returns, records 
and vouchers prepared or kept outside Australia 
in respect of public moneys, stores and other 
property of the Commonwealth.
(2) For the purposes of the application outside 
Australia of the provisions of the Audit Act 1901-1975 and 
the Finance Regulations (other than the provisions of that 
Act and those Regulations referred to in the last preceding 
sub-clause) -
(a) a reference in those provisions to a Chief Account­
ing Officer shall be read as a reference to a Chief 
Accounting Officer as defined by the next succeed­
ing clause;
(b) a reference in those provisions to a Collector 
shall be read as a reference to a Collector as 
defined by the next succeeding clause;
(c) a reference in those provisions to a Paymaster shall 
be read as a reference to a Paymaster as defined by 
the next succeeding clause;
(d) a reference in those provisions to a Collector's 
Receipts Account or to a Drawing Account shall be 
read as a reference to a bank account as defined 
by the next succeeding clause;
(e) a reference in regulations 61, 112, 120 and 121 
of those Regulations to The Commonwealth Public 
Account shall be read as a reference to a bank 
account as defined by the next succeeding clause;
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(f) a reference in regulations 52A, 75 and 132 of 
those Regulations to a Chief Officer shall be 
read as a reference to a Chief Accounting Officer 
as defined by the next succeeding clause;
(g) a reference in regulations 47, 49, 52A, 65, 66 
and 74, sub-regulation (3) of regulation 75 and 
regulations 77, 78, 94, 98, 99, 111, 118 and 120 
of those Regulations to an Authorizing Officer 
shall be read as a reference to an Overseas 
Authorizing Officer as defined by the next succeed­
ing clause;
Allocation Advices
10A (1) Expenditure by an overseas office of public
moneys for any purpose shall not be made unless the Overseas 
Authorizing Officer for that office has received from an 
Authorizing Officer or from another Overseas Authorizing 
Officer an Allocation Advice specifying that moneys are avail­
able for expenditure for that purpose.
(2) Where, in an Allocation Advice, it is specified 
that the moneys referred to in the Advice are available for 
expenditure for a specified purpose during a specified period, 
those moneys are available for expenditure for that purpose 
only during that period.
Requests for Payment of Moneys 
and Procurement of Supplies by 
Overseas Office
11. (1) Each request by a Department in Australia or
by an overseas office for the payment of moneys by another 
overseas office shall -
(a) be accompanied by an Allocation Advice that specifies 
that moneys are available for payment of those first- 
mentioned moneys or by a statement referring to the 
Allocation Advice that specifies that moneys are so 
available;
(b) show the head of expenditure to be charged;
(c) contain a direction as to the Authorizing Officer
to whom the paid account or copy of the paid account 
covering the transaction is to be forwarded;
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(d) be signed by the Chief Officer or an Officer 
authorized for the purpose by him;
(e) be addressed to the Chief Accounting Officer for 
the overseas office to which the request is made; 
and
(f) be sent to that office in duplicate.
(2) A request by a Department in Australia or by 
an overseas office for the obtaining of supplies shall -
(a) be accompanied by an Allocation Advice that 
specifies that moneys are available for the 
purchase of those supplies or by a statement 
referring to the Allocation Advice that specifies 
that moneys are so available;
(b) shows the head of expenditure to be charged;
(c) contain a direction as to the Authorizing Officer 
to whom the paid account or copy of the paid 
account covering the transaction is to be forwarded;
(d) be signed by the Minister or an officer authorized 
for the purpose by him;
(e) be addressed to the Chief Accounting Officer for 
the overseas office to which the request is made; 
and
(f) be sent to that office in duplicate.
Tenders to be invited for 
Certain Supplies
12 (1) Subject to the next succeeding sub-clause,
contracts shall not be entered into, and orders shall not 
be placed, for supplies outside Australia the estimated cost 
of which exceeds $5,000 in Australian currency at the current 
rate of exchange unless competitive tenders have first been 
invited for those supplies.
(2) The last preceding sub-clause does not apply
to -
(a) supplies the expenditure on which is authorized 
by the Governor-General;
(b) supplies that are to be obtained only from or 
through the Government of an overseas country; or
(c) particular supplies approved, or to be obtained, 
by a Tender Board established for the purposes of 
an overseas office, being supplies in relation to
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which the Secretary to the Department of Finance, 
or an officer authorized by him in writing for the 
purpose, certifies that the inviting of tenders 
is impracticable or inexpedient.
Purchase Orders
13. When a request is received by an overseas office 
for the obtaining of supplies, the Chief Accounting Officer 
for that office or an officer authorized for the purpose by 
him may issue a Purchase Order in accordance with Form 13 in 
respect of the supplies.
* * * * * *
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Books
Amos, M.S. and 
Walton, F.P.
Badaoui, M.




Brown, L.N. and 
Garner, J.F.













Introduction to French Law (Oxford 
3rd ed. 1967)
Le fait du prince (Paris 1954)
Australian Defence Procurement 
(Canberra 1970)
Community Law in the French Courts 
(The Hague 1973)
Building Contracts (Butterworths 
1974)
French Administrative Law ( London, 
Butterworths 2nd ed. 1973)
The Law of Contract (Butterworths 
7th ed. 1969)
Exception Clauses (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 1964)
Contracts (2nd ed. 1963)
Administrative Law Treatise (U.S.
1958 with 1970 and 1976 Supplements)
Droit Administratif (Paris 1968)
Research and Development in Australian 
Industry (Sydney University Extension 
Board Symposium 1967)
Traitd de Droit Constitutionnel 
(2nd ed. 1928) Vol. Ill
The Conseil d'Etat in Modern France 
(New York 1968)
Law in a Changing Society (London 2nd 
ed. 1972)
Public and Private Enterprise in Mixed 
Economies (London 1974)
The New Industrial State (London 1967)
Laws of England (London, Butterworths 
3rd ed., Australian pilot 1953) Vol. 3
Laws of England (London, Butterworths 
4th ed. 1974) Vol. 8
50 9




















Pannam, C.L. and 
Hocker, P.J.
Nash, R.C. and 
Cibinic, J.
Nieburg, H.L.
Planning, Politics and Public Policy - 
The British, French and Italian 
Experience (Cambridge University Press 
1975)
Liability of the Crown in Australia,
New Zealand and the United Kingdom 
(Law Book Co. 1971)
Australian Federal Constitutional Law 
(Law Book Co. 2nd ed. 1972)
Building and Engineering Contracts 
(London, Sweet & Maxwell 10th ed. 1970)
Principles of Administrative Law 
(Tripathi, Bombay 1971)
Principes Gdn^raux du Droit Administratif 
Vol. Ill (Paris 1925-1936)
Theorie G^ndrale des Contrats de 
1 'Administration (Paris 1945) Part I
The Law of Carriage by Inland Transport 
(London, Stevens 4th ed. 1965)
The Law and Practice of Building 
Contracts (London, Sweet & Maxwell 4th 
ed. 1977)
Contracts, Cases and Materials (Boston,
2nd ed. 1970)
Traits Theorigue et Pratigue des Contrats 
Administratifs (Paris 1956)
The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 
(Boston 1970)
Non-Tariff Distortions of Australian 
Trade (Canberra 1973)
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia Annotated (2nd ed. 1977)
Australia's Defence (2nd ed. 1969)
The Contracts of Public Authorities 
(London 1954)
Cases and Materials on Contract 
(Law Book Co. 3rd ed. 1975)
Federal Procurement Law (Washington 
2nd ed. 1969)





















Starke, J.G. and 
Higgins, P.F.P
Street, H.
Cours de Contentieux Administratif 
(1965-66)
Principles of Pleading and Practice 
(London 21st ed. 1975) Chapter 14
United States Government Contracts and 
Subcontracts (American Law Institute 
1964)
Thdorie Gdndrale du Contrat Administratif 
(Paris 1945)
and Cases and Materials on Contracts 
[Including Government Contracts]
(Eastern, Delhi 1974) """
The Standardization of Commercial 
Contracts in English and Continental Law 
(London, Sweet & Maxwell 1937)
Science and Government (New York University 
Press 1954)
Caractdristiques du Contrat Administratif 
par nature, Sirey 1961
Public Administration in France 
(London 2nd ed. 1970)
Le Rdgime Democratique et le Droit Civil 
Moderne (Paris 2nd ed. 1948)
Law of Contract: Text and Materials 
(Law Book Co. 1974)
Precis de droit administratif 
(10th ed. 1951)
De la Declaration de Volontd (1901)
Federation under Strain: Australia 1972- 
1975 (Melbourne University Press 1977)
The Industry Act 1975 (London 1976)
Modern Capitalism (London 1965)
Secrecy, Political Censorship in Australia 
(Sydney, Angus & Robertson 1972)
Cheshire & Fifoot's Law of Contract 
(Butterworths, 2nd Australian ed. 1969)
Government Liability: A Comparative Study 
(Cambridge 1953)
The Law of Sale of Goods in Australia andSutton, K.C.T.





















Law of Contract (Sweet & Maxwell 1975)
Government Contracts (Penguin 1972)
The London Transcript - A Comparative 
Look at Public Contracting in the 
United States and the United Kingdom 
(American Bar Association 1973)
Droit Administratif (Paris 3rd ed. 1954)
Droit Administratif (Paris 9th ed. 1963)
Federal Government Contracts, Cases and 
Materia Is (New York 1975)
A Treatise on the Law of Contracts 
(N.Y. 1957, 3rd ed. by W.H.E. Jaeger)
Commentaries on the Australian Constitution 
A Tribute to Geoffrey Sawer (Butterworths 
1977)
"Unconscionable Contracts under the 
Uniform Commercial Code" (1965) 4 Am. 
Business L. Rev. 127
"The Scope of Contract" (1967-68) 41 
A.L.J. 274
"The Audit Responsibility in Settlement 
of Contract Claims" (1974) 6 Public 
Contract L. J. 147
"In the Guise of Research" (1974) 6 
Public Contract L.J. 201
"Unconscionable Contracts - A Comparative 
Study" (Unpublished manuscript contributed 
to the Canberra Law Workshop II (28-29 
October 1977) 1-50.
"The 'Contract of Adhesion' Doctrine in 
Franco-Belgian Law" [1956] ABA Sect. Int'l 
& Comp. L. Proc. 119
"The Government and Industrial Know-How" 
(1955) 41 A.B.A J. 1024
"General Accounting Office in the Regul­
ation of Industry" (1965) 21 Business 
Lawyer 235
512
Beauregard, H.G. "Termination for Convenience as Breach 
of a Government Contract" (1965) 7 
B.C. Ind. & Comm. L.R. 259
Bergsten, E.E. "The Administration of Economic and 
Social Programs in France by the Use 
of the Contractual Technique" (1975) 
48 South Calif. L. Rev. 852
Bledsoe, E.P. and 
Ravitz, H.I.
"The Evolution of Research and Develop­
ment as a Procurement Function of the 
Federal Government" (1957) 17 Fed. B.J. 
189
Bolgar, V. "The Contract of Adhesion - A Comparison 
of Theory and Practice" (1972) 20 Am. J. 
of Comp. L. 53
Braemer, R.J. "Recent Developments in Government 
Contract Law" (1967) 22 Bus. Law. 1057
Braucher, R. "The Unconscionable Contract or Term" 
(1970) 31 Univ. of Ptt. L. Rev. 337
Braude, H.M. and 
Lane, J.
"Modern Insights on Validity and Force 
and Effect of Procurement Regulations - 
a New Slant on Standing and the Christian 
Doctrine" (1972) 31 Fed. B.J. 99
Bright, C.H. "Contracts of Adhesion and Exemption 
Clauses" (1967) 41 A.L.J. 261
Brous, T.R. "Termination for Convenience: a Remedy 
for the Erroneous Award" (1972) 5 Public 
Contract L. J. 221
Burt, D. "Contracts that Save Money" (Aug/Sept 
1976) Australian Purchasing 5
Campbell, E. "Private Claims on Public Funds" (1969)
3 Univ. of Tas. L. Rev. 138
"Commonwealth Contracts" (1970) 44 A.L.J.
14
"Federal Contract Law" (1970) 44 A.L.J.
580
"Agreements about the Exercise of Statutory 
Powers" (1971) 45 A.L.J. 338
"Australian Government Contracts" Research 
Paper No. 47, Royal Commission on Austral­











Crowell, E.H. and 
Johnson, W.S.








"Judicial Review of Legislation:
European Antecedents and Adaptations" 
(1966) 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1207
"Contract by Regulation" (1963) 32 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. Ill
"Unequal Bargaining Power in the Law 
of Contract" (1975) 49 A.L.J. 229
"Property and Sovereignty" (1927) 13 
Cornell L.Q. 8
"Small Business and Research and Develop­
ment" (1957) 17 Fed. B.J. 285
"The Rise and Fall of Fundamental Breach" 
(1966-67) 40 A.L.J. 336
"The Effect of Options on Consideration" 
34 Yale L.J. 571
"A Primer on the Standard Form Changes 
Clause" (1963) 8 William & Mary L. Rev. 
550
"Negotiated Contracts: Two-Step Procure­
ment, Cost and Pricing Data Requirements 
and Protests to the Comptroller General" 
(1963) 5 B.C. Ind. & Comm. L.Rev. 43
"Impossibility of Performance: Assumption 
of Risk or Act of Submission?" (1964)
29 Law and Contemp. Prob. 531
"From Improvisation to Policy" (1963)
31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 732
"Unconscionable Coercion - the German 
Version" (1976) 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1041
"Contracts of Adhesion in Light of the 
Bargain Hypothesis: An Introduction" 
(1972) 5 Akron L. Rev. 1
"Unconscionability and the Uniform 
Commercial Code" (1967-68) 22 Univ. of 
Miami L. Rev. 121
"The Way of an Iconclast" [1959-60]
The Journal of the Society of Public 
Teachers of Law 77
"Purchasing of Goods and Services in 
Australian Government Departments and 
Agencies" Research Paper No. 46, Royal 
Commission on Australian Government 
Administration
514
Dewey, a .E. "Freedom of Contract: Is it Still 
Relevant?" (1970) 31 Ohio State L.J. 
724
Diamond, A.L. "The Israel Standard Contracts Law" 
(1965) 14 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 1410
Doke, M.J. "Contract Formation, Remedies, and 
Special Problems" (1968-69) 2 Public 
Contract L.J. 12
Donnelly, J.R. "The Milkman Rings Twice: Has Paul v. 
United States given Federal Procurement 
Regulations the Force of Statutory Law?" 
(1964) 29 Law & Contemp. Prob. 347
Drago, R- "Some Recent Reforms of the French 
Conseil d'Etat" (1964) 13 Int'l & Comp. 
L.Q. 1282
Drake-Brockman "How the R.A A.F. Aids Industry" (Feb. 
1972) 19 (IQ Australian Purchasing 22
Duncan, C.H. "Equitable Adjustment under Fixed-Price 
Contracts" (1962) 22 Fed. B.J. 307
Duncan, N.K. "Adhesion Contracts: A Twentieth Century 
Problem for a Nineteenth Century Code" 
(1974) 34 Louisiana L. Rev. 1081
Dygert, G.H. "Implied Warranties in Government 
Contracts" (1971) 53 Military L. Rev. 39
Egan, B. "Standard Contracts" [1968] J. of Bus. L 
204
Ehrenzweig, A.A. "Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of 
Laws" (1953) 53 Colum. L. Rev. 1072
Ellinghaus, M.P. "In Defence of Unconscionability" (1969)
78 Yale L.J. 757
Enderby, K. "Purchasing as a Function of Government" 
(June 1974) Australian Purchasing 11
Eörsi, G. "The Validity of Clauses Excluding or 
Limiting Liability" (1975) 23 Am. J. of 
Comp. L. 215
Flint, R.N. "Independent Research and Development 
Expenditure: A Study of the Government 
Contract as an Instrument of Public 
Policy" (1964) 29 Law and Contemp. Prob. 
611
Forman, H.I. "Proprietary Rights in Research and 
Development Contracting - a Case Study" 
(1957) 17 Fed. B.J. 298
515
E’rccborn, M.D. "Government Contractors Today" (1971) 
4 Indiana Legal Forum 489
Frenzen, D. "The Administrative Contract in the 
United States" (1968-69) 37 Geo. Wash. 
L. Rev. 270
Frost, A.C.H. "Plant Contracts - the Case for Rational­
isation" (Aug/Sept 1974) 2 4 ; (Oct/Nov 1974) 
25; (Dec 1974/Jan 1975)24 Australian 
Purchasing, Parts I, II and III respectively
Gantt, P.H. and 
Burg, R.C.
"The Doctrine of Substantial Compliance 
in Federal Government Contracts" (1969) 
2 Public Contract L.J. 313
Gantt, P.H. and 
Panzer, R.M.
"The Government Blacklist: Debarment and 
Suspension of Bidders on Government Con­
tracts" (1956-57) 25 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
175
Garland, V. "The Department of Supply as a Purchasing 
Authority" (September 1972) 20 (5) 
Australian Purchasing 21
Gaskins, J.W. "Practical Aspects of the Changed Condit­
ions Clause under Government Construction 
Contracts" (1963) 5 B.C. Ind. and Comm.
L. Rev. 79
Geiger, R. "The Unilateral Change of Economic Develop­
ment Agreements" (1974) 23 Int'l & Comp. 
L.Q. 73
Gilmour, L. "Government Purchasing Arrangements"
(May 1977) (Unpublished Manuscript, 
Purchasing Division, Department of Admin­
istrative Services, Canberra)
Glassman, L. "The Patent Indemnity Clause in Government 
Contracts" (1956-57) 25 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
256
Glöckler, G. "The Contractual Versus the Grant Approach 
to Basic Research Activities" (1957) 17 
Fed. B.J. 265
Gorla, G. "Standard Conditions and Form Contracts in 
Italian Law" (1962) 11 Am. J. of Comp. L.
1
Gower, L.C.B. Note, "Exemption Clauses - Contractual and 
Tortious Liability" (1954) 17 Modern L. 
Rev. 155
Greenberg, M.E. "Problems Relating to Changes and Changed 
Conditions on Public Contracts" (1970) 3 
Public Contract L. J. 135
516
Grossbaum, J.J. "Federal Support of Research Projects 
through Contracts and Grants: A Rationale" 
(1970) 19 Amer. Univ. L. Rev. 423
"Procedural Fairness in Public Contracts: 
the Procurement Regulations" (1971) 57 Va. 
L. Rev. 171
Grossberg, M.E. "The Competitive Bidding Requirement" 
(1965) 44 Texas L. Rev. 82
Grunfeld, C. "Passenger Charges Schemes 1952-3 and the 
Voice of the Consumer" ( 1954) 17 Modern 
L. Rev. 119
"Reform in the Law of Contract" (1961)
24 Modern L. Rev. 62
Gusman, R.C. "A Critique of Subcontract Dispute 
Procedure under Defense Contracts" (1964) 
19 Business Lawyer 1023
"Article 2 of the U.C.C. and Government 
Procurement: Selected Areas of Discussion" 
(1968) 9 B.C. Ind. & Comm. L. Rev. 1
"A Critical Study of the 'Truth in 
Negotiation' Law" (1969) 54 Cornell L.
Rev. 708
"Constructive Change: A Theory Labelled 
Wrongly" (1974) 6 Public Contract L.J.
229
Hadden, T. "Industry Act 1975" (1976) 39 Modern L.
Rev. 318
Hale, R.L. "Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty" 
(1943) 43 Colum. L.R. 603
Hamson, C.J. "Le Conseil d'Etat statuant au Contentie" 
(1952) 68 L.Q.R. 60
Hannah, P.F. "Government by Procurement" (1963) 18 
Bus. Law. 997
Heyman, V.K. "Government by Contract: Boon or Boner?" 
(1961) 21 Public Admin. Rev. 59
Hiestand, O.S. "A New Era in Government Construction 
Contracts" (1968) 28 Fed. B.J. 165
Hogg, P.W. "The Doctrine of Executive Necessity in 
the Law of Contract" (1970) 44 A.L.J. 154
"Suits against the Commonwealth and the 
States in the Federal Jurisdiction" (1970) 
44 A.L.J. 425
517
Honey, J.C. "Federal Government Organization and 
Program for Research and Development 
- An Overview" (1957) 17 Fed. B.J. 216
Isaacs, N. "The Standardizing of Contracts" (1917) 
27 Yale L. J. 34
Jacobson "The Standard Contracts Law of Israel" 
[1968] Journal of Business Law 325
James, E.P. "Termination for Default and for 
Convenience of the Government" (1963) 
5 B.C. Ind. and Comm. L. Rev. 65
Johnson, J.A. "The Expanding Role of Contract in the 
Administration of Research and Development 
Programs" (1962-63) 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
747
Jorgensen, S. "Contract as Form" (1966) 10 Scandinavian 
Studies in Law 99
Kahn, L. "The Lawyer and the Scientific Community 
- Procuring Basic Research" (1964) 29 Law 
& Contemp. Prob. 631
Keeffe "The Christian Government Contracts" 
(1963) 49 A.B.A.J. 1225
Kelly, E.J. "Government Contractors' Remedies: the 
Silent Partners" (1965) 18 Adm. L. Rev. 
145
Kelly, M.S. "Independent Research and Development: 
The First Twenty Five Years" (1974) 7
Public Contract L.J. 81
Kessler, F. "Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts 
about Freedom of Contract" (1943) 43 Colum. 
L. Rev. 629
Lando, 0. "Standard Contracts - A Proposal and a 
Perspective" (1966) 10 Scandinavian Studies 
in Law 129
Lane, J. "Administrative Resolution of Government 
Breaches: the Case for an All-Breach 
Clause" (1968) 28 Fed. B.J. 199
Lane, P.H. Note (1967) 41 A.L.J. 210
Langrod, C. 
Laubadere, A. de
"Administrative Contracts" (1955) 4 Am. 
J. of Comp. L. 325
"L1Evolution rdeente du rdgime juridique 
des marches de l'Etat" [1959] Actuality 










"Uncle Sam's Right to Damages for Delay 
in the Wonderland of Government Contracts"
(1969) 10 Santa Clara Lawyer 2
"Why Research and Development Contracts 
are Distinctive" (1957) 17 Fed. B.J. 255
"The Shadow and Substance of Intellectual 
Property in Department of Defense Research 
and Development Contracts" (1954) 14 Fed. 
B.J. 296
"Unconscionability and the Code - The 
Emperor's New Clause" (1967) 115 Univ. 
of Pa. L. Rev. 485
"Unconscionability and the Crown - 
Consumers and the Common Law Tradition"
(1970) 31 Univ. of Ptt. L. Rev. 349
"Contract as Thing" (1970) 19 American 
Univ. L. Rev. 131
"Contracts d'Ahbsion in German and Austrian 
Law" [1956] ABA Sect. Int'l & Comp. L.
Proc. 121
"Contracts of Adhesion and the Freedom 
of Contract: A Comparative Study in the 
Light of American and Foreign Law" (1961- 
62) 36 Tulane L. Rev. 481
"The Effect of Legal Institutions upon 
Economics" (1925) 15 Am. Econ. Rev. 665
"What Price Contract? - An Essay in 
Perspective" (1931) 40 Yale L. J. 704
Book Review of Prausnitz, The Standardiz­
ation of Commercial Contracts in English 
and Continental Law (1939) 52 Harv. L.
Rev. 700
"The Intention to Create Legal Relations" 
(1970) Vol. 3 (4) Adelaide L. Rev. 419
Book Review of Loeber, Der Hoheitlich 
gestaltete Vertrag. Eine rechtsvergleichenc 
Untersuchung über den Planvertrag im 
Sowjetrecht und den 'diktierten Vertrag' 
im Recht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(Beiträge zum ausländischen und inter­
nationalen Privatrecht, Band 35) (Berlin 
1969) (1970) 3 Modern Law and Society
(Section II) 157-9
519
Lumb, R .D . "Contractual Relations between Government 
and Citizen" (1962) 35 A.L.J. 45
Lynch, C.A. and 
Reading, E.C.
"Formal and Doctrinal Differences between 
Government and Commercial Contracts" (1964) 
1 San Diego L. Rev- 88
Lyons, D.G. "Government Indemnification against Un­
usually Hazardous Risks for Military R & 
D Contracts" (1957) 17 Fed. B.J. 314
Macaulay "Non Contractual Relations in Business:
A Preliminary Study" (1963) 28 Am. Soc. 
Rev. 55
"Private Legislation and the Duty to Read" 
(1966) 19 Vand. L. Rev. 1051
Matera, F.V. "Public Contracts" (1962) 47 Mass. L.Q. 
379
Mellinkoff, D. "How to Make Contracts Illegible" (1953) 
5 Standord L. Rev. 418
Mewett, A.W. "The Theory of Government Contracts" 
(1959) 5 McGill L. J. 222
Meyer "Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine 
of Fundamental Breach" (1964) 50 Va. L. 
Rev- 1178
Miller, A.S. "Government Contracts and Social Control:
A Preliminary Inquiry" (1955) 41 Va. L. 
Rev. 27
"Administration by Contract: A New Concern 
for the Administrative Lawyer" (1961) 36 
N.Y. Univ. L. Rev. 957
"Introduction: The Rise of an 'External 
Bureaucracy'" (1962-63) 31 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 685
Murray, J.E. "Unconscionability: Unconscionability" 
(1970) 31 Univ. of Ptt. L. Rev. 1
McGlynn, F.R. "Small Value Orders" (October 1972) 
Australian Purchasing
Mclntire, J.A. "Authority of Government Contracting 
Officers: Estoppel and Apparent Authority" 
(1957) 25 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 162
Nash, R.C. and 
Cibinic, J.
"'Changes Clause' in Federal Construction 
Contracts" (1967) 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
908
Nicholas, B. "Loi, Reglement and Judicial Review of the 
Fifth Republic" [1970] Public Law 251
520
O'Neill, B.E. "The Purchasing System" (1965) 44 Texas 
L. Rev. 58
Pasley, R.S. "Formation of Government Contracts - 
Application of Common Law Principles - 
A Reply" (1955) 40 Cornell L.Q. 518
"The Interpretation of Government Contracts 
A Plea for Better Understanding" (1956) 25 
Fordham L. Rev. 211
"The Nondiscrimination Clause in Govern­
ment Contracts" (1957) 43 Va. L. Rev. 837
"Research and Development Contractual 
Instruments" (1957) 17 Fed. B.J. 329
"Organizational Conflicts of Interest 
in Government Contracts" [1967] Wis.
L.Rev. 5
Pasley, R.S. and 
TeSelle, J.
"Patent Rights and Technical Information 
in the Military Assistance Program"
(1964) 29 Law & Contemp. Prob. 566
Patten, T.L. "Government Contracts - Are they Enforce­
able if not in Writing?" (1975) 7 Public 
Contract L. J. 232
Patterson, E.W. "The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy" 
(1919) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 198
"Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Ball" 
(1943) 43 Colum. L. Rev. 731
"The Interpretation and Construction of 
Contracts" (1964) 64 Colum. L. Rev. 833
Patton, R.J. "The Material and Workmanship Clause in 
Standard Government Construction Contracts" 
(1967) 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 998
Pettit, W.F. and 
Gleason, G.K.
"Liquidated Damages in Government 
Contracts" (1971) 25 Southwestern L. J. 
264
Phillips, P.D. "Choice of Law in Federal Jurisdiction" 
(1961) 3 M.U.L.R. 170 (Part I), 348 
(Part II)
Pole, W.T. "Standards in Purchasing by Government" 
(1972) 19 (10) Australian Purchasing 32
Pound, R. "Liberty of Contract" (1909) 18 Yale L.J.
454
Prince, K. "Sandia Corporation: A Science-Industry- 
Government Approach to Management of a 
Special Project" (1957) 17 Fed. B.J. 432
521
Puri, K.K. "Standard Terms in Government Purchasing 
in Australia, United States, United 
Kingdom and India" (Jan/Feb 1978) 25(6)
Australian Purchasing and Supply 12
Ramaseshan, V. "Adhesion Contracts and the Indian Law 
of Contract" (1975) 17 Journal of Indian 
Law Institute 237
"Fundamental Obligation and the Indian 
Law of Contract" (1968) 10 Journal of 
Indian Law Institute 331
Ramey, J.T. and 
Erlewine, J.A.
"Introduction to the Concept of 
'Administrative Contract' in Government 
Sponsored Research and Development" (1957) 
17 Fed. B.J. 354
Rendel, M.
"Mistakes and Bailouts of Suppliers under 
Government Contracts and Sub-contracts - 
A Study of Doctrine, Practice and Adhesion" 
(1953-54) 39 Cornell L.Q. 645
"How the Conseil d'Etat Supervises Local 
Authorities" [1966] Public Law 213
Reynolds, F.M.B. "Warranty, Condition and Fundamental 
Term" (1963) 79 L.Q. Rev. 534
Rice, D.A. "Judicial Review for Disappointed Bidders 
oh Federal Government Contracts" (1972)
26 Southwestern L.J. 389
Richardson "Methods of Supporting Basic Research" 
(1957) 17 Fed. B.J. 281
Rishe, M. "The Recognition of Delay, Disruption 
and Acceleration in Changed Work" (1973) 
6 Public Contract L. J. 152
Sales, H.B. "Standard Form Contracts" (1953) 16 Modern
L. Rev. 318
Samek, R. A. "The Objective Theory of Contract and the 
Rule in L'Estrange v. Graucob" (1974)
50 Can. Bar. Rev. 351
Sawer, G. "State Statutes and the Commonwealth" 
(1961) 1 Univ. of Tas. L. Rev. 580
Schmitthoff, C.M. "The Unification or Harmonisation of Law 
by Means of Standard Contracts and General 
Conditions" (1968) 17 Int'l & Comp, L.Q. 
551
Shepherd, H. "Contracts in a Prosperity Year" (1954) 











"Unconscionability - The Code, the 
Court and the Consumer" (1968) 9 B.C.
Ind. & Comm- L. Rev. 367
"Research and Development in Britain's 
Mining Industry" (24 October 1975) Vol.
21 (4) Trade and Industry 218-21
"The Meaning of Standard Form Contracts"
(1967) 7-8 Rhodesian L. J. 158
"The Economics of Standard Contracts"
(1968) 8 Rhodesian L. J. 89
"Standard Form Contracts and Democratic 
Control of Lawmaking Power" (1971) 84 
Harv. L. Rev. 529
"Overhead Rate Determination - the Use 
of Negotiated Rates" (1973) 6 Public 
Contract L.J. 128
"Dollar Purchasing Power" (March 1972)
19 (11) Australian Purchasing 14
"Delays - Damages on Government Contracts: 
Constructive Conditions and Administrative 
Remedies" (1957-58) 26 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
505
"Enforcement of Non Discrimination 
Requirements for Government Contract 
Work" (1963) 63 Colum. L. Rev. 243
"Assuring Government Contract Performance" 
(1966) 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 666
"Is it 'Bianchi's ghost1 or 'Much Ado 
About Nothing'?" (1964) 16 Adm. Law. Rev. 
265
"Financial Inability and the Default 
Termination of Defense Supply Contracts:
A Small Business Case Study" (1960) 44 
Minnesota L. Rev. 1055
"Implied Duties of Co-operation and the 
Defense of Sovereign Acts in Government 
Contracts" (1963) 51 Geo. L. J. 576
"Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer 
Protection" (1970) 31 Univ. of Ptt. L.
Rev. 359
"Judicial and Administrative Review of 
Government Contracts Awards" (1972) 37 
Law and Contemp. Prob. 63
523
Spongle "Analyzing Unconscionability Problems" 
(1969) 117 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 931
Stelzenmuller, C.V. "Formation of Government Contracts -
Application of Common Law Principles" 
(1955) 40 Cornell L.Q. 238
Stone, E.J. "Contract by Regulation" (1964) 29 Law 
& Contemp. Prob. 32
Treitel, G.H. "Mutuality in Contract" (1961) 77 L.Q.R. 
83
Turpin, C. "Government Contracts: A Study of Methods 
of Contracting" (1968) 31 Modern L. Rev. 
241
Van Cleve "The Use of Federal Procurement to 
Achieve National Goals" [1961] Wis. L. 
Rev. 566
Vom Baur, F.T. "Differences Between Commercial Contracts 
and Government Contracts" (1968-1969)
2 Public Contract L.J. 12
"Fifty Years of Government Contract Law" 
(1969) 29 Fed. B.J. 305
Von Hippe1, E. "The Control of Exemption Clauses - A 
Comparative Study" (1967) 16 Int'l &
Comp. L.Q. 591
Waddams, S.M. "Unconscionability in Contracts" (1976) 
39 Modern L. Rev. 369
Waline, M. "L1Evolution des rapports de l'Etat avec 
ses co-contractants" [1951] Revue du 
Droit Public et de la Science Politique 5
Wedderburn, K.W. "Contract-Exception Clause - Fundamental 
Breach - Agents" [1960] Camb. L.J. 11, 
[1962] Camb. L.J. 17
Weekes "Australian Government Policy on Tariffs" 
(Dec/Jan 1972-1973) 20 (8/9) Australian 
Purchasing 16
Weil, P. "The Strength and Weakness of French 
Administrative Law" [1965] Camb. L.J. 
242
Whale, A.R. "Government Rights to Technical Information 
Received under Contract" (1957) 25 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 289
Whelan, J.W. "A Government Contractor's Remedies: 




Whelan, J.W. and 
Dunigan, T.L.






"Contracting-Out - A Trialoguc" (.1963)
31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 698
"Public Contracts of the United Kingdom 
Government: A Comparative Survey and 
Introduction" (1964) 32 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
82
"Government Contracts: Apparent Authority 
and Estoppel" (1967) 55 Geo. L.J. 830
"Government Contracts: Emphasis on 
Government" (1964) 29 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 315
"Freedom of Contract and Adhesion 
Contracts" (1965) 14 Int'1 & Comp. L.Q.
172
"Administrative Resolution of Government 
Breaches - a Solution without a Problem" 
(1968) 28 Fed. B.J. 234
"Opposition of the Law to Business 
Usages" (1926) 26 ’Colum. L. Rev. 917
(in Bright, C.H. "Contracts of Adhesion 
and Exemption Clauses" (1967)) 41 A.L.J. 
261, 272
3. Miscellaneous
Compilation of the General Financial Rules (2nd ed. October 
1968) (Ministry of Finance, Government of India)
Contracting-out Government Responsibility for Administrative 
and Management Services, Hearings before a Sub-Committee on 
Manpower Utilization of the House Committee on Post Office and 
Civil Service, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (U.S.)
Contracting-out Procedures, Hearings before a Sub-Committee for 
Special Investigations of the House Committee on Armed 
Services, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) (U.S.)
Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 17, Brooklyn N.Y. (1949)
Notes on Australian Industry Participation in Overseas Defence 
Procurement (Canberra, December 1972)
Press Release, "Australian-Made Goods" (Canberra, 26 October 
1977) Issued by the Minister for Industry and Commerce
Project SCORE, Research and Development in Australia 1968-69, 
(Canberra 1974) Department of Science. P.P. No. 271 of 1973
525
Industries Assistance Commission Report, Aerospace Industry,
P.P. No. 34 of 1976 (Australia)
Government Contracting for Research and Development: Report to
the President (Bell Report) (30 April 1962) Senate Document 
No. 94, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962 (U. S.)
Government Procurement Policy Report by Committee of Inquiry
(1974) (Scott Committee Report) P.P. No. 124 of 1975 (Australia)
Report of the Commission on Government Procurement (Sowie Report) 
(U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, December 1972)
Report of the Committee on the Management and Control of Research 
and Development (Zuckerman Report) (HMSO 1961)
Report of the Defence Legal Services Committee of Review 
(Professor Whitmore Committee) (Canberra, November 1971)
Report of the Steering Group on Development Cost Estimating 
(Downey Report) (IIMSO 1969)
Report on Harsh and Unconscionable Contracts (Professor Peden's 
Report) (Submitted to the Minister of Consumer Affairs of New 
South Wales in October 1976)
Report on Remedies in Administrative Law(March 1976) Cmnd. 6407 
(U.K. )
The Organisation and Management of Government R & D (Lord 
Rothschild Report) (November 1971) Cmnd. 4814 (U.K.)
Research and Development Contracting (Conference Papers on R & D 
Contracts, published by the George Washington University and 
Federal Publications, Inc. 1963)
Restatement of the Law (Second) of Contracts (Tentative Draft 
No. 1, 13 April 1964, American Law Institute, Philadelphia)
Studies in Official Statistics No. 21, R &D Expenditure (HMSO 1973
Symposium: "Administration by Contract: An Examination of
Government Contracting-out" (1963) 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 685-783
Symposium: "Defence Policy and Procurement"(23April 1971) (Held
in Canberra under the joint auspices of the Australian National 
University and the University of Sydney)
White Paper, An Approach to Industrial Strategy (Novermber 1975) 
Cmnd. 6315 (U.K.)
White Paper, Defence Research and Development (December 1969) 
Cmnd. 4236 (U.K.)
White Paper, Government Organisation for Defence Procurement and 
Civil Aerospace (1971) Cmnd. 4641 (U.K.)
White Paper, Science and Technology in the Service of Society - 
The Framework for Australian Government Planning, Department 
of Science, Canberra 1975
